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Letter from The President

The Dalhousie Undergraduate Political Science Society has once again persevered through this year’s challenges. By way of both online and in-person events, our strong team has facilitated a variety of first-time and reoccurring events for the Dalhousie community. To list a few, we hosted a successful trivia night, a headshot fundraiser, a bake sale, and a Poli Nights social. We are proud to have once again offered the Dalhousie Political Networking initiative and The Podium undergraduate journal. Our annual educational events such as the Honours Panel and “So You’re Thinking About Grad School?” are well underway, as is the annual gala and journal launch.

Thank you to everyone who has chosen to participate in our events and initiatives this year, despite any personal tests you may have been facing. It has been our pleasure to ensure that Dalhousie students have the opportunity to grow their networks and communities. In addition, thank you to Tracy, Dr. Katherine Fierlbeck and the entire Political Science Department for their continuous support.

Please join me in congratulating all the students selected for the 2022 Podium journal. Best of luck in all your future endeavours.

Sincerely,

Claire Mercer

President, Dalhousie Undergraduate Political Science Society 2021-2022
Foreword

As Editor of The Podium journal this year, I am proud of how political science students have overcome and adapted to the challenges the pandemic has demanded of us. Political science students are even more emboldened today to explore difficult topics through perceptive and skillful analysis.

Each author presented in this year’s edition of The Podium challenges readers to reconsider their perspectives on past and present-day political issues. Various modern political topics such as the incarceration crisis and its legacy from slavery, the refugee crisis, sexual violence in the Canadian armed forces, and the 2016 US Election challenge our assumptions and offer new ways of examining current issues. Other authors explore historically political topics including the Oslo Accords and the legacy of colonialism both globally and locally. These authors argue that political phenomena are processes that span through time, continuing to influence our political world today.

Readers will appreciate how the authors use creative theoretical frameworks as powerful tools for analysis. The academically exceptional essays contained within these pages are carefully crafted and take the reader through important topics and offer compelling arguments.

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to all the authors who have contributed to this year’s journal edition, and to the editorial board for their diligent work in the review process. Thank you all for supporting another year of academic excellence.

Sincerely,

Emilie Quinn Villanueva

Editor of The Podium 2021-2022
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Gives Municipalities the Opportunity to Defy their Status as “Creatures of the Province”

by Victoria Hudson

In 2015, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) released its 94 calls to action, yet it only called upon municipal governments as a participating entity a total of five times. I would argue that the municipality’s role in the process of reconciliation and decolonization is much more critical than the TRC is leading on. The issue with suggesting that the calls to action predominantly target the Federal and Provincial governments is that it will assume a top-down and “one size fits all” approach. This approach will not work because many diverse subgroups of Indigenous people live across Canada. So, who is going to help develop policies, resources, and urban planning for the local Indigenous communities best? That would have to be municipalities; this level of government will adequately address the unique histories of oppression and structural racism that continue to impose upon the Indigenous peoples. This paper will articulate why municipalities are critical power structures for the process of reconciliation and decolonization across settler-colonial Canada, unlike what the TRC is suggesting. Municipalities will provide a grass-roots approach to urban planning when addressing the calls to action, something the other levels of government can not do, therefore, defying the ideology of being known as “Creatures of the Province.” This paper will substantiate the argument by firstly analyzing Canada as a settler-colonial state and the importance of cities to this process. Then, I will introduce the role and power dynamic of municipalities. Finally, I will define reconciliation and decolonization and evaluate how municipalities can contribute more efficiently to the calls to action by recognizing and including the unique Indigenous identities within urban spaces.
First and foremost, it is imperative to recognize that Canada is a settler-colonial state. It places the European colonizers as the host of the country that established the modern power dynamic we see today. Cities were used to help the process of colonization, claim land, and erase Indigenous communities by creating nodes of centralized power across Canada. As interdisciplinary scholar Julie Tomiak argues, “cities have been constructed as settler place through practices intended to evict, displace, and invisibilize Indigenous peoples and place-making in urban areas” (Tomiak, 2016, p.9). With this in mind, settler cities were the only governing power before establishing the Federal and Provincial governments. There is a clear establishment of colonial structures that displace Indigenous people outside the urban core. These urbanized centers of colonial presence continue to reinforce the erasure of Indigenous people from the city, even though the process has become more subtle over the years. Cities are much more involved in the process of settler colonialism than TRC recognizes, so reconciliation needs to be made at the local level. Such that “rather than treating the city as an innocent container of social relations, we need to examine its active constitution, as an object of and agent of settler colonialism” (Tomiak, 2016, p.10). The goal of settler colonialism was to erase the Indigenous population, whether through violence or policymaking, all of which Canadian cities have contributed to. As a scholar and professor, Joyce Green has stated, the establishment of settler-colonial cities was “not just about the physical occupation of someone else’s land but also about the appropriation of others’ political authority, cultural self-determination, economic capacity, and strategic location” (Green, 2003, p.52). There is a clear connection between city space and colonialism where reconciliation and decolonization must be prevalent in urban planning and policymaking.

The historical and ongoing process of settler colonialism started with establishing cities and municipalities across Canada. But the municipalities will also be the re-emerging power structure that enables the process of reconciliation and decolonization to occur. Municipalities beg the question of their responsibility and duty as to what they owe to Indigenous communities, especially after the release of the TRC. Questions like this arise because the constitutional doctrine asserting them as Creatures of the Province limits their powers. The Canadian Constitution of 1867 has a special place for Municipalities under Section 92(8), stating that the only power municipalities have, comes directly from the province. This framework emphasizes a legally subordinate status, minimizing the municipality’s importance and autonomy. But legal precedent contrasts this ideology, which recognizes municipalities’ ability to protect Canadian Charter rights. This specifically pertains to the protection of Section 35, which states that all existing Aboriginal and treaty rights are recognized and affirmed (First Nations Studies, 2009). Justice Gérard La Forest (1997) says that since “the Charter applies to provincial legislatures, it then must apply to entities upon which they confer governmental powers” (Flynn, 2021, p.123). This apparent empowerment of municipalities comes from Charter rights, which go outside the laundry list of powers delegated explicitly by the provinces. The Charter, therefore, applies to the policymaking and urban planning done by
municipalities. With increased autonomy and authority, scholar Alexandra Flynn argues that municipalities must now “address their legal obligations to Indigenous Peoples and communities” (Flynn, 2021, p.127) as protected by s.35. As municipalities try to assert their role as autonomous democratic and legislative bodies within the federal landscape, they must first “understand their obligations to Indigenous peoples and communities” (Flynn, 2021, p.127).

As governing and legislative bodies, municipalities have the power dynamic and infrastructure to make policies regarding the protection of Indigenous rights. The question moves away from whether municipalities have the power to address reconciliation and decolonization. Instead, it turns to the question of how they are going to use it. Indigenous peoples are a part of the urban population that continues to face the brunt force of colonial violence and marginalization in and through city boundaries. These practices are normalized to be a part of everyday occurrences, reinforcing the structural racism that colonialism provokes. To offer a perspective as to how this form of urban life is shaped, scholars Heather Dorries et al. (2019) introduce the concept of settler-colonial urbanism (p.10). Settler colonial urbanism is a “socio-spatial formation that is grounded in an inequitable relationship between settlers and Indigenous people” (Dorries et al., 2019, p.11). This concept reaffirms the foundational role of ongoing dispossession that works to benefit white settlers as they shape urban life (Dorries et al., 2019, p.11). This continuous social-spatial power dynamic between Indigenous communities and the settler population has given rise to resurgence movements, particularly in municipalities. Resurgence is the “movements and embodied practices focused on rebuilding nation-specific Indigenous ways of being and actualizing self-determination” (Dorries et al., 2019, p.7). Resurgence, in turn, starts the action of decolonization. Decolonization “involves the process of Aboriginal liberation from the oppressive colonial relationship with the state” (Green, 2003, p.61). These terms intersect because resurgence brings rise to movements and change in social-political relationships and institutions that enable the process of decolonization to occur. Resurgence and decolonization are the languages municipalities need to focus on in planning and policymaking because they can help navigate how to incorporate a daily existence of place-based cultural practices that reconnect Indigenous peoples to lands and communities right there in the urban core.

The TRC defines reconciliation as a process that “establishes and maintains a mutually respectful relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people” in Canada (TRC, 2015(c), p.7). To maintain this mutual relationship, “there has to be awareness of the past, acknowledgement of the harm that has been inflicted, atonement for the causes, and an action to change behaviour” (TRC, 2015(c), p.7). As I have previously discussed, the TRC only allocates five calls to action to the space of municipalities, when they could be doing much more with the power they have to address the other calls to action. The education section of the TRC, for example, is arguably why the concept for reconciliation came about. But it will also be the primary source for rebuilding a nation-to-nation relationship by educating those local communities
about the unique and indispensable histories that settler conceptions have covered up. Education brought about reconciliation because of the Residential School system, just one of many mechanisms used to erase Indigenous people across Canada. The disturbing reality is that most adult Canadians have been taught very little or nothing at all about Canada’s true history. They only know the contextual history of the white settlers. The TRC supports this claim by arguing how “Educating Canadians for reconciliation involves not only schools and post-secondary institutions but also dialogue forums and public history institutions such as museums and archives. Education must remedy the gaps in historical knowledge that perpetuate ignorance and racism” (TRC, 2015(b), p.117). This proposition to fill the gaps in the education system can be met through the municipality by creating community-centred action plans for policy development that are premised on reframing history, reconnecting Indigenous people to their land, and restoring their culture and community presence. Even though the education section of the TRC directly addresses the Federal government, public forums of education need to be tailored to the many local Indigenous histories so that you and your neighbours can become culturally competent. The TRC believes that education is the key to reconciliation.

Scholar Kay Johnson has enlightened municipalities about a good start for making space for education. She argues that “cultural institutions, such as museums, play key roles in urban life, urban imagining, public memory, civic engagement and city building, making them important sites for contesting urban space” (Johnson, 2016, p.181). In other words, a shift towards encapturing Indigenous histories instead of covering them with colonial ones can make people question who makes up a city, what values are attached, who makes decisions, and who benefits from those choices. These questions engage the public with contesting urban spaces, opening another opportunity for resurgence. This decolonizing discourse allows for the opportunity to have Indigenous voices heard and perpetuate the unsettling of the city. This pertains to museums and is also true for statues, figures of commemoration, historical sites, names of streets, buildings and parks, and public organizations. Municipalities can facilitate each role in education outside of the classroom. Municipalities also have the duty and ability to consult and accommodate Indigenous peoples as part of s.35. This way, we can ensure a proper education. This will inherently unveil to society the structural inequities that continue to infringe upon Indigenous rights. It creates an urban space for the “settler to look at herself or himself within a community of selves that share a troubled history, but in which there are possibilities for dialogue and healing,” which reconciliation is all about (Johnson, 2016, p.191).

There are other steps that municipalities can take to help facilitate reconciliation and decolonization outside of the sphere of education. Municipalities can adopt the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP), such as Toronto did in 2013. Or create a Task Force for the Recognition and Commemoration of Indigenous History, such as Halifax did in 2020. Not only does this increase empowerment and autonomy for municipalities, but it also “advances Indigenous rights to the protection of
their ancestral territories and mandates informed consent from Indigenous communities for developments on their lands” (Flynn, 2021, p. 121). The duty to consult and the right to informed consent for development in urban areas ensure Indigenous communities exercise their right to reconnect their culture to the land. Another thing municipalities can do is alter their local services and offer a hybrid model that combines Indigenous and non-Indigenous approaches (DeVerteuil et al., 2010, p.506). Indigenous people are often users of the resources provided by municipalities. However, these urban spaces do not accommodate their unique status and requirement of culturally appropriate services tailored to their values and practices. There also needs to be a collaborative relationship of co-production to do so. Co-production, as defined by Ryan Walker, is “the normative principle for engaging in planning and policymaking with urban Aboriginal communities” (Walker, 2013(a), p.152). This reinforces an equal relationship between state actors and those from the Indigenous community when concerns arise about certain developments. Following this normative standard of co-production, municipalities can re-open opportunities for Indigenous self-determination from within urban spaces. This could entail the creation of a range of agencies, boards, or commissions such as Friendship Centres and Indigenous Affairs Committee’s that allow them to participate in local governments and other social institutions. These are all examples of how municipal power can transform Canadian spaces across the nation, operating from the ground up to achieve specific methods of reconciliation and decolonization.

There is a reason I specifically left out the inclusion of Indigenous representation on city councils as a method of engaging with decolonization more specifically. One might suggest that to plan and develop policies in urban life adequately; the city council should represent all diverse subgroups in society, including Indigenous people. The problem with this recommendation is how it places Indigenous people within a colonial institution. By incorporating Indigenous people into existing state bodies and systems, it no longer represents a nation-to-nation relationship. Since municipalities continue to be recognized as creatures of the province, Indigenous peoples want to remove themselves from this framework entirely rather than be included in its infrastructure. This would be a process of re-colonization rather than decolonization. An alternative way to increase representation within local development is the establishment of Urban Reserves. These are not your traditional reserves. Instead, they are “urban lands acquired by First Nations through land claim settlements or purchase for economic development that serve the interest of the principal reserve community” (Walker, 2013(a), p.161). Urban reserves create an opportunity for significant cultural, economic, and social development for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal citizens. It places a contemporary Indigenous culture within settler cities by providing a wide range of jobs and services (Walker, 2013(a), p.161).

