At What Cost Sovereignty?  
Canada-US Military Interoperability in the War on Terror

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This book flowed directly from my doctoral thesis which I defended in 2012. The origins of the research, and thus this book, go back much further. In fact, my 36 years in the Navy probably had the greatest role in guiding this book.

This is largely because Canada’s Navy is an allied navy – its design, its training and, most significantly, its operations have all focused on working alongside the navies of Canada’s allies. Our Navy, more than others, also fully embraced all the technological measures that would allow it to communicate rapidly with those allies. We were quite good at this, and during the ‘war on terror,’ I and other Canadian officers were the ones usually in charge of large parts of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. I personally ended up in control of 20 ships from the many allied navies supporting the war on terror. Other Canadian commanders did the same.

The interoperability that allowed us to command others actually went far beyond technology. A blue-water culture had developed that tied Canadian sailors’ thinking to those of others. Most of the time this led to a focus on the American Navy because it was the largest, operated worldwide and was the most technologically sophisticated. Its officers were also consistently ready to assist us in advancing cooperative goals.

As Canadians we knew a too close relationship with the US Navy could present problems for us and our government. After all, part of Canada’s identity involves not being seen as Americans. Certainly, our ship captains knew that operating thousands of miles from Canada required that we ‘call home’ when there was the slightest hint of a Canadian sovereignty challenge. I also had a long period as the NATO policy advisor to three Liberal Defence Ministers and thought I had a pretty clear practical understanding on the political limits of allied cooperation.

As a result of that background and my immediate experience as the Commander of the Strait of Hormuz sector in 2002, I was a strong supporter of close interoperability with the United States. I also thought our government and Canadians generally were behind both our recent operations and our interoperability goals. The huge outpouring of Canadian political and popular support for the United States following 9/11 was obvious.

That unconditional support progressively came into question for a wide variety of reasons. The US attack on Iraq in 2003, Guantánamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and Canada’s increasingly costly commitment in Afghanistan were undoubtedly factors, and this was hardly surprising. What I did find surprising was the attending critique of our military interoperability policy. Some argued that our close military ties with the United States had dictated Canada’s response to 9/11. Others claimed our close association with the US military had resulted in Canada being rejected by its European allies. Some suggested our entry into Kandahar was guided by Canadian military officials all too ready to appease the United States after Canada chose not to join the 2003 Iraq War. The broad claim was that these close interoperability ties had resulted in an erosion of Canadian foreign policy independence and reduced Canadian sovereignty.

Determining the extent to which Canada had lost sovereignty as a result of interoperability then became the focus of my doctoral research. Happily, Dalhousie University had unmatched expertise in Canadian-US security relations in Dan Middlemiss, Frank Harvey and Brian Bow who guided me. Later Joel Sokolsky and Ruben Zaiotti joined my team. I was then significantly assisted by the release of a series of books by Canadian politicians and their close advisors that described in great detail their decision processes during the war on terror.

These works and a large number of Canadian media reports helped outline my initial research. I also soon found I could corroborate their claims, or not, with other sources. I was also able to interview 18 high-level government officials who were engaged in these decisions. I did this when their memories were fresh and they, in turn, proved very forthcoming, perhaps because the political accounts had been equally forthcoming. Moreover, 99 per cent of the time those officials agreed to be named whenever I quoted them. Their candour and
insights were key to establishing the facts. After two years of effort I had also been able to review several hundred government documents via the Access to Information program. Most of these once-classified documents were used to verify the claims of the interviewees and the political accounts. Wikileaks then provided superb information on what the Americans thought Canadian officials and politicians were telling them. Finally, the staff preparing the Department of National Defence official history of the Afghanistan conflict provided their own interview material and initial findings. Here I must specifically cite Major Jim McKillip of the Directorate of History and Heritage for his cooperation and most importantly his ability to set me straight when I was going down the wrong track.

I was also significantly assisted by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Security and Defence Forum. Dalhousie’s Centre for Foreign Policy Studies played a central role in getting this book to print, and I could not have had a better editor than Ann Griffiths.

