

# PANGAEA

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# **Pangaea**

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## Editor's Note

Students of history are gifted with a broad knowledge of things, and an inextinguishable curiosity for truth. Just as archeologists search relentlessly for lost antiquities around the world, so do the undergraduate history students of Dalhousie University expertly navigate the various libraries of Halifax, and elsewhere, to uncover and illuminate facts about the past. Unlike students of other social sciences, who often find themselves lost in the ambivalent and subjective nature of their studies, we endeavour to clarify, rather than to complicate, the various puzzles that our contemporary academic communities struggle with.

For these reasons, I have had a great pleasure reading the numerous essays that were submitted to me this year and I hope you will agree that the varied topics covered in this journal make fine contributions to our common quest for truth. I must thank my editorial board for assisting me with the selection of these essays, as well as Dr. Shirley Tillotson and Dr. Jaymie Heilman for their words of advice. This publication of *Pangaea* showcases the diversity of thought and interest amongst Dalhousie University's undergraduate history students and I trust that you will learn as much reading these papers as I did editing them.

William E. Demers



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## The Man of Life Upright: Etiquette, Self-Mastery, and the Rise of the Victorian Bourgeoisie

Madeleine Cohen

In *The Gentle Life: Essays in Aid of the Formation of Character*, published in 1880, James Hain Friswen proclaims, “The men of one age are not those of another.”<sup>1</sup> This commonplace points to an ambivalence about the present, as it does the importance of the past, and the development of character that occurs in the nebulous space between the two. Citing the words of ‘a lady long known as a leader of society’ Friswen continues, “I really do not know what to make of the young men of the day...they cannot talk, they lounge about, and are not fond of company.”<sup>2</sup> These statements, as well as the anthology of social customs in which they appear, speak to a reliance on an understanding of the past as comfortable, unified, and unchanging, as contrasted to a chaotic, confusing, and fragmented present. It is within these distinctions that we find couched what Eric Hobsbawm refers to as invented tradition and the dialogue between past and present it creates. He writes, “‘Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a... symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour... which... attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.”<sup>3</sup> This ‘suitable historic past’ and the ceremony in

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<sup>1</sup> James Hain Friswen, *The Gentle Life: Essays in the Aid of the Formation of Character*, 26th Edition (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1880), 26.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1.5

which it is shrouded, come to serve as the basis for our judgments of the present; our very understanding of the world.

Etiquette - the rules of social and moral conduct - illuminates the importance of, and reliance on, tradition. It became the most 'suitable' element of the historic past. Prevalent throughout much of the nineteenth century, this call to tradition through etiquette provided a sense of a solid backdrop to the increasingly rapid technological, social, and political change of the Western world. England in particular, a nation deeply concerned with its historic past, came to view tradition and the value set it upheld, as the ultimate benchmark of any progress which hinted at deviation from it. In this way, etiquette provided an opening between the seemingly discrete worlds of past and present, as the manners of modern subjects uncertain about their place in society channelled the accepted views of past times. In the multivalent concept of etiquette in nineteenth century England, as well as its prescribed rules and precepts, we see the search for a kind of containment within, and distance from, a world caught in a seemingly endless spiral of rapid change which threatened not only a bold break from tradition, but its ultimate dissolution. This is largely characterized by a social code which privileged, above all else, comportment: cultivation, propriety, containment, discipline, and polish. The belief of those who subscribed to the doctrine of etiquette - namely an upper class anxious about losing its footing in a progressively levelled society and a rising bourgeoisie attempting to gain their own ground - was that the inner self could be moulded by the outer; humanity itself constituted by human behaviour. Etiquette was therefore about more than presenting oneself to the world as a dignified subject; it was about presenting oneself to the world, and to oneself, as a moral agent. Etiquette was therefore "taken from a moral point as well as from a conventional one" which governed as much as it guided, not only social behaviour, but mind, body, and spirit.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Anon., *Manners and Rules of Good Society or Solecisms to be Avoided by a Member of the Aristocracy, 14th Edition* (New York: Frederick Warne & Co., 1887), 3.



The inward turn such etiquette brought about would prove to be of extreme importance to the rising bourgeoisie, who sought both escape from, and distinction within, a society they considered too heavily embedded in stifling traditional practices of the past. By adding a profound moral, utilitarian, and pragmatic dimension to what was seen as more ceremonial social practices of the past, the bourgeoisie stressed the importance of both their own value set and their ability to achieve and mirror those values in the project they came to make of themselves. English men and women attempted, therefore, not only to present themselves as, but truly to become, English gentlemen and English ladies. They wished through these two distinct but related ideals, to be worthy of a lengthy and illustrious historical tradition, rather than to artificially or dishonourably inherit it. In this, they were reacting, and refusing to react, to a dramatically changing society. Members of the bourgeoisie saw in etiquette a path to reason, morality, and authenticity in the face of a world which challenged all three. Additionally, this path enabled the bourgeois to engage in a real dialogue with the past wherein they negotiated on their own terms what space tradition was to play in this rapidly transforming society and equally rapid change in their view of themselves. Fuelled by anxiety and buttressed by tradition, etiquette illuminated not only broader social change, but a radical shift in the modern understanding of the creation, significance, and epistemological place of the self.

The appeal to history and tradition is often suggestive of the need for solid footing in a time when society's very foundations have been shaken. This is most certainly the case for Victorian England, wherein rapid industrialization, political reform, and increasing social mobility significantly altered its internal functioning, as well as its place on the world's stage. Despite the sense of optimism which accompanied much of the large-scale change brought about during this time, many were touched negatively by its stymieing effects: "...the revolutions that shook Western culture were traumatic too for their beneficiaries; cheering on

the innovators, many confessed to a vertigo generated by the disappearance of familiar landmarks.”<sup>5</sup> Embraced for their forward movement as much as they were denounced for their departure, innovations of the nineteenth century sent English society reeling into an uncertain future. One reaction was a thrust towards rediscovering a more stable past. This tension between a desire to advance and the desire to retreat not only produced an atmosphere of anxiety, but fostered what Peter Gay refers to as an era of aggression. This climate, while affecting all of English society, was particularly potent for the rising bourgeoisie. In dealing with social and cultural uncertainties, we see a desire for certainty and a turn towards the individual in an attempt to find it. As Gay writes:

...we can appropriately call Victorian bourgeois aggressive not merely because their hunt for profits and power exacted grave social costs from sweated labor, exploited clerks, obsolete artisans, or maltreated natives, but also because they expended energies to get a grip on time, space, scarcity – and themselves – as never before.<sup>6</sup>

In redefining the world in which they lived, bourgeois Victorians were forced, in turn, to redefine themselves. In the process of so doing, more than notions of progress and capital were taken into account. The dramatic social change of the era forced individuals to come to terms with the degree to which they were shaped by those processes of change, and the degree to which they could shape themselves. In an attempt to carve some kind of space separate from a dizzying world of new social realities and old struggles, the Victorian bourgeoisie looked to themselves and the very essence of their humanity as the ultimate embodiment of, and escape from, society at large.

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<sup>5</sup> Peter Gay, *The Cultivation of Hatred* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993), 425.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

Implicit in this turn to the self is the importance of boundaries. Whether seen as a sequestering or constituting of the individual, a turn to self-mastery in the nineteenth century demonstrates an attempt to achieve some sense of self-space not made available in or by the broader social world. Despite the fact that the incitement to find such space had its roots in anxiety about social change, Gay argues that these aggressive attempts to self-fashion were not always negative. They were in fact, often quite the opposite, leading individuals to discover new modes and models of efficiency, knowledge, social improvement, and self-confidence, all of which were important issues for the Victorian bourgeoisie.<sup>7</sup> There is a sense in which a turning inwards as a reaction to external forces helped to foster an increasing rate of change in themselves. Whether against the aristocracy and working-class between which it was couched, in an appeal to greater morality, or stability, “[I]t was the middle ranks who erected the strictest boundaries between private and public space, a novelty which struck many early nineteenth-century travellers in England.”<sup>8</sup>

Determinately adhering to a value set prescribed by neither the upper nor lower class, the bourgeoisie attempted to safely and comfortably define their own arena in the midst of the moral decay they observed on both ends. Reacting to the lavish and illicit manner of the aristocracy, while at the same time desirous to channel the long tradition from which it stems, as well attempting to distance themselves from the general decay and degeneracy commonly associated with the working class, the bourgeoisie stressed rationality, productivity, and utility. In so doing, the bourgeoisie not only grounded itself in a tradition and a past they saw as an integral part of life, but admitted themselves to the change of the future. In this way, “the middle class view was

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<sup>7</sup> Gay, *Hatred*, 424-6.

<sup>8</sup> Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 359.

becoming the triumphant common sense of the Victorian age.”<sup>9</sup> As such, bourgeois self-mastery – the erection of boundaries and the spaces created therein – proved to be enormously significant, not only to class development, but to the way in which class came to engage with external factors which affected all members of society. As Peter Gay writes:

[m]astery simply gives pleasure. The gratified sense of closure, of sheer relief, experienced when one finally understands the workings of an intricate machine, solves an intractable riddle, gets a demanding skill securely in one’s grip, contrasts with its cheerless counterpart, frustration.”<sup>10</sup>

From the drawing of lines came more than a sense of pleasure about one’s newly discovered or solidified identity, particularly in comparison to others, or even an escape from the frustration brought about by the loss or dissolution of that very identity. For the Victorian bourgeoisie, it came to signify a reconstitution and new understanding of the very concepts on which that mastery was founded.

A similar charge can be made of the history and development of etiquette, which came to play a significant role in the formation of the new ‘space’ of the bourgeoisie. Founded on notions of civility, morality, and general conduct, the word etiquette came to take on a variety of meanings during the nineteenth century. Originating in the concept of civility, rules of correct conduct have undergone many transformations. The first popular usage of the word civility can be found in Erasmus’ *De civilitate morum puerilium*, published in 1530, in which it is “... associated with the notion of proper deportment...”<sup>11</sup> and “...spread the idea that propriety of

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>10</sup> Gay, *Hatred*, 425.

<sup>11</sup> Jorge Ardití, *A Genealogy of Morals: Transformations of Social Relations in France and England from the Fourteenth to Eighteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 2.

behaviour meant something important for the conduct of civil life – of life, that is, within the spheres of the body politic.”<sup>12</sup> As such, civility was centred on the idea of maintaining social order, guiding the manner of the individual so as to better guide that of society. It is here that an appeal to Norbert Elias’ work on the concept of civilization is useful, as he points to the significance of the factors and dimensions included in our very understanding of the word; that which we consider to lie in and outside the boundaries it sets out: “By this term Western society seeks to describe what constitutes its special character and what it is proud of: the development of its technology, the nature of its manners, the development of *its* scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more.”<sup>13</sup> To be civilized necessarily means, then, to adhere to the accepted social understanding of what civilization is; to be civil means to self-consciously give oneself to/be a part of society.

By the eighteenth century, however, the concept of civility as a socially governing power was replaced by that of etiquette. Previously, the notion of civility that predominated corresponded to “stages in a development” rather than constituting “an antithesis of the kind that exists between ‘good’ and ‘bad’”<sup>14</sup> - in other words, a slow unfolding rather than an immediate prescription. ‘Etiquette’ set out a more clearly defined system of rules and conventions which sought to denote that very black and white distinction, and in a punctuating fashion. Even the word etiquette, derived from the French word for ticket which denoted the “list of ceremonial observances of a court”<sup>15</sup> clearly demarcated which “forms of behaviour were necessary to be observed” and thus “what behaviour was, or was not, ‘the ticket.’”<sup>16</sup> Despite its clear-cut etymology, we must not suggest that etiquette – as both word

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Norbert Elias, *The History of Manners: The Civilizing Process, Volume I* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 4.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>15</sup> Oxford English Dictionary Online

<sup>16</sup> Friswen, *Gentle Life*, 36.

and concept - did not enjoy an intricate unfolding of its own. But it did set out to clearly delineate lines of power, appropriateness, and identity where previous social code sought to gather, assimilate, and guide. As the opening chapter of *Manners and Rules of Good Society* (1887) makes perfectly clear, nineteenth century etiquette was as much about what was not done as what was; what was excluded from the strict realms of appropriateness being drawn carried as much weight as what was included:

Not only are certain rules laid down, and minutely explained, but the most comprehensive instructions are given in each chapter respecting every form or phase of the subject under discussion that it may be clearly understood, what is done, or what is *not* done, in good society, and also how what is done in good society should be done.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to clearly marking social space by the measure of behaviours, the systems of etiquette also came to clearly define the individuals who adhered to such definitions. In short, etiquette provided for various social values a structure that civility lacked; etiquette carefully created a well-defined space for individuals within which to operate. As Jorge Ardití suggests: "The word [etiquette]... marked the breakdown of what had been taken as a necessary connection between manners and ethics, and just as important, their reconnection to a different ground: the group in itself."<sup>18</sup> In other words, new rules and systems of etiquette came to speak as loudly to the group through which they were enacted as the foundational moral base from which they originally drew.

Furthermore, these systems enabled newly demarcated social groups to cohere and develop internally and, thus, to pay less heed to the greater social schema of which they were a part. In this way, Ardití suggests that after the eighteenth century, etiquette

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<sup>17</sup> Anon., *Manners and Rules*, 1.

<sup>18</sup> Ardití, *Geneology of Manners*, 3.

can be viewed as “a transformation in the nature of the experience of detachment...” wherein social groups developed through their own self-identification as buttressed by the social codes they themselves had created. This would prove to be of great significance to the rising Bourgeoisie. Moreover, “...the boundaries that started to form between people provoked a changed experience of other and, by extension of self”,<sup>19</sup> suggesting that the governing social systems led to increased self-consciousness and, inevitably, self-mastery.

The rise of etiquette not only sparked a tendency of certain pockets of society to turn in towards themselves (and within their own self-imposed borders), but to turn inwards altogether. Founded on the belief that etiquette was the utmost expression of humankind’s inner condition, the individual was viewed as a project which could be worked upon from many angles. “Bodily carriage, gestures, dress, facial expressions – this ‘outward’ behaviour with which the treatise concerns itself is the expression of the inner, the whole man.”<sup>20</sup> Despite the extreme importance placed on exterior comportment, the interior state to which it spoke took precedence: “Can manners be learnt by rote, and the gentle life assumed? We think not; first make a man good and good-wishing, and you will then make his manners good; all else is mere ceremony, although that is a great thing.”<sup>21</sup> It was the responsibility of the individual, then, to either find or harness within themselves a morality that would then be enacted extrinsically.

This conflation of exteriority or appearance and internal condition carried further depth, as it was also believed that, if working with a firmly rooted though perhaps hazy moral base, exterior work could, of one’s own volition, enhance one’s internal condition. “The duty to be moral, they [the Victorians] believed (or wanted desperately to believe), was not God-given but

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<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>20</sup> Elias, *Manners*, 55-6.

<sup>21</sup> Friswen, *Gentle Life*, 35.

man-made, and it was all the more 'peremptory and absolute' for that."<sup>22</sup> Despite this emphasis on individuals' roles in constituting themselves as moral beings rather than relying on a belief that they were such from birth, much of nineteenth etiquette was centred on characteristics specifically associated with Christianity which largely stressed humankind's inherent good nature. "[G]entleness, mercy, humility, sweetness, self-abnegation, love..."<sup>23</sup> were all considered of the utmost importance for a truly moral constitution. Without the foundation these virtues provide humanity, there could not exist any true etiquette regardless of the level of self-mastery achieved:

"...manners, rightly regarded, are the style of the soul, and they can never be genuine, never be anything more than veneer or polish, unless they proceed as naturally as the exhalation of a rose from the inmost beauty of the spirit, that is to say, from humility, tenderness, loving-kindness, and desire of excellence."<sup>24</sup>

By improving oneself, tending to one's manner and caring for one's appearance, the nineteenth century individual proved themselves as an ever-evolving being, seeking greater morality and greater strength: "Morals, with Christ, had to do with man as he was; Manners with what He was becoming."<sup>25</sup> As dictated by the etiquette of the day, this evolution, or, further civilizing, was to come about as a result of greater refinement and containment, both made manifest by the denial of humankind's 'animalistic' tendencies; its most basic drives. Samuel Smiles, a popular public moralist of the late nineteenth century wrote: "to be morally free –

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<sup>22</sup> Gertrude Himmelfarb, *Marriage and Morals Among Victorians* (Boston: Faber & Faber, 1986), 21.

<sup>23</sup> Anon., *The Glass of Fashion, Some Social Reflections by A Gentleman with a Duster* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1921), 114.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 123.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 117.



to be more than an animal – man must be able to resist instinctive impulse, and this can only be done by the exercise of self-control.”<sup>26</sup> This emphasis on self-control was evident in all forms of etiquette, expressed from advice literature of the day to satirical cartoons and, as Peter Gay suggests, “... appears as among life’s most precious goods...”<sup>27</sup> Like all important Victorian values, however, this was something that could only be gained through hard work, dedication, and perseverance: “...since it is contrary to human inclinations, it is also among the hardest of lessons to impart. It demands nothing less than the triumph of reason over passion, of one’s higher over one’s lower nature.”<sup>28</sup> This call on the inner depths of humankind’s morality not only signified the importance placed on ‘proper’ behaviour in society, but on individuals’ ability to deny all their ‘improper’ tendencies in order to access it.

This curbing of humankind’s inner passion with staunch reason speaks to the rise of etiquette as a new kind of bourgeois religion which not only governed society from above, but individuals, their minds and bodies, from within. “Control over the countenance is a part of manners”,<sup>29</sup> and quite an integral one for a bourgeois sphere preoccupied with the notion of self-mastery. In particular, this was made manifest in the meticulous attention paid to outward appearance which displayed for the world what, if anything, remained of humankind’s natural ‘savage’ state. For men and women, however, the inner nature to which one’s outer appearance adverted came to take on vastly different meanings, with man expected to thoroughly suppress his nature, while women had merely to channel the altogether more gentle nature they were believed to have had.

Working within this contradictory conflation of nature and

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<sup>26</sup> Gay, *Hatred*, 505.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 494.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Joan Wildeblood and Peter Brinson, *The Polite World: A Guide to English Manners and Deportment from the Thirteenth to the Nineteenth Century* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), 244.

gender, man's association with a particular kind of artifice was increasingly considered beneficial, while, by the same token, it was considered detrimental for women to appeal to the same kind of distance from nature. "Nature, rather than Art, was to be the young lady's guide",<sup>30</sup> while the exact inverse would be said for young men. In this turn away from man's nature, Evelyn Waugh suggests that "If you examine the accumulated code of precepts which define the gentleman you will find that almost all are negative."<sup>31</sup> While viewed in a masculine context, nature symbolized all that threatened good morals and good manners, within a feminine one, it illustrated everything that must be guided in order to attain either. While this type of division between the origins and expectations of the genders was not, by any stretch of the imagination, particular to the nineteenth century, its continued implacement speaks not only to that century's increased appeal to a more traditional past, but also to an attempt to sort out how, in the future, women were to factor into a society increasingly opening to them.