It will take many years to see the effects of successful Indigenous urban development and policymaking that take on more than just five of the TRC’s calls to action. Coates and Morrison have argued
that “a single model will not suit the very different Indigenous groups across the country” (Coates et al., 2008, p.108). This “one size fits all approach” is inefficient because the Federal and Provincial governments will only be able to address the TRC calls to action in this manner. As outlined in this analysis, there are many ways that municipalities can obtain and use power that goes beyond and defies the creatures of the province ideology, especially when it pertains to Indigenous rights. The TRC has failed to acknowledge the special role municipalities have in fostering urban spaces for the resurgence of Indigenous self-determination and presence within settler cities. There are many ways of organizing locally to engage citizen participation. They have the power to use the Charter to establish a visible cultural presence in place-making like heritage articulation and education (Walker, 2008(b), p.161). There are ways of making Indigenous culture an asset to municipalities by producing room for economic and social development. They can also enforce co-production to ensure equal involvement in the developmental process. Therefore, municipalities are the critical growing power structures needed to pursue reconciliation and decolonization across settler-colonial Canada by including the diverse and distinctive Indigenous identities within urban space.
References


“More African American adults are under correctional control today – in prison or jail, on probation or parole – than were enslaved in 1850, a decade before the Civil War began” (Alexander, p. 180, 2020). This chilling fact presented in Michelle Alexander’s book *The New Jim Crow*, offers a frightening reality check of the American prison system (2020). The legacy of slavery is evident in its transformation into the supposed “neutral” institution of incarceration, a transformation that took place over a hundred years. From its abolishment in 1865, slavery has found ways to infiltrate institutions, continually evolving to oppress African Americans. The sentencing process, the political disenfranchisement of individuals, and the continued racial bias endured by black Americans exemplify the ways in which the current American legal system is riddled with remnants of slavery.

The birth of incarceration as we know it today was not accidental: the prison industrial complex was built over the course of 150 years of institutionalized racism. It is through looking at history through this critical and racialized lens that shatters the illusion of the absence of slavery from today’s political institutions. To understand incarceration as a modern institution of slavery, we must look to the past to understand how America got to where it is, starting with the abolishment of slavery.

The abolishment of slavery is often taught as a victory, a key moment in the history of African American people that shaped the course of black individuals across America. This was not the case. It is critical to note that the abolishment of slavery was not wholly due to a change of heart of governing officials. Although prominent figures like Abraham Lincoln condemned the notion of slavery for its brute and disgraceful nature, many scholars argue that the emancipation of black slaves included several reasonings, among them that new technologies were emerging that made slavery less economically profitable than before (Tomek, 2014). Author Beverley Tomek argues that the normal “romanticized” story that depicts the leaders of the USA coming to a sort of moral awakening about the treatment of black people
was simply not the case (2014). She argues instead that it was the very institution of slavery itself that was considered incompatible with the institution slaves were building, “the land of the free” (Tomek, 2014). Slavery then, was simply not viable in the political climate of that time. Knowing the abolishment of slavery was not only for the purposes of granting equality immediately shapes our understanding that racism did not end with this abolishment.

Emancipating black slaves would not be as simple as granting them 100% freedom. Southern politicians who stood to lose the most from the abolishment of slavery had to find a way to recoup the economic loss the 4 million slaves who would soon be free represented (Mazama & Asante, 2005), having to figure out a way for the state to maintain discretionary control of free black Americans (Denis, 2015). There was also a notable amount of fear surrounding the freedom of slaves, who understandably would hold a lot of anger towards their former masters (Alexander, 2020). This is where the significance in the wording of the 13th amendment, which brought an end to slavery, comes to light. Section 1 of the 13th amendment is as follows:

> “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime were of the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” (History: 13th Amendment, 2019)

The clause excluding convicted felons from the protection against enslavement provided the groundwork on which a new version of slavery could be introduced: incarceration. The word “slave” could be changed to “convict”, and alas politicians eager to continue using free black labour were given the tool they needed to legally make it happen (Mazama & Asante, 2005). The legacy of slavery in its treatment of black Americans as second-class citizens was then institutionalized into the very Constitution the country was built on, ironically in the very amendment that banned it outright.

After the passage of the 13th amendment, statutes called “Black Codes” were enacted throughout 1866 and 1867 to relinquish the very brief freedom the black population had begun to experience. (Mazama & Asante, 2005). These statutes “prevented blacks from sitting on juries, prohibited blacks from voting, limited blacks’ testimony against whites, denied blacks the right to work in certain occupations, and legislated against blacks carrying weapons.” (Mazama & Asante, 2005: p. 120). Black codes prevented newly freed slaves from making any political, economic, or social gain. Many of the codes outlawed particular activities more harshly for black people than white for extremely minor offenses like loitering. Leaving plantations and going to look for work with nothing in their pockets proved to be an excruciating task for these newly free black Americans, and yet strict vagrancy laws made it a crime to not work (Alexander, 2020). Unable to find work, black Americans were arrested, considered indebted to the state, and made to work to pay off the fine (Mazama & Asante, 2005). Physical labour then, although not being imposed by a slave-master, was eerily similar to the ways in which it was imposed on the Black population
during the time of slavery. It was during these formatives and so called “reconstructive” years that the inherent “mythology of black criminality” was established (Jelanie Cobb quoted in DuVernay, 2016 at: 0:07:38). In an age where white elites and businessmen needed bodies working, that convict clause became the tool at their disposal that created and perpetuated the image of black people as criminals (DuVernay, 2016). Black people could then be used once again for the same type of physical labour that had been demanded of them under slavery in the name of maintaining the sanctity of civil order within society.

Eventually, Black Codes proved unsuccessful due to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and the era of Jim Crow began (Mazama & Asante, 2005). Jim Crow is best described as a “living institution” that sought to hinder the gains made by African Americans, (Alexander, 2020) one that was made up of social norms, sanctions and symbols that intended to keep the black American population oppressed (Mazama & Asante, 2005). A paradigm shift was again required in order to keep the black population under some sort of social ostracization, and this came under the form of separating colored from non-colored areas, essentially creating a caste system (Longley, 2017). Even though Jim Crow laws denied African Americans of their civil rights protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1875, (Mazama & Asante, 2005), it wasn’t long before the contents of that Act were challenged by the Supreme Court. In 1883, the Supreme Court ruled in an 8-1 decision in the Civil Rights Cases that the 13th and 14th amendments of the Constitution did not give Congress the power to regulate the affairs of private individuals and businesses. (Longley, 2017). This nullified the Civil Rights Act as the contents of the Act were considered an infringement on personal freedom of choice (Longley, 2017). Essentially, the clause maintaining that people all of races were equal and could not be enslaved did not correlate to giving the federal government power and authority to protect Black Americans from the discrimination imposed on them by private institutions. The effects of this ruling were felt deeply across the country (Longley, 2017). This status of legitimacy granted to Jim Crow laws embedded the notion of the supposed inferiority of black people among the American population. This time period also invited the second paradigm shift to unfold, to now understand African Americans as both criminal and “other”.

Racial segregation became even more deeply accepted within the notions of legality with the Supreme Court’s 1896 ruling in the Plessy v. Ferguson case (Longley, 2017). The Supreme Court ruled that so long as the facilities and services being provided were equal, racial discrimination in colored and non-colored areas was not unconstitutional (Longley, 2017). The “separate but equal” doctrine was echoed throughout the nation. Jim Crow laws then created a legally sound system of discrimination (Mazama & Asante, 2005). Attempts to counter these codes were met with brutal force, and:
“African Americans were subjected to an onslaught and nightmare of verbal and physical attacks, police brutality, lynching, murders, several decades of situational and institutional discriminatory mistreatment, inhumane living and working conditions, and a total erosion of all of their economic, educational, civil and human rights.” (Mazama & Asante, 2005, p. 283).

With every single instance that black people had to use a different doorway, sit in a different section of the bus or train, or watch movies at designated times, the racial bias endured (Duvernay, 2020). Jim Crow segregation remained for more than half of the 20th century, ending around the time of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1967 (Mazama & Asante, 2005).

The end of the Jim Crow era opened the doors to the haunting and ever-powerful era Americans now find themselves in, the era of mass incarceration. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 promised equality. However, by the time the 1970s rolled around, the political climate was shifting notably under the Nixon administration (Travis et al., 2014), and due to the increase in crime, this period started what would become known as the “law and order” period of American history (DuVernay, 2020). During this period, the Republican party took on a very strong leadership role to tap into public fear and anxieties surrounding crime (Travis et al., 2014). Nixon officially declared the war on drugs, shifting the conversation about drugs from being a healthcare crisis to a criminal crisis (Travis et al., 2014). The prison population was 357,292 people (DuVernay, 2016: 19:10). Many Republicans of this era argued that crime and poverty were manifestations of culture, and since poverty was most rampant in colored communities, black and brown folk alike suffered from the illusion that it was somehow their culture that placed them under the vicious cycle of poverty (Alexander, 2020). Therefore, the very carefully articulated image of the black criminal who lives on the margins of society and who poses a threat to the safety of white communities could be strengthened thanks to the foundations set during the era of black codes (Alexander, 2020).

The 1980s rolled around, and the prison population had risen to 513,900 inmates (DuVernay, 2016: quoted at 26:58). The term “war on drugs” that Nixon had coined became the movement that Reagan ultimately mobilized (DuVernay, 2016). Using extremely clever rhetoric, Reagan was able to avoid racial terms and instead opted for words like “criminal predators” and “welfare queens”, although the implicit racial bias was already there and strong from the previous decade (Alexander, 2020). Under his administration, the FBI anti-drug fund increased from 8 million dollars to 95 million dollars (Alexander, 2020). The appearance of crack cocaine exemplified the racial nature of incarceration measures the Reagan administration took (DuVernay, 2016). This inexpensive and smokable drug became an inner-city issue,
while powder cocaine remained a white suburban issue (Duvernay, 2016), and provided the Reagan administration with a way to publicly garner support for the war on drugs (Alexander, 2020). Crack was in essence “a poor man’s cocaine” (Shein, 1993). The sentencing for crack cocaine was significantly more severe than the sentencing for powder cocaine. A 10-year minimum sentence of incarceration was given based on possession of only 50 grams of crack, while 5000 grams were required if it was powder cocaine (Shein, 1993). This classist dimension of incarceration could easily be paralleled to newly freed black slaves who were arrested more vehemently than white folks during the time of Black codes for similar offenses. It was during the 80s that mandatory prison sentences were enforced, as well as truth-in-sentencing laws (Travis et al., 2014). Mandatory sentences meant that certain crimes were subject to a minimum sentence when convicted, regardless of the Judge’s decision, and truth-in-sentencing laws required convicts to serve a minimum of 85% of their sentence before being eligible for parole (Travis et al., 2014).

Throughout the 80s, mass incarceration provided the means with which the black population could continue to be seen through the lens of criminality (Duvernay, 2016). Most survey data showed that the majority of white people agreed with anti-discriminatory equality measures (Alexander, 2020). However, the news was full of TV shows and news segments alike highlighting black men as criminals (DuVernay, 2016). By persuading the public that crime was the opponent and not racial minorities, Reagan’s administration effectively embedded the association between black communities, poverty and crime in the heads of American citizens, garnering support for an essentially racist movement thinly veiled by promises of ending crime (DuVernay, 2016). As Bryan Stevens explain in the documentary 13th, “the way that we appeal to voters’ sense of fear and anxiety in our Nation runs through black bodies” (quoted in DuVernay, 2016: 0:34:18).

Bill Clinton’s presidency in the 90s then accelerated mass incarceration to being the massive complex it is today. The enactment of the 1994 Crime Bill provided the infrastructure necessary to enforce mandatory sentencing and truth-in-sentencing laws. The mobilization that had occurred under Reagan’s administration could now be hyper-mobilized. The 90s saw the introduction of the 3 strikes law, a law that mandated life sentences to convicts convicted of their 3rd felony charge (Travis et al., 2014). A survey conducted in 1995 asked participants to describe a drug user, and the results were disturbing (Alexander, 2020). 95% of participants included the drug user as being of black race, even though at the time “African Americans constituted only 15 of the current drug users […]” (Alexander, 2020). The indoctrination of black men as criminals had proven to be extremely effective. It became evident during this era that incarceration was not a result of rising crime rates, but the result of policy decisions made by legislators
that had been funded by powerful and well-funded lobbying groups (Travis et al., 2014).

Without understanding this history, we cannot fully appreciate the ever-present face of slavery that looms over American political institutions. These previous pages served to understand how slavery as an institution can evolve to better serve the current time, and how it became modern day incarceration. How then, did the culmination of slavery, Black Codes, Jim Crow era laws, the War on Drugs and the militarization of prison infrastructure create a modern institution of slavery titled the “prison industrial complex”? How is it best recognized? The following section depicts the sentencing process, political disenfranchisement, and the perpetuation of racial bias as the best examples of the inherent biases slavery morphed within the American judicial system.