Finally, this would not have happened without the support of my wife. Any errors are my own.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

This book examines whether Canada’s military interoperability with the United States affects Canadian sovereignty. The literature dealing with this subject is highly polarized arguing either that such interoperability significantly reduces Canadian sovereignty or that it is necessary to maintain it. Successive Canadian governments, for example, have supported the military view that high levels of interoperability with allies are needed for operations to proceed safely and effectively and that this poses no cost to Canadian independence. The interoperability critics strongly disagree, arguing that increased interoperability, especially if it is with the United States, will diminish Canada’s international independence, its ability to refuse US military adventures and its domestic sovereignty.

In a limited sense this division in the literature allows one to comprehend the broad contours of the issue. But, in general, the most recent Canadian analyses of the topic have been marked by shifting definitions, a regular failure to develop testable hypotheses, and only limited efforts to examine government documents and to question the officials who actually make Canadian interoperability policy. These shortcomings have led to a reliance on conjecture, with the critics predicting damaging ‘future implications’ as a result of interoperability policies and governments promising outright gains. As a result, the Canadian public that underwrites the financial costs of such multi-billion dollar investments as the new F-35 fighter has little to guide it in assessing the interoperability and sovereignty benefits or costs of the purchase.

There is a need, therefore, to examine Canada’s interoperability history, define the terms, develop hypotheses and then test them against recent issues and events. This would include the Canadian response to 9/11 and the decisions to participate, or not, in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. Six case studies will flow from these events and each will be assessed against the hypotheses that test for sovereignty gains or losses. Having examined the case studies, the results will be totalled and a final broad assessment will be made of the sovereignty costs of Canada’s military interoperability policies and cooperative choices. Ultimately one should also see concrete examples of the costs and benefits of Canada’s interoperability policies and whether mitigating techniques are available to counter the costs. This data could, one hopes, be useful in gauging the sovereignty implications of future interoperability projects.

To outline why the military thinks interoperability is necessary while also hinting at the embedded dangers, this chapter will begin with two brief historical examples. The first sustained multinational interoperability effort occurred as the result of a major wartime defeat. Between 25 February and 1 March 1942 a force of five cruisers and nine destroyers from the British, American, Australian and Dutch Navies joined together under temporary Dutch command. The purpose was to repel a Japanese invasion force of 41 cargo ships escorted by four cruisers and nine destroyers from the British, American, Australian and Dutch Navies joined together under temporary Dutch command. The purpose was to repel a Japanese invasion force of 41 cargo ships escorted by four cruisers and nine destroyers. The two naval forces initially appeared to be well matched, with Japan’s slight numerical advantage offset by the limited freedom of action of the Japanese forces as a result of the need to escort the transport ships. Although the forces were of equal strength, after six days of battle all five Allied cruisers and five of the nine destroyers were sunk with the remaining four American destroyers, almost out of ammunition, forced to escape to Australia. In return, the allies only significantly damaged one Japanese destroyer and could only claim to have sunk one unarmed Japanese cargo ship. The Japanese invasion force was delayed by a single day and conquered Java a week later.

Despite the one-sided results, all reports indicate that the Dutch, British, Australian and American crews fought bravely and the ships were led by competent and determined commanders. So why did the Allied ships suffer such a terrible defeat? While some reports explain part of the defeat on the superior Japanese Long Lance torpedo, only three Allied ships were lost to this weapon. Others credit superior Japanese air power, and indeed the Japanese were
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particularly effective in coordinating aircraft support to their ships.

I will argue here that the level of inter-unit coordination was likely the key factor in explaining the lopsided results. Like Japan, the Allied forces also had aircraft in theatre but their efforts were never integrated with those of the ships. The Japanese forces were receiving continuous and effective support from their aircraft. In this and in almost every other aspect of effective military cooperation and coordination, what one terms ‘interoperability’ today, the Allied forces failed. Prior to the actual battle the Allied fleet units had never exercised together and had only met for a single one-hour conference prior to sailing that night into battle.