One author of a book on contemporary etiquette and manners suggests that much of the uncertainty and anxiety of the age was, in fact, *caused by women*: "One markedly new thing in English life has accompanied the decline in morals and manners. This new thing is a new spirit in women."<sup>32</sup> This 'new spirit' is touched upon by many authors of the day, who saw in women the root of the dissolution of a more comfortable traditional society. "The ambition of the modern woman is to show herself everywhere. She is no longer content with the drawing-room, the ballroom, and theatre; she must reign in the open air..."<sup>33</sup> These feelings of hostility are largely attributable to the movement of women outside the

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<sup>30</sup> Wildeblood and Brimson, *Polite World*, 244.

<sup>31</sup> Jacques Carré ed., *The Crisis of Courtesy: Studies in the Conduct-Book in Britain, 1600-1900* (New York: E.J. Brill, 1994), 74.

<sup>32</sup> Anon., *Glass of Fashion*, 153.

<sup>33</sup> James Laver, *The Age of Optimism: Manners and Morals, 1848-1914* (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 186.

strictly demarcated areas that were meant to be their 'place'. Ironically, the traditionalism of this place which trapped them equally appealed to them. Even with regards to a sojourn out of the home, women were expected to make their presence known to any friends or acquaintances they might have had in the visited area: "Ladies arriving in town or country should leave cards... to intimate that they have arrived, or returned home, as the case may be."<sup>34</sup> Refusal to do so, or, even worse, a robust predilection for time spent outside the company of those included in respectable society thrust women into a new realm of ruin. One author goes to far as to suggest that, "[t]he equipoise of the sexes is...destroyed... On her part, woman has done a good deal to deserve this: she has ceased to be wholly domestic and feminine, and therefore interesting and real. She has abandoned her own exclusive province, and has not established herself in another."<sup>35</sup> This same author suggests that in leaving her place in respectable society, woman abandoned her own agency, her legitimate claim to that place: "A charmed circle surrounds women. They can always acquire the love, respect, and due observance of man, if they choose to demand it. To do so they must be themselves. It is their fault if they step out of bounds."<sup>36</sup> Accordingly, women were allowed to exhibit agency so long as that agency manifested the socially acceptable. Any deviation from acceptability thus created a self-imposed limbo into which women were to remain lost. The only escape seemed to be recourse to a tradition which now proved to be more strangling than the anxiety it was originally meant to alleviate. Viewed in such a way, movement outside, or even, in some cases, within such acceptable areas, signified such horrifying change that the immediate reaction was to create ever stricter boundaries.

With regards to men, this appeal to airtight perimeters and the containment it promised was made manifest in a slightly different fashion. While a certain sense of respectability and modesty

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<sup>34</sup> Anon., *Manners and Rules*, 18.

<sup>35</sup> Friswen, *Gentle Life*, 26.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

was expected of women – indeed the common belief that “[w]oman was held to be of a finer kind of clay than man; just as Dresden is somewhat finer and more fragile than Berlin ware”<sup>37</sup> guaranteed that women were expected to hold and carry themselves with a certain degree of control, refinement, and poise - the same expectation made of men appealed less to the enactment of their natural innate grace, than their command over their very nature. The English gentleman “must fulfil his obligations and live up to his standards. He should accept and exercise leadership”<sup>38</sup> with and for society and with and for himself.

But to what end and for what reasons? Catherine Hall suggests the answers to these questions were not as clear cut as they perhaps appear due to the uncertainty surrounding the definition of masculine middle class identity in the nineteenth-century. As she suggests, it was “still in the process of being forged and always measured against the background of condescension from the gentry as well as the long tradition of artisan pride.”<sup>39</sup> While it is unfair to exclude women from these same tensions, the role men played in the public sphere versus the private realm of woman’s domain does emphasize the degree to which pressures from other social classes factored more significantly into the making and development of their identity. So great was the uncertainty surrounding this identity that manifesting the identity was required even in the more trite practices of the day: “‘the Englishman does not gesticulate when talking and in consequence has nothing to do with his hands. To put them in his pockets is the natural action, but this gives an appearance of lounging insouciance.’ The best substitutes, therefore, were the cane or umbrella...”<sup>40</sup> This type of commentary, the product of anxiety about the proper way to appear in society and what specifically that appearance had to say

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<sup>37</sup> Friswen, *Gentle Life*, 27.

<sup>38</sup> Philip Mason, *The English Gentleman: The Rise and Fall of an Ideal* (New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1982), 12-13.

<sup>39</sup> Davidoff and Hall, *Family Fortunes*, 229.

<sup>40</sup> Wildeblood and Brinson, *Polite World*, 240.

about one's inner nature, further stresses the greater social anxiety of the time. Such boundaries allowed for the creation of carefully constructed categories of the self which followed the lines of authority, be it tradition, religion, or nature. Even though these strict conceptual models were not necessarily pleasing – the next century would prove to be a fight to escape from them – they helped to serve their function as creating safe space for the subject amidst unrepentant uncertainty. As Gay suggests, "Paradoxical as it might sound, character was freedom won by submission to rule."<sup>41</sup>

If the importance we see in the reforming and forming of individual character in nineteenth century etiquette speaks to a need for self-mastery and a broader authority to which it answered, then we must also see in it an appeal to tradition as a similar authoritative power. The author of *The Manners and Rules of Good Society* (1887) declares: "[o]ur present code of etiquette is constructed upon the refinement, polish, and culture of years, of centuries. Wealth and luxury, and contact with all that is beautiful in art and nature, have in all ages exercised a powerful influence on the manners of men..."<sup>42</sup> In etiquette, one certainly sees a reliance on, and desire for, the past as a reservoir of all that contemporary behaviour attempts to both channel and access. Despite the promise afforded by etiquette viewed in such a way, this kind of idealistic call on history was not powerless against the greater social forces to which it was made subject.

Etiquette during the nineteenth century, despite roots as strong as they were deep in history, tradition, and class division, was being pried from the ground out of which it grew. This was due to a process wherein the decline of the aristocracy was primarily a fact only in respect of the rise of the bourgeoisie: "If aristocratic values were thus gradually losing ground, it was largely

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<sup>41</sup> Gay, *Hatred*, 505.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

due to the energy of the urban middle-classes."<sup>43</sup> With the rise of the bourgeoisie during the nineteenth century, etiquette was infused with a rational spirit which emphasized the use to which it could be put, rather than the ceremony and tradition for which it stood: "The rules of etiquette are indispensable to the smooth working of society at large."<sup>44</sup> As Arditì puts it, "Being an expression of civility, manners themselves thus become an expression of the useful."<sup>45</sup> In moving from a function of moral behaviour within aristocratic society, through the identification and authority of social groups to stringent self-regulation, "...the spirit was lost, and only a mechanical application of some isolated recommendations, supposed to procure immediate gentility, was proposed..."<sup>46</sup> Regarding British conduct-books of the nineteenth century, Jacques Carré suggests that "[o]ne finds in them a distinctly pragmatic, even utilitarian strain. They are very largely about what one might call the grace of authority"<sup>47</sup> rather than the ceremony and courtliness for which they once stood. This shift from a decorative to a moralizing practical sense of etiquette can be seen in the changing definition of what it meant to be a gentleman.

William Thackeray asks, "What is to be a gentleman? Is it to be honest, to be gentle, to be generous, to be brave, to be wise, and, possessing all these qualities, to exercise them in the most graceful outward manner?"<sup>48</sup> The commonly held answer to these questions was yes; in order to be a gentleman, a man had to exhibit many qualities which not only emphasized his moral comportment but his good breeding. Indeed, to be respectable and exacting was of the utmost importance. Without the proper lineage, however, a man was considered little more than common: "a gentleman should be extracted from 'an ancient and worshipful par-

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<sup>43</sup> Carré, *Crisis of Courtesy*, 4.

<sup>44</sup> Anon, *Manners and Rules*, 4.

<sup>45</sup> Arditì, *Genealogy*, 189.

<sup>46</sup> Carré, *Crisis of Courtesy*, 7-8

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3.

<sup>48</sup> Friswen, *Gentle Life*, 1-2.

entage..."<sup>49</sup> At the same time, the rising bourgeoisie introduced the importance of duty, productivity, and taste. As Remy G. Saiselin writes, stressing the growing significance of principles, containment, and utility, "one might be a gentleman and yet be ill-mannered, ignorant, and vulgar. Taste became necessary to distinguish qualities superior to the mere rank of gentlemen." In this way, "[o]ne might say that taste would 'moralize' wealth."<sup>50</sup> The rise of bourgeois etiquette ensured that "...the rich and the successful were required to be morally worthy of their social status, in short to be what they appeared."<sup>51</sup> This new attitude towards not only gentlemanly behaviour, but gentlemanly constitution significantly coloured the dialogue the bourgeoisie had with the past. Both originating and contaminating the very precepts of gentlemanliness, the past and the stronghold of aristocratic rule to which it spoke became an idea from which the bourgeoisie both took and dismissed.

According to Hobsbawm, the great effort made by the bourgeoisie for distance from a morally questionable yet attractively safe past resulted in an even greater need for that from which the distance was sought: "...the nineteenth-century liberal ideology of social change systematically failed to provide for the social and authority ties taken for granted in earlier societies, and created voids which might have to be filled by invented practices."<sup>52</sup> This sent many, including much of the bourgeoisie itself, reeling towards a past which had so consciously been abandoned. This chimes with Gay's conception of the Victorian bourgeois as a culture of anxiety and aggression, viewed as "an evolving amalgam of heritage and environment"<sup>53</sup> which carried with it a nostalgia for the past as weighty as its radical thought about the future.

This paradoxical combination led many to believe that

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>50</sup> Carré, *Crisis of Courtesy*, 120.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>52</sup> Hobsbawm and Ranger, *Tradition*, 8.

<sup>53</sup> Gay, *Hatred*, 501.

manners and etiquette as such had been robbed of the very components of which they were constituted. Cutting ties to the past inevitably led to an experience of free-floating within uncertainty: "The development of the nation has also tended to destroy true quietude and repose in manners. Formerly there was a courtesy and gentleness in the behaviour of the gentleman which distinguished him entirely from inferior grades. To behave well in society was the study of a life."<sup>54</sup> However, the rise of the bourgeoisie during the nineteenth century saw the decline of this attitude towards the 'study of a life' as one of behaviour in the name of gentility and towards one of pragmatism in the name of progress. In this way, the bourgeoisie came to identify itself and its own outlook on life through its unique approach to the rules of social behaviour. Viewed in this light, the systems of etiquette adopted by the bourgeoisie regulated more than its place within the social strata, they regulated its very essence. As Gay writes: "The guidelines governing conduct in polite society, at least according to those who produced books about them, rose above snobbery and penetrated beneath artificial glitter to the core of middle-class virtuousness itself."<sup>55</sup>

Despite the forward looking nature of this rising bourgeoisie, the etiquette it adopted still pointed to a desired and perhaps much needed dialogue with the past, wherein not all that was courtly, fanciful, and idle was lost to the practicality and virtuousness of self-regulation. As Norbert Elias writes:

...in the nineteenth century were to be heard the voices of those who for one reason or another opposed the transformation of society through industrialization, whose social faith was oriented toward conservation of the existing heritage, and who held up, against what they took to be the deteriorating present, their ideal of a better past.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Friswen, *Gentle Life*, 26.

<sup>55</sup> Gay, *Hatred*, 496.

<sup>56</sup> Elias, *Manners*, 236.



Despite their emphasis on progress – its play in the very essence of their increasingly solidified identity - the English bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century saw the past as a route to all that was inaccessible in the present, and etiquette as the guide to finding it. Whether considered an invented tradition or the playing out of an authentic one, the systems of etiquette with which the bourgeoisie engaged came to constitute that class, not only as a solid social entity, but as a self-reflexive one based on morality, improvement, and self-mastery. If, upon the rapidly changing landscape of nineteenth century England “[a]ll beauty seemed to have departed – to have fled into the past...” then, despite its attempt to distance itself from the traditional systems on which that past was built, the bourgeoisie found in them great appeal. The past “...appeared all the more enchanting; thither everyone turned to seek for an ideal of great deeds, noble men, and dignity of life.”<sup>57</sup> Although nineteenth century bourgeois etiquette pointed to the possibility of attaining, or, capturing the essence of all three through discipline, containment, and heavily freighted inward turning, there remained a sense that these ideal notions were forever lost to a past increasingly being subsumed by a relentless present. Etiquette, while not offering grounds for stopping the uncertainty, anxiety, and aggression brought about by this process, indicated a small window in which the past could enter in dialogue with both the present and the future, providing glimpses, if not promise, of stability.

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<sup>57</sup> Dr. Oaskar Fischel and Max Von Boehn, *Modes and Manners of the Nineteenth Century As Represented in the Pictures and Engravings of the Time* (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1970), 56.

## Fighting Genocide in the 'Model Protectorate': Resistance to the Final Solution in Occupied Denmark, 1940-1943

Mark MacAulay

On 9 April 1940, German Nazi forces invaded the neutral country of Denmark, placing the territory under occupation after just a few hours of armed combat.<sup>1</sup> Unlike nearby Norway, invaded the same day, the weak Danish forces offered almost no resistance to the German advance,<sup>2</sup> quietly capitulating with the Nazi's promise to respect Danish political independence.<sup>3</sup> For the next five years – until the fall of the Third Reich in May of 1945 – Denmark would remain under Nazi occupation.<sup>4</sup> In this respect, the Danish situation was not at all exceptional; the Nazis would occupy vast amounts of European territory over the course of the Second World War, finding little resistance and even willing collaborators in many European governments. What is unique to the experience of occupied Denmark is its remarkable success in ensuring the survival of its Jewish population at a time when European Jews were being decimated by the Nazis' agenda of genocide: historian Leni Yahil suggests that less than two percent of

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<sup>1</sup> Hans Kirchoff, *Resistance in Western Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 94.

<sup>2</sup> Harold Flender, *Rescue in Denmark* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1963), 23.

<sup>3</sup> Kirchoff, *Resistance*, 94.

<sup>4</sup> Leni Yahil, *The Rescue of Danish Jewry* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969), 369.

Danish Jews perished in the Holocaust.<sup>5</sup> Denmark is the only example of an entire nation, “from King to fisherman, [taking] an active role in rescuing the Jews” from systematic extermination at the hands of the Nazis.<sup>6</sup> As such, it is one of the very few happy stories to emerge from the incomprehensible tragedy of the Final Solution. This essay will examine three aspects of Danish resistance to the Nazis’ anti-Semitic measures from the time of the nation’s occupation to the rescue of its Jews in October of 1943. First, the methods of resistance employed by the Danes will be discussed, followed by an examination of Nazi reaction to Danish resistance. Finally, this essay will consider the possible reasons for the unique resistance offered by Denmark as suggested by historians of the Holocaust.

In the decades following the war, a mythology of Danish resistance grew to occupy a prominent place in the collective memory of the nation. Reigning monarch Christian X, in rebuttal to a German official’s discussion of “the Jewish question”, was said to have replied “[t]here is no Jewish question in this country. There is only my people.”<sup>7</sup> This and similar anecdotes of the monarch’s open defiance of Nazi policy were so widespread as to be accepted as fact in Hannah Arendt’s coverage of the Eichmann trial in 1963, though historians now generally attest to their fictitiousness.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, these apocryphal tales speak to a general Danish support for resistance against the Nazi’s anti-Jewish policies throughout the period of occupation.

In point of fact, the first signs of Danish resistance were far

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, xviii.

<sup>6</sup> Flender, 255.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

less sensational than these legends would suggest. During the first year of Denmark's occupation, no attempt was made for an organized resistance; instead, the Danes adopted a mode of 'symbolic resistance' which took the form of a revived sense of nationalism.<sup>9</sup> By joining together in support of Danish history, culture and historical institutions, the Danes implicitly rejected the totalitarian ideals of their occupiers. Anti-Semitic newspapers, films and literature found so little support from the Danish people that most of these propagandist efforts were discontinued by early 1942, around the time that active resistance to Nazi policy in Denmark began in earnest.<sup>10</sup>

As early as 1941, Frode Jakobsen had been attempting to garner support for what he referred to as "the study circle": regional resistance cells organized according to profession, which would later form the backbone of a large-scale resistance movement throughout the nation.<sup>11</sup> By 1942 the organization boasted 10,000 members; by late 1943, when the safety of the Danish Jews had been reasonably secured, the number was double, and continued to grow throughout the duration of the war.<sup>12</sup> An astounding 75 per cent of doctors and 90 per cent of clergymen in Denmark belonged to the organization by 1945.<sup>13</sup>

Illegal radio broadcasts and acts of sabotage were chief amongst the strategies of the 'study circle,' and until August 1943 these were among the most prominent acts of resistance undertaken by the general population.<sup>14</sup> Christopher Møller, an outspo-

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<sup>9</sup> Kirchoff, *Resistance*, 99.

<sup>10</sup> Flender, *Rescue*, 32.

<sup>11</sup> Yahil, *The Rescue*, 226-7.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 227.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 228.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 227.

ken opponent of the German occupation, traveled to Britain in May 1942 “to urge active resistance and sabotage over the [British Broadcasting Corporation].”<sup>15</sup> Throughout the war, broadcasts from the BBC would continue to reach Danish homes, in spite of German attempts at censorship, with the result that “occupied Denmark was better and more widely informed than at any time previously.”<sup>16</sup> But the broadcasts from Britain offered more than mere news of the war; they were explicit in their call for active Danish resistance to its Nazi occupiers. “Every attempt from Britain until March 1943,” writes Jeremy Bennett, “was directed at making Denmark herself react positively against the Germans... whether by riots, strikes, marches or sabotage.”<sup>17</sup> The sabotage of factories, ports and rail lines became a phenomenally widespread activity amongst Danish resistance fighters as a result of the efforts of Møller and Jakobsen; by the war’s end, nearly 5,000 individual acts of sabotage had been committed on targets vital to German interests.<sup>18</sup>

By early 1942, underground resistance efforts by Danish students also began to coalesce into organized resistance movements. A group of thirty students at Copenhagen University joined together to produce a self-financed news-sheet, *Studenternes Efterretningstjeneste*, featuring news items donated by conservative newspapers which were considered too risky for regular print.<sup>19</sup> By the end of the year, the group had acquired a cheap duplicating machine and began a campaign to disperse censored literature

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<sup>15</sup> Jeremy Bennett, *British Broadcasting and the Danish Resistance Movement 1940-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 62.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, xii

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 105-106.

<sup>18</sup> Flender, *Rescue*, 229.