Firstly, before trial even begins, black people are victims of the justice system. Black men are incarcerated at a rate six times that of white men (Rehavi et al., 2012). 97% of convicted felons took a plea deal before entering the system (DuVernay, 2016). Black defendants are often denied proper representation, and often use public defenders (The Sentencing Project, 2013). Public defenders in the USA are expected to work on an average of 371 cases a year, forcing them to decide which cases are worth fighting for and which simply need plea bargains (Justice Shadow Report). Black defendants are then more likely to be pressured into a plea bargain, essentially pleading guilty to a crime to avoid the possibilities of being found guilty in court and being subjected to even harsher sentences (Alexander, 2020). Even more troubling, a study in 1976 also found that the probability of a black defendant being indicted for killing a white person was more than twice as high as that of the chances of a white defendant being indicted for killing a black person (The Sentencing Project, 2013).

At sentencing, racial bias is still present. With the introduction of mandatory minimums, prosecutors hold much of the power previously held by judges (DuVernay, 2016). Prosecutors also decide what charges to bring forward, whether or not to be lenient and what type of plea bargain to offer them (Rehavi et al., 2012). When a particular crime is brought before a judge, there are already statutes that tell the judge the minimum sentence a convicted felon must serve (DuVernay, 2016). Judges now lose much of their discretion when sentencing, because they are legally bound to give certain amounts for statutory offenses, regardless of the context in which crimes are committed (Rehavi et al., 2012). Black men are also twice as likely as white men to face statutory minimums to begin with and receive sentences approximately 10% longer than the sentences enforced on white men (Rehavi et al., 2012). Sentence length
is particularly interesting when it comes to drugs, because the sentences subjected to black men is significantly longer despite their lower levels of drug use in general (Travis et al., 2014).

Secondly, political disenfranchisement is an unfortunate but obvious parallel to draw from the era of slavery to modern day incarceration. As slaves, African Americans were not considered citizens and therefore could not vote, but once slavery was abolished, the convict clause of the 13th amendment, as discussed earlier, gave legislators the tool to revoke their right to vote. The danger in the American Prison Industrial Complex is that the American government and society have created an institution that labels black Americans as criminals, and the system runs autonomously at this point. Stripping black Americans of their right to vote and as a result, disenfranchising them relinquishes convicted felons to a permanent state of second-class citizenship. (Travis et al., 2014) Because Black people are disproportionately incarcerated as a whole, political disenfranchisement can be seen as an attack on their rights to influence political discourse in any capacity (Alexander, 2020). Author Michelle Alexander (2020) offers a haunting fact to demonstrate the insane damage disenfranchisement causes to Black communities:

“Less than 2 decades after the War on Drugs began, one in seven black men nationally had lost the right to vote, and as many as one in four in those states with the highest African American disenfranchisement rate.” (p. 239)

This was, arguably, a covert way of denying African Americans their right to vote becomes socially acceptable because of the paradigm shift that made black people into criminals. Mass incarceration is so accepted, we often consider things like your right to vote a privilege simply lost because of the choice an individual made to commit the crime, ignoring the social and political institutions that made that crime exist in the first place (Alexander, 2020).

Lastly, modern incarceration serves to perpetuate the racial bias that existed throughout the existence of slavery, shifting into more systemic and institutional forms of bias that become harder to distinguish. Despite claims of neutrality and equality, the system of mass incarceration “serves to redefine the terms of the relationship of poor people of color and their communities to mainstream, white society, ensuring their subordinate and marginal status.” (Alexander, 2020, p. 223). By creating an autonomous self-operating system, mass incarceration continues to perpetuate stereotypes of black people through its very existence and keeps them permanently as “2nd class citizens” (Alexander, 2020). The dangers of mass incarceration compared to slavery are in the assumption that the judicial system operates through a color-blind lens, affording individuals equal opportunity to seek justice, and as noted throughout this entire essay, that notion is simply false.
The legacy of slavery unfortunately has lasted over centuries. To acknowledge modern day incarceration as contemporary slavery may seem bold and ignorant of the progress made by Black activists across America, however, it is imperative that the racial structure of incarceration be thoroughly understood, so it can be effectively dismantled. Slavery protected the white elite and when its structure was threatened, it had to morph into something less overt that could stand the test of time. Sentencing, disenfranchisement and continued racial bias are present-day manifestations of this “new slavery”. Understanding how this racial bias was created and sustained over the evolution of incarceration allows Americans to be on the front line of how to fight and dismantle this system and prevent its next inevitable evolution. Mass incarceration should already scare all Americans: we cannot allow it to evolve any further.
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An Examination of Robert Putnam’s Two-Level Games in the Oslo Accords

by Olivia Paul

Introduction

The following paper will analyze the outcome of the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords through the theoretical framework of “two-level games”, as outlined by Robert Putnam (1988), in order to understand why the peace process failed. The findings of this report expound on Daniel Lieberfield’s 2008 publication Secrecy and ‘Two-Level Games’ in the Oslo Accords”, to argue that both Israel and Palestine approached Level I international negotiations with narrow win-sets; though it might have appeared that these win-sets eventually expanded and overlapped in order to formulate a peace deal, the complicated nature of Level II domestic realities in Israel and Palestine thwarted any gains made by Level I negotiations. In addition, while the United States acted as a third-party facilitator of the talks, the U.S was involved in the peace process with its own win-sets. However, the U.S’ bargaining position was insufficient in dictating the outcome of the negotiations. Through an analysis of the existing literature on two-level games, with special attention to domestic components, the roles of each of the various actors in the Oslo Accords can be better evaluated. I will focus primarily on the Level I and II win-sets of Israel and Palestine, but also discuss those of the United States to a lesser extent. I will then conclude by briefly examining the conflicting axes of culture and identity in the Holy Land, to discern that Israeli and Palestinian national identity was a strong influencer of Level II politics, causing the progress of the Oslo Accords to be nullified.

Overview of Domestic Political Factors Preceding the Oslo Accords

Antagonisms between the Israelis and Palestinians have been ongoing since Israel became a state in 1948. By the early 1990s, however, both the Palestinian and Israeli governments were facing political
pressures that finally made direct negotiation seem like the best option.

On the Palestinian end, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had been significantly weakened by the demise of the Soviet Union, which was a military resource for the PLO (Shlaim, 2005). Moreover, the PLO alienated itself from the United States and Gulf countries by supporting Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War (Rynhold, 2008). As a result of these events, Yasser Arafat, the PLO’s de facto leader, was struggling to retain his authority within the organization. The PLO was beginning to lose traction in the key areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supplanted by the powerful terror group Hamas. Palestine increasingly looked weak internally and on the world stage, as well as in the eyes of the United States, whose support for the country was critical. It is immediately clear from the Palestinian example how international and domestic politics can reinforce one another, as forecasted by Putnam (1988). Palestine’s isolation in the global arena had a destabilizing effect on the domestic realm of Palestinian society, and it became necessary for Arafat to do something about this crisis of legitimacy.

Israel was facing its own unique domestic circumstances prior to the negotiations. Israeli politics had previously been dominated by the right-wing Likud party, which made concessions of the Israeli occupied zones unimaginable (Hermann, 2013). However, the election of Yitzhak Rabin’s Labour Party in 1992 marked an ideological shift within the Israeli government, leading to a “diplomatic revolution” in Israel’s foreign policy (Shlaim, 2005). While Rabin was reluctant to have contact with the PLO, Rabin’s foreign minister, Shimon Peres, and deputy foreign minister, Yossi Beilin, insisted on engaging in bilateral talks with Arafat (Rynhold, 2008). Peres’ and Beilin’s openness helped guide Rabin towards the end of conciliation. Additionally, the Israeli government was facing threats imposed by Iran, along with national security concerns related to Hamas (whom Israel naively funded during the 1980s, seeing Hamas as having the potential to undercut the PLO) (Buan, 2005). It was these conditions that turned a corner in Israeli-Palestinian relations, paving the way for the Oslo Accords.

Like Israel, the United States had an election in 1992, in which Bill Clinton was elected president. The Clinton administration was committed to establishing “a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East that will ensure the security of Israel and the wellbeing of its neighbours” (Clinton White House, n.d). Israel would feature prominently in Clinton’s foreign policy strategy, since the U.S is home to the largest Jewish diaspora of any country outside of Israel, and many prevalent pro-Israel lobbying groups and corporations (Rebhun, 2009). However, Clinton was also invested in Palestinian statehood; it was in America’s interest to stabilize relationships between Israel and Palestine, in the form of a proposed two-state solution. Peace in the Middle East was an elusive goal confronted by U.S presidential administrations in the latter half of the 20th century. The precedent for American mediation on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute
was set by President Jimmy Carter with the 1978 Camp David Accords, but the issue remained insoluble fifteen years later (Swenson, 2010). Clinton was certainly motivated by the fact that being credited with orchestrating a peace agreement between Israel and Palestine would correlate to higher approval ratings in office.

**Israeli and Palestinian Win-Sets in the Oslo Peace Accords**

Once all three parties had reached the conclusion that negotiations between Israel and Palestine were necessary, the question became what format the talks should take. It was decided that a bilateral conference between Rabin and Arafat would occur secretly in Oslo, Norway in 1993, supervised by third-party Norwegian organizers (Boatman & Martin, 2019). Secrecy was a necessary condition of the talks, considering that both the Israeli and Palestinian heads were unable to withstand the political implications of publicly meeting one another. Although the Israeli Labour government had a decidedly more liberal orientation than its Likud predecessors, the Peace Accords violated Israel’s official stance against negotiating with the PLO, which was regarded as a terrorist organization (Lieberfield, 2008). For his part, Arafat, who was already diminished politically, was unlikely to survive the fallout of being seen conferring with the Israelis.

It can be speculated that the furtive, remote location of the peace talks influenced either side’s win-sets. While clandestineness allowed the actors to negotiate freely without interference from domestic audiences or the press, it also meant that the Israeli and Palestinian diplomats had to represent their respective country’s position as best they could, without drawing direct insight from their individual bases. Putnam (1988) observes that “there are likely to be prior consultations and bargaining at Level II to hammer out an initial position for the Level I negotiations” (p. 436). Yet in this circumstance, the Israeli and Palestinian leaders did not have the benefit of conducting preliminary Level II referenda or other official mechanisms of gauging public opinion. I would argue that the privacy of the talks caused the actors to become even more conservative in their win-sets, at least at the beginning. The negotiators risked tremendous consequences from reaching an agreement that was determined to be unacceptable in Level II politics. It is doubtful that either Arafat or Rabin could have justified going behind their countries’ backs and underselling national interests (both leaders would be accused of “selling out” once the talks became public anyways) (Rynhold, 2008). For all of the advantages of holding secret negotiations, the two leaders risked appearing out of touch with their constituencies.

It is thus possible that a sense of trepidation caused Arafat and Rabin to initially understate their
win-sets, which may not have happened if the talks had been conducted publicly. Even if this claim is unfounded, in the event of a public spectacle, Arafat and Rabin would at least have access to polling data that could have better informed their win-sets. In any case, secrecy altered the character of the negotiations. Rabin and Arafat approached the talks with extremely narrow win-sets, which they believed summarized the sentiments of their side (Lieberfield, 2008). Although both the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were required to take Level II domestic factors into account in their negotiations, Lieberfield (2008) postulates that Level II politics played a much more serious role for Israel. Any Level I deal produced at Oslo would become the subject of extensive deliberation within the Israeli Knesset, where it would undergo scrutiny from various parties and factions from across the ideological spectrum (Hermann, 2013). This phenomenon is explained by Fearon (1994)’s theory of domestic audience costs. Fearon indicates that leaders of democracies like Israel are more susceptible to public feedback and levers of accountability than non-democratic leaders. The reality of domestic audience costs put increasing pressure on Israel to reach a satisfactory deal to present to its legislature.

Israel’s cautiousness in Level I negotiations was problematic given that many of the areas that the Israelis deemed “non-negotiable” were preconditions of a deal for the Palestinians, and essential for Arafat to gain Level II support. As Lieberfield (2008) argues, “Palestinians’ Level-II bargaining...required tangible Israeli concessions on these same issues; any agreement that omitted these elements would lose the necessary public support” (p. 139). As such, a deadlock was reached in the negotiations. Arafat’s central objective was the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state, but for practical reasons Israel would not, or could not, acquiesce. These two contradictory win-sets rendered any peaceable settlement between Israel and Palestine impossible, unless compromises were made.