They shared no common procedures for even basic fleet manoeuvring let alone for conducting complex ship-air coordination or executing a multi-ship night attack. The Japanese, meanwhile, had long practised these operations. Hermon Gill suggests that the Allied forces were only capable of following each other single file or ‘line ahead’ manoeuvring. Communications were fraught, with the Commanding Officer of one ship reporting that “[t]here were no common flag signals or signal books available, nor were there any tactical plans save of the most rudimentary nature.”

Until an American liaison officer was assigned to the flagship, communications with the Dutch Task Group Commander were described as “farical” by one of the Captains. Even with this liaison officer, communications remained problematic. At the bitter end of this saga, the critically needed American destroyers had to leave the area after they ran out of torpedoes, unable it would seem, to replenish them from the nearby Dutch naval dockyard.

It is also clear that the allies did not share what is now termed a ‘common operational picture’ that sets out for the force where each of its own units are located and where the enemy might be. Indeed the battle of the Java Sea was marked by frequent Allied failures in this area – for example, HMS Jupiter was sunk by a minefield laid by the Dutch. Jupiter knew nothing of the minefield and initially reported she had been attacked by a submarine, and no enemy submarines were in her vicinity. Another Allied ship steamed through the survivors and debris of the Dutch destroyer Kortenaer unaware that she had been sunk. A US destroyer’s after-action report covering the end of the most violent of the battles stated that “[d]arkness set in and we followed the main body, endeavoring to regain station, and having not the slightest idea as to his [the force Commander’s] plans and still only a vague idea of what the enemy was doing.”

Michael Pugh argues that this particular battle played a key role in encouraging the Allied states to reword their coordination procedures and establish common codes amongst the Australian, Canadian, British, American and New Zealand (or USCANUKUSNZ) militaries. More significantly, a permanent Combined Communications Board was created soon after to guide the Allied effort. The need for it was regularly reinforced. A year after the disaster off Java, the Allied ships and land forces of the Sicily invasion force mistook for German bombers a force of over 144 transport aircraft loaded with American paratroopers sent to reinforce them. More than 23 were shot down and 37 were badly damaged. This spurred a separate reform of ship-air coordination methods. By June 1944, Allied procedures had advanced sufficiently to allow the execution of the immensely complex landings in Normandy. At the war’s end the Combined Communications Board had also moved beyond its initial AUSCANUKUSNZ partners and had issued over two million copies of its Allied communications manuals to 12 other cooperating states.

World War II had brought fundamental change to the entire notion of military cooperation. The ad hoc cooperative arrangements of the past were replaced by sustained efforts overseen by permanent organizations. Further, there were few upper limits on what data could be shared, with the Australians, British, Canadians, Americans and occasionally the New Zealanders exchanging the most highly secret code-breaking and communications intelligence material. Finally, the need for coordination continued into peacetime with, for example, the Combined Communications Board still active today. It continues to lead the interoperability effort for the AUSCANUKUSNZ group and is an active partner with the mirror-image NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board.

NATO has also significantly expanded the interoperability function within its unique Standardization Organization. This system involves scores of NATO and national boards, conferences and agencies which seek agreement on
everything from common terminology to the most complex technical standards. The technical effort involves over 20,000 officials and it has produced over 1,300 NATO Standardization Agreements or STANAGs. These agreements bind all NATO allies to minimum interoperability standards. They cover an immense range including standards for the provision of safe drinking water to other states, ammunition interchangeability, air-to-air refuelling, and parallel software development for satellite-based tactical data systems. NATO has thus moved beyond simply enhancing communications into logistical, doctrinal and industrial interoperability.