<sup>19</sup> John Oram Thomas, *The Giant Killers: The Story of the Danish Resistance Move-*

smuggled into the country; the circulation of the news-sheet had grown to fifty thousand copies by the time its creators were found by the Gestapo and forced to go into hiding or flee the country.<sup>20</sup>

It was not only the Danish underground movement, but often the Danish institutions themselves, which offered resistance to German occupation and anti-Semitic proposals. In late 1942, the Reich plenipotentiary in Denmark, Dr. Werner Best, approached Danish Prime Minister Erik Scavenius regarding the introduction of anti-Semitic legislation, and was told simply that Scavenius and his entire cabinet would “resign in protest” if the matter were pressed further.<sup>21</sup> An attempt to claim German Jewish refugees under asylum in Denmark was similarly repulsed by the Danish government, who claimed that “because the stateless refugees were no longer German citizens, the Nazis could not claim them without Danish assent.”<sup>22</sup> Danish assent, it was clear, was not and would not be forthcoming. Making no headway, the Nazis for a time considered it prudent to postpone the implementation of the Final Solution in Denmark.

It was in August of 1943 a crisis finally erupted in Denmark, in the form of large-scale riots and strikes which would come to be known as the “August uprising.”<sup>23</sup> Kirchhoff contends that growing anti-collaborationist sentiment, coupled with a continental “atmosphere of crisis,” resulted in tremendous unrest amongst the Danish workers.<sup>24</sup> Suddenly, the Germans were faced with open resistance from the shipyards, where workers com-

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 95-96.

<sup>21</sup> Flender, *Rescue*, 32.

<sup>22</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Eichman in Jerusalem: A Study in the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Books, 1964), 172.

<sup>23</sup> Kirchhoff, *Resistance*, 105.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

menced to strike in protest of German presence in Danish ports. Riots and strikes quickly spread throughout Denmark; the upheaval was further exacerbated by the declaration of martial law and the establishment of the Gestapo in Denmark in the weeks following the initial uprising.<sup>25</sup> On September 8, 1943, Werner Best wrote to Berlin "suggesting that the present state of emergency afforded him the very opportunity he needed for the arrest and deportation of the Danish Jews to German concentration camps."<sup>26</sup> Over the next month, Best made plans for a German raid on Copenhagen to round up and arrest the Jewish population; the first in Denmark to be informed of Best's plan was his head of shipping operations, Georg Duckwitz.<sup>27</sup> It was Duckwitz who would prove to be the catalyst for the greatest and most significant achievement of the Danish resistance movement: the evacuation of nearly the entire Jewish population to nearby Sweden in October 1943.

Duckwitz himself claims that he "reacted sharply against the proposal", and on September 28 he met secretly with Danish leaders to inform them of the plan.<sup>28</sup> From them, news of the impending raid filtered down to a young woman named Inga Bardfeld, who in turn notified Rabbi Marcus Melchior.<sup>29</sup> The following day, Melchior informed his congregation of the raid scheduled to be carried out on the night of October 1, encouraging the Danish Jews to "pass on the information to friends and relatives."<sup>30</sup> So widely did the news spread throughout the Jewish community

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<sup>25</sup> Arendt, *Eichman*, 172-3.

<sup>26</sup> Flender, *Rescue*, 44.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>28</sup> Yahil, *The Rescue*, 150.

<sup>29</sup> Richard Petrow, *The Bitter Years* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1974), 206.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 208.

that, by the time the Nazis began their raid on the evening of October 1, they found only 477 Jews who had remained in their homes; more than 7,300 Danish Jews had disappeared into hiding in a matter of two days.<sup>31</sup> Those arrested were sent to Theresienstadt at the insistence of Werner Best himself, where they “enjoyed greater privileges than any other group because of the never-ending ‘fuss’ made about them by Danish institutions.”<sup>32</sup> According to Arendt’s figures, only a small fraction of these Jews died as prisoners in the camp.

The Nazi raid on Copenhagen provided the impetus for the Danes’ decision to find their own immediate solution to the Jewish question in Denmark; such a solution was not long coming. In August, neighbouring Sweden had revoked a right-of-passage agreement with Germany which had been in place since 1940.<sup>33</sup> It had become clear that the Allies stood a very good chance of defeating the Nazis, and so in early October King Gustav of neutral Sweden announced that his nation would offer refuge for the Danish Jews in hiding.<sup>34</sup> According to the figures suggested by Arendt, over the course of October 1943 nearly 6,000 Jews were ferried across to Sweden in Danish fishing ships, the only Danish vessels still permitted to operate out of the Nazi-occupied ports.<sup>35</sup> Some, albeit a very few, Danish fishermen took advantage of the unusual state of affairs to extort ridiculous fares from the fleeing Jews. However, Harold Flender states that “There is not a single case on record of a refugee failing to reach Sweden because he lacked the fare...For every fisherman who overcharged the Jews, there were

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<sup>31</sup> Arendt, *Eichman*, 173.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 174.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.

<sup>34</sup> Flender, *Rescue*, 75-76.



a dozen who ferried them across out of a genuine desire to be of help.”<sup>36</sup> By the end of the year, it was clear that the Nazis’ efforts to implement the Final Solution in Denmark had been an unquestionable failure; the Danes’ resistance efforts had managed to save virtually all of Denmark’s Jews from deportation and almost certain death.

It is impossible, given the scope of this analysis, to examine the full breadth of Denmark’s resistance to Nazi occupation leading up to the rescue of the Jews in October 1943. Nevertheless, it is clear that Danish resistance – and particularly, resistance to Nazi anti-Semitism – took place on an enormous scale throughout the duration of the war, and that virtually every group of Danish citizens, “from the King down to simple citizens,” was represented in the resistance movement.<sup>37</sup> From passive resistance in the early stages of occupation to the united effort to evacuate Danish Jews to Sweden, the Danes’ resistance occupies a unique place in the Holocaust experience as the only genuinely successful nation-wide attempt to defy Nazi power during the course of the war.

Given Denmark’s exceptional experience under occupation – “the only case we know of in which the Nazis met with open native resistance”<sup>38</sup> – German reaction to the Danes’ defiance is a matter of particular interest to historians of the Holocaust. Indeed, nothing testified to the uniqueness of the Danish situation more clearly than the often “bizarre and uncharacteristic

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<sup>36</sup> Flender, *Rescue*, 98.

<sup>37</sup> Arendt, *Eichman*, 174.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.

behaviour of the Nazis" in the face of large-scale resistance efforts.<sup>39</sup>

Until August 29, 1943, when the large-scale strikes of Danish workers forced the resignation of the government, Denmark had maintained a policy of "official state collaboration" with its German occupiers. The result of this active and willing collaboration was a relatively benign occupation by the Nazis until the fall of 1943; parliament and public institutions were permitted to remain under Danish control, and even free elections could be held as late as the spring of 1943.<sup>40</sup> This is not to suggest that the Danes enjoyed *carte blanche* to conduct their affairs without interference throughout the duration of Nazi occupation. Nazi toleration of political independence in Denmark relied "on the ability of the Danish authorities to uphold law and order," and thus any semblance of a resistance movement was fought, using legal means, by the Danish government itself until its collapse in 1943.<sup>41</sup> Thereafter, the Wehrmacht took up the effort to contain Danish resisters, though "the fight...was comparatively moderate when contrasted with the excessively brutal methods employed by the Germans in other parts of occupied Europe."<sup>42</sup> In fact, police terror in Denmark was only instituted as 'official' Reich policy in December 1943, after the Danish Jews had been safely evacuated to unoccupied Sweden.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Gunnar S. Paulsson, "The 'Bridge over the Øresund': The Historiography on the Expulsion of the Jews from Nazi-Occupied Denmark," *Journal of Contemporary History* 30 (1995), 436.

<sup>40</sup> Bjorn Schreiber Pederson and Adam Holm, "Restraining Expresses: Resistance and Counter-Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Denmark 1940-1945," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10 (1998), 62.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

The case of Dr. Werner Best, Reich plenipotentiary in Denmark beginning in November 1942, provides an intriguing study in German attitudes towards the situation in the occupied state. Best's time in Denmark is conspicuously marked by the plenipotentiary's seemingly contradictory actions, which would earn him the disfavour of Hitler himself after the events of August 1943. Throughout the period of occupation, Best argued against repressive measures for Denmark, believing "Germany's interests in Denmark were best served through a continued collaboration with Danish authorities."<sup>44</sup> He strongly contested proposals for the implementation of a hard-line policy towards the Danes, and his views were shared, rather curiously, by the head of German police in Denmark.<sup>45</sup> It was Best himself who had initiated plans for the raid on Copenhagen in a telegram to Berlin in September 1943, yet it was also he who deliberately let slip word of the impending Nazi raid – in a perverted sense ensuring the survival of the Danish Jews in hiding.<sup>46</sup> At the Nuremberg Trials, Best claimed to have "played a complicated double role" as plenipotentiary in Denmark, and his argument was apparently convincing enough to save his life.<sup>47</sup> Condemned to death by a Danish court after Nuremberg, Best successfully appealed the sentence and eventually served less than five years in prison before being released. Intriguingly, however, Best's case was not unique in occupied Denmark. Like Best, the German military commander General von Hannecken appeared loath to follow hard-line policies in Denmark, "refus[ing] even to issue a decree requiring all Jews to re-

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<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 80

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> Arendt, *Eichman*, 173.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 175.

port to work.”<sup>48</sup> Even the infamous *Einsatzkommandos*, the special S.S. units renowned for their brutality in the eastern occupied zones, became outspoken opponents of “the measures they were ordered to carry out by the central agencies” in Denmark.<sup>49</sup>

Why is it that the behaviour of German authorities stationed in Denmark appears so often to have run counter to the express wishes of the Reich? It is evident that there was a sharp divide between the orders given by the central authorities and their execution by officials working within the occupied state; where Adolf Eichmann, viewing the situation from Germany, declared the “action against the Jews in Denmark...a failure”, Werner Best claimed it a success, as “the objective of the operation was not to seize a great number of Jews but to clean Denmark of Jews.”<sup>50</sup> Obviously, Best’s definition of success was a long way from the Reich’s notion of a Final Solution. Hannah Arendt provides a fascinating perspective on the dual nature of authority in occupied Denmark; she argues that it was not the pricking of conscience which compelled men like Best to “sabotage...orders from Berlin,” but rather that the resolve of German authorities in Denmark had been gradually worn down by the Danes’ “resistance based on principle.”<sup>51</sup> In other words, extended exposure to a moral resistance against Nazi doctrine had compelled more than a few German authorities to relax their execution of orders in order to maintain a comfortable status quo – “a ruthless desire for conformity at any price,” as Arendt writes.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 173.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 175.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

Arendt's argument may seem a little simplistic to account for the sheer bizarreness of circumstance evident in Denmark until late 1943. It seems plausible to suggest that years of active collaboration coupled with non-violent methods of Danish resistance were also contributing factors in German attitudes of lenience and moderation in occupied Denmark leading up to the exodus of Danish Jews in October 1943. Whatever the reason for the unexpected behaviours adopted by the German authorities, it is clear that the resistance movement in Denmark was able to thrive as a result of this moderation. The circumventing of orders and the vocal opposition to strong-arm tactics seen in the cases of Best and von Hannecker clearly enabled the resistance fighters to continue their efforts without fear of harsh counter-measures, at least until the Danish Jews had been safely cleared out of the country. Moreover, Best's somewhat confusing "double role" as both persecutor and protector of the Danish Jews offered a singular opportunity for the nation to save its Jewish population from Nazi decimation. Denmark was uniquely fortunate in its ability to wage successful resistance efforts against the Nazis, and much of this good fortune appears to be due to the actions and attitudes of the Nazi authorities themselves from 1940 to 1943.

It should be clear based on this analysis that Danish resistance to anti-Semitism in the early years of occupation was not necessarily part of a greater anti-German sentiment. On the contrary, the Danish government continued to cooperate with the Nazis until mid-1943, believing the Third Reich to represent "a New Order in political and economic spheres under Germany's leadership."<sup>53</sup> Thus, the resistance to anti-Semitic measures in Denmark

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<sup>53</sup> Petrow, *Bitter*, 161.

appears to have been borne of a sense of humanitarianism rather than ideology. It was the persecution of Danish citizens, Jews or otherwise, which was opposed by the majority of Danes under occupation. Historians identify a number of factors specific to the case of Denmark, which help to explain why and how this nation alone managed to successfully resist the deportation of its citizens to the concentration camps in occupied Europe.

Perhaps foremost amongst these explanations is the unique situation of Danish Jewry prior to World War II. Danish Jews had enjoyed a legal status of full equality since the drafting of the Danish constitution in 1851, though effectively they had been assimilated citizens for nearly forty years before this.<sup>54</sup> Unlike the Jewish experience in other parts of Europe, Danish Jews had always been permitted to live as un-ghettoized residents of Denmark's cities.<sup>55</sup> The result of this tolerance was twofold: Danish Jews were almost completely assimilated into larger Danish traditions, but often at the expense of their own uniquely Jewish heritage. Yahil argues that "the tiny Danish community lived its internal life in considerable isolation from world Jewry."<sup>56</sup> By 1940, it appears as though Danish Jews were primarily identified as Danes – certainly not the 'stateless' community so essential to the Nazis' ideological views. While this arrangement may not have suited the more orthodox members of the Jewish community, it is clear that Danish Jews were not looked upon as an entirely separate community by the rest of the nation. To paraphrase the alleged words of King Christian X, there was no Jewish problem in 1940s Denmark – there was only the Danish people. Thus, we see at least a partial rationale for

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<sup>54</sup> Yahil, *The Rescue*, 8.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 10.

what Arendt calls Denmark's "immun[ity] to anti-Semitism."<sup>57</sup>

Add to this the unique political climate of occupied Denmark, with its "pragmatic German mode of occupation and the collaborationist policy of the Danish government," and we begin to see not only the motivations for Danish resistance to anti-Semitism, but the capacity for its success.<sup>58</sup> Gunnar Paulsson suggests that it was "an open secret that the Germans abstained from interfering with the flight of Jews," and for this reason he argues that the planned raid on Copenhagen on October 1, 1940 was "essentially a charade...never seriously meant to succeed."<sup>59</sup> In other words, the high degree of moderateness exercised by the German occupiers enabled the Danes to evacuate their Jews with virtually no interference, right under the noses of the seemingly indifferent Nazi authorities. Arendt claims that, by October 1943, the Germans in Denmark "apparently no longer looked upon the extermination of a whole people as a matter of course."<sup>60</sup>

It is also significant, as Yahil contends, that the Nazis' first organized attempt to implement the Final Solution in Denmark came just after what many consider the 'turning point' of the war. The Autumn uprising had roughly coincided with the Nazis' decisive defeats at El Alamein and Stalingrad, and by the time of the Copenhagen raid in October 1943 the German army was in some ways fighting a losing battle.<sup>61</sup> Given the tumultuous state of affairs, it is likely that the deportation of Denmark's tiny Jewish population was considered a matter of secondary importance for

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<sup>57</sup> Arendt, *Eichman*, 171.

<sup>58</sup> Pederson and Holm, "Restraining Expresses", 61.

<sup>59</sup> Paulsson, "The 'Bridge'", 435.

<sup>60</sup> Arendt, *Eichman*, 171.

<sup>61</sup> Yahil, *The Rescue*, xviii.

the central Reich authorities. Somewhat ironically, it seems the Danish government's active collaboration with the Nazis had lasted just long enough for external circumstances to turn the focus of German attention away from the situation in Denmark, allowing resistance efforts to continue with relatively minimal interference.

Finally, the Danes were exceptionally fortunate in their geographical proximity to the neutral and unoccupied state of Sweden. Sweden, separated from Denmark by only a few miles of open water, "could not have been more cooperative toward the Danish refugees," offering financial aid, housing and food to the Jews evacuated from Denmark in October 1943.<sup>62</sup> Obviously we must be careful not to ignore the traumatic effects of the displacement of Denmark's Jewish population in their flight to Sweden, yet the rescue effort made in October 1943 was a phenomenal piece of luck and good timing for those persecuted by the Nazis in Denmark. The willingness of nearby Sweden to accept the Danish refugees saved the lives of many thousands of Danish Jews at a time when one's Jewish identity spelled almost certain death in virtually every area under Nazi occupation. Sadly, this good fortune was shared by very few other Jewish communities during the Holocaust.

Thus, as Gunnar Paulsson argues in his study of the historiography of the events of October 1943, it was not simply a matter of a romanticized Danish heroism which saved the lives of the Jews in occupied Denmark, but a combination of a number of internal and external factors.<sup>63</sup> Certainly, had it not been for Den-

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<sup>62</sup> Flender, *Rescue*, 242.

<sup>63</sup> Paulsson, "The 'Bridge'", 433.



mark's unusual experience under a moderate German occupation, its geographical nearness to neutral Sweden, or the prevailing war-time conditions at the time of the Nazis' raid on Copenhagen, it is doubtful that Danish resistance could have proved as successful as it did. Furthermore, had Danish Jews not enjoyed almost complete assimilation into a greater Danish society, one might question whether the majority of resisters to anti-Semitism would have taken up the cause of saving the Jewish community from deportation at the hands of the Nazis. Fortunately, these factors did exist, and coalesced at an opportune time to ensure the success of Danish resistance under occupation until the rescue of the Jews in the fall of 1943.

Denmark was not the only nation to fight against German anti-Semitism during World War II, nor was it alone in its offer of resistance to Nazi occupation. What is unique is the overwhelming success of the Danes to collectively thwart the Nazi agenda of the Final Solution through active and large-scale resistance. The Danish resistance was favored by auspicious circumstances not evident in other occupied nations, certainly not least of which was the German authorities' relaxed rule over the 'model protectorate'. This, together with the persistence of the Danish resisters and a host of favorable social, political and geographic conditions, helped to bring about a comparatively happy conclusion to Denmark's role in the history of the Holocaust. Denmark's experience under occupation is a profound testament to humanitarian principles so often obscured by the devastating events of the Second World War, and as such is of tremendous interest and importance to scholars seeking to extract some meaning from the unfathomable barbarity of the Holocaust experience.

## The Rendering of a Queen

Crystle Hug

Over four centuries after the reign of Queen Elizabeth came to an end, the portraits of the 'Virgin Queen' are still powerful and breathtaking to onlookers in their detail, symbolism and their ability to inspire. These portraits that display the Queen in all the glory of kingship were only part of a larger propaganda program that was laid out by the government to remind the people of their responsibility to their Queen, as her divine right indicated. Queen Elizabeth was not the first to facilitate the use of portraits in this way but this practice would reach its pinnacle under Queen Elizabeth, especially in the second half of her reign. Interestingly, portraits were not just the prerogative of the Queen and her government. These portraits were commissioned by nobles and courtiers for their own uses and for the Queen, and even people from the masses sought out the image of her majesty, making it vital for patterns deemed appropriate by the Queen to be used. Miniatures of the Queen, seen as images of loyalty, also became fashionable in this period and would be sought after by a large part of English society. All of the forms that these portraits and images of the Queen came in were a crucial part of the relationship between the Queen and her people. Whether it came from the government, nobles, or from lower classes of society, portraiture was a way in which loyalty and the virtues of the Queen and thus the state, both real and desired, were presented.