Notwithstanding the limiting quality of the negotiations, some form of agreement was reached at Oslo, which involved both sides widening their win-sets and making substantial sacrifices. Perhaps this shift was a matter of wearing each other down after a series of grueling, exhausting, and emotional discussions. On August 20, 1993, the two parties landed on The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements, which involved mutual recognition between Israel and Palestine, phased withdrawal of Israeli settlements, the establishment of a Palestinian police force, and the relinquishing of Israeli governance of the West Bank and Gaza, with promises to hold Palestinian elections in those regions (Boatman & Martin, 2019). It is rather astonishing how comprehensive the Declaration was, considering that the Israelis and Palestinians entered the negotiations with such restrictive win-sets. Given Israel’s sensitivity to domestic audience costs, it is especially surprising that Rabin and his delegates were willing to relent on longstanding issues related to the conflict with Palestine. I propose three potential reasons why Israel was able to agree to the terms of the Declaration: 1) Rabin and Peres did not imagine that this deal
would contravene Israel’s national interests, and therefore could be accepted in Level II negotiations, 2) by widening Israel’s Level I win-set, the Israeli leaders hoped that Level II win-sets could also be expanded, or 3) any deal was better than no deal. Again, Rabin and Peres were not privy to empirical knowledge of Israel’s actual Level II win-sets, thus they relied on estimation. With that said, certain topics remained off the table. The Declaration excluded the right of return of 1948 Palestinian refugees and did not define the borders of a possible Palestinian state (Shlaim, 2005). Similarly, Israel neglected to make any commitments about the future of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, nor did the Declaration comment on the status of Jerusalem (Shlaim, 2005). Rabin likely calculated that a treaty that included these topics would be too controversial to withstand Israeli Level II deliberation. Consequently, though Israel’s Level I win-set did widen considerably, it was by no means large.

On their part, Arafat and the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, and denounced Palestinian terrorism towards Israel (Shlaim, 2005). Arafat was forced to postpone his dream of full Palestinian sovereignty and accept an uncertain future with regards to Israeli settlements on the West Bank (Shlaim, 2005). Unlike the Israelis, Arafat did not have to worry about democratic backlash by increasing his Level I win-set to reach an agreement. However, that did not mean that Arafat was impervious to domestic pressures. Putnam (1988) writes that the Level II ratification process does not necessarily have to take place in formal political institutions but can be loosely constituted as “public opinion” (p. 436). Arafat confronted domestic challenges imposed by hardliners like Hamas and other right-wing radicals who would oppose any type of negotiation with the Israelis (Buan, 2005). Indeed, the element of risk was ever-present in the signing of the Declaration, which would be received ambiguously by the general public in Israel and Palestine. In the end, Rabin and Arafat were unable to deliver a deal that could be sustained in Level II politics, and for this reason the peace process ultimately collapsed.

While the aftermath of the Peace Accords appeared promising as Israel began scaling back its settlements, this progress was short-lived (Boatman & Martin, 2019). Both the Israelis and Palestinians eventually reneged on the agreements made at Oslo. Illegal Israeli settlement activity continued into the 2000s, and so did Palestinian violence towards Israel (Boatman & Martin, 2019). A two-state solution remained as far out of reach as ever, and many now view the Oslo Accords as a spectacular failure. Putnam (1988)’s theory makes a distinction between voluntary and involuntary defection in understanding why Level I treaties fail to be ratified. Voluntary defection refers to a situation in which diplomatic actors defect on their promises in the absence of enforceable contracts. This problem presents itself in rational choice formulations of collective action, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Putnam, 1988). Conversely, involuntary defection occurs when actors cannot fulfill their promises due to a lack of ratification (Putnam, 1988). I posit that both voluntary and involuntary defection are plausible explanatory factors for the aftermath of
the Oslo Accords.

Firstly, the follow-up Oslo II agreements signed in 1995, which granted even more land to the Palestinians, were especially unpopular in Israeli Level II politics. The agreements were ratified by only a slim margin in the Knesset, and Rabin attracted scorn from conservative Likud opponents (Hermann, 2013). The hostilities directed towards Rabin culminated in Rabin’s assassination by a Zionist extremist in 1995 (Shlaim, 2005). This turn of events indicates involuntary defection. It can be theorized that Rabin and Arafat earnestly believed in the capability of the Oslo Accords to build a lasting peace, a vision that Rabin quite literally died for. However, there is also a more cynical perspective that suggests Rabin and Arafat signed the Oslo Accords without sincerely accepting the provisions of the agreement, in the hopes that they could continue to manipulate the other side. It is probable that some combination of involuntary and voluntary defection was in effect in the years following The Oslo Accords. The Accords allowed the Israelis and Palestinians to get their foot in the door for future negotiation and collaboration. Still, the balance of power was skewed towards Israel, allowing Israel to assertively backslide on promises without facing any major consequences, either domestically or from the U.S. Regardless of whether defection was voluntary or involuntary, it was the complicated landscape of Level II domestic politics in Israel and Palestine that prevented the Oslo Accords from being upheld. The divides within and between the Israeli and Palestinian populations encompass intersecting layers of win-sets held by different groups. This fact guarantees that virtually any Level I deal reached, regardless of its terms, would be contested by domestic audiences. As such, the Oslo Accords were inherently not fated to survive.

**U.S Win-Sets in the Oslo Accords**

American representatives were not present at the Oslo negotiations, but the U.S still assumed an active role in the peace process (Swenson, 2010). On September 13, 1993, the Declaration formed in Oslo was signed by Arafat and Rabin at the White House in a ceremony presided over by Bill Clinton. The infamous photo of Arafat and Rabin shaking hands on the White House lawn, while Clinton looks on messianically, is a symbol of U.S involvement in Israeli-Palestinian affairs. It was clear from the outset that any Level I deal brokered between Israel and Palestine would need to be approved according to the United States’ own win-sets.

Arafat and Rabin recognized that U.S intervention was unavoidable. Lieberfield (2008) notes that “each party believed it in the interest of its relations with the U.S. to secretly arrange for the U.S. to take credit for any accord they reached” (p. 137). The Oslo II Accords in 1995 were also signed in Washington,
under an even more conspicuous U.S presence (Swenson, 2010). As previously mentioned, the U.S had wider win-sets than the Palestinian or Israeli diplomats; American interests were fixated primarily on scoring any type of deal that might generate stability in the region, without the same self-doubt, apprehensions about Level II ratification, or emotionality that the principal actors were facing. Nevertheless, American foreign policy is traditionally biased towards Israel, and the U.S has been chastised by the international community on numerous occasions for its seemingly uncritical support and defense of Israel throughout Israel’s history (Swenson, 2010). On the other hand, Palestine was not even considered a state, and ceased to be a strategic partner for the U.S. Therefore, it may be inferred that priority for the protection of Israeli interests was implicit in American win-sets. Just as Rabin was vying for American support in his Level I negotiations, Clinton wanted to ensure that he did not alienate the U.S’ most formidable democratic ally in the Middle East. Any deal that seemed punishing to Israel would be less likely to gain support in Level II American politics, especially amongst Republicans.

The Role of Culture and Identity on Win-Sets in the Oslo Accords

Over the past several decades, political science discourse has taken a turn to embrace the roles of culture and social and psychological factors in diplomacy, as an alternative to more traditional frameworks like realism and rational choice (Mollov, 2001). Social scientific approaches are valuable in analyzing the case of the Oslo Peace Accords. For example, psychology might be a useful tool for determining what motivated Rabin’s and Arafat’s individual decisions to initiate the peace process. However, to understand the failure of the Oslo Accords more broadly, an examination can be made based on culture and identity. It is self-evident that the Israelis and Palestinians both feel a strong emotional and religious identification with the land that is designated as Israel. Jerusalem, as home to the holiest site in Judaism and the third holiest site in Islam, has consistently remained a contentious and highly charged theme in Israeli-Palestinian relations (Mollov, 2001). As a result, it is unclear whether Israeli and Palestinian Level I win-sets will ever harmonize on the status of Jerusalem. Moreover, the issue of nationalism continually undermines the peace process. Rynold (2008) found that much of Israelis’ support for the peace process was “not about Palestinian rights, but about security and the need to protect Israel’s identity as a Jewish and democratic state” (p. 10).

Zionism remains a fervent political force inside and outside of Israel (Hermann, 2013). Meanwhile, Palestinians feel passionate about the “right of return” and are moved by the ambition of statehood under a Palestinian national identity (Hermann, 2013). The sense of collectivist obligation to one’s cause, whether it be Zionist or pro-Palestinian, has interfered with Level I and Level II negotiations at Oslo and in other situations, and effectively stifled feelings of empathy for the other side (Mollov, 2001).

The United States clearly does not possess the same emotional stake in the Israeli-Palestinian
dispute as the main players. Even so, the U.S does have a vociferous civil society consisting of Arabs, as well as Jews, living in diaspora in the United States with strong attitudes about the issue and how the U.S should respond to it (Swenson, 2010). Any attempts to assess the U.S’ “cultural” role in the Oslo Peace Accords should refer primarily to American political or organizational culture, in order to describe how U.S presidential administrations generally feel the need to propagate American interests by asserting themselves in Israeli-Palestinian affairs. The U.S’ cultural image of itself as liberal international mediators or “world police” is a worthwhile further discussion to consider why the U.S had any role in the Oslo Accords in the first place.

Conclusion

The two-level games framework provides insight into how international negotiations were impacted by domestic politics in the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Peace Accords. The secrecy of the talks commanded the Israeli and Palestinian leaders to guess what their actual Level II win-sets were, and Arafat and Rabin fell short of a Level I deal that could be sustained in Level II politics. The divisiveness of the conflict, along with entrenched cultural and national ties to the land, ensured that any manifestation of a Level I deal arrived at between Israel and Palestine would be rejected by domestic audiences. The United States, though presenting itself as a disinterested moderator of peace, had its own interests and win-sets involved in reconciling the two parties, and especially in aiding Israel. The U.S was unable to realize its goals due to the complexity of politics in the Middle East. Over twenty-five years later, the three countries have still failed to align their win-sets, and the short-term hope inspired by the Oslo Accords has unfortunately dissolved.
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Building a Culture for the African Revolution: The Imagined Communities of Nkrumah and Nyerere in Early Independence Ghana and Tanzania by Ronny Blanchard

Introduction

The moment immediately following independence presents many challenges for the leaders of postcolonial nations. This postcolonial moment symbolizes freedom from an oppressive colonial administration and inspires optimism for many but uncertainty for all. Celebrations in the street are contrasted with the ghost of colonialism. Colonialism shaped African societies in remarkable ways: the economic, social, political, and legal systems, were affected to varying degrees by colonial control. The colonial period did not always have a significant impact throughout Africa and could often be overshadowed by other historical and social forces such as urbanization and gender relations. The aftermath of colonial rule and the achievement of independence left significant obstacles for new leaders to overcome and various sociopolitical forces they had to contend with. In the moment of independence, when there are seemingly endless possibilities for the new state, what can leaders of newly independent states do to attempt to unite their countries and strive for prosperity despite these monumental challenges? The answer reveals how grandiose ideas of freedom and a continent liberated from colonialism interplay with the realities of continuity and change from the colonial into the early independence periods.¹

Using Ghana and Tanzania² as case studies, this paper explores postcolonial nation-building within the theoretical frameworks set out by Benedict Anderson, Partha Chatterjee, and Frantz Fanon. I argue that

² In October 1964, Tanganyika merged with the island of Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania. See Priya Lal, “Maoism in Tanzania: Material Connections and Shared Imaginaries,” Chapter
Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere engaged with philosophical and intellectual discourses on statehood and decolonization to form revolutionary socialist ideologies based on their perception of “traditional African society” and modernity. Specifically, these processes played out in cultural spaces such as education, youth programs, and sports as methods to achieve their vision for their newly independent nations and a future liberated Africa. This paper will first discuss Frantz Fanon, Benedict Anderson, and Partha Chatterjee’s notions of postcolonial nationalism. It will then attempt to understand the revolutionary African socialism that emerged through Nkrumah’s Philosophical Consciencism and Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* ideologies. Finally, this paper will explore cultural Africanization programs in newly independent Ghana and Tanzania – which were aimed at promoting African culture throughout various aspects of the nation including in economic, political, and social spheres. Nkrumah and Nyerere engaged culture in various forms, such as sport and youth. Youth programs, such as the Youth Brigade and Young Pioneers in Ghana and the TANU Youth League in Tanzania, played a central role in the enforcement of national culture programs because the youth represented the possibility of a brighter future. The nations’ youth were to lead their respective nations, and in many respects all of Africa, to freedom from colonial oppression. Youth and youth programs were also embedded within the struggle to define modernity and citizenship within their newly postcolonial nation-states.

**Imagining a Nation: A Framework for National Culture**

Setting the theoretical framework is this paper’s first step in understanding postcolonial nation-building and Africanization. Frantz Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth* and Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* – balanced with critiques from Partha Chatterjee’s *The Nation and Its Fragments* – provide the framework for exploring coloniality and postcoloniality. These terms encompass nationalism and national culture; they attempt to convey what it means to be a colonial subject and the state of the postcolonial person. Anderson and Chatterjee present general concepts useful for framing nationalism, while Fanon inserts a specific postcolonial analysis that helps frame Nkrumah and Nyerere’s ideological leanings and actions regarding national culture. This paper does not argue that Nyerere and Nkrumah based their ideologies on these concepts, but rather uses Fanon, Anderson, and Chatterjee as a framework for exploring the cultural-political thought of Nkrumah and Nyerere.