When I commanded the ships of seven NATO states in the Persian Gulf in 2002 as a part of the international counter-terrorist effort, the Canadian Forces were the direct beneficiary of that process. Electronic communications proceeded rapidly between the ships via voice, teletype, email and web-based formats all of which were automatically enciphered with very high-grade codes. Units could control, land and refuel each other’s helicopters without ever having to examine the potential for differing languages, procedures and fuel standards, or worrying about incompatible landing area deck fittings and hoses interfering with the procedure. As a great many other non-NATO state militaries also voluntarily ascribe to NATO STANAGs and tactical publications, Canadian ships were able to refuel from the Japanese Navy’s tankers and include their ships in the common operational picture. That picture was created by the exchange of each ship’s radar plots which were then combined into a common master picture with an assessment of who was friendly or not via a near-instantaneous encrypted data link. As the ships of this Canadian-led multinational group were included in the same data link net with tens of others in the region, they were able to see ship and aircraft movements in high precision from their position off Oman to the northern areas of Iraq some 700 miles away. An additional benefit that was denied the forces in the Java Sea was that the vast majority of the ship Captains in the group had participated at least once in NATO’s standing naval groups or had been part of one of the alliance’s major exercises. Thus some 60 years of NATO procedural interoperability has engendered a cultural interoperability of unstated but no less strong mutual understanding that guides how one does business during coalition warfare.

Until now only a very positive view of military cooperation and interoperability has been presented. This should not lead readers to believe that there are no problems. There are problems, and these go beyond Sir John Slessor’s joke in the 1950s that “war without allies is bad enough – with allies it is hell!” The Franco-British military staff talks of 1906-1914 provide one of the frequently cited examples of the potential dangers of cooperation.

These talks, frequently conducted in secret at the senior military officer level, are often blamed for leading Britain into the Great War. According to some historians, “by 1914, although there were no treaty obligations, the military staff talks between the British and the French had, without the knowledge of many Cabinet ministers, virtually committed Britain to go to the aid of France in a war with Germany.” One account of the formal agreement, named after the two general officers involved in these talks, says “20 Jul [1911] The Dubail-Wilson Agreement: without authorization, the Anglo-French military conference settles the details of military cooperation – [General] Henry Wilson pledges a 150,000 man BEF, to be ready for action on the thirteenth day of mobilization.”

These brief summaries of historic events introduce many elements of the contemporary critique of military interoperability. One element of the critique is that low-level military cooperation today can lead to unintended strategic commitments downstream. Another element suggests the possibility of military officials pushing the interoperability agenda without the assent of their political superiors. Moreover, the smaller state in such a cooperative team is frequently portrayed as a servant who contributes much but ultimately has little say in how that contribution is employed. The French Generals, for example, considered the British Army leadership inferior and confidently expected British officers would follow French direction. Indeed, they believed that “[w]hile the French devised grand strategy, the British would doggedly hold their positions.”

Finally, the French-British military staff talks of 1906-1914 provide reminders of the extreme difficulty associated with analysing military interoperability decisions. The suggestion that the British military staff made these arrangements with the French without Cabinet or other political authority provides a good example. This supports the popular view that an unchecked
military-led interoperability effort can lead a country to war. However, several detailed analyses indicate that a more complex process was actually at work. Barbara Tuchman, A.J.P. Taylor and, especially, John Charmley make clear that the decision to hold staff talks in 1906 was made by Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and not the military. As the Liberal Party was deeply divided between an “imperialist” faction ready to make preparations for war and a “sternly pacifist” faction committed to non-intervention, Grey and his party leader deliberately chose not to inform the rest of Cabinet of the details of those talks. This deception continued until 1911 when the substance of the talks was presented at a special meeting of the Committee on Imperial Defence. Again, the majority of Cabinet was not informed of the meeting, and Ministers who might oppose such talks were excluded from it. This deception was soon discovered, and Tuchman reports that General Sir Henry Wilson, the military officer who led the staff talks, quickly sensed that he was being cast as the “villain of the proceedings” by those excluded and opposed to military cooperation with France. There is, as a result, the very strong suggestion that General Wilson became the scapegoat for a Liberal Party facing a Cabinet split over the results of the staff talks and the secret manner in which they had developed.

Taylor argues that the French “never acted on the confident assumption that Great Britain would support them in a continental war, whatever the cause.” After the war Marshal Joseph Joffre seemed to confirm this stating that “there was no commitment” from Britain and that the staff talks were “only studies” of embarkation and billeting options.