The Tudor state was consumed with propaganda and visual images of their rulers' legitimacy. The love of ceremony and images started with Queen Elizabeth's grandfather, King Henry VII, when he founded the Tudor dynasty with somewhat limited

legitimacy.<sup>1</sup> It was a way in which the members of the Tudor dynasty could display that their rightful place was on the throne of England. This practice continued under the reign of Elizabeth's father, King Henry VIII, and was exaggerated by the fact that under Henry VIII the Reformation of the Catholic Church started. When Queen Elizabeth finally ascended the throne in 1558, she inherited this love of pageantry, which was advantageous because of the host of problems pertaining to her legitimacy as Queen of England.

After the unsuccessful reign of her sister Mary, the thought of yet another female monarch was not a popular one in England. There was also the problem of her late mother and if in fact the divorce between Henry VIII and Katherine of Aragon and therefore the marriage between Henry VIII and his second wife, Elizabeth's mother, Anne Boleyn was legitimate. Elizabeth had more to prove than any monarch had before and she used public display of her right to the throne of England as a way to strengthen views of the people in her favour. There were many ways in which the Queen did this. As pertaining to this paper, there were large number of portraits of the Queen circulating during her reign and these helped people to see their Queen and form of a sort of relationship with her. Similar to this, Elizabeth was known for making progresses throughout the country to see both the nobles and officials that were running those parts of the country and to be available and therefore somewhat accessible to her people.

Writings were another avenue in which the Queen could assert her power and her right as a divinely appointment ruler and which her subjects could espouse the values of kingship that they saw or wanted in their Queen.<sup>2</sup> Writers such as Shakespeare, Spenser (famously in his *Faerie Queen*, named for Queen Elizabeth), and even the Queen's favourite Walter Raleigh wrote about

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<sup>1</sup> Roy Strong, *Gloriana: The Portraits of Queen Elizabeth* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), 12.

<sup>2</sup> Helen Hackett, "Dreams or Designs, Cults or Constructions? The Study of Images of Monarchs," *The Historical Journal* 44 (2001), 821.

their Queen and the virtues that both Elizabeth personally and the state that she controlled displayed, such as power, chastity, virtue, and righteousness to both the one true faith and to the people. This outlet of propaganda was a two way street in which the authors, within limits, were able to comment on the Queen and policies that she was espousing towards diplomatic relationships, marriages or religious settlement. Within Spenser's *Faerie Queene* there is another role for Una (the Queen Elizabeth representation), the defender of the one true faith, personifying also the Church of England.<sup>3</sup> The Reformation of the church and the change that it caused in the pageantry of the state is where we now turn.

The Reformation from the Catholic Church to the protestant Anglican Church carried with it the destruction of many religious images, symbols and pageantry. These were part of the Catholic Church but not part of Protestantism. As Roy Strong notes, in its place came greater state pageantry and imagery which "did not assume a major role until the advent of the reformation in the 1530s, which led to the first deliberately orchestrated propaganda programme designed to build up the crown in the face of the break with the Universal Church".<sup>4</sup> With a break from Rome, major secular celebrations such as the Accession Day of Elizabeth and the anniversary of the defeat of the Armada, instead of religious holidays, began to dominate. Understandably, the break with the Catholic Church brought a break with the Pope and the monarch of the English throne became the head of the Church of England. The Protestant monarch became the earthly embodiment of God.<sup>5</sup> Thus in one sweep the Reformation had rendered all the power of the church and state into one person, the monarch of England. As the reign of Elizabeth ran on, all of these aspects of propaganda such as portraits, literature, ceremony, festival and Queen Elizabeth as the leader of the Church would become more consolidated and important. Portraits would emerge

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 815.

<sup>4</sup> Strong, *Gloriana*, 12.

<sup>5</sup> Hackett, "Dreams or Designs", 815.

as symbols of loyalty that came in many shapes and sizes and by many different means apart from just that of the state's propaganda initiatives.

The portrait of the Queen was crucially important to the state and the people in the many different functions it served. Long after the ceremonies of the Accession Days were over or a progress of the Queen had passed, a portrait of the great lady sovereign remained. Having a portrait of the Queen rather than a noticeable show of arms became a sign of loyalty for the nobility.<sup>6</sup> As the Queen became more settled in her reign, she became a sort of visual exemplar for the people. One of the most important functions of the portrait was a diplomatic function. The portraits of the Queen were sent to people on the continent such as to the French court, when some sort of diplomatic alliance was being considered. They were also used in one of Elizabeth's most important diplomatic strengths: marriage negotiations. A picture of the Queen (in French style dress) was sent to the Duke of Anjou at the climax of their marriage negotiations.<sup>7</sup> These, however, were not only portraits of Elizabeth that were on the continent.

Painters from various countries abroad tended to render the Queen of England in whatever way they saw fit.<sup>8</sup> There was little fear of repercussion for the painters' actions and in areas where Elizabeth was less than popular (usually Catholic places) the images of Queen Elizabeth were usually less than flattering. One of the areas that was a huge problem for the Queen was Ireland. Although technically part of the Kingdom, the Irish had little regard for the Queen or her portrait, and were averse to putting another portrait, like that of Philip of Spain, in a more prestigious place in their home.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless the people of England acted in quite a different way in regards to portraits of their Queen.

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<sup>6</sup> Roy Strong, *Gloriana*, 22.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>8</sup> Louis A. Montrose, "Idols of the Queen: Policy, Gender, and the Picturing of Elizabeth I," *Representations* 68 (1999), 116.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 114

Nobles would have been the one with the greatest access to portraits of the Queen. They both received them from the Queen as gifts and allow commissioned portraits to keep or to give to the Queen. For many, this portrait would have been the focal point of their collections, as portraiture and painting grew more popular in these items. These portraits were the greater portraits in both talent and symbolism and provided a communication between Elizabeth and her ruling class. However, in addition to these there was also a growth in portraiture at lower levels of society. These portraits would not have been sat for by the Queen but patterns of her face were used to create portraits that would have been in the likeness of the Queen. Patterns were also used for her jewellery and clothing; and other common elements, such as chairs and fans were replicated throughout many very similar portraits. One of the most famous patterns was called the Darnley pattern in which the Queen was turned to the right or left and the portraits was three quarters in length. These portraits would have been created in workshops and available to a greater public than those personally commissioned by the nobility or the crown and sat for by the Queen.<sup>10</sup>

Another form of portraiture that grew greatly in popularity and in some measure eclipsed the regular portrait was miniatures. Miniatures were one thing in English portraiture that came directly out of the Elizabethan era. These miniatures started out as smaller portraits that were kept in boxes. As they became more in vogue they were placed in lockets and people would wear them as necklaces. This increased around 1585 after William of Orange from the Netherlands was assassinated and many feared for the life of the Protestant Queen.<sup>11</sup> There were many different types wore by different classes of people. More bejewelled ones, or those painted by more famous painters, would have been worn by the nobility. Many of Queen Elizabeth's closest counsellors and courti-

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<sup>10</sup> Strong, *Gloriana*, 117-20.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 122.

ers can be seen in their own portraits wearing or holding miniatures of Elizabeth, men such as Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester; Sir William Cecil, and the famous privateer, Francis Drake.<sup>12</sup> The type of miniature that Drake wore in his portrait is even known as the Drake jewel. Copies of these portraits or pieces of metal with the likeness of Elizabeth stamped on them would have been worn by the lower classes.<sup>13</sup> These miniatures were a throwback to a similar 'Golden Age' of the Romans and Elizabeth was the only English monarch whose reign they were worn.<sup>14</sup> These miniatures were essentially likenesses of the Queen where little symbolism is seen. The entire scope of symbolism and virtues elicited to in portraits can only be seen in the magnificent full size portraits that were created in Elizabeth's reign.

Pleasing a rather vain Queen was not the easiest of tasks and as time continued this would become even trickier as the sovereign began to age. Portraits in the time period of Queen Elizabeth were far from pictures of today; rendering the likeness of the Queen was only one of the elements in the portraits, however important it was. Everything in the portraits was there for some reason. Before discussing three portraits in greater detail of the slowly developing 'cult' of Elizabeth the portraits of the beginning of Elizabeth's reign must be explored and how symbols in them would either be extrapolated in later years or changed. The portraits in early years of Elizabeth's life and the first years of her reign are fairly simplistic and are much in the same lines as other noble women of the era. There was not a great amount of symbolism and the dress and jewellery of the princess/Queen is fairly unadorned.<sup>15</sup> Yet in the second decade of the Queen's reign, starting

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<sup>12</sup> Susan Watkins, *In Public and in Private: Elizabeth I and her World* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1998), 78.

<sup>13</sup> Different types of Miniatures can be seen in Roy Strong's book *Gloriana: The Portraits of Queen Elizabeth* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987) on page 120.

<sup>14</sup> Watkins, *In Public and Private*, 78.

<sup>15</sup> Portraits of Elizabeth as a princess and a young queen can be seen in Roy Strong's book *Gloriana* on pages 48 and 58 respectively.

in the late 1560s and the early 1570s, common themes begin to develop.

These were the years in which allegory began to creep into the portraits of Elizabeth. As we will see later in the discussion of the 'Rainbow Portrait', allegorical symbolism became internalized in Elizabeth in the later years, but early on it is still externalized. She is seen conversing with goddess Pax (peace) in 'The Family of Henry VIII: An Allegory of Tudor Succession'<sup>16</sup> and then Juno, Minerva, and Venus in 'Queen Elizabeth and the Three Goddesses'<sup>17</sup> the two earliest allegorical paintings. These allegorical goddess representations continue in many ways in the later portraits of Elizabeth including portraying her as Diana, Cynthia (the moon goddess, "the origins of this cult lay earlier in the 1580s in the personal imagery with which Sir Walter Raleigh clothed his relationship with the Queen")<sup>18</sup> and Astraea, a famous ancient Virgin. Roses also become an important symbolic figure in the portraits of Elizabeth. The Tudor rose, being both red and white figured prominently, yet white was especially important because it was the colour of virginity.<sup>19</sup> On the same symbolic level was the almost inevitable presence of pearls. These were a jewel that symbolized virginity and purity and are seen in vast amounts in the portraits of Elizabeth. These symbols are important as well as many others that will be discussed in greater detail in the case studies of three portraits of the later years of Elizabeth: the 'Sieve Portraits', the 'Armada Portrait', and the 'Rainbow Portrait'.

The 'Sieve portrait'<sup>20</sup> dates from 1579, yet quite soon after, the portraits was elaborated upon in a second series of portraits

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<sup>16</sup> This portrait can be viewed online at: <http://ladysarafina.home.att.net/allegorytudor.jpg>

<sup>17</sup> This portrait can be viewed online at: <http://www.geocities.com/queenswoman/elizadoran.html>

<sup>18</sup> Strong, *Gloriana*, 125.

<sup>19</sup> Roy Strong, *The Cult of Elizabeth* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1997), 68.

<sup>20</sup> This portrait can be viewed online at: <http://www.marileecody.com/gloriana/eliz1-metsys.jpg>



dating from 1580-1583.<sup>21</sup> In these portraits the first tracings of two very important components of Elizabeth's identity can be found. One of these is the assertion of imperial power. This is the first time that Elizabeth lays claims to any imperial power through portraiture and it is done in two ways. The first is the globe to the right of the Queen, a globe in which the British Isles are illuminated and are surrounded by ships. In addition, "The imperial overtones of 1579 take on an even wider dimension, for at the base of the pillar to the left there is depicted not a royal crown but that worn by the Holy Roman Emperors."<sup>22</sup> The other important aspect of the 'Sieve portrait' is the presence of the sieve. The sieve is a symbol for chastity and virginity yet in the context of this portrait it is more that just the stately assertions of virginity that would appear later. This portrait was painted right around the same time as the climax of marriage negotiations between the Queen and the Duke of Anjou were happening. By a courtier commissioning a portrait, which was the case of this portrait, with such a clear symbol for chastity it was a clear message against the French marriage.<sup>23</sup> This displays the start of a shift away from the idea of marriage and towards the 'Virgin Queen'. By the 1580s Elizabeth was quite easily past childbearing, being almost fifty and by the 1590s the cult of the Virgin Queen was at its greatest extravagance as there was no hope for a child from the Queen.<sup>24</sup> Although she would not produce an heir, the people of England received reassurances of their Queen's benevolence in the greatest challenge England would face in Elizabeth's reign, the Spanish Armada.

The 'Armada Portrait'<sup>25</sup>, painted after the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, is a classical example of Elizabethan portraiture, from style, dress, jewels, and symbols. The only unusual

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<sup>21</sup> Strong, *Gloriana*, 125.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 103.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 97.

<sup>24</sup> Louis A. Montrose, "'Shaping Fantasies': Figurations of Gender and Power in Elizabethan Culture," *Representations* 2 (1983), 81.

<sup>25</sup> This portrait can be viewed online at: <http://www.elizabethi.org/uk/armada/>

thing about the portraits is that it is horizontally rather than vertically oriented. Portraits of Elizabethan time were still neo-gothic; they had yet to come into the new renaissance style and because of this there was no constant of time and space.<sup>26</sup> Because of this style it was possible for the two windows to either side of Elizabeth to show both the triumph of the English fleet on one side and the defeat of the Spanish ships, somewhere on the coast of Ireland, on the other. Another important aspect of this portrait is the Queen herself. She is dressed magnificently in the style of French dress, which was fitting having just defeated the Spanish. Also she is attired in black and white, the colours of Queen Elizabeth, “white is the colour of virginity, black of constancy”.<sup>27</sup> In addition, the characteristic pearls are saturating the Queen; on her dress, in her hair and around her neck. The necklace of pearls that Elizabeth is wearing is of special significance as they were given to her from Robert Dudley in his will.<sup>28</sup> As in the ‘Sieve portrait’ the symbols of imperial power are there yet they take on an even greater role in this portrait. The globe is placed under the Queen’s hand, her fingers touching the Americas and to the left of the Queen is a Roman Imperial crown, no longer just on a pillar. In this portrait Elizabeth is the liberator of the English; the condemner of the Spanish. This portrait displays a triumphant Queen who took on Europe’s superpower and won and was ready to take on the world. Yet the greatest culmination of all Elizabeth’s power and virtues in portraiture would only appear a few years before her death, as the goddess rendered in the ‘Rainbow Portrait’.

The ‘Rainbow portrait’<sup>29</sup> was painted sometime between 1600 and 1603 and was one of the last great portraits to be painted of the Queen. It was likely to have been commissioned by Robert Cecil and kept by the Cecils for a great many years. The ‘Rainbow Portrait’ is that of a goddess; not merely just a Queen. The beauty

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<sup>26</sup> Strong, *The Cult*, 43.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 71.

<sup>28</sup> Watkins, *In Public and in Private*, 166.

<sup>29</sup> Portrait can be viewed online at: <http://www.marileecody.com/gloriana/>

of a goddess is ageless and it is clear that because Elizabeth would have been almost seventy when this was painted, the painter was following in the steps of many painters in the later part of the Queen's reign and being rather courteous, to put it lightly, with her appearance. Yet it was more than just the vanity of a Queen who have been sovereign for almost five decades, it was also to appease the uncertainty that a clearly aging sovereign with no heir brought to a kingdom that had been relatively stable for much of her forty-five year reign. Through all the symbols pictured in this portrait, the Queen is seen as the goddess Astraea, the virgin of another golden age,<sup>30</sup> yet also with this it displays the strengths and importance of Elizabeth's reign.

The Queen is dressed impeccably: yards of fabric encompass her, jewellery hangs from every possible place, and quite remarkably she is holding a rainbow. These portraits were idealized visions of statehood for the elite, full of symbolism.<sup>31</sup> The rainbow is a biblical symbol for peace and above the rainbow is the motto *NON SINE SOLE IRIS*, 'no rainbow without the sun which "identifies Elizabeth as the sun that shone upon England,"<sup>32</sup> the one who brought the people and land peace. Another striking use of symbolism to display the values of the Queen appears on the sleeve of her dress. The serpent symbolizes wisdom and holds a heart in its mouth; Elizabeth's wisdom controlled her heart. Right above the serpent is also the celestial globe which symbolizes imperial power, and also wisdom. Another interesting aspect that is displayed is the power that the Queen derives from her councilors and the information and intelligence that they gave her. This is symbolized by the ears and eyes that appear on her dress.<sup>33</sup> This is especially fitting as the portrait was commissioned by the family

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<sup>30</sup> Watkins, *In Public and in Private*, 83.

<sup>31</sup> Tarnya Cooper, "Queen Elizabeth's Public Face," *History Today* 53 (2003), 83.

<sup>32</sup> Montrose, "Idols of the Queen", 140.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* 141-2.

of the two greatest councillors of Elizabeth's reign: William and Robert Cecil. The 'Rainbow portrait' is the epitome of Elizabethan portraits. Displayed in it is the power of the state through a strong Queen, with excellent councillors, peace and prosperity, and wisdom. Such greatness is legitimized by the allegorical rendering of the Queen as more than just a woman but a goddess, the virgin of a golden age, one which would never leave England unprotected even if death was surely on its way.

The portraits of Queen Elizabeth were an invaluable tool in the relationship between the Queen and her people. When commissioned by the throne they were used as propaganda to assert the divine and unchallenged right of the Queen. They were also used as diplomatic tools for the Queen abroad in both alliance and marriage negotiations. The Queen's imagery also became a tool of the Church of England which had become imageless during the Reformation. At home they were used by the people to show their loyalty to the Queen and in some cases lack thereof. They were commissioned by courtiers also in self interest or to make a point, such as the dislike of the French marriage in the 'Sieve portraits'. The culmination of the portraits displaying the virtues of the state and Queen would only begin to be realized in the second part of the Queen's reign when she would take on allegorical dressings of goddesses, and when imperial power and chastity would be integral to the image that the Queen presented. These portraits were not merely a snapshot of the Queen, far from it. In many ways the pictures were inaccurate, both of the Queen's appearance and in space and time such as the 'Armada portrait'. Yet their function was much greater than that. They were meant to espouse the values and greatness of a Queen and State, to capture the virtues of a sovereign and a reign which had brought much stability and promise to England.