In his book, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Anderson presents nations as “imagined communities,” which is useful for understanding nationalism. He claims nationalism and national bonds should be understood in the same vein as religion or kinship; the
connections and sense of belonging is an abstract umbrella under which patrons occupy a horizontal comradeship. Of course, the reality of national bonds is much more complex. Exploitation and inequality are rampant, but since these connections are imagined, the reality is generally overlooked. The nation is imagined because its members share a common sense of community even though they will never know most of their fellow community members. Nations are envisioned as limited because it has finite boundaries and numerical limitations; no one imagines their nation could contain all of humankind. The nation is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in the age of European Enlightenment and increasing globalization that accompanied colonial expansion. These forces threatened universal religious ontologies by presenting them with the possibility of pluralism even within their own religion – such as the protestant revolution.

Partha Chatterjee critiques Anderson’s idea of nations as imagined communities. For Anderson, there are three models of nationalism – based on western Europe, Russia and America – that act as the basis for the rest of the world, but Chatterjee does not want to restrict non-Western nationalism to Western models. When one applies Anderson’s modular approach globally, it reduces the agency of the colonized and paints them as incapable of generating conceptions of nationalism. If early nationalists selected preferred elements from Western European, Russian, or the American models of nationalism, then the imagined community would not have anything left to imagine for themselves, thereby imprinting colonial ideas in the minds of colonized nationalists in the global south. Chatterjee argues that the colonized imagined the “national culture” and implementation of nationalist ideas before and after gaining political sovereignty, showing that nationalism is more than a political movement, it is also a cultural movement. The colonized utilize the power of the “inner” domain to create their own culture and challenge the material realm of the colonizers. The inner domain generally emphasizes the moral and or religious superiority of the colonized over the economic and military supremacy of the colonizers. Through this lens, Nkrumah and Nyerere become generative rather than derivative. Balancing Anderson’s notion of imagined communities with Chatterjee’s revisions allows a deeper exploration of Nkrumah and Nyerere’s imagining of their postcolonial nations.

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5 Anderson, 123.
Fanon claims that everyone under colonial rule must unite to spread global socialism and repel the evil forces of colonialism.\(^8\) A vital aspect of this rejection lies within culture: rejecting Western culture and embracing African culture. For Fanon, the only true culture is that of the revolution;\(^9\) any other culture symbolizes the false existence experienced under colonial control. African culture affirms European culture unconditionally, which means both groups cling to an unreal culture that only exists in the context of colonialism.\(^10\) Colonialism insists that the Black society lacks culture. This insistence inevitably leads to a glorification of cultural phenomena that become continental instead of national and singularly racialized. The colonizers see African countries as a homogenous “Africa,” diminishing the diverse reality. Culture becomes increasingly disconnected from reality. It finds sanctuary in a “refuge of smoldering emotions” and has difficulty constructing a “straightforward path that would, nevertheless, be the only one likely to endow it with productiveness, homogeneity, and substance.”\(^11\) Productiveness and homogeneity are key; this is the challenge for any “national culture.” The culture of the revolution is the people’s untied struggle against oppression.\(^12\)

Fanon further argues that the colonizer strips the colonized of their culture, so the “colonized intellectuals” aim to assert that their culture does exist. In this way, a postcolonial leader must fill the void left by the colonization – and therefore the disintegration – of their culture. When the primary commonality between members of these nations is hatred of colonial rule, it leads to an anti-identity or anti-culture that rallies together for sovereignty. An anti-identity, however, is unstable in the absence of a colonizer. Essentially, the question remains: “We have gained independence – what now?” This presents a challenge for the leader of newly independent nation-states because this instability means, in part, that over time, regional identities, sub-nationalisms, and separatist movements emerge or grow due to historical and contemporary political and social tensions not always related to independence itself. Yet, Fanon proclaims the message of unity to the colonized: “you may fear or be feared; that is to say, abandon yourself to the dissociations of a sham existence or conquer your birthright of unity.”\(^13\) Fanon sees the fate of the Third World as neo-colonial markets; he claims the colonized must reject this fate by choosing socialism and uniting against the capitalist regime that enslaved them for centuries.\(^14\) However, Fanon argues that efforts

\(^{8}\) Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Translated by Constance Farrington, New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1963, 11.
\(^{9}\) Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 12.
\(^{10}\) Fanon, 151.
\(^{11}\) Fanon, 154-5.
\(^{12}\) Fanon, 235.
\(^{13}\) Fanon, 21.
\(^{14}\) Fanon, 104-5.
to revive culture from the depths of history oppose history itself and the nation’s people because it circumvents the social, political, and economic reality that informs current culture.\textsuperscript{15} Fanon’s exploration of the culture of the colonized acts as a reference point for this paper’s examination of Nkrumah and Nyerere’s cultural and political philosophies.

**Shaping Imagination: Consciencism and Ujamaa**

Both Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere understood the importance of culture for decolonization and building a postcolonial nation and state. The nation refers to the community and the state refers to the governance apparatus, including institutions, a monopoly on violence among other things. Not everyone under the state’s control fit inside the nation, as well shall see. Nkrumah despised colonialism for its crude exploitation and overt dehumanization of Africans, which was achieved through psychological, coercive, and brutal methods and dislocated the Africans to the periphery of the European cultural and historical context.\textsuperscript{16} The British “civilizing mission” introduced education systems meant to instill “European” culture and values such as Christian theology, cosmology, and western individualism, thereby removing the African responsibility to the collective, connecting to any African identity, and showcasing the purity of European rule.\textsuperscript{17} By 1960, Nkrumah saw the need to utilize the institutional power of the state to revive African culture and the “African personality.”\textsuperscript{18} Dubbed “Philosophical Consciencism,”\textsuperscript{19} his ideology espoused the need for African unity to achieve the second stage of the African revolution: the socio-economic transformation of Africa.\textsuperscript{20} Socialism is accordingly seen as the ideal African society because it is predicted on communal identity\textsuperscript{21} but must be critically engaged to capture traditional African life’s “communal spirit.”\textsuperscript{22} Culture becomes the true basis for the people’s history.\textsuperscript{23} Nkrumah’s perception aligns with Fanon’s in that he views culture as the only means through which a true African revolution can be achieved because the actual colonization was one of culture rather than merely political domination.

\textsuperscript{15} Fanon, 225.
\textsuperscript{17} Botwe-Asamoah, *Nkrumah’s Politico-Cultural Thought and Politics*, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{18} Botwe-Asamoah, 8.
\textsuperscript{19} Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, 69.
\textsuperscript{20} Botwe-Asamoah, 9.
\textsuperscript{21} Botwe-Asamoah, 17.
\textsuperscript{22} Botwe-Asamoah, 19.
\textsuperscript{23} Botwe-Asamoah, 38.
Consciencism fits within Chatterjee’s perception of postcolonial nationhood and national culture because it emphasizes the spiritual aspects of the African to advance the revolution; it also implies the formation of a new collective consciousness and the definition of a new cultural identity.

Nyerere’s vision of African socialism also harkens back to “traditional” African society. He frames socialism not as a solely political movement but as a state of mind. Socialism is not necessarily about how wealth is generated; it is about the distribution of the wealth created and how society cares for its members – especially the poor. In this imagined community, both the rich and poor are secure within society; neither has to try to hoard wealth to survive because any wealth generated by the land, tools, and workers belongs to the community instead of the landlords. In Nyerere’s perception of traditional African society, capitalists and loiterers do not exist because “everybody was a worker,” meaning everyone was equally responsible for contributing to the society, or they did not reap the rewards and certainly could not benefit more than their peers. Nyerere states, “in our traditional African society we were individuals within a community,” and, in order to regain societal “African roots,” Tanzanians must re-educate themselves. Furthermore, the nation must share in the labour necessary to make Tanzania prosperous once again. Whereas European socialism is based on the Agrarian and Industrial revolutions, African socialism is based on extended family and kinship instead. This is “Ujamaa:” familyhood; it is the foundation for Nyerere’s African socialism. Ujamaa was influenced by Maoism rather than European socialist models because it had more in common with “peasant socialism” than Marxist industrial socialism because it focused on rural agrarian development. Nyerere sees Ujamaa as the cultural means to restore Tanzania to its former prosperity.

The nations that Nyerere and Nkrumah imagined surrounding the period of their independence were not merely based on European, Russian, or American models, but instead were premised on their understanding of “traditional” African society and culture. The relative uniqueness of African socialism, or Afrosocialism, is crucial because it highlights Chatterjee’s argument that the colonized can imagine their own communities in the form of nations and ideologies; it reasserts African agency concerning nation-building. One of the main commonalities between Ujamaa and Consciencism is the rejection of European capitalism and the emphasis on collective economic and social development. The nationalization of banks and the provision of credit to peasants were critical components of Nyerere’s vision, and they reflect the transformative potential of socialism for Africa.

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24 Botwe-Asamoah, 42; Nkrumah, 68.
25 Botwe-Asamoah, 43.
26 Nyerere, 1.
27 Nyerere, 2.
28 Nyerere, 4.
29 Nyerere, 5-6.
30 Nyerere, 6.
31 Nyerere, 9.
32 Nyerere, 12.
models of socialism because they are predicated upon capitalism; they are based on European understandings of class and historical development that, according to Nkrumah and Nyerere, do not apply to their respective nations and Africa more broadly. Nkrumah argues that the social dynamics within a capitalist society – the bourgeoisie continuously exploiting the proletariat – are similar to those of masters and slaves or lords exploiting serfs. True socialism cannot develop out of capitalism because it would remain exploitative. Nyerere frames Afrosocialism similarly: based on African communalism rather than European individualism.

Nkrumah and Nyerere both emphasize the importance of inner domains – as defined by Chatterjee – such as the mind and spirit of the nation. Their conceptions of socialism are generally continental in scope; socialism is a means through which Africa and Africans can unite to free themselves from colonialism and imperialism, which fits within Fanon’s framework. Conveying the “Africanness” of these socialist ideologies is crucial to understanding how these leaders perceived and engaged with African history and culture in combination with the modern present to adapt to the challenges of the times. Nyerere, for example, wants to keep the essence of traditional African society while incorporating modern elements of production to guide the nation into a prosperous future. Notably, he also recognizes that the traditional culture on which Ujamaa is based has some “inadequacies,” such as the perceived inferiority of women and generalized poverty. This shows that they are imagining their communities, as Anderson suggests, but they are using their own history and culture rather than relying solely on the imagination of Europeans. Nkrumah and Nyerere envision nations that capture the spirit of Africa and reject capitalism and colonialism. Both change and continuity across the independence divide showcase the reflection and discourse of the governments’ relationship to the governed and the possibilities for postcolonial societies. During the late colonial and early independence eras, African intellectuals attempted to locate Africa’s place in the modern world.

Creating the Nation: Africanization and National Culture

Thus far, we have seen how Nyerere and Nkrumah imagined their nations’ futures free from imperialism and capitalism. Now it remains to be seen how they sought to implement their visions. The

34 Nkrumah, 73.
35 Nyerere, 6-7.
36 Nyerere, 50.
37 Nyerere, 110.
38 Nyerere, 109.
40 Hunter, 365.
primary method Nkrumah and Nyerere used to create their imagined communities was a system of policies and programs, which together are known as “Africanization programs.” These programs were common among newly independent African nations and were generally targeted at transforming the country culturally, economically, and politically to be more African, but had parallel objectives of promoting unity and bolstering the new leader’s legitimacy.  

These programs were central to many leaders’ agendas because they allowed them to tackle multiple socio-political issues at once. Embedded within these programs were attempts to secure and legitimize the power of the President, both among constituents and former colonizers, reorganize the economy, and replace European civil servants with Africans. Early independence policies and programs demonstrate the intersectionality between the ways in which leaders engaged with notions of legitimacy and how they attempted to grapple with the political, economic, and social legacies of colonialism to shape the nation according to their visions. Anti-colonial ideologies revolved around reasserting African culture into the nation because leaders like Nkrumah and Nyerere saw that as the foundation upon which social, economic, and political prosperity would be built. To transform the national culture, both men looked to state institutions to promote their socialist agendas.