Thus confusion over the strategic implications of the staff talks was almost guaranteed. Given the deep divisions in the British Liberal Party over any continental intervention, a formal alliance with France that might spell out the details was never an option. The alternative that was chosen – informal low-level technical staff talks – appeared ideal. This option supported France and potentially deterred Germany without requiring wider and, therefore, riskier Cabinet or parliamentary review. Moreover, the political leadership then ceased to provide any regular annual review of what their military and naval staffs were up to after initially authorizing cooperation with the French. In Tuchman’s phrase, “[t]hile the military prearranged the lines of battle, England’s political leaders, pulling the blanket of ‘no commitment’ over their heads, resolutely refrained from watching them.”

The Liberal leadership under Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith, ably assisted by the military, then wrapped whatever work was being done in great secrecy, and the analyses of historians Barbara Tuchman, John MacKintosh and John Charmley all infer that this was more to deceive political opponents than to foil the Germans. Winston Churchill described the ultimately confusing result as “we have all the obligations of an alliance without its advantages and above all without its precise definitions.”

Almost 95 years after the end of the First World War, the current Canadian debate over the military’s high levels of interoperability with the United States repeats many of the same criticisms. The danger of informal military-to-military cooperation leading to unintended strategic consequences has been outlined by Danford Middlemiss and Denis Stairs. They warn that Canada’s efforts to maintain close military interoperability with the United States involves the risk that “we may be dealing here with a heavy train rolling downgrade without brakes” wherein interoperability may be progressing to unspecified higher levels of military integration.
that Canada’s current interoperability policies, in conjunction with other elements of “deep integration,” will eventually lead to “a kind of de facto political association or union (though with no political representation)” with the United States.  

The charge that the policy of cooperation is being advanced by military officials without formal government sanction is also repeated. Thus Andy Knight argues that “[i]nteroperability is presented almost as a fait accompli by the Canadian military establishment. But we ought to be sceptical and critical of this process of formulating foreign and defence policy by stealth.” Middlemiss and Stairs make the same accusation of ‘stealth’ as does Ann Denholm Crosby in describing the development of the interoperability components of Canada’s North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreements.  

Much as Great Britain was viewed in 1911 by some as a decidedly junior partner who should take French direction, Canada today is frequently seen as the junior, if not subservient, partner to the United States. For example, in 2002, New Democratic Party (NDP) Member of Parliament (MP) Lorne Nystrom argued that closer military ties with the United States had the potential for “all the shots being called by the Americans and having Canadian troops under American command, it certainly diminishes our sovereignty.”  

In fact, the great disparity in military and other elements of national power between Canada and the United States has created a longstanding concern over the degree to which Canada is able to maintain its sovereignty and to act independently when it cooperates with the United States. This thought can pre-occupy Canadians, with Brian Bow and Patrick Lennox suggesting that “[n]ot many countries have spent as much time as Canada has arguing about whether and to what extent they can pursue an ‘independent’ foreign policy.” Any large-scale cooperative venture undertaken with the United States provokes an examination of the potential cost to Canadian independence and sovereignty.  

Canada’s military interoperability has frequently been at the centre of this concern. Former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy argues that one inescapable cost of interoperability with the United States is foreign policy independence. He suggests that the quest for greater interoperability brings with it higher levels of military-to-military integration and that, in turn, represents “one of the weak links in our ability as a country to assert a more independent foreign policy.” Michael Byers claims that the policies also threaten Canadian sovereignty. In his view, closer Canada-US military cooperation involves a “delegation” of sovereignty to the United States with the “very real possibility that Canada’s standing in the international community would suffer.” He has also argued that an expansion of NORAD roles and wider Canada-US interoperability could result in pressure to reduce the greater rights enjoyed by Canadian servicewomen and serving gays and lesbians over their American equivalents. Canada’s ability to conduct independent military activities may also be at risk according to Denis Stairs. Close cooperation with the US military brings with it increasing dependence on American systems. This, Stairs argues, creates conditions where it could be “very difficult for us to refuse to participate in a US operation that we found inconvenient or regarded as ill-advised.” Alternatively, this same dependence could make it difficult to respond to a United Nations (UN) request “unless the Americans happen to share the Canadian view.”  