## The West Wants In: The Inadequate Representation of Western Canada in the Group of Seven

Chris Matthews

When searching for the roots of Canadian nationalism, historians, politicians and Canadians at large at some point mention the Group of Seven. This group of pioneering Canadians, consisting of founders Franklin Carmichael, Lawren Harris, A. Y. Jackson, Frank Johnston, Arthur Lismer, J.E.H. MacDonald, and Frederick Varley, with Tom Thomson considered a posthumous member of the Group, are considered the foundation of Canadian art. Some may even say that the Group's development in the early twentieth century was the only 'movement' in the history of Canadian Art. To Dennis Reid, the public's perception of the Group had steadily ascended to the point that they occupied a "position in the Canadian cultural pantheon shared only with a few hockey stars and a handful of beloved politicians."<sup>1</sup>

One cannot discredit the Group's talent or impact, but the myth surrounding the Group, which sets them on a pedestal as the creators of a Canadian school of art, as well as their creation of a Canadian nationalism through art needs to be revisited. In association with a pan-national image, which the Group sought to create, the very nature of the Group makes it inadequate in properly portraying Canada. This paper, by focusing on the portrayal and art scenes of Western Canada, will discuss how framing the 'Canadian spirit' through the focused lens of the regionally developed Group of Seven is a misrepresentation of several key regions of Canada. There is an argument suggesting that the West, seen through the Group's idea of nationalism, is not the 'true' West,

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<sup>1</sup> Barker Fairley, "The Group of Seven," *The Canadian Forum* 5 (1925), 146.

and that it may be better represented when a western painter holds the brush. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the fact that Canada and its school of art were not framed through a conglomeration of artists from all regions of the nation, and that historic events moved the spotlight onto the Group in Ontario instead of scanning the nation.

The Group of Seven came into existence officially in May 1920 under the edict "that an Art must grow and flower in the land before the country will be a real home for its people."<sup>2</sup> Background into the members of the Group is vital in understanding the mentality of the seven men. Their first exhibition together was not their first interaction as a group. Dating back to November 1911, Lawren Harris and J.E.H. MacDonald were meeting at the Arts and Letters Club in Toronto.<sup>3</sup> The Group was founded with no native Westerner in attendance; also, three out of the seven members were born overseas. MacDonald was born in Dunham, England and moved to Hamilton, Ontario at the age of fourteen,<sup>4</sup> while Arthur Lismer and Fred Varely both hail from Sheffield, England.<sup>5</sup> Harris was born in Brantford, Ontario and was one of the main economic contributors for the Group; his family owned part of the Massey-Harris Company. Along with Harris, Frank Carmichael and Frank Johnson were Ontarians and A.Y. Jackson hailed from Montreal, Quebec.<sup>6</sup> The lack of a western presence in the Group was of no concern to the founding members. They had met, become colleagues and friends in central Canada, and from the outset this was not an issue. It was not until they and the media started to put forth the idea of a distinct Canadian nationalism and 'spirit,' seen through the Group's landscapes, that the mem-

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<sup>2</sup> Dennis Reid, *A Concise History of Canadian Painting* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1973), 146.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

<sup>6</sup> Catharine M. Mastin, *The Group of Seven in Western Canada* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2002), 15-17.

ber's heritage raised a few eyebrows. By 1931, criticism of the Group's exclusiveness of both its membership and its vision of Canadian art had arisen in the media, which forced the Group to consider changing its dynamic in 1933. Along with these well-defined Anglo-Central Canadian roots, the Group's education was derived from places abroad.

For a group claiming to be "drawn by an irresistible urge to replace [the European] 'foreign-begotten technique' by a way of painting dictated by Canada itself, to concentrate all their energy on making a Canadian statement in art in Canadian terms,"<sup>7</sup> they had studied a great deal in Europe. It was not uncommon for young, budding artists at the turn of the twentieth century to venture to develop their skills overseas. Jackson went to Paris to study at the Académie Julian; Harris trained in Germany; Varley studied in Antwerp; and MacDonald viewed exhibits in London.<sup>8</sup> The only colleague that had little to no contact with the European masters and techniques was Tom Thomson. Even though he did not receive formal training abroad, he must have obtained tutoring and crash courses from the Group. Thomson was the Canadian boy who felt most at home in the landscapes that he and the Group painted. Growing up in Leith, Ontario, near Owen Sound, on the Georgian Bay, Thomson was a guiding light for the Group, showing them nature in a fresh, hands-on manner. Harris reflects, "Thomson knew the north country as none of us did and it was he who made us partners in his devotion to it."<sup>9</sup> This contagious mentality drove the artists into northern Ontario and their 'wilderness'.

Riding on the coattails of their guide Thomson, the Group developed in the 'north,' painting Georgian Bay, Algonquin Park,

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<sup>7</sup> Lawren Harris, "The Group of Seven in Canadian History," *Canadian Historical Society, Report of the Annual Meeting Held at Victoria and Vancouver June 16-19, 1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948), 29.

<sup>8</sup> Ryan Edwardson, "A Canadian Modernism: Pre-Group of Seven 'Algonquin School,' 1912-1917," *British Journal of Canadian Studies* 117 (2004), 84.

<sup>9</sup> Harris, "The Group of Seven", 32.

Alogma, Lake Superior and many lakes, hills, rivers and trees in northern Ontario. According to the Group, they were fun loving, “young rebels”, and serious painters fighting to establish a “modern Canadian” outlook, by presenting a Canadian view of Canada.<sup>10</sup> One gets the image of life at summer camp when reading the accounts of the summers the Group spent in northern Ontario, but it was here that defining moments occurred and influential works were created. Harris recalls that while they were painting the Georgian Bay they “were at times very serious and concerned, at other times hilarious and carefree. Above all, we love this country, and loved exploring and painting it.”<sup>11</sup>

The Group, with the help of Thomson, quickly fell in love with the Canadian Shield region, which would come to define them. The early influence of the Shield on their artistic lives would carry through into the foundation of the Group of Seven, and thus into the foundation of what is today considered the Canadian school of art. Their scenes of northern Ontario soon become indistinguishable from what Canadian culture saw as the Canadian landscape. This was reinforced at the Groups first official exhibition in 1920. The beautiful pictures of the Shield region became the landscapes that represented the ‘spirit’ of Canada.<sup>12</sup> It is this mentality and Shield-centric perception of the Group and of what they defined as the Canadian landscape that hinders the claim of the Group’s nationalism. The West is blatantly absent from paintings of northern Ontario at the Groups inception. Along with the lack of western members, the lack of any pan-Canadian feel early on is obvious.

Examining the Group members who made the trek west and saw the vast prairies, the spectacular Rockies and the picturesque West Coast, some observations can be made concerning

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<sup>10</sup> Daniel Francis, *National Dreams: Myth, Memory and Canadian History* (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 1997), 140.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.

<sup>12</sup> Christine Sowaik, *A Passion for Identity: Canadian Studies for the 21st Century* (Canada: Nelson Thomson Learning, 2001), 258.



their attempts to portray the Canadian west. Each of the artists' styles and techniques certainly evolved after 1911 and the formation of the Group; looking at a painting by Harris from 1915, for example, and comparing it another from 1931, one can see a drastic difference. However, what is more striking are the similarities in the works of the four who made the trip west: Harris, Varley, MacDonald and Jackson. For each, similarities between their early (or Eastern) and later work in the west is blatantly noticeable. In particular, A.Y. Jackson's early work in the Laurentians and northern Ontario bears striking similarities with his works of southern Alberta. This would suggest that Jackson did not paint the west any differently than the east, or to put it another way, he did not see the west as a new entity unlike the Canada he saw in central Canada. Dennis Reid has observed this same phenomenon in Jackson's work in the late 1930s. Reid concludes that "technically and conceptually, [the Alberta paintings] are the same work as Jackson did at St. Tite des Caps the previous spring, and essentially the same work he had been producing since 1914, or even since France."<sup>13</sup> Compare *Winter, Quebec* (1926) with *Blood Indian Reserve, Alberta* (1937) and *Country Road, Alberta* (1954), or *Saint-Jean, Île d'Orléans* (1925) with *Lundbreck, Alberta* (1937). The similarities of composition and subject jump off the canvas. Once the connection is made, Jackson's great works of the west seem a little less spectacular than they did before. Without minimizing the value of *Alberta Rhythm* (1948) or *Waterton Lakes* (1948), the repetition or application of his earlier style needs to be acknowledged, if only for the fact that Jackson did not give western Canada the same intensity and attention he gave the east.

Another point of contention about the Group from the Western Canadian perspective is the spectacular promotion of the Group from Central Canada at the expense of artists from other regions of the nation. There are a number of factors that caused the pro-

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<sup>13</sup> Dennis Reid, *Alberta Rhythm: The Later Work of A.Y. Jackson* (Toronto: Art Gallery of Ontario, 1982), 15.

motion of the Group of Seven, namely the National Art Gallery under the leadership of Eric Brown and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. The National Art Gallery was the main advocate of the Group. Along with the Gallery's almost exclusive internal promotion of the Group, it also led a calculated and relentless marketing campaign which inundated Canadian homes and schools with Group works such as *The West Wind* (1917) or *The Solemn Land* (1921) along with a narrative reinforcing the mythology of the Group embodying a rugged style and expressing a national 'spirit'.<sup>14</sup> Taking up the mandate of nation building and establishing a common heritage, the Gallery focused on the Group of Seven as the definitive school of art in Canada. By simply placing their works inside the walls of the Gallery it legitimized the Group's work as Canada's art. In the Group's works, the Gallery and Brown found an art that was free from both traditionalism and extreme modernism;<sup>15</sup> it was something Canadians could embrace. The Group's paintings were also affordable and easily attainable, in contrast with European works.

By focusing almost directly on the Group of Seven, the National Gallery created a sense of alienation of western artists. The painting of Canada by members of a Toronto-based group rang fowl in the west, and brought back bitter memories of the Central exploitation in the National Policy.<sup>16</sup> There was even a calculated campaign focusing on Tom Thomson as a folk hero, drawing on his legendary status as the outdoorsman painter.<sup>17</sup> A.Y. Jackson knew to be thankful of his elevated position, writing in the early 1930s: "We artists go on existing thanks to a few enthusiasts and

<sup>14</sup> Claire Campbell, *Shaped by the West Wind: Nature and History in Georgian Bay* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 147.

<sup>15</sup> Maria Tippett, *Making Culture: English-Canadian Institutions and the Arts before the Massey Commission* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 84.

<sup>16</sup> Lynda Jessup, "The Group of Seven and the Tourist Landscape in Western Canada," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 37 (2002), 144-179.

<sup>17</sup> Joyce Zeymen, "Establishing the Canon: Nationhood, Identity and the National Gallery's First Reproduction Programme of Canadian Art," *Journal of Canadian Art History* 16 (1995), 14-15.

Eric Brown.”<sup>18</sup> It is clear that he is referring not to artists in general but ‘we artists’, meaning the ones in Jackson’s circle. The mention of Brown is also appropriate, because it was he who filled the Canadian art spotlight with the seven members.

Eric Brown believed whole-heartedly that he had found a national school of painting in these few artists, and he did everything in his power to make the Group known. There was no limit to his promotion of the Group. He exhibited the works at home and abroad, made silkscreen prints and reproduction postcards for sale, travelled across the country speaking in lectures and on radio, as well as arranging the Gallery to purchase a number of canvases.<sup>19</sup> Concerning reproduction of the Group’s works to Canadian libraries, school and homes, Brown believed the art would create a strong sense of Canadian nationalism in the populace. In a speech in 1936 he stated:

Quite a large business is...growing up in the sale of both large and small coloured reproductions of National Gallery pictures, both to the public schools and commercially. They are made available to the schools and sent out complete with lesson plans which can be used in class and I am glad to say that the use of them is spreading rapidly and cannot fail to bring to the children a better knowledge of the work of Canadian artists and the program of the arts in Canada...The greatest need in Canada for the growth of the arts is active public awareness...[which] the National Gallery is the radiating centre for art knowledge.<sup>20</sup>

The Group members supported Brown in his commercial ventures of its art. Lismer believed that “prints of Canadian pictures, wisely used, will go far in establishing a knowledge and

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<sup>18</sup> Tippett, *Making Culture*, 85.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Zeymens, “Establishing the Canon”, 22.

love for the work of our own artists and our own country.”<sup>21</sup> A somewhat shameless plug, seeing that Lismer and the Group were ‘the Canadian artists’ used, and it was their interpretation of the country that was being seen. Taking the role of championing the Group, Brown never faltered, and while increasing the popularity of the Group, he reinforced the feelings of alienation of the west in an Ontario-based central Canadian school of art.

The National Gallery also teamed up with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to extend the art world through the media. The duo broadcasted three annual series between 1945-1947, highlighting Canadian artists and basing the shows on the reproductions from the Gallery. The Gallery was then responsible for the core material on each artist and suggested lines of discussion for each.<sup>22</sup> It is not difficult to guess which artists were featured the most. Of the eighteen broadcasts, six were concerned with artists associated with the Group of Seven.<sup>23</sup> The CBC provided a means to promote the Group, this time on an instantaneous and national scale, and once again, the emphasis was on youth. Schools were the prime audience of the programs on the CBC, with an estimated 3,500 schools tuning in, which equates to roughly 125,000 students.<sup>24</sup> The National Gallery had its objectives, and Canada was going to receive the Group whether it liked it or not. Although the National Gallery was the main advocate of the Group, other institutions helped promote the Canadian nationalism that it created.

The Group of Seven often appeared between the pages of Canadian periodicals throughout the 1920s and onward. As a result, a relationship was forged between certain periodicals and the Group members. Graham Spry’s *Canadian Nation* often published works by the Group, but it was the University of Toronto’s journal, *The Rebel*, and its successor, the *Canadian Forum* that created

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 25.

the greatest support for the Group. This symbiotic relationship between the *Forum* and the Group is convincingly described by Margaret Davidson: "the periodical found the painters the perfect example of the new postwar Canadian cultural spirit for which it was searching; in turn the artists were encouraged by the attention and publicity the Forum gave them."<sup>25</sup> The *Forum*, in the 1920s and after, was easily one of the most important journals regarding the arts and academia in Canada, thus allowing for debate and criticism of the Group's art. This also supplied a means for the Seven to have their literary works published and to effectively present their ideal version of nationalism to the country.<sup>26</sup> Throughout the promotion of the Group of Seven's nationalism in all its forms, the view presented was built out of central Canada, with little westerner input, and was based on perceptions taken from a specific section of Ontario landscape. Therefore, the so-called Canadian nationalism represented little more than central Canada, and can hardly be referred to as nationalism.

In contrast with the events associated with the Group of Seven and its regional orientation, there were artists in western Canada who were born in western Canada and worked in western Canada. By examining L.L. FitzGerald and Emily Carr and their work as contemporaries to the Group, one can see that a central Canadian regional bias on the school of art in Canada was not necessary. FitzGerald and Carr were both western-born artists who painted what was in their bones and struggled all the while to get a toe into the spotlight Toronto placed on the Group of Seven. FitzGerald, born and raised in Manitoba, was officially welcomed into the Group of Seven in 1932, shortly before it disbanded. Technically speaking then, there was a western born member of the Group, but FitzGerald still stands outside the Group in both style and perception.

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<sup>25</sup> Mary Vipond, "The National Network: English Canada's Intellectuals and Artists in the 1920s," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 7 (1980), 42.

<sup>26</sup> Charles C. Hill, *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1995), 123.

The late addition of FitzGerald into the Group gives the impression that adding a western flavour was an afterthought. In 1921, Jackson is quoted as proposing that the Group expand. He claimed: "I would like to see it increased to ten or twelve members, but we do not see any original genius among the young elements here [in Toronto]."<sup>27</sup> Early on there was mention of expansion to encompass regional differences, east or west, just to increase in size, not to address deficiencies in the Group's perspectives. Later it had been revealed that the Group intended to disband in the early 1930s, only to form a larger group, one they believed would represent the nation better, so FitzGerald's inclusion could be thought of as a honorary membership, celebrating his achievements thus far.<sup>28</sup>

Similarities between FitzGerald and Tom Thomson, as men at home in their regional nature, are striking. In a Thomson-esque recollection, FitzGerald recalls: "Summers spent at my grandmother's farm in southern Manitoba were wonderful times for roaming through the woods and over the fields, and the vivid impressions of those holidays inspired many drawings and paints of a later date."<sup>29</sup> One gets the sense that FitzGerald understood and felt the nature of that region, something he developed as a boy and developed into authentic art of the region. FitzGerald was a regional artist from a completely different area of Canada. Well beyond Lake Superior and the Algonquin Park resides FitzGerald's Winnipeg, with its open sky and the beginnings of vast prairie. "The prairie has many aspects," he would explain, "but intense light and the feeling of great space are dominating characteristics and are the major problems of the prairie artists."<sup>30</sup> It would take a regional representative to understand this about the prairie

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<sup>27</sup> Reid, *A Concise History*, 173.

<sup>28</sup> Peter Mellen, *The Group of Seven* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1970), 182.

<sup>29</sup> Liz Wylie, "The Prairie Art of L.L. Fitzgerald," in *The Group of Seven in Western Canada* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2002), 136.

<sup>30</sup> Reid, *A Concise History*, 160.

landscape, and, for the most part, FitzGerald dealt with it in his Impressionistic paintings of the prairies. This is evident in FitzGerald's *Summer Afternoon* (1921). Even in one of his most famous works, *Doc Snider's House* (1932), he differs from the Group, as this painting portrays and focuses on human interaction in the landscape – something that the Group tended to avoid.

The other major character coming out of western Canada during the time of the Group of Seven was Emily Carr. Born in Victoria and painting the West Coast, Carr is somewhat of an anomaly in the history of the Canadian school of art. Being a westerner she fought through trials, tribulations, and seemingly endless training.<sup>31</sup> At one point Carr actually walked away from painting, but came back once she received a piece of the spotlight and became associated with the scene surrounding the Group and the National Art Gallery. Carr began painting something from which the Group of Seven shied – the Natives of the West Coast.<sup>32</sup> Reid explains that Carr was “resolved – much like Paul Kane had done sixty years before – to paint a programmatic series that would record [Native] villages, and particularly the awesome totem poles, for posterity.”<sup>33</sup>

Early in her career, Carr painted what she thought was important and part of the culture of her region, but gained little success. An interesting part of Carr's journey is that she was brought into the fold of the Group's Canadian consciousness. In 1927, Carr's work was shown in the National Art Gallery and she travelled to Ontario, meeting members of the Group. The impact was immediate. She was strongly affected by the style of Lawren Harris, and her style changed noticeably with her images of Native villages and carvings now being devoid of human figures.<sup>34</sup> From

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<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>32</sup> The expeditions to the B.C. Skeena Valley by members of the Group of Seven once again come across as an afterthought of how they could rectify their lack of pan-Canadian representation in their notion of Canada.

<sup>33</sup> Reid, *A Concise History*, 154.