After achieving independence from Britain in 1957 and 1961, respectively, Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) and Nyerere’s Tanganyika (Tanzania) African National Union (TANU) became responsible for mass education. Rather than perpetuate the colonial education system, Nyerere wanted to utilize education to imprint Ujamaa values into the minds of the next generation of Tanzanians. Nyerere thought the purpose of education was to “prepare the young people for their future membership of the society and their active participation in its maintenance or development.” Nyerere’s Tanzanian government modified the inherited colonial education system by removing racial and religious distinctions, expanding education facilities, and making curricula more “Tanzanian.” Making education more Tanzanian entailed teaching “national songs and dances” as well as the national language – which was proclaimed to be Swahili. Post-independence education in Tanzania was aimed at encouraging the principles of Ujamaa, such as equality, dignity, and communalism for the purposes of self-reliance. Education reforms also had

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43 Nyerere, 44.
44 Nyerere, 45.
45 Nyerere, 48-9.
46 Nyerere, 52.
goals of promoting an inquiring mind, the ability to adapt others’ ideas to one’s needs, and basic confidence in one’s position in society.\textsuperscript{47}

Beyond updating the national education systems, engaging the youth more broadly through youth leagues was a tactic used by Ghanaian and Tanzanian governments. In Tanzania, the ruling TANU party established the TANU Youth League (TYL) to promote national culture among the new generation of Tanzanians; it was primarily aimed at young men. “Operation Vijana” encapsulates the TYL’s focus on national culture and partisan loyalty. Andrew Ivaska argues that this operation represented a crucial moment in the discourse on national culture.\textsuperscript{48} The operation was launched in 1968 in Dar es Salaam to eliminate and regulate culture that was seen as antithetical to the national culture. Interestingly, it named youth as both the enforcers and targets of the campaign – hence the codename “Vijana,” which is loosely translated from Swahili into English as “youth.”\textsuperscript{49} TYL leadership specifically wanted to promote ideas such as defined gender roles, heshima (respectability), and uhuni (immorality, indecency) to the nation’s youth.\textsuperscript{50} The program was aimed at policing “indecency” among women and eliminating perceived laziness, decadence and corruption among generally unemployed boys and young men.\textsuperscript{51} Operation Vijana was launched partially to eliminate the negative elements of popular youth culture and promote the positive elements of national culture, as outlined in Nyerere’s Ujamaa agenda.

There were two aspects of post-independence Dar es Salaam revealed through this operation. The first was the debate over the “national culture” relative to TANU’s political goals of nation-building and Tanzanians’ engagement with the broad concept of “modernity.”\textsuperscript{52} As part of this policing of youth popular culture, the League banned mini-skirts, wigs, and tight male trousers.\textsuperscript{53} The policing of women’s clothing represented a wider urban struggle to redefine gender roles in rapidly changing urban environments – where women could gain financial freedom and enjoy increased mobility from men.\textsuperscript{54} Supporting this operation were bands of armed young men who capitalized on their proximity to the state to conduct legitimized violence and political espionage to carry out the will of the party; they would also use it to support their member’s socio-economic status, even if it meant going against the party’s goals.\textsuperscript{55} The discourse

\textsuperscript{47} Nyerere, 53.
\textsuperscript{48} Ivaska, 588.
\textsuperscript{49} Ivaska, 584.
\textsuperscript{50} Ivaska, 585.
\textsuperscript{51} James R. Brennan, “Youth, the TANU Youth League and Managed Vigilantism in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, 1925-73,” \textit{Africa} (London. 1928) 76, no. 2 (2006), 238.
\textsuperscript{52} Ivaska, 603.
\textsuperscript{53} Brennan, “Youth, the TANU Youth League,” 238.
\textsuperscript{54} Ivaska, 603.
\textsuperscript{55} Brennan, 233.
surrounding Operation *Vijana* and the creation of national culture in Tanzania represents the complexity and challenge Nyerere faced while attempting to actualize his vision of a nation built on the principles of *Ujamaa* while also balancing the ongoing tension between the disparate groups who want to define said culture and the nation’s place within the wider modern world.

In Ghana, Nkrumah formed the National Workers Brigade and the Ghana Young Pioneers to instill socialist values in children and young people. These organizations represented Nkrumah’s attempt to harness the youth’s power to affect social change to instill the social values of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) into the next generation of political leaders and to solve major issues such as youth unemployment. Peter Hodge notes that youth unemployment became an issue partially because the expansion of education systems since 1957 and the high proportion of the population under the age of 15 outpaced economic growth, resulting in more (somewhat) educated workers than jobs available. These unemployed young men were thought to be provoking gang violence and separatist movements. In response, the CPP government established the National Worker’s Brigade in September of 1957, which, in addition to giving the unemployed “useful occupation,” gave the youth “an opportunity to give patriotic service in the development of the country” and to execute the government’s infrastructure projects. Women were also eligible but were trained in cooking, cleaning, and other traditionally feminine skills. After a few years, from 1960-2, the Brigade shifted to more explicit instilling of agricultural training and discipline in youth because the government thought that ideological education would be a more effective method of boosting agricultural output (for the national economy and to trade intra-continentally) and patriotism among that age group. Established in 1961, the Ghana Young Pioneers program aimed to inform socialist and nationalist values in young children starting in elementary school. In many ways, the Young Pioneers succeeded the Worker’s Brigade because it became the dominant youth organization Nkrumah’s government used to instill Consciencist values in adolescents and children. The Brigade and the Pioneers took on a para-military structure, and they were occasionally used to quell political dissent or riots, which shows the state weaponizing the nation. These two programs represent how Nkrumah attempted to build a national culture and solve practical issues by engaging the nation’s youth.

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58 Hodge, 115.
59 Szymkowski, 30-1.
60 Hodge, 125.
The Ghanaian government used other forms of culture to promote the development of a national culture, such as sports. Soccer has long been the most popular sport in Ghana, so, unsurprisingly, Nkrumah would wield its cultural power to further his political goals. The newly formed “Black Stars” Ghanaian national team represented his ambitions of unified national consciousness and pan-African cooperation.62 The game was featured heavily in independence and cultural celebrations. Nkrumah established the Ghanaian Amateur Football Association (GAFA) in 1957, which included two teams from each of the four major municipalities – Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi, and Cape Coast – and was instrumental in the implementation of his goal for the game. The Ministry of Education and Information oversaw football’s incorporation into education curricula63 and attempted to mobilize the youth to support Nkrumah’s political goals.64 Nkrumah sponsored intracontinental football tournaments such as the Africa Cup of Nations and international matches to support cooperation between African nations.65 Intercontinental matches were also a showcase for the African revolution; the Black Stars played European teams, such as the English FA and Fortuna Dusseldorf, in Ghana and Europe66 to promote a united African consciousness.67 Nkrumah attempted to cultivate a national culture – and indeed an “African personality” – by channelling football’s popularity and social power.68 He saw football as a cultural tool to realize his imagined community.

Conclusion

Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere engaged with various intellectual, philosophical, and historical sources when envisioning their postcolonial communities; they were not simply borrowing European models of socialism. The assertion of African culture against colonial and racist efforts to diminish it was foundational to the socio-economic transformation of Ghana and Tanzania in the aftermath of European colonial rule. Nkrumah’s Philosophical Consciencism was the basis for his revolutionary African socialism; African culture was seen as the key to ushering in the next phase of the African revolution. Similarly, Nyerere engaged with this understanding of traditional African society when formulating his concept of Ujamaa. Whether or not these ideologies were based on accurate interpretations of traditional African society is not as important as the ways in which Nkrumah and Nyerere understood

63 Darby, “‘Let Us Rally Around the Flag,’” 233.
64 Rosbrook-Thompson and Armstrong, 294.
65 Darby, 235-6.
67 Rosbrook-Thompson and Armstrong, 296.
68 Rosbrook-Thompson and Armstrong, 294.
and applied their knowledge to further their political goals. To achieve the imagined vision of their nations, both leaders attempted to institutionalize culture by establishing youth programs, reforming education systems, and channelling popular culture such as football. These attempts often became entangled in grassroots efforts to define the nations’ culture and Africa’s place in the modern world as well as other forces like urbanization and gender relations. Fanon, Anderson, and Chatterjee offer insightful frameworks to examine these efforts to formulate national and pan-African consciousnesses for the African revolution. Fanon’s notion that attempting to retrieve culture from the past results in further dislocating the contemporary revolutionary culture is compelling when considered from the perspective of leaders like Nkrumah and Nyerere, who were trying to do so to present an aura of authenticity. From their perspectives, retrieving cultural elements from African history was one of a few methods available to garner mass support and channel the revolutionary culture to which Fanon refers towards furthering their political goals – which they understood to be the creation of a revolutionary African culture.
References


A Marxist Analysis of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election by Alexander Macnab

Only months after the controversial “Brexit” vote in the U.K, the 2016 U.S Presidential election surprised the world when Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton to become the 45th American President. Media predictions had been heavily favouring Clinton for the duration of the campaign, forcing political experts to re-examine their predictive polling strategies after the upset. The key factor that was missing from these inaccurate pre-election assessments was an analysis of the structural factors that supported the Republican candidate. The methodology for this paper will utilize a Marxist analysis with primary and secondary sources, while still acknowledging the limitations of Marxist theory, to show that Donald Trump’s win (and Hillary Clinton’s loss) was the inevitable result of capitalist, class-based societal division. This war against labour manifested in various ways: the consolidation of capital’s control of the levers of American political power; the financialization and deindustrialization of the American economy; the war waged against the left and working class; and, with support from long-standing capitalist institutions like the electoral college. These elements of class warfare allowed Trump to win by taking advantage of public disillusionment with ineffective traditional political solutions and the questionable track record of the Democratic Party to act on behalf of the working class, despite receiving less votes than his opponent.

An intentionalist analysis of the election results would suggest that Trump’s surprise victory was the result of his direct actions, however, the structural forces on agents involved were overwhelming. The conditions described below will demonstrate how the election was vulnerable to an outsider candidate, highlighted by Bernie Sanders outperforming expectations in the Democratic Primary. Trump was also structurally compelled to seek the office of U.S President, as his net worth is primarily based on name recognition (the Trump brand), and the presidential race would give him the highest possible public profile. Some observers believe Obama could have done more with his administration to improve conditions and slow anti-establishment sentiment by implementing programs like public healthcare, but based on institutional precedent from the Democratic Party, insurance companies, and Congress, progressive policy
aims would have faced severe structural limitations and opposition. Certainly, there were moments of agency to the 2016 election, candidates had to decide to run, and Trump had many spontaneous moments on the campaign, but the numerous structural factors on agents set conditions that would have been difficult to resist.

A historical material analysis of economic conditions in America provides an understanding of how they have declined over the past 50 years. Income inequality in the aftermath of the industrial revolution led to a socialist and anti-establishment political party thriving during the early decades of the 20th century. Over the course of the four-term FDR administration, a “New Deal” was enacted that saw the wealth generated from increases in labour productivity shared between labour and capital. Marx would have predicted that this bargain would inevitably collapse, as he believed capital and labour to be irreconcilable, and it did, beginning in the late 1970s. By this time, as Marx also predicted, profits began to decline, falling in all sectors from 15.5% to 9.7% between 1967 and 1978 (Bluestone, 1988, p. 38). The redistribution of wealth that occurred from post-war reconstruction was coming to an end, few markets and resource deposits were left to discover and exploit, and other causes such as traditional competition and competitive advantages all forced margins down. After 1970, labour was denied any of the wealth generated from increased productivity and wages stagnated, a critical factor in the dramatic rise in the gap between the rich and the poor (Economic Policy Institute, 2021). President Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980 under similar conditions as Trump, benefiting from the electorate’s rejection of the Democratic Party’s neoliberal turn (Smith, 2021, p. 284). Reagan accelerated a new conservative movement that advocated for the privatization of government services and coordinated attacks on the working class. Capital’s influence over all levels of government ensured that economic debate – the base – had been almost completely removed from political discourse, leaving debate restricted to issues of superstructure and therefore, according to Marx, ineffective at making meaningful change.

Bipartisan international trade agreements became prevalent in attempts to increase market sizes for productive industries, loosening the restrictions on capital flow across international borders. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and other various pacts shifted the economies of participating countries as some businesses thrived, others collapsed, and capital consolidated on a global scale. By implementing these trade deals, the U.S faced major de-industrialization as manufacturing jobs moved to countries with cheaper labour and larger profits. Between 1969 and 1976 over 22 million American jobs were eliminated, 39% of all jobs in 1969 (Bluestone, 1988, p. 31). Economists have suggested that de-industrialization was the prime driver in the decline of wages (Elsby, Hobijn, & Sahin, 2013). Commercial infrastructure across the country remains unused or has been
refitted for modern corporations like FoxConn (Hung, 2014), the company famous for requiring suicide prevention nets below the windows surrounding their manufacturing plants (Ye, 2010).

Other economic shocks and crises have frequently occurred over the last 50 years. The OPEC oil crisis caused oil and gasoline prices to skyrocket as states with extraction-based economies exerted political pressure by manipulating the fuel supply in 1973. Economic crises occurred again in 1980 and 2008, further accelerating conditional decline. The enormous $800 billion dollar bipartisan defense budget is not open to scrutiny – the last defense budget bill prior to Trump’s inauguration passed in the Senate 92 to 7 (Zengerla, 2016), even though recent polls show that a majority of all voters (including 50% of Republican voters) support at least at 10% decrease in military spending (Pocan, 2020). Most health care is provided as a public service in industrialized nations, but in America care providers and pharmaceutical corporations wield large amounts of wealth and political power and keep the industry largely privatized. This leaves many Americans either priced-out or bankrupted by basic medical treatment. Economic precarity is a fact of American life and desperation for a political solution has only increased as conditions worsen.