Canada’s involvement in the US-led war in Afghanistan heightened these concerns while contributing other potential sovereignty problems. One example occurred in 2003 when there were indications that the United States may have been seeking to have both the Mexican and Canadian Ambassadors to the United Nations removed for their reported opposition to American efforts against Iraq. Another example is provided by Richard Williams who argues that Canada was coerced by the United States into dropping its support for the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan. Equally problematic for some was the potential that the long-established close cooperation of the Canadian defence and foreign policy establishments with their American equivalents would result in Canadian officials being co-opted to US advantage throughout the 2003-2006 period. Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang are very direct in claiming that Canadian military officials are “more concerned about their relationships with their American counterparts than they are with their own political masters in Ottawa.” Lloyd Axworthy repeats the accusation, and asserts that there is “a strong predilection by many senior officers, supported by their civilian mouthpieces, to become too absorbed into the American military orbit.”
Given that Lang was recently Chief of Staff to two Defence Ministers and Axworthy was one of Canada’s most prominent Foreign Affairs Ministers, there is a need to take such accusations seriously and examine them along with the more traditional claims of lost independence and reduced sovereignty. To achieve this Chapter Two will establish whether the recent critiques represent new concerns or whether they conform to the historical patterns of Canada-US cooperation marked as it is with regular challenges to Canadian sovereignty.

The objective of this book is to assess the extent to which Canada-US military interoperability affects Canadian sovereignty. It will not stray beyond these boundaries by, for example, assessing the sovereignty impact of Canada’s other cooperative ties such as those with NATO or the independence costs of recent continental counter-terrorism measures. As will be soon be clear, there is plenty of material within the purely military cooperative arrangements, especially in light of commitments to Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.

This study will, however, rely initially on NATO for its definition of ‘interoperability’ as “the ability of systems, units, or forces, to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to work effectively together.” The suitability of this definition will be examined in Chapter Three to ensure it does not bias the analysis. As well, I will outline the research methodology and develop the definitions, hypotheses, criteria and case study selection in more detail in Chapter Three.

Here the concept of ‘sovereignty’ will be considered to have both an external and an internal component. External sovereignty is defined as a state’s “liberty of action outside its borders in the intercourse with other states.” Internal sovereignty is defined as “internal independence with regard to the liberty of action of a state inside its borders.” Chapter Three will examine these definitions in more detail, and establish the extent to which they enjoy broad support within international law and international relations theory. There will be no attempt to develop new theories or types of sovereignty as the current Canadian literature on interoperability suffers from all too regular attempts to devise new and often highly selective types of sovereignty. Rather than offering new theory, I will challenge the prevailing narrative that Canada-US interoperability undermines Canadian sovereignty.

To achieve this, I will ensure that the specific concerns raised by the critics have some direct connection to Canadian sovereignty. This is best done by rewriting the critiques as hypotheses. The preliminary critiques are that:

Canada’s external sovereignty is violated:
• when the Canadian government alters its support for international agreements as it senses US opposition to them;
• when the Canadian government adopts, rejects or modifies domestic policies as a result of US pressure;
• when the Canadian government adopts, rejects or modifies personnel policies as a result of US pressure;
• when the Canadian government commits to US-led military coalitions despite the presence of disincentives; and,
• when Canada is prevented from joining non-US-led military coalitions because of its close interoperability ties with the United States.

Canada’s internal sovereignty is violated:
• when Canadian officials advance military projects with the United States without government support; and,
• Canadian officials support the position of the US government over the Canadian position.

Chapter Three will comb the international relations literature to ensure that each of the hypotheses is supported with clear criteria for assessing the extent to which Canadian sovereignty was at risk.