<sup>34</sup> Gerta Moray, “Wilderness, Modernity and Aboriginality in the Paints of Emily Carr,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 33 (1998), 53.

that point on, Emily Carr had an audience and contributed to Canadian nationalism through her work. She added a western Canadian dimension, but it needs to be noted that she did not remain a slave to the Group's style. Her Harris-like paintings, such as *Sky* (1935-1936) have been said to rival even the best of Harris, and she became successful in her home region as well. In a 1938 exhibition at the Vancouver Art Gallery she sold eleven paintings, but she received the most joy from the fact that she "had been able to make their own western places speak to them."<sup>35</sup>

It is evident that the Group of Seven has been found lacking in pan-Canadian composition, continuity, style, and perspective. The fact that the Group was embraced so strongly as 'the school of art' for Canada, even though they did not wholly represent the vast nation, can be blamed on a few factors. Early on in the Group's existence, quasi-propaganda literature was being written about the painters and what nationalistic ideals they were creating. Writers like F.B. Housser were proselytizing the message of the Group as the foundation for Canadian art, and his message seemed to have caught on. It is a shame that the Group became the measuring stick for national art instead of its successor, the Canadian Group of Painters, which included L.L. FitzGerald and Emily Carr. This new, larger group consisted of artists from across Canada and would have been a far better icon for a foundation for the Canadian school of art, with the Group of Seven seen as a foundation piece to the new Canadian Group. The lack of western representation in the Group of Seven is an unfortunate circumstance, and the same argument could be made for the Maritimes or the Arctic. Barker Fairley points out that the Group of Seven's error in representation in his critique of their 1925 exhibition: "The defects of this landscape school have frequently been defects of outer knowledge; the artists were not sufficiently familiar with the country they were painting. For, whether an artist is going to paint nature literally or not, he must know her before he can use her."<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 159.

<sup>36</sup> Fairley, "The Group of Seven", 146.



## New Woman, Dependent Woman: Family, the Work Community, and Working-Class Sexuality in the Progressive Era

Joshua Tapper

Although written about the 1950s, Saul Bellow's tableau of New York City from *Seize the Day* captures the same vociferousness of an urban and industrial America at the turn of the nineteenth century:

And the great, great crowd, the inexhaustible current of millions of every race and kind pouring out, pressing round, of every age, of every genius, possessors of every human secret, antique and future, in every face the refinement of one particular motive or essence—I labor, I spend, I strive, I design, I love, I cling, I uphold, I give way, I envy, I long, I scorn, I die, I hide, I want.... The sidewalks were wider than any causeway; the street itself was immense, and it quaked and gleamed...<sup>1</sup>

The economic landscape of the modern American city was undergoing a rapid corporatization; vestiges of mercantilism were replaced by the boom of corporate industry as both the industrial and retail sectors came to prominence as the bulwarks of a capital-driven society.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, cultural modernization placed new emphasis on the heavily commercialized leisure and

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<sup>1</sup> Saul Bellow, *Seize the Day* (New York: Penguin Books, 1956), ix.

<sup>2</sup> Kathy Peiss, *Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 38.

entertainment industries.<sup>3</sup> The extensiveness of the entertainment realm in America's urban centers was complementary to the incipient popular notion that cosmopolitanism was a necessary facet of urban life. Moreover, the milieu of urban social life diversified the experiences of people of all classes, regardless of their respective societal contexts.<sup>4</sup> While these vast social changes had significant ramifications for native-born Americans, immigrants and first generation Americans of all classes and gender, the trends of working-class women are of particular consequence. By the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century women's work had moved from the private sector to the public domain. While the percentage of women in the labour force was still relatively low, this movement into industrial and retail labour simultaneously increased the competition for jobs amongst unmarried, working-class women and decreased the average age of the woman labourer.<sup>5</sup>

With the sexual revolution of the early twentieth century and the evolution from a conservative, Victorian America to one of Progressivism, it seemed as if the "New Woman" would supersede what were becoming increasingly anachronistic perceptions of women. While working-class women were able to broaden their social universe, they were still met by the stringent social and economic necessities of a low wage-earners' life. Thus, the Progressive Era was, in part, marked by an ideological preponderance

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<sup>3</sup> Ann Schofield, "From Sealskin and Shoddy' to 'The Pig-Headed Girl': Patriarchal Fables for Workers," in *To Toil the Livelong Day: America's Women at Work, 1780-1980*, eds. C. Groneman and M.B. Norton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 115.

<sup>4</sup> Peiss, *Cheap Amusement*, 9.

<sup>5</sup> Susan J. Kleinberg, "The Systematic Study of Urban Women," in *Class, Sex, and the Woman Worker*, ed. M. Cantor and B. Laurie (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977), 23-4; Leslie Woodcock Tentler, *Wage-Earning Women: Industrial Work and Family Life in the United States, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press), 1987. For example, in a census taken in 1920, the average percent of females in the labor force between Boston, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia was 33.6%.

of independent, feminine women who imagined themselves breaking free of the social, economic and political constrictions of Victorian society. Despite the emergence of this “New Woman,” there remained the reality of a stringent, conservative model in the workplace that dictated the communal and individual actions of the working-class woman.<sup>6</sup> So, how did the working-class female reconcile notions of a liberated woman, taking advantage of the opportunities of the Progressive Era, with the subtle conformity of both industrial and commercial early twentieth-century working-class life?<sup>7</sup> Moreover, how did pervasive concepts of female chastity influence how working women expressed their sexuality? Was the “New Woman” bunk? While hetero- and homo-social work environments created a new definition of sexuality for working-class women, how did this sexuality manifest itself in daily working-class life? While the communal environment of factory and retail shop life offered new ways for women to express their sexuality, it is important to recognize that their sexuality was, at the same time, repressed by the assimilative function of the communal work environment.<sup>8</sup> Thus, the trend towards a pleasure-oriented women’s culture was undermined by ubiquitous concepts of conservative female sexuality, a trend that was identifiably present in the workplace. This essay will focus primarily on

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<sup>6</sup> Carolyn Christensen Nelson, “Introduction,” in *A New Woman Reader: Fiction, Articles, and Drama of the 1890s*, ed. C. Christensen Nelson (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2001), ix. In 1894 Sarah Grand introduced the term, the “New Woman” in her essay, “The New Aspect of the Woman Question,” published in England in the *North American Review*. She described a woman that had “solved the problem and proclaimed for herself what was wrong with Home-is-the-Woman’s Sphere, and prescribed the remedy.” In Victorian ideology the separate spheres assigned to men and women was biological. Grand debunked this theory and argued that the two spheres were “a construct of society and culture” and could easily be manipulated.

<sup>7</sup> Tentler, *Wage-Earning Women*, 62.

<sup>8</sup> Kathy Peiss, “‘Charity Girls’ and City Pleasures: Historical Notes on Working-Class Sexuality, 1880-1920,” in *Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality*, eds. A. Snitsnow, C. Stansell and St. Thompson (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 76; Tentler, *Wage-Earning Women*, 68.

the major economic centers of the American Northeast. While the feminine sexuality of working-class women will be discussed on a broader geographical scale, some of the focus will surround conditions in New York City. Furthermore, it will seek to intertwine sociological constructions of these working women with the reality of the urban working-class environment. While working-class trends transcended gender, class and race, as there was a common experience, different ethnicities had their own cultural definitions of sexuality. Thus, as Elizabeth Alice Clement suggests, it is important to negate the notion of a "monolithic 'working' and 'middle' [class]."<sup>9</sup> Also, the historiographical implications of the primary documents must be kept in mind. Social reformers and those writing investigative commissions for the state were typically middle-class and are inherently biased. Therefore, the line between what was considered respectable and promiscuous is muddled and conceptions of female chastity were subjective.<sup>10</sup>

Integral to this study is an explanation of how the image of the woman began to change at the turn-of-the-nineteenth century. The common Victorian portrayal of a woman required her to be respectable rather than promiscuous, virtuous rather than depraved; essentially a lady:

Our ladies ... soar to rule the hearts of their worshippers, and secure obedience by the scepter of affection.... Is not everything managed by female influence? ... A woman is nobody. A wife is everything. A pretty girl is equal to ten thousand men, and a mother is, next to God, all powerful ... therefore, under the influence of the most serious "sober second thoughts," are resolved to maintain their rights as wives, belles, virgins, and mothers, and not as women.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Elizabeth Alice Clement, *Love for Sale: Courting, Treating, and Prostitution in New York City, 1900-1945* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 2.

<sup>10</sup> Peiss, "Charity for Girls' and City Pleasures," 74-75.

<sup>11</sup> *Philadelphia Public Ledger and Daily Transcript*, in Peter G. Filene, *Him/Her/Self: Sex Roles in Modern America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1974), 8.

While the boundaries imposed on the female sex were ostensibly benign and venerable, women were stripped of any independence or individualism. Victorian women were imbued with a sense of maternalism and were confined to a cult of domesticity that inhibited any ambition of a fruitful foray into the public sphere.<sup>12</sup> However, towards the end of the nineteenth century, and in the context of a thriving industrial economy, general conceptions of subservience and obsequiousness that had dictated the social and economic roles of women were beginning to deteriorate in favour of an acknowledgement that a more liberal and equitable place for women in society was necessary. A number of factors contributed to the proliferation of the notion that women could free themselves from the generated norms of the Victorian conscience. The industrialization of labour, immigration, and the social reform movement all created new opportunities for women to express their socio-sexual inclinations. Although the “New Woman” was, at its nascence, a middle- to upper-class construction, it became a common thread in universal conceptions of femininity.

Boyd Winchester, a Southern male lawyer, wrote in 1902 that “from the darkness of ignorance and servitude woman has passed into the open light of equal freedom.”<sup>13</sup> Winchester’s pseudo-definition of the “New Woman” called for the abandonment of the imposed inferiority and ignorance of women but still required that a woman’s inherent “tenderness”, or “womanliness” be recognized.<sup>14</sup> He derided the concept of the “New Woman” as a caricature, explaining that equal opportunity did not require the

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<sup>12</sup> Laura S. Abrams, “Guardians of Virtue: The Social Reformers and the ‘Girl Problem,’ 1890-1920,” *Social Service Review* 7:3 (September 2000), 437.

<sup>13</sup> Boyd Winchester, “The Eternal Feminine,” [*Arena* 27 (April 1902): 367-73] in *A New Woman Reader: Fiction, Articles, and Drama of the 1890s*, ed. C. Christensen Nelson (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2001), 176. Boyd Winchester (1836-1923) practiced law in Louisville, Kentucky. From 1869 to 1873 he was the representative from Kentucky to Congress. From 1885-1889 he was the Minister Resident and Consult General to Switzerland.

<sup>14</sup> Winchester, “The Eternal Feminine,” 177.

woman to prove herself as a man, but rather to “claim her own sphere.”<sup>15</sup> As ideological constraints loosened, a malleable definition of female sexual respectability and virtue began to emerge.<sup>16</sup> As Kathy Peiss explains, “Many young women defined themselves sharply against the freer sexuality of their pleasure-seeking sisters, associating ‘respectability’ firmly with premarital chastity and circumspect behavior.”<sup>17</sup> There was a greater need to negotiate the respectability of sexual encounters in terms of specific motivations. Were women pursuing a freer sexuality purely for sexual delectation? Or, was the primary incentive to find a husband?<sup>18</sup> Either way, female morality and exhibitions of sexuality came under cultural scrutiny. This cultural anxiety was borne out of demographic trends that revealed a prevalence of divorce and illegitimacy.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, of increasing importance was the portrait of the woman as more vulnerable and susceptible to vice in the context of a congested urban and industrial society.<sup>20</sup> As Jane Addams, a prominent social reformer, explained, “Only the modern city has offered at one and the same time every possible stimulation for the lower nature and every opportunity for secret vice.”<sup>21</sup> Addams, and her contemporaries in the social reform movement, suggested that domesticity was the most logical way to save the newly sexualized, young, unmarried, working-class female from social ruination:<sup>22</sup> “She is in peril which threatens the ruin of her whole life; and the situation demands immediate attention ... [her] only hope of rescue seems to lie in prompt removal from old

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Peiss, “‘Charity for Girls’ and City Pleasures,” 84.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Abrams, “Guardians of Virtue,” 436.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 438.

<sup>21</sup> Jane Addams, *A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil* (New York: Macmillan, 1912), 105.

<sup>22</sup> Abrams, “Guardians of Virtue,” 443.

surroundings and associates.”<sup>23</sup>

Ann Schofield explains that with the effervescence of industrial capitalism, “an additional polarity further defined women’s secondary status: the evolution of separate, noncompeting labour markets labelled ‘male’ and ‘female’.”<sup>24</sup> In concordance with the increased commodification of labour at the turn of the nineteenth century, women’s work was not seen as an obligatory practice. Rather, women relied on the pragmatism of the labour market to secure jobs; they were valued as workers only when it served employers economically.<sup>25</sup> But, as notions of sex began to change, particularly in the workplace, women “self-internalized” their image, thus establishing solidarity on the issue of a woman free to make her own choices.<sup>26</sup> So, it is amongst the working class where the social and economic independence of the Progressive Era manifested itself most clearly.<sup>27</sup> As a result, new arenas (both in and out of the workplace) for the expression of female sexuality challenged the conservative conceptions of femininity.

Between 1870 and 1920 the number of women in the labour force increased from 1.72 million to 8.28 million.<sup>28</sup> The demographics, especially amongst female factory and retail sales workers, indicate that the large majority of these women were adolescent. In a statistical survey of 4017 women employed in the manufacturing industry in New York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia conducted in 1915 by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 71%

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<sup>23</sup> Sophonisba P. Breckinridge and Edith Abbott, *The Delinquent Child and the Home: A Study of the Delinquent Wards of the Juneville Court of Chicago* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1912), 41.

<sup>24</sup> Ann Schofield, “From ‘Sealskin and Shoddy’ to ‘Pig-Headed Girl,’” 115.

<sup>25</sup> Kleinberg, “Systematic Study of Urban Women,” 23.

<sup>26</sup> Caroline F. Ware, “Introduction,” in *Class, Sex, and the Woman Worker*, eds. M. Cantor and B. Laurie (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977), 16-18.

<sup>27</sup> Abrams, “Guardians of Virtue,” 438.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

of women were between the ages sixteen and twenty-four.<sup>29</sup> It is within this contextual prevalence of young, unmarried working-class women that the intricacies of workplace sexuality become visible. While a tableau of the communality of workplace culture is necessary, it would be prudent to first examine the roots of conservative femininity that were instilled in young, working-class women before they even sought out work. In the first three decades of the twentieth century 10-25 percent of working-class women lived outside of their immediate family.<sup>30</sup> The socio-cultural implications of living at home or on one's own were significant. To live at home had an air of respectability while a woman that lived alone was vulnerable to accusations of sordid behaviour. Moreover, the paltriness of the woman's wage usually forced independent women into living in dangerous and suspect areas.<sup>31</sup> That is not to say that working-class women did not rely on the family dynamic for economic protection and emotional and psychological stability anyway. Social service centers and religious institutions in working-class living areas were reluctant to help sustain independent women bordering on destitution because it was unprofitable.<sup>32</sup> To some, however, the possession of a family identity ostensibly made it easier to have a social life and engage in romance. As Tentler explains, "Life outside the family was difficult for women because extra-familial institutions did not offer them the emotional security, the social status, the easy personal identity of family membership."<sup>33</sup> The importance of a familial association was illustrated by the New York State Factory Investigating Commission in 1915:

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<sup>29</sup> U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Summary of the Report on Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners*. Women in Industry Series No. 5, Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor Statistics No. 175 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915), 16.

<sup>30</sup> Tentler, *Wage-Earning Women*, 115.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 116.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* Because these independent, working-class women were so poor there was no money to be made even by offering "singles" rooms.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.



Many girls prefer to live with private families. "I live with a missus" is the recurring explanation of an immigrant shop girl. To her this is the nearest approach to home—for it is not unwonted that the "Missus" is a relative or friend, "landsluete"—it is more respectable, more safe than living totally apart from kith and kin. Moreover the family, which is so often driving the world from the door, will time and again countenance a falling behind in the board bill, when the girl is out of work. "Don't I know what it means to be out of a job" many a kindly woman will say. "She is like my own child. How could I put her out? The little we have will have to go a bit further for a while." On the other hand the girls repay in kind, giving their services in every conceivable way. To quote Jennie, who lives very closely: "When I don't work I look after the three children and the home. My Missus was deserted by her husband. She depends lots on my rent. Now I must go and live with my sister, because her husband is out of work. But first I must find someone to take this room."<sup>34</sup>

From this, it becomes apparent that working-class women who lived in a family atmosphere adopted conservative values about femininity. Additionally, by 1910 wage-earning working-class women were making between \$9 and \$10 a week. Wage earning gave young, unmarried a sense of independence from the confines of family as well as a new motivation to explore areas of entertainment.<sup>35</sup> However, this independence was just a facade. While those who lived independently had to commit a substantial por-

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 135

<sup>34</sup> Marie S. Orenstein, "How the Working Girl of New York Lives," New York State, Factory Investigating Commission, *Fourth Report Transmitted to Legislature*, February 15, 1915, Senate Doc. 43, vol. 4, app. 2 (Albany: J.B. Lyon Co., 1915), 1700-1701.

<sup>35</sup> Clement, *Love for Sale*, 51.

tion of their wage to rent, food and clothing, those who lived with families contributed nearly all of their earnings to the family and were left with very little to spend on social activities.<sup>36</sup> According to economist Claudia Goldin, 86 percent of young women living with their own families gave all of their earnings to their parents.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, the family had oblique control over a woman's sexuality as a way of inhibiting her exploration and expression in heterosexual environments. The sexual liberation of the working-class female was linked inextricably to economic dependence.<sup>38</sup> These women were very much imbued not only with female sexual limitations but with their own socio-economic realities, and it is important to examine how this translated into the workplace community where social, economic and sexual autonomy were impacting the way in which femininity was defined.

The workplace community was inherently paradoxical. As Leslie Woodcock Tentler explains, "Young women brought to the job conservative values about femininity learned at home and in school. And in their very struggle for adolescent independence, they reinforced for one another and ultimately conservative orientation to their lives as women."<sup>39</sup> So, the workplace was a place where young, unmarried working-class women could acquire a sense of independence simply by exposure to the socio-sexual narratives of their peers.<sup>40</sup> However, because of the transient state of women's labor and the potential divisibility of the female workplace community there was a tendency to establish a code of behavioral norms, and furthermore, a structure of conformity based around the discussion of social relations.<sup>41</sup> Social life was of singular importance in extraneous workroom discussion; social functions, clothing, romantic interests all superseded interest in labour

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<sup>36</sup> Peiss, "Charity Girls' and City Pleasures," 80-81.

<sup>37</sup> Clement, *Love for Sale*, 51.

<sup>38</sup> Abrams, "Guardians of Virtue," 439.