Marxist theory suggests that the working class would resist this deterioration of conditions while working towards socialist revolution, but this has not manifested because violent anti-communist Cold War attitudes removed anti-capitalism from political possibility for the left in America. McCarthyism was weaponized against leftists and radical labour was purged from union membership and positions of power in the late 1940s and 1950s, including national organizations like the United Auto Workers (UAW) and Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) (Breitzer, 2009). Activists were targeted by the FBI, infiltrating and subverting organizations like the Communist Party, the Black Panther Party, and others, even famously attempting to blackmail Martin Luther King Jr into committing suicide. Without the political analysis and organized resistance these activists would have provided, the public has been left with a confused (or as Marx would say, lumpenproletariat) understanding of the consequences of capitalism. Despite this lack of comprehension, Americans have not stopped feeling the negative effects of declining conditions and further alienation from their labour.

The Democratic Party has also been associated with advancing the interests of the working class since FDR, but this is not typically true. After profits began to decline, one-term Democratic President Jimmy Carter looked to policies of austerity to improve economic conditions (he was defeated by Reagan in 1980). The Clinton administration radicalized neoliberalism by cooperating completely with Republicans on economic policy. His administration ratified NAFTA, the unpopular trade agreement that sparked protests in the 1990s, culminating in the Battle of Seattle in 1999 that saw tens of thousands of protestors riot outside of a World Trade Organization conference. Political observers believe that event
helped form the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011 when hundreds of thousands of people occupied public spaces around the world to protest worsening economic inequality (Stamper, 2011).

Barack Obama was elected in 2008 by a large majority, running a campaign advocating for a type of Gramscian consent that would see labour satisfied with economic reforms. Despite the Democratic Party’s super-majority in Congress, Obama has been criticized for a lack of significant legislation during his administration. He disappointed many supporters less than a year after his inauguration announcing that he would not pursue a public health care option that would have alleviated some economic pressure from Americans (MacAskill, 2009). Instead, Obama enacted the Affordable Care Act (ACA), a program that applied financial penalties for those that did not obtain private insurance coverage. In 2017, 46% of Americans viewed “Obamacare” unfavourably for several reasons, including the complexity of navigating the insurance system and the high rates and deductibles (Rovner, 2017).

Obama has been credited with stabilizing the American economy in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, but some critics believed his solutions did not go far enough in demanding concessions from tax-funded bailout recipients such as the auto industry and wall street (Greenwald, 2013). The housing market crash and foreclosures from the 2008 crisis caused a massive decline in wealth and African Americans were hit disproportionately hard (Bruenig & Cooper, 2017). The gig economy also emerged during the Obama administration as Silicon Valley utilized modern technology to further reduce pay and benefits for workers. The Democratic Party repeatedly failed to change the trajectory of American life and by 2016, any Democratic candidate would have had a difficult campaign offering a continuation of the policies of the Obama or Clinton administrations. Hillary Clinton was uniquely connected to both, being the husband of one and the Secretary of State for the other. As a result, at least 5.7 million Americans that had voted for Barack Obama in 2012 voted for Donald Trump in 2016, and for many, this was due to the attraction to a shift in economic policy (Morgan & Lee, 2019). Some political scientists attribute Trump’s win to economic factors more than any other, suggesting that the relative improvement of the economy since the 2008 financial crisis was not enough to reverse the deeper economic decline (Ferguson, Page, Rothschild, Chang, & Chen, 2020).

Trump was able to capitalize on these political conditions in several ways. Using the charisma of a New York real estate billionaire, Trump’s offer to pursue Republican policy aims with no compromise to any values of the left or center became hugely popular with the Republican base. He dominated the Republican primaries and consistently held high approval ratings among Republicans throughout his administration (Gallup, 2021). Trump’s pitch to the general electorate deviated from traditional politics with two key tactics. First, he signaled to American voters that he was prepared to break from traditional political solutions. Trump denounced the types of policies that usually received bipartisan support,
attacking the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement that would see new tariff structures for America and Asian countries. Crafted under Obama, which Clinton had at one time intended to ratify if elected (she reversed this position during the Democratic primary after pressure from the Sanders campaign) (Nakamura & Gearan, 2015), the deal sounded to many Americans like the trade deals of the past that fueled deindustrialization. Trump also used his platform to denounce the Iraq War, providing a blunt assessment of it as a mistake and appealing to those who had grown to see the wars in the Middle East and bloated defense budget as an expensive moral and tactical failure. Secondly, Trump attempted to emphasize this break from tradition by acting unlike any politician that the average voter was accustomed to. His unprofessional presentation deviated from all other political figures and provided an outsider, anti-elite image, which his campaign capitalized on. With enough voters believing that past administrations had failed to improve conditions, regardless of party, Trump’s deviation from norms captured the attention of Americans that had justifiably lost faith in traditional (superstructural or capital-friendly) political solutions.

It is important to recognize that capitalist control of American institutions pre-dates the World War period and was built into the foundation of the U.S government. The U.S Constitution was a document drafted by the wealthiest, property-owning men in the country, which entrenched the electoral college under Article II, Section 1. The electoral college is an electoral system in which the winning candidate receives the greatest number of votes by specially appointed Electors from each state. This gives states disproportionate electoral power, as those with large (Democratic leaning) populations like California and New York have less voting power than states like Montana or the Dakotas. Many understand this complex arrangement as a provision by the founding fathers to place a limitation on democracy from populist candidates (Beinart, 2016). Working in Trump’s favour, the electoral college allowed him to win despite losing the national popular vote by nearly 3 million votes (The New York Times, 2017). Capital was rewarded with massive tax cuts shortly after Trump’s victory (Hendricks & Hanlon, 2019).

The result of the 2016 Presidential election was not a surprise to those that understood the deterioration of material conditions in America since the 1970s. After labour’s defeat and profits declined, the deal between capital and labour was broken. Capital’s influence on government lifted international restrictions on investment that de-industrialized the nation and introduced policies of extreme austerity. Repeated economic shocks and crises widened the gap between the rich and poor in America, while the Democratic Party remained ineffective in stopping it. War against the left wiped-out class consciousness and removed the base from political debate. Decades of political neglect from Democrats and Republicans set the conditions for a public desperate for a political solution. Trump, also motivated by structural influences, took advantage of this desperation and presented himself as a unique political figure. With the
aid of the electoral college and a lack of enthusiasm for the Democratic candidate, Trump was able to capture enough disgruntled voters to win the election.
References


Introduction

The field of international relations, especially its prized speciality of security studies, tends to focus on militaries as cohesive, uniform institutions. Consequently, academic efforts investigating the global security order are biased towards militaries’ outward-oriented policy, rather than internal initiatives. Perhaps this conceptualization of the military as a black-box towards civilian society has itself created the conditions for the situation the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) now finds itself in. As only the latest “institutional crisis” to reach the Canadian public, the past year has seen several senior officers at the highest echelons of military leadership come under investigation for sexual misconduct (Connolly, 2021). This has led to the second external review of the CAF in just over five years on precisely the same issue of the institution’s pervasive prevalence of sexual violence, demonstrating a lack of progress in equitable change. There is considerable irony in how an organization frequently deployed abroad to defend women’s rights fails to provide the most basic notion of a safe working environment for its own servicewomen. While sexual violence is in and of itself a pressing issue, with devastating impacts on victim’s psychological and physical health, military career and success in the transition back to civilian life, there lies an opportunity to advance the argument for change by looking at this problem with an alternative, security-focused lens.

Security studies as a field are rich with a range of different theoretical frameworks. Each conceives a unique picture of the global security order with distinct referent objects and thereby distinct threats; security is, as Barry Buzan puts it; “an essentially contested concept” (1991b). The aim of this paper is not to privilege a specific set of theoretical lenses, but rather establish how contending conceptualizations of security are all able to point to the issue of systemic sexual misconduct within the CAF as a broader security vulnerability. Using realist and feminist security theories, this argument hopes to unequivocally frame
sexual violence against servicewomen as a security threat and thus strengthen the case for the need for urgent, progressive policy to address this pervasive issue.

**Theoretical Approach**

While there exists a rich pool of literature exploring the prevalence of sexual violence within the Canadian and American military context, there appears to be less focused on the wider implications of this issue and, especially, the theoretical analysis of these implications. Taking the developing crisis in the CAF specifically, a preliminary literature review revealed a lack of articles within the already underdeveloped body of international relations theory in the Canadian context (Lennox, 2010). Security studies as a wider field also tend to privilege security threats external to the state and its institutions, so the internal nature of systemic sexual violence within the CAF does not enjoy the same theoretical analysis as other proposed security threats. As the primary function of this paper is to provide a theory-based case for sexual violence to be considered as an insecurity, I will utilize both broader theory-focused security literature and investigations into the implications of sexual violence in the CAF to synthesize my argument.

The existing academic body for the two foundational security theories of this research is extensive, with both essential, time-proven work and more critical interpretations available for the realist and feminist schools of thought. For the realist component of this paper, I will include both conventional realism and Ken Booth’s contemporary approach of emancipatory realism (1991). As more of a broad family of theories rather than a single cohesive approach, diverse streams of realism will approach security threats differently, but they all maintain key assumptions of an anarchical international system and the importance of power (Glaser, 2019). Traditional realism asserts states as the referent object in the global security order and thus the lens of consideration for determining and defining security threats. Alternatively, Booth’s modern interpretation of realism contends that people and their emancipation is at the heart of security pursuits (1991). Together, these two distinct approaches will form the basis of the realist argument.

Feminist security theory, though overlapping in certain considerations with emancipatory realism, focuses its study on gendered systems and relations of power between people, structures and the greater global order. The feminist component of this paper’s argument will utilize concepts like the interconnected nature of family, national and international violence, hegemonic masculinity and comprehensive security (Tickner, 1992). The lack of peer-reviewed literature focusing on theoretical conceptualizations of military sexual violence as insecurity means that the discussion to follow will rely on a creative synthesis of sources. To establish that this issue manifests itself as a security threat, my argument will largely take the form of a thought experiment in applying theory to the case of the Canadian military.

**Analysis**

Sexual misconduct is the Department of National Defence’s organizational term for sexual violence and is defined as “[c]onduct of a sexual nature that causes or could cause harm to others, and that the person
knew or ought reasonably to have known could cause harm” (Department of National Defence, 2021). With sexual misconduct investigations ongoing against two former Chiefs of Defence Staff, two heads of military personnel, the incoming Army Commander, the head of the Military Intelligence School and the COVID-19 Vaccine Task Force Commander, the magnitude of this issue is evident (Connolly, 2021). However, sexual misconduct has long grieved the institution and soldiers within it. Various Canadian news outlets have triggered scandal with reports on sexual violence in the CAF published in 1998, 2014 and again in 2021 (Connolly, 2021). Despite the long-standing nature of the issue, little appears to have changed in the Forces, with 80% of current Regular Force members reporting they have witnessed or experienced sexualized or discriminatory behaviour by their colleagues (Cotter, 2016). The struggle for culture change against sexual misconduct encumbers militaries around the world, but scholars point to Canada as lagging behind other western democracies in their approaches to addressing this enduring issue (Vieira, 2021). While sexual violence is not solely perpetrated against women, there is a disproportionate scale of servicewomen’s victimization (Kennedy & Dingli, 2019). The unique issue of sexual assault by servicemen against their fellow male colleagues warrants discussion and further research, however, the scope of this paper will only permit a focus on sexual violence against women in the CAF.

Realist Security Theory

The realist argument for sexual misconduct within the CAF as a form of insecurity will be articulated in two parts: first, through a statist, conventional stream and then through Booth’s emancipatory interpretation of realism. The study of international relations has long been dominated by realist thought founded on power, interests and state-centric thinking. Conventional thinking conceives of institutions, national and international, as of little importance in the global security order – with one exception. Military security, and thus the military as a federal institution, has always been central to realists’ fundamental pursuit of security (Sheehan, 2019). As perhaps the only national organization conventional realists privilege in their analysis of security issues, the military continues to be of paramount importance. Even if a state maintains security over its economic, political, societal and environmental realms, “all of these accomplishments can be undone by military failure” (Buzan, 1991a). This security prioritization of the military and its functionality has clear implications for the systemic prevalence of sexual violence within this particular institution.

The CAF is currently short over 10% of its required strength, with substantial challenges in both recruitment and retention (Brewster, 2021). The Chief of the Defence Staff has explicitly pointed to the ongoing sexual misconduct crisis as a major contributor to this and has warned it may take several years for recruitment efforts to recover from the fallout. This means that the institution entrusted with Canadian national defence will go understaffed for the better part of a decade, and even those that continue to serve will be participating in a less productive defensive force. It is well-established that operational readiness
and battlefield success is predicated on unit cohesion and *esprit de corps* (Borch, 2000). For gender-integrated militaries, of which the CAF is one, ensuring this cohesion requires the eradication of sexual misconduct. Sexual violence creates hostile work environments that interfere with victims’ work performance, perpetuates abuses of power and creates an organizational health concern with 66% of victims displaying symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (*Sexual Assault and Violence Against Women in the Military and at the Academies*, 2007). The consequences these outcomes have on military effectiveness and security is only exasperated in the international, operational theatre – an environment where the rates of sexual misconduct against servicewomen are even higher than in domestic contexts (Hahn et al., 2021). With the makeup of women soldiers in the CAF stagnating at around 15% for almost two decades, there is evidence that sexual misconduct and other organizational culture harmful to women has become a significant barrier to targeted recruitment (von Hlatky, 2019). Women deployed on past missions to the Congo and Afghanistan offered a distinct strategic advantage in efforts of civilian-military cooperation and intelligence gathering (Bell, 2011). In this light, even state-centric, war-focused realists can theorize how the issue of systemic sexual violence in the CAF presents itself as a broader threat to national and military security. A military that perpetuates sexual misconduct within its ranks compromises operational effectiveness, force strength and mission readiness.