These hypotheses will then be applied in six separate case studies drawn from the 2001-2006 period. The case studies will assess the extent to which the available evidence supports, or not, the sovereignty-testing hypotheses. The case studies are: Canada’s response to the 11 September 2001 attacks; the mission to the International Security Force in Kabul in 2002; Canada’s deployment to Kandahar in 2003; Canada’s decision to reject participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom; the Canadian leadership of the coalition naval Task Force 151; and Canada’s return to Kandahar in 2005.
All cases involve claims of lost or reduced sovereignty. These claims will be probed and assessed. Chapter Ten will collect the findings from each case study, evaluate their overall impact and establish trends. In addition to demonstrating that much of the current Canadian interoperability narrative is wrong, it will explain how and why this narrative came to dominate the recent analyses of Canada-US military cooperation. The final chapter suggests potentially more profitable avenues of policy analysis.

Notes

1. Theodore Roscoe, United States Destroyer Operations in World War 2 (Annapolis: US Naval Institute (USNI), 1953), p. 103. He describes the forces involved as “almost matched in size and weight.” See also Hermon G. Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957). Note particularly the charts at pp. 604-605 which make the numerical equality case well.

2. Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942, p. 621. This covers the occasionally contested results.

3. The Allied coordination of ship and aircraft had a host of problems and complicating factors. Vincent O’Hara suggests that the Allied calls for air support were rejected due to a “British influence” that had decreed air and naval forces would fight separately and follow separate operational programs. Vincent P. O’Hara, “Battle of the Java Sea: 27 February 1942,” p. 5, available at www.microworks.net/PACIFIC/battles/java_se.htm (accessed 15 October 2009). B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot also report that the force Commander had put his ships’ reconnaissance aircraft ashore as he predicted a night action. See B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot, “Battle of Java Sea: The Oxford Companion of World War 2,” Encyclopedia.com (2001), available at www.encyclopedia.com/doc/10129-JavaSea battleof.html (accessed 10 June 2009), p. 1. Other Allied shore-based aircraft such as Catalinas and Flying Fortress made regular attacks on the Japanese but to little effect. Moreover, their infrequent reports on the Japanese shipping never matched the near-continuous reconnaissance and reporting efforts put out by the Japanese aircraft to their own ships. See O’Hara, “Battle of the Java Sea: 27 February 1942,” p. 1. David Thomas underlines this, pointing out that the critical first Flying Fortress sighting of the Japanese invasion force never got to the Allied ships. See David A. Thomas, Battle of the Java Sea (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1968), p. 161. In addition, Allied fighter support to the ships had become so complete a failure Thomas reports that subsequent promises to provide it at a pre-battle conference were met by “gales of scornful laughter” from the Allied ship captains who were long tired of such failed promises. See Thomas, Battle of the Java Sea, p. 166.

4. Thomas, Battle of the Java Sea, p. 168.

5. Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942, p. 556.


8. Ibid., p. 2.

9. Roscoe, United States Destroyer Operations in World War 2, pp. 105-106. See also Thomas, Battle of the Java Sea, p. 207.


11. Thomas, Battle of the Java Sea, p. 208.


15. Ibid.


18. It is now named the Combined Communications-Electronic Board.


20. STANAG 2885 covers standards for potable water in the field, STANAG 3971 addresses air-to-air refuelling, STANAG 4172 covers small arms ammunition

21. Indeed some 60 navies rely on NATO publications for communications and basic tactics.
22. Sir John Cotesworth Slessor, A Strategy for the West (New York: Morrow, 1954), p. 2. This was not, however, Sir John’s personal view and he made clear that this was a facetious viewpoint he did not hold.
“deep integration” see Ricardo and Yasmine Shamsie Grinspun, Whose Canada: Continental Integration, Fortress North America, and the Corporate Agenda (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press and Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2007). This collects the majority of those works critical of deep integration and catalogues the wide range of meanings of “deep integration.” The editors’ introductory chapter does this particularly well.


45. Michael Byers, Canadian Armed Forces under U.S. Command (Vancouver: Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues, 2002), pp. 6-8. In his view this delegation arises from plans to expand NORAD to cover both land and maritime activities and from “closer military cooperation” generally. See Byers, Canadian Armed Forces under U.S. Command, p. 1, first para.

46. Ibid., pp. 20, 21.


48. Ibid.