<sup>39</sup> Tentler, *Wage-Earning Women*, 62.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 68, 71.

concerns such as wages or working conditions.<sup>42</sup> Mrs. Van Vorst, a Chicago factory worker, provides insight into the usual areas of discussion amongst females in the workplace:

The subjects are the same as elsewhere—dress, young men, entertainment. The girls have “beaux” and “steady beaux.” The expression, “Who is she going with?” means who is her steady beau. “I’ve got Jim Smith now, but I don’t know whether I’ll keep him,” means that Jim Smith is on trial as a beau and may become a “steady.” They go to Sunday night subscription dances and arrive Monday morning looking years older than on Sunday, after having danced until early morning. “There’s nothing so smart for a ball,” the mundane of my team tells us, “as a black skirt and white silk waist.”<sup>43</sup>

While it may seem that working-class women used discussion of their social lives as an escape from the monotony of factory routine, sexually stereotyped values still developed from the conformity of the work community. Mrs. Van Vorst lamented:

I long to be in the hum and whirl of the busy workroom. Two days of leisure without resources or amusements make clear to me how the sociability of factory life, the freedom from personal demands, the escape from self can prove a distraction to those who have no mental occupation, no money to spend on diversion. It is easier to submit to factory government which commands five hundred girls with one law valid for all...<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>43</sup> Mrs. John Van Vorst and Marie Van Vorst, *The Woman Who Toils: Being the Experiences of Two Gentlewomen as Factory Girls* (Toronto: George N. Morang, Co. Limited, 1903), 132-33.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 31.

Again, a dichotomy develops in the way in which the meaning of femininity was translated to these unmarried working-class women. Femininity was conveyed in a decidedly romantic way. Women would gossip about the social atmosphere outside of the factory or store, gregariously comparing tales of dancehalls, nickelodeons and encounters with the opposite sex.<sup>45</sup> However, the benefits of this gossip were illusory. The camaraderie and intimacy that were created from discussion of same social experiences were fleeting because of the high turnover rates in female employment.<sup>46</sup> Therefore, what became the most realistic possibility of liberation from the mores of working-class life, and the most convenient way to material prosperity, was marriage. There was a prevailing belief that marriage was a reprieve from the difficulties of wage labour.<sup>47</sup> For example, women were much more eager to work in environments where there would be strong heterosocial interaction—such as department stores—because there was greater potential to meet a mate.<sup>48</sup> Along conservative lines, marriage would offer financial stability. Interestingly, Tentler parallels the romanticism of married life with liberal sexual expression in the workplace: “Perhaps collective fantasies about the possibilities of matrimony helped to obscure for the young the still harsh realities of early twentieth-century working-class life, endowing domesticity with a romantic glow.”<sup>49</sup>

This concept was reinforced by the early twentieth-century social reform movement. Instead of focusing attention on the economic practicalities of marriage, social reformers saw matrimony as a way of curbing the perceived destitution and sexual improprieties of the working-class woman. Addams said that “the long hours, the lack of comforts, the low pay, the absence of recreation,

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<sup>45</sup> Schofield, “From ‘Sealskin and Shoddy’ to ‘The Pig-Headed Girl,’” 115.

<sup>46</sup> Tentler, *Wage-Earning Women*, 72. Among other things, this included seasonal employment.

<sup>47</sup> Peiss, *Cheap Amusements*, 45.

<sup>48</sup> Tentler, *Wage-Earning Women*, 73.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

the sense of 'good times' all about which she cannot share" contributed to the working-class woman's increased inclination towards both emotional and physical escapism.<sup>50</sup> The realities of factory and retail labour and domestic housework led social reformers of the time to believe that marriage—the "safe port of domesticity"—was best for young, unmarried working-class women.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, it becomes apparent that the communal work environment was repressive in the face of the progressive women's movement. Strong emphasis on maintaining a traditional social structure placed errant sexual and romantic behaviour as dangerous to the "natural" order.<sup>52</sup>

Two questions of particular importance to this study are: How did communal work environments allow women to express their sexuality? Subsequently, how did female sexuality manifest itself in working-class life? The sexually-segregated workplace allowed for a heightened sexual consciousness, especially amongst women, and provided a private atmosphere for what came to be relatively suggestive and profane talk.<sup>53</sup> A study of department store clerks in 1914 noted the crudeness of conversation:

While it is true that the general attitude toward men and sex relations was normal, all the investigators admitted a freedom of speech frequently verging upon the vulgar, but since there was very little evidence of any actual immorality, this can probably be likened to the same spirit which prompts the telling of risqué stories in other circles.<sup>54</sup>

This workplace discourse on sexuality was between both married and single and experienced and green women. The social free-

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<sup>50</sup> Addams, *A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil*, 77.

<sup>51</sup> Abrams, "Guardians of Virtue," 445.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 448.

<sup>53</sup> Peiss, "'Charity Girls' and City Pleasures," 80.

<sup>54</sup> Frances Donovan, *The Woman Who Waits* (New York: Arno Press, 1974), 42., quoted in Peiss, "'Charity Girls' and City Pleasures," 80.

doms of a sex-segregated workplace allowed for women to openly discuss their heterosocial relationships and despite the refinement that was associated with holding a job, particularly for those working in the retail industry, working women embraced the opportunity to communicate their sexual pursuits and educate each other on the nuances of finding a man.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, the nature of the work itself had considerable impact on how sexuality was manifested. New labour patterns, such as the explosion of the garment trade, not only contributed to sex-typing but created different expectations in the workplace.<sup>56</sup> Retail and factory labour was preferred amongst young, unmarried, American-born women because it was more of a contractual obligation; work was for a set period of time unlike domestic service, which left little time for leisurely and personal endeavours.<sup>57</sup> For example, by 1912 New York had past legislation establishing a nine-hour work day and fifty-hour work week for women.<sup>58</sup> Kathy Peiss explains that this, and similar legislation, was passed in order to “safeguard women’s health and reproductive capacities.”<sup>59</sup> Was the workload lightened not only to preserve the chastity of female sexuality but also so that women could function as they were supposed to? Mrs. Van Vorst recorded a dialogue that would suggest that women did not have ample time to pursue leisure on top of their work obligations, leaving them fatigued and unproductive:

“I was out to a ball last night,” the young one says. “I stayed so late I didn’t feel a bit like getting up this morning.” “That’s nothing,” another retorts. “There’s hardly an

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<sup>55</sup> Peiss, *Cheap Amusements*, 50.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 43. This was the standard even into the 1920s. It marked a progressive trend beginning in 1880 that saw women’s work days shortened hourly. In 1885 women worked ten to seventeen hours per day and by 1911 studies showed that “almost two-third of... female wage-earners worked less than ten hours daily.”

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

evening we don't have company at the house, music or somethin'; I never get enough rest."<sup>60</sup>

Because of what was bred in the workplace, sexual expression became an embedded part of social familiarity. The conflicting realities of workplace labour and traditional family tenets disabled working-class women from aptly negotiating an appropriate meaning of chastity in their daily lives.<sup>61</sup> Very simply, the inequitable conditions of labour, along with a newfound sense of sexuality, pushed women to explore that sexuality outside of the workplace.<sup>62</sup>

While many women had limited motivations in their socio-sexual activity, such as the basic pursuit for entertainment, others were able to use their sexuality for economic gain. The mid-nineteenth-century archetype of the Victorian "rowdy girl" was the forerunner of what was to become the Progressive Era pleasure-oriented working woman.<sup>63</sup> Especially amongst immigrant families, where the social structures were still traditional and the women wholly domesticated, young working-class women began exploring their sexuality through cultural entertainment. The social reform movement at the turn-of-the-nineteenth century tried to curb the upsurge in sexual expression by implementing moralistic conceptions of chastity and working toward the containment of "wayward girls."<sup>64</sup> Social reformers such as Addams and Sophonisba P. Breckinridge suggested that sex and other immoral behavior offset hardships of the workplace, like low wages and long hours. For example, at the end of a long day, suffering from fatigue and depression, a woman might be inclined to allow a man to "take her home", too weak to resist the temptation.<sup>65</sup> However,

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<sup>60</sup> Van Vorst and Van Vorst, *The Woman Who Toils*, 23.

<sup>61</sup> Peiss, *Cheap Amusements*, 110.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>64</sup> Abrams, "Guardians of Virtue," 443, 447.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 448.

social reformers chose not to place blame on the women themselves as this would skew the conceptions of chastity were intrinsic to a woman's nature. As Peiss explains, "Although the social reformers may have acknowledged a female sex instinct, they still characterized young women's sexual experiences as divorced or alienated from innate desire. This contradiction reflects their deep attachment to Victorian ideas about "proper" womanhood, including the archetype of the asexual wife and mother."<sup>66</sup> Ostensibly, women were not responsible for their sexual conduct; it was the immorality of undomesticated social activity that would have a significant impact on the chastity of working-class women.<sup>67</sup>

While working-class women pursued suspect behaviour to break away from the patriarchal vexations of the family and the workplace, they also did so to define themselves as independent and self-sustainable, creating a feminine identity vastly different from that of their matriarchal forebears.<sup>68</sup> However, because young, unmarried working-class did not always have the financial wherewithal to survive in a pleasure-oriented culture they had to turn to morally ambiguous methods of pursuing fun. Thus, they used their sexuality to their advantage. Perhaps the most prevalent apotheosis is that of the "charity girl." The "charity girl" subscribed to the process of treating; that is, in return for entertainment—dinner, dancing, the theatre—they provided sexual favours, both platonic and not. George Kneeland, a New York vice reformer in the 1920s found that "charity girls" "offer themselves to strangers, not for money, but for presents, attention and pleasure, and, most important, a yielding to sex desire."<sup>69</sup> Of course,

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Kathy Peiss, "Gender Relations and Working-Class Leisure: New York City, 1880-1920," in *To Toil the Livelong Day": Americas Women at Work, 1780-1980* eds. C. Groneman and M.B. Norton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 109.

<sup>69</sup> George J. Kneeland, "Memorandum on the Relationship between Low Wages and the Vice Problem," New York State, Factory Investigating Commission, *Fourth Report of the Factory Investigating Commission*, February 15, 1915, Senate Doc. 43, vol. 1, app. 3 (Albany: J.B. Lyon Co., 1915), 403.



there was a fine line between treating and prostitution, although “charity girls” did not take money in exchange for sexual favours.<sup>70</sup> Instead, they “were eager to see life, have better clothes, [and] more excitement.”<sup>71</sup> This seemingly outward expression of liberal sexuality must be seen in the context of the continued female dependency on an able provider; just as a woman would turn to her family for socio-economic stability, she could now turn to a male companion for similar gains.<sup>72</sup> Thus, the realities of working-class life had significant impact on how young, unmarried working-class women expressed their sexuality outside of the workplace. Active social participation usually required a companion for economic support. Regardless of its questionable morality in conservative eyes, treating was just another example of female atavism to traditional feminine constructions.<sup>73</sup>

The realities of the workplace and the socio-sexual actions of women in an increasingly pleasure-oriented culture forced young, unmarried working-class women to find new ways to express their sexuality. However, conservative feminine constrictions continued to play a role in how femininity was constructed in the face of the burgeoning sexual movement. The dualism of the working-class female experience was such that women could obtain a level of autonomy through actions such as treating but ultimately, thanks to the ubiquitous conception of chastity that was chronically assigned to women, and material dependency, both in the pursuit of marriage and entertainment, women were limited in their social and economic freedom.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Peiss, “‘Charity Girls’ and City Pleasures,” 81.

<sup>71</sup> Kneeland, “Low Wages and the Vice Problem,” *Fourth Report*, 407.

<sup>72</sup> Peiss, “Gender Relations and Working-Class Leisure,” 110.

<sup>73</sup> Peiss, *Cheap Amusements*, 114.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

## Greek Perception of the Persian Other

Jesse Mintz

The development of Western society has occurred in concert with the establishment of a discourse concerning the 'other.' The Western understanding of the 'other' is dependent on a division between two cultures and is typified by an antithetical analysis, asserting its own cultural identity and defining the 'other' merely as the opposite of itself. Existing beyond the scope of the Western scholarly tradition – and thus beyond the discourse defining it – the 'other' is not engaged as an equal on its own terms; rather, it is viewed from afar.<sup>1</sup> Despite the historically changing counterpart to this occidental study, the tendency to demarcate and define based on an oppositional understanding of those beyond Western society has existed since well before the Greco-Persian wars.<sup>2</sup> Within this tendency, the 'other' is not described within their cultural phenomenology, but rather is understood along inherently biased Western sociological lines. That being said, the Western depiction of the 'other' is not static; it evolves and changes in accordance with both the external realities confronting a society and the internal academic current. The writings of Aeschylus, Herodotus and Xenophon attest to such growth. The existence of certain motifs of 'otherness' concurrent in all three authors, and pervasive in Greek thought, is undeniable. However, beginning with Herodotus' nuanced understanding of the tenuous relationship between civilization and barbarism, and culminating in the tolerant ethnography of Xenophon, a changing conception of the other occurred within Greek thought. By the

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<sup>1</sup> Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994)

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

time of Xenophon's writing, Greek thought had undergone a palpable shift in the tone and depiction of the Persian 'other.'

Orientalist discourse is dependent on the maintenance of a separation between the scholar and the subject of analysis. In Edward Said's formative text, *Orientalism*, he recognizes this tendency of demarcating the other and analyzing them on specifically Western terms in the oldest Grecian tragedy extant, Aeschylus' *The Persians*.

Aeschylus represents Asia, makes her speak in the person of the aged Persian queen, Xerxes' mother. It is Europe that articulates the Orient; this articulation is the prerogative, not of a puppet master, but of a genuine creator, whose life-giving power represents, animates, constitutes the otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries.<sup>3</sup>

The goal of orientalism, insofar as it understands foreign cultures along Western norms, is to silence the 'other' and to transform the threat of difference into familiar, albeit reductive and degrading, terms.<sup>4</sup> In the age of Aeschylus, before any pervasive cultural exchange can be understood to have occurred between the Achaemenid Persians and the Ionian Greeks, the Persians presented a "tabula rasa upon which Greeks drew a portrait in their own idiom, a portrait that answered to their own imaginative purposes."<sup>5</sup> However, as Said notes later in his work, the identity of the 'other', created by the orientalist, is far from static. It is constructed and reconstructed as society evolves and is the product of historical, social, intellectual and political debate.<sup>6</sup> As the Greek

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>4</sup> Catherine Gimelli Martin, "Orientalism and the Ethnographer: Said, Herodotus and the Discourse of Alterity," *Criticism* 32 (1990), 511.

<sup>5</sup> Pericles Georges, *Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience: From the Archaic Period to the Age of Xenophon* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 48.

<sup>6</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, 332.

experience with Persians evolved, so too did their discourse concerning them.

If the orientalist discourse is the subject of constant reinterpretation depending on changing societal factors, then before it is possible to discuss concurrent motifs of 'otherness' within Greek thought, it is first necessary to understand the context in which the discourse was produced. This paper will analyze the works of Aeschylus, Herodotus and Xenophon insofar as they can be understood to be representative of their respective eras. While all three authors are the product of the same Grecian scholarly tradition, the context in which they were writing differs greatly. There existed a threat to the social fabric of society during each author's era; the threats, though, differed for each. The subsequent classification of barbarism by each author reflects their perception of the threat.

Said asserts that a Western orientalist tradition has existed within scholarly circles from the earliest times in Europe; one of its earliest manifestations occurs in the era of the Greco-Persian Wars.<sup>7</sup> The threat of Persian despotism loomed over Athenian society during this epoch and it was within this milieu of fear that the "two terms [Greek and barbarian respectively] were constituted as a pair and passed into the shared knowledge of Greeks and that barbarian came to mean, first and foremost, Persian."<sup>8</sup> Engaged in a war defined along a democratic versus tyrannical division, Greek scholars began to associate notions of freedom and autonomy with their society and conversely notions of slavery and despotism with Persian society.

"Aeschylus and Sophocles are the two surviving tragedians whose minds were formed in Athens' era of liberation from tyranny and the threatened absorption into the world monarchy of Persia."<sup>9</sup> It is within this context that one must appreciate the de-

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 55-56.

<sup>8</sup> Francois Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 323.

<sup>9</sup> Georges, *Barbarian Asia*, 78.

piction of Persian culture in Aeschylus' *The Persians*. To understand how a contemporary Greek would comprehend the image of the Persians as presented in the play, it is first necessary to understand whether the play was intended as a tragedy or satire. This question hinges on the depiction of the Persian failure as either a tragic representation, making the play a tragedy with the Persians as the heroes, or as homage to the victory of Greek culture over the barbarians, making the play a satire. Modern scholarship has tended towards the second interpretation, asserting that the timing of the play – eight years after the initial victory of the Greeks over the invading Persians but four years before the banishment of the Persian army from Asia Minor following the battle of Eurymedon – establishes it as an homage to the triumph of the Greeks.<sup>10</sup>

The time of the play allowed Aeschylus certain liberties when describing the Athenian enemy. Occupied in the process of self-definition, he expounds the Athenian self-conception of society as democratic and autonomous and of the Athenian citizen as masculine and guided by moderation, reason and self-restraint.<sup>11</sup> Persian culture, as presented in *The Persians*, “operates antithetically to that of the Athenians [...] and contradicts Hellenic nature at every point with radically pathological human consequences.” He thus engaged in a typical orientalist methodology – that of definition by opposites. To affirm the reality of such an Athenian image he asserts the very opposite, namely slavery, decadence, effeminacy and tyranny, as Persian traits.<sup>13</sup> The depiction of the Persians by Aeschylus therefore describes some important truths held by contemporary Greeks; they were, however, “truths pertaining less to the Persians than to the Athenian sense of self-

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<sup>10</sup> J.D. Craig, “The Interpretation of Aeschylus' *Persae*,” *Classical Review* 38 (1924), 98.

<sup>11</sup> Edith Hall, trans., *Aeschylus' Persians* (Warminster: Aris and Phillips Ltd., 1996), 6.

<sup>12</sup> Georges, *Barbarian Asia*, 86.

<sup>13</sup> Hall, *The Persians*, 13.

identity."<sup>14</sup> Despite this limited, Greco-centric means of constructing the 'other,' Said notes that Aeschylus' presentation of the emptiness, loss and disaster which the Persians suffer is thereafter associated with Oriental meetings with the West. The motif of imminent danger and irrationality of the East, evident in Aeschylus' work, remains present in the Western imagination long after the reductive conceptions of the Persians, exemplified by Aeschylus, ebbed.<sup>15</sup>

Aeschylus identified anything non-Greek as barbarian; the Persians, therefore, as the epitome of the 'other' embodied the epitome of barbarism. The distinction, for him and many Greeks of the time, was simple: Greece was civilized, cultured and democratic and thus anything opposing Greece must be opposing Greek values as well. There is little ethnographic support for such a viewpoint. In contrast with this wholly sophisticated argument stands Herodotus' *Histories*. The *Histories* represents the most formative account of the Greco-Persian War, and, if Herodotus can be trusted as an historian, it is the product of empirical knowledge rather than rumour and conjecture. Like *The Persian*, the *Histories* must be understood in context. With the Greco-Persian War long over and the Peloponnesian Wars already looming, Herodotus' writing provides a justification for the long standing hostility between Persians and Greeks, thematically aligning it with the growing enmity between Ionian Athenians and Dorian Spartans.<sup>16</sup> Herodotus relied on direct investigation – the *epsis* and *akoe* (the eye and ear respectively) – and often rejected the clout of accepted wisdom.<sup>17</sup> Writing retrospectively after the victory of Greece over Persia, Herodotus' account is more interested in the delineation between citizen and slave than between civilized and barbaric.<sup>18</sup>

While both Aeschylus and Herodotus present the traits of

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 6

<sup>15</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, 56-57.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 130.