If conventional realists see sexual violence against women as the means to insecurity, the emancipatory stream sees it as the ends. Within this framework, Booth contends that while war has been historically seen as the central problem in international relations, there are other “silent destroyers of lives” of equal importance (1991). Within this stream of thought, true security comes from the emancipation of people – making them the referent object of this security lens. Among other goals, this humanistic approach to realism values non-violence and rights, and views failure to obtain these as a form of insecurity. Scholars in this school contend that there exists a tension at the centre of security studies between the strategic practices of the state and the insecurity of human beings (Shepherd, 2012). Emancipatory realism then offers a project predicated on the engagement of empowered actors like the state while still privileging the individual. The implications of structural sexual violence in the CAF within this theoretical framework are then obvious. If the end goal of Booth’s realism is to create conditions for emancipation, the long-standing, pervasive issue of sexual violence against servicewomen becomes a security threat hindering the ultimate goal of individual freedom and empowerment. The pitfall of much of security scholarship is that it requires an identifiable enemy through which security threats can be portrayed. Structural violence like sexual misconduct presents a challenge to this tradition, as there lacks a single identifiable force creating this insecurity (Shepherd, 2012). However, this idealistic interpretation of realism overcomes this by contextualizing security relative to an emancipatory goal. Meaning that any circumstance that inhibits
individual empowerment and freedom, such as systematic sexual violence, becomes the evidence in and of itself for the presence of a security threat.

**Feminist Security Theory**

Feminist security theory, though still a developing academic field, offers a slightly different approach to conceptualizing security. By first addressing the male-dominated nature of international relations, feminist scholar J. Ann Tickner explains how the field itself is biased towards issues that grow out of men’s experiences; the meaningful incorporation of women’s perspectives would demand a “radical redefinition” of security (1992). In this lens, hegemonic masculinity that glorifies a particular image of the stereotyped male warrior becomes a security concern in the way it reinforces expectations of gender that both men and women in the Forces fail to meet, and are consequently marginalized for. Feminist scholarship also moves considerations of violence beyond simplistic dichotomies of war and peace towards a definition of security more comprehensive than just the absence of war (Tickner, 1992). Emphasizing the interconnected nature of family, national and international security, feminist scholars assert that true security requires the elimination of violence at all levels – including gender-based violence like military sexual misconduct. In arguing that violence and security at these three levels are mutually influenced, the feminist school of thought unequivocally paints sexual violence within the CAF as a security threat with wider implications at the national and international levels.

If we assume that servicemen who commit sexual violence against their fellow servicewomen are more likely to do so against civilian populations in a conflict context, then the feminist argument finds further footing in framing this issue as a security threat. Conflict-related sexual violence against civilian women deeply erodes their capacity to participate in post-conflict public life (Clark, 2019). More than half of all peace agreements fail within five years of signature, but evidence shows that peace agreements are substantially more likely to be secured and endure when women are meaningfully involved in initial negotiations and post-conflict peacebuilding (*The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*, 2016). A work environment permissive of sexual misconduct then manifests itself as a compounding form of insecurity. Its systemic prevalence in the CAF means that deployed soldiers are individuals more likely to commit conflict-related sexual violence that compromises long-term peacebuilding and, thus, adds to global insecurity.

**Conclusion**

It is important to note that theoretical conceptualizations of sexual violence should not alone form the basis for reform. Even when combined and compared to produce a more complete picture of the world, theories are always simplifications (Nexon, 2005). Regardless of whether or not an issue is labelled a security threat by academic elites, it remains an existential threat for all those under its pressures (Shepherd, 2012). The purpose of my argument is to make the case that, either individually or collectively, there is a
theoretical basis to establish sexual violence within the Canadian military as a broader security threat. In approaching the problem of sexual misconduct with the tools of security scholarship, I hope to demonstrate the need for urgent, brave policy reform in this crucial institution.
References


Throughout the development of the international human rights regime, the creation and ratification of international treaties, conventions and/or covenants often leads to shifts in societal mores, standards, and social norms. Consider the ratification of The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), which encouraged more equitable and multicultural social norms in Canada; or consider the ratification of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which led Canadian and Provincial governments to introduce sweeping legislation promoting equitable hiring practices, including maternity leave and vital female health services. In these instances, there is a correlation between the ratification of these conventions and social progress. Yet, even as favourable shifts follow these conventions, such normative changes are not universal. In fact, while CEDAW and ICERD have positively reoriented the position of women and racialized persons, perceptions of refugees (and the rights they are endowed with) have deteriorated over time.

Fundamental to the Refugee Convention is the principle of non-refoulement: that ideas that refugees — defined as those with “well-grounded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” — will not be returned to their country of origin (Haggard, 2015). Once they have crossed a national border, according to this principle, refugees have a right to more than just physical safety. They should be entitled to as many rights as native citizens to the host country. Contrary to our modern understanding, the principle of non-refoulement includes the protection of economic and social rights. As such, refugee rights include basic freedoms, like freedom of expression, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, but also includes such rights as access to health services and the right to work. This paper examines the normative shift that has resulted in the degradation of the principle of non-refoulement — a development that has catalyzed the ostracization of refugees throughout the developed world. In the paragraphs that follow, I demonstrate the consequences of
this normative shift on the world stage and within a Canadian context; in particular, I illustrate the necessity of the non-refoulement principle to the preservation and protection of future of refugee rights.

If indeed the pervading normative view of non-refoulement has changed or deteriorated, it is first necessary to explain how it was once widely perceived. The principle of non-refoulement arose in the aftermath of World War II, stemming from the failure of the international community to provide a safe haven to refugee groups fleeing genocide at the hands of a brutal Nazi regime. Complicit in this abhorrent neglect was the Canadian government’s refusal of the M.S. St. Louis, a German vessel carrying approximately 937 Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany, into Halifax – a refusal which forced the return of these refugees back to Nazi Germany. At no other moment in history was the need for a check on state sovereignty more apparent. As a result, the principle of non-refoulement was born. At the height of its affirmation, the principle of non-refoulement was codified into the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951). According to this principle, once a refugee crosses an international border, the refugee has a right to more than just physical safety: they are entitled to the same rights as citizens to the host country. The 1951 Refugee Convention grants refugees equal access to important state institutions “including courts (article 16), public relief (article 23), labor markets (article 23), and elementary schools (article 22)” (Holtzer p, 842). Throughout the convention, the principle of non-refoulement is upheld as fundamental to the treaty and corresponding refugees/asylum-seeker rights. And yet, though the principle is described as a core liberal tenet, many scholars challenge its authority in practice.

In his compelling piece “From Right to Favor” Fassin claims that there has always been dissatisfaction with asylum seekers. According to the scholar, “the […] benevolent attitude of Western countries, in the two decades following the ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention was, Fassin argues, largely the result of two overlapping contingencies: the need for a workforce to rebuild European countries after World War II, and the political tensions associated with the Cold War” (Fassin, 2016). Fassin goes on to argue that the promotion of non-refoulement as a liberal virtue was, in fact, a sham: this rhetoric served the dual purpose of (1) allowing for a cheap workforce and (2) grounding western nations as voices of moral authority on the international stage. At the centre of this critique is the idea that non-refoulement is grounded on international rhetoric alone — rhetoric that presents the West as virtuous moral actors and conceals its instrumental motivations. If we assume the validity of Fassin’s critique, it holds that there was a push toward upholding non-refoulement — albeit for ulterior motives.

And yet, over the last several decades “the image of refugees has been transformed from victims of persecution entitled to international protection to undesirable persons suspected of taking advantage of a liberal system” (Fassin, 2016). This affirms the idea of how many European states increasingly perceive asylum — an idea once regarded as a right — as a favour.
It is possible that current suspicion of asylum seekers emerged out of the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the global financial crisis of 2008. These events certainly catalyzed a growing fear of ‘the (non-Western) other’ represented by migrants and refugees. Though this speculation does not explain the more extreme ostracization of refugees we see today.

Ormsby reflects on the decline of non-refoulement in the twenty-first century and considers the adoption of a variety of deterrence mechanisms, primarily used by Western nations, to mitigate or stop the flow of asylum seekers. These new deterrence mechanisms demonstrate a shift in the conception of “the refugee” from an individual fleeing the dangers of persecution to one who is attempting to take advantage of a liberal state’s immense resources. One of the principal refugee deterrence policies that states have pursued is the imposition of visa requirements for entry into a country (Ormsby, p. 1203). These effectively screen out many potential refugees by restricting entry access via ships and airlines. The prominence of “different refugee deterrence policies over the past three decades, as well as the increasing sophistication of these policies, reflects an increasing sense among many countries that the duties they bear toward refugees are a significant burden” (Ormsby, p. 1204). Ormsby’s assessment considers many of the tangible repercussions that result from the normative shift: however, they are concerned only with instances where there is a complete denial or external restriction on non-refoulement. But what happens when refugees are allowed within a host state, but not adequately protected? By understanding the half measures put in place by many states around the globe, we see how the deterioration of non-refoulement has worsened the current refugee crisis and contributed to exacerbating the negative perception of refugees.

Even when states accept the first part of non-refoulement (allowing an asylum-seeker entry), either out of moral obligation or because they lack other options, they often refuse to implement the principle in full (i.e., they withhold basic human rights granted to their own citizens). According to Holtzer, this denial has allowed refugee camps to become “a highly visible symbol of a failed human rights campaign” (Holter, p 837). While I admit that many refugee camps are noble in their attempt to preserve life, they nevertheless fail to provide those basic rights that are available to most citizens, such as the right to work. In “Refugee Livelihoods in the International Context,” scholars examine the concept of refugee self-reliance. The right to work has been highlighted as central to self-reliance for refugees (Brown et Al, p. 10). Globally, the right to work is protected in international refugee and human rights instruments, most notably in the UN’s 1951 Refugee Convention and 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (Brown et Al, p. 12). Although UNHCR has set out explicit obligations for host countries to allow refugees to live and work in cities, many host governments still possess restrictive policies on refugee work (Brown et Al, p. 10). Likewise, Christophersen, in his exhaustive work on the UNHCR, puts a spotlight on the right to education (article 22) and the intricacies of being a young refugee in a developing nation. He explains, for example, how the loss of one’s rights can happen by something as simple as misfiling paperwork:
Syrian refugees only have temporary status in Jordan for six months at a time, they have been granted the right to attend public schools [...] this right is easily disrupted, however, if the student’s family fails to re-register with the Jordanian authorities or UNHCR every six months (Christophersen p, 15)

Without valid registration, Syrian refugees lose the right to aid and other benefits such as access to health facilities and education (Christophersen p, 16). The onus becomes placed on refugees to justify the continued existence of their fundamental rights, contrary to non-refoulement, which assumes the priority of individual rights. There is a grim repercussion of this lived reality: the denial of supplementary human rights protections only exacerbates the negative perception of refugees and worsens the vicious cycle of victimhood experienced by the most vulnerable among us. When you deny an individual the right to work or the right to an education, as illustrated above, you create a system where there is a perpetual need for state assistance.

Closer to home, Howard, a Canadian scholar, discusses humanitarian, racial, economic, and ideological factors affecting Canada's asylum policy and procedure. These policies are used to illustrate the variety of factors the Canadian government considers when giving the right to asylum/refugee status. Howard criticizes the Canadian practice of “taking the best refugees and asylum seekers” (Howard p, 370). Canada disproportionately admits professionals and private entrepreneurs, while refusing entrance to those less skilled or educated. Howard also draws attention to the racial component of refugee acceptance that still exists today: Canada selects “races that are very hard workers, economically entrepreneurial, and unlikely to be politically active within Canada (Howard p, 370). Assuming the validity of Howard’s assessment, Canada — a supposed “advocate” for the international human rights regime — denies one of the founding principles of non-refoulement (and human rights itself): universality. By imposing such a litmus test, the Canadian Government replaces humanitarian obligation with economic interest. This manufactures a racial, political, and economic hierarchy of those who are deemed “worthy” of asylum.

In this paper, I have illustrated the changing perception of non-refoulement. I have illustrated the history of the principle, demonstrating how its unstable foundation, grounded upon rhetoric alone, offers little protection from the interest-based decision making it was meant to check. Not only have I demonstrated the deterioration of this principle in the context of the developed world, using examples of Syrian Refugees within Jordan, but I have also brought this issue closer to home, illustrating how Canada actively participates in undermining a principle it once championed. The world today has more displaced persons than ever before, yet, even as we see photos of asylum seekers wash upon the beach — blue in the face, cold to the touch, never having made it to the safe haven they so desperately needed — the world continues to remain silent. What happened? Has the bitter taste of remorse faded? Only by answering this
question can we truly begin to dismantle the underlying factor that fans the refugee crisis that we know today. Only then can we move forward toward a better world.
References