<sup>17</sup> Georges, *Barbarian Asia*, 124.

<sup>18</sup> Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus*, 224.

the barbaric 'other' similarly – namely, despotic, unorganized and violent – the difference lay in the definition of what constitutes a barbarian.<sup>19</sup> For Aeschylus, the redeeming and indeed civilizing factor of Greece was its Grecian identity while the barbaric nature of Persia was dependent solely on its non-Grecian, Persian identity. For Herodotus, on the other hand, all peoples are capable of both civilization and culture.<sup>20</sup> Herodotus engaged the Persians and, by doing so, partially reshaped their place as the separate 'other.' From Herodotus' relatively equitable pursuit arises:

Not the strict and linear opposition between barbarian and Hellen canonized by Aeschylus [...] but a taxonomy of human behaviour that threatens to span the received distance between the two human poles of barbarism and Hellenism, or even to erase it: close beneath the surface of his narrative is his conviction that Hellenism – the condition of being Greek through and through – is a hard-won, fragile prize, and easily lost.<sup>21</sup>

Society's question, which Herodotus strove to answer in his Histories, concerned the nature of the division between Greek and Persian and between civilized and barbaric. Herodotus' answer, elucidated over the nine books of his Histories, is that neither term is static and that both Europe and Asia engaged in a cultural transvaluation.<sup>22</sup>

The *Histories*, in qualifying the definition of barbarism as more than non-Greek, distinguishes the Persian 'other' from further forms of barbarism. There are several incidents recorded by Herodotus which defy the typical conception of Persian barbarism. He recounts a Persian debate concerning their means of government which occurred between Darius, future Shah of Persia,

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<sup>19</sup> Hall, *Persians*, 6; Georges, *Barbarian Asia*, 123.

<sup>20</sup> Georges, *Barbarian Asia*, 181.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 124.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 205.

and his six political equals.<sup>23</sup> Despite the outcome of these debates, in which Darius proclaims that a monarchical system best suits Persia and assumes autocratic control, the ability to conceive alternative forms of government is an ability in which Aeschylus and earlier thinkers never could have ascribed to the Persians. Rather, as understood by Aeschylus, Persian barbarism is intricately linked with servitude and tyranny; "to that extent, the peoples of Asia are incapable, not of seeking liberty, but of living with it."<sup>24</sup> Herodotus, on the other hand, presents this incident as a point of reference for the possible Persian evolution towards Hellenism. Otanes, who suggests "entrusting the management of the country to the Persian people,"<sup>25</sup> represents the freedom possible to all Persians. Anticipating that many Greeks may find the idea that a Persian could conceive of free rule deplorable, Herodotus puts forth the story of Mardonius as further proof. Mardonius, a Persian commander under Darius, deposed of the Ionian tyrants and instituted democratic rule in Ionia, further proving the Persian capacity for democracy, a defining characteristic of civilization.<sup>26</sup>

According to Herodotus, the states of barbarism and civilization are thus determined, not by the ethnicity of the people in question, but by their culture and laws.<sup>27</sup> There exists a potential in all peoples, attested to by Herodotus' accounts of the Pelasgian evolution and assimilation into the Hellenes and the Medes constitutional debates, to develop their culture.<sup>28</sup> This evolution, however, occurs from the theorized tyranny of barbarism and culminates in the autonomy of Hellenism. Thus, despite Herodotus' nuanced understanding of the causes and relationship between barbarism and civilization, he still maintained Athenian society as

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<sup>23</sup> Robin Waterfield, trans., *Herodotus: The Histories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 203-206.

<sup>24</sup> Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus*, 324.

<sup>25</sup> Waterfield, *Histories*, 204.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 366.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 204.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.



the ultimate goal of both. As Georges writes, “in the *Histories* the potential direction of development of Asianic peoples is out of their peculiar barbarisms into Hellenism.”<sup>29</sup>

The changing conception of the ‘other,’ evident in the evolved depiction of the Persians in the writings of Herodotus as compared to those of Aeschylus, evolved once more in the works of Xenophon, a fourth century B.C.E. Greek philosopher and historian. Of the three thinkers discussed in this paper, Xenophon requires the most contextualization and his writing receives the most scrutiny. His close association with the Persian Empire led to both his involved knowledge of Persian society and allegations of bias. Unlike the epochs of both Aeschylus and Herodotus – epochs in which the Persian threat loomed but was tempered by Grecian strength and unity – Xenophon lived in an era of Athenian disarray. The Peloponnesian Wars ravaged Athens and the Thirty Tyrants disillusioned the Athenian identity. The inability for any single Greek state to maintain stable hegemony became evident, and an increasing number of Greek thinkers looked to monarchical rule to maintain order. Having served the Thirty in the cavalry, the restoration of democracy saw Xenophon exiled from Athens. Xenophon was ideologically orphaned from politics – betrayed by the autocratic and self-serving Thirty and disillusioned by a weak democracy – and began his service as a mercenary in the Persian military.<sup>30</sup> It is within this context – that of a disgruntled and disillusioned Athenian serving under a stable, albeit monarchical, regime in Persia – that one can understand the writings of Xenophon.

Confronted with the chaos and disarray of Athenian democracy coupled with the subjugation of Athens to Sparta following the Peloponnesian War, Xenophon became increasingly enamored with the Persian Empire. Xenophon’s work concerning the Persians, *Cyropaedia*, is unique among Greek depictions of Persia.

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<sup>29</sup> Georges, *Barbarian Asia*, 181.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 207-212.

Whereas the typical Greek historiography of the 'other,' evident in Aeschylus' work, equated Persia with barbarism solely because it opposed Greece, Xenophon saw within the different Persian political system – monarchy as opposed to democracy – an idealized society. Xenophon freed the barbaric Persian from their place in servitude within the Greek tropes of though as attested to be by both Aeschylus and Herodotus, and elevated them above the fragmented Greek society. Xenophon understood "the stability of the Persian empire in its rule over so many mutually foreign peoples, which contrasted so remarkably with the anarchy and misrule of Greece,"<sup>31</sup> as an achievement beyond the reach of Greek society. His elevation of tyranny over democracy – indeed of Persia over Greece – is indicative of his reverence for stability and order, not ethnicity and culture, and is testimony to the growth which occurred in the Greek conception of the 'other.' As Georges writes:

That Xenophon should regard Persians of his own status to be as noble and essentially free in their choice of loyalties as himself and his Spartan hero Agesilaus, completed the formation of a new outlook toward the imperial people that stood Aeschylus and the ideology descending from the Persae on its head. This outlook belonged to the future.<sup>32</sup>

The future era which Georges alludes to is the era of Alexander the Great. Alexander conquered much of the Achaemenid Empire which Xenophon praises; within his ecumenical policy, his appropriation of Persian culture to justify his rule, and his regard for Persian nobility and military, Xenophon's influence is evident. Alexander's attitude, like that of Xenophon, was one forged by personal experience not by patriotic prejudice and scholastic training.

The close relationship that Xenophon had with many Per-

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<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 212.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 221.

sians, including Cyrus – the object of his *Cyropaedia* - has led many of his contemporaries and subsequent generations of scholars to question the bias present in his depiction. In this vein, Georges writes that Xenophon's conception of the Persians and their civilization was "formed far less by the patriotic anti-barbarism of those demagogic politicians and rhetorical performer whom he despised,"<sup>33</sup> but rather was more in tune with his personal experience with Cyrus. Despite criticisms levelled at Xenophon, alleging that his writings amount to the precursor of the modern novel, much can be learned about the evolution of Greek thought from him. The *Cyropaedia* remains an orientalist work, using Greek terms to define both Greece and Persia; it is, however, for this very reason that it proves to be astonishing. Whereas Aeschylus perceived the barbaric to be intrinsically linked to the Persian and Herodotus perceived the Persians as requiring cultural evolution to achieve Hellenic culture, Xenophon used the same ideals to venerate Persia. The rubric of liberty, stability, knowledge of the world and the like – the same rubric used just centuries earlier to degrade the Persians – now attested to their cultural distinction.

Plato, writing in the fourth century B.C.E., like Xenophon recognized the universality of merit:

Among the mass are always some men, though not many, of superhuman excellence. Association with such men, who spring up in misgoverned communities as well as those enjoying good laws is a privilege of the highest value. It is always a good thing if members of well-governed states, if they are incorruptible, should travel by land and by sea in search of such men, in order to confirm those good customs of his own community and correcting those which are defective.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 209.

<sup>34</sup> Trevor Saunders, trans., *The Laws* (New York: Penguin Classics, 2004), 951.

The Greek discourse on the Persian 'other,' as evidenced by subsequent Hellenistic policy in concordance with this reasoning, evolved beyond the simple dichotomy of Greeks and Persians. What was good was no longer solely what was Greek; likewise, what was bad was not merely what was 'other.' A universal standard of society – based on a common rubric – had been developed, with which it was possible to better understand the notion of the 'other.' However, following Xenophon's praise of Persian society, many within Athenian academic circles maintained their prejudiced, antithetical conception of the 'other.' The reductive Greek depiction of the 'other,' in fact, from the time of Aeschylus, remains as ubiquitous today in society, as illustrated by Said.<sup>35</sup> That being said, while their understandings may not have eradicated previous preconceptions, Herodotus and especially Xenophon represent an evolving discourse on the 'other.'

Greek perception of the Persian 'other' has not been static over time. Its evolution has been shaped by concurrent factors both from within Greek society and from without. While there are common motifs present – namely, characteristics ascribed to barbarians – the perception of the Persians and the qualitative definition of barbarian changed greatly in the period spanning Aeschylus and Xenophon. The changing perception of the Persian 'other' corresponds to the evolving classification of what constituted a barbarian. The initial definition of a barbarian presented by Aeschylus, that of merely a non-Greek, was replaced by Herodotus' delineation between a citizen and a slave and his acceptance of the Persian ability to progress. In terms of the scope of this paper, the Greek understanding of the 'other' receives its ultimate expression – the expression carried forth by Alexander into the Hellenistic age – in the writings of Xenophon. Xenophon freed the Persian 'other' from the title of barbarian and provided a universal conception of the dichotomy between the civilized and the barbaric.

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<sup>35</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, 56.

## Their Situation Led Their Actions: How Situationism Explains the Common Perpetrators' Actions During the Holocaust

D'Arcy Mulligan

To many, the actions of the perpetrators during the Holocaust seem completely incomprehensible unless one views all the actors as 'evil'. After all, how could a normal, decent person willingly kill a multitude of people solely because of their ethnicity, nationality, or religion? The idea of situationism helps explain how this could happen. Situationism is the idea that social forces "larger than ourselves determine our mental life and our actions".<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that they play the only role, but for most people they are the determining factor. The situational factors that came into play within the Nazi system that made it easier for the Holocaust and massacres in the east to occur would include antisemitism, a linking of Jews with their ideological adversary (communism), deindividuation, the use of violent imagery, rewards for violent behaviour and punishments for non-compliance, and the authoritative power from which the orders to kill originated.

The first thing that must be proven is that those men who did the killings were not extraordinary in any way. The Order Police, who were in charge of deportations and murders in towns and villages in the east, were generally a little older than the

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<sup>1</sup> Phillip Zimbardo, "Situational Sources of Evil – Part II," *The Situationist*, 23 February 2007, 29 November 2007 <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/02/23/situational-sources-of-evil-part-ii/>>

average soldier and were almost halfway comprised of by reservists.<sup>2</sup> Most of these men had families and were not fanatical Nazis so, on the whole, they did not seem to be “ a very promising group from which to recruit mass murderers” .<sup>3</sup> There was no real selection process for those guarding the victims and doing the killing, and those who did were very commonly not party members. Concentration camp guards were not specially chosen, trained, or fervent Nazis.<sup>4</sup> The Wehrmacht itself, which planned and carried out the murders of Jews, gypsies, and communists in Serbia,<sup>5</sup> had no strict policies for having to be a party member or being particularly prone to violent actions. In fact, the only three groups which carried out killings that did have requirements or a selection process were the SS, the Einsatzgruppen, and the Trawniki. The Trawniki, who were used by the SS for ghetto clearing, were Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian POWs who were screened on the basis of their anti-communist sentiment.<sup>6</sup> If an individual was deemed to be enough of an anti-communist he could be selected. However, it must be noted that antisemitism and violence were not one of the measures used for selection. The SS, which was in charge of the concentration camps as well as organizing and carrying out some massacres, did have rigorous selection methods, though these requirements did lessen as the war went on. They required that no recruit have been convicted of a criminal act, that they meet certain racial standards, as well as possessing the qualities of loyalty, obedience, courage, truthfulness, honesty, comrade-

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<sup>2</sup> Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 182.

<sup>3</sup> Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), 48.

<sup>4</sup> Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 337.

<sup>5</sup> Wolfram Wette, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider, *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 103.

<sup>6</sup> Browning, *Ordinary*, 52.

<sup>7</sup> Elie A. Cohen, trans. M.H. Braaksma, *Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp* (London: Free Association Books, 1988), 225-6.

ship, responsibility, industry, and abstention.<sup>7</sup> However, once again there seems to be no requirement for fanatical antisemitism or penchant for violence. The SS men actually used for massacres were drawn mostly from rear-support or replacement divisions which left the fittest men for front line duty.<sup>8</sup> The SS men used to guard the concentration camps also faced little, if any, type of selection process as there was a "continual exchange of personnel between field units of Waffen SS and concentration camp service".<sup>9</sup> The SS also made up around half of the Einsatzgruppen,<sup>10</sup> a special unit devoted almost exclusively to massacring civilian populations. The SS in the Einsatzgruppen had been court-martialed and were given the choice of either joining "special commando units" or fulfilling their sentence normally.<sup>11</sup> The Einsatzgruppen was one of the only units where many of the men within the unit could be said to have had anti-social tendencies, though it is a difficult claim to make as the severity of the crimes for which they were court-martialed is unknown. Though the rank and file of the Einsatzgruppen might have been suspect, Himmler preferred that their leaders be highly educated.<sup>12</sup> Even the commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolph Hoess, avoided watching corporal punishment because he did not like the violence involved.<sup>13</sup> It must be stressed that all these men were ordinary human beings.<sup>14</sup> It was the situation of the war and the regime they were under that led them to act as they did.

It should also be noted that most men who were involved

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<sup>8</sup> George H. Stein, *The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939-1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 274.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 261.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 264.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 263.

<sup>12</sup> Wette, *Wehrmacht*, 122.

<sup>13</sup> Rudolph Hoess, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon, *Commandant of Auschwitz* (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1961), 69.

<sup>14</sup> Browning, *Ordinary*, xx.; Norman G. Finkelstein and Ruth Bettina Birn, *A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth* (New York: Henry Hold & Co., 1998), 98.

in killing units performed their duties. When the 101 Police Battalion was given orders to massacre a group of Jews for the first time only 12 out of 500 men declined to take part.<sup>15</sup> What makes this even more surprising is the fact that their commander, Major Trapp, offered them a way out when he said that what they would have to do was a "frightfully unpleasant task... [that was] not to his liking, [and] highly regrettable... [and that] older men who did not feel up to the task could step out".<sup>16</sup> In later actions, when the opportunity to opt-out was not explicitly given, those who did not shoot fell to only two people, and both men did it by slinking away and hiding.<sup>17</sup> Many of the group complained about their job but few got themselves out.<sup>18</sup> To determine why the men followed their orders almost universally, even though the orders ran counter to their own emotions,<sup>19</sup> one must look at their situation.

Of course, not all guards and perpetrators are created equal. Amongst the perpetrators there were sadists. Some members of the order police in Lodz purposefully set their watches ahead so that they could beat Polish civilians for breaking curfew.<sup>20</sup> Many guards at concentration camps also took pleasure in prisoners bullying and injuring other prisoners.<sup>21</sup> However, these are the minority. At the Auschwitz trial it was determined that not more than five to ten percent of guards were sadists.<sup>22</sup> Once the war ended and the Nazi apparatus was dismantled many perpetrators, and their spouses, realized the crimes they had committed as shown in their high divorce rate after the war.<sup>23</sup> It is these men, these regular men, who were "turned evil" by their situation.

To more easily be able to kill large groups of people one

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<sup>15</sup> Browning, *Ordinary*, 71.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>21</sup> Hoess, *Commandant*, 128.

<sup>22</sup> Finkelstein and Birn, *Nation*, 67.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.



must first separate oneself from them. The easiest way to do this is to create a group to which one's people feel allegiance, an "ingroup", and isolate the enemy from that group by relegating them to another, an "outgroup", or 'other'. The Nazis were able to accomplish this with the Germans (ingroup) and the Jews and other 'subhumans' (outgroup). . Creating these groups, and allegiances to them is actually remarkably easy. One experiment that shows how simple this can be done, and how people are naturally drawn to creating distinctions, was done by Henri Tajfel:

He asked boys to guess how many dots were shown on a speckled slide and subsequently announced they were over- or underestimators. Next the boys distributed points (that were exchangeable for money) amongst each other. They tended to give more to those who were the same 'type' as themselves. They had spent mere minutes as a member of this transparently meaningless ingroup, and yet were already showing favoritism!<sup>24</sup>

Another way to create group bias is to provide a prize or goal that only one group can have. This was shown in Muzafer Sherif's Robbers Cave Experiment. In this experiment the researchers took two groups of middle class 11-year-old boys with no prior disciplinary problems and had them go to a summer camp. For the first week the week the groups did not see each other. On the second week they met each when they were forced to share sports fields and the cafeteria. The groups began to call each other names and taunt each other. It was decided by the counselors that they should have a four day games tournament with a cash prize given to the winning team. After that the name calling escalated into fist fights and cabin raids. After the final game the losing group

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<sup>24</sup> Alex Gunz, "The Doubled Edged Passion," *In Mind*, 20 October 2007, 29 November 2007 <<http://www.in-mind.org/issue-4/the-double-edged-passion.html>>

raided the winning groups cabin and stole their prizes.<sup>25</sup> After only two weeks groups of strangers were stealing and fighting each other because they were part of one designated group or the other. The reason they did these things was because they “knew” that their group was good and the other group was bad: “In-group members tend to make internal (dispositional) attributions to positive in-group behavior and negative out-group behavior, as well as external (situational) attributions to negative in-group behavior and positive out-group behavior”.<sup>26</sup> The need to find a scapegoat, or other, normally occurs, according to anthropologist Thomas J. Schoeneman, “closely after social turmoil. The need to find a scapegoat peaked in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries when churches fell under siege from science and monarchs, they peaked in Massachusetts when Puritan influence there came under intense fire, and they peaked in Washington when China and the USSR loomed as threats”.<sup>27</sup> This can also be seen, in a more direct parallel to the Holocaust, with the Turks when, only a few years after the Sultan was deposed, the Turkish leaders asserted need to destroy Armenians as a way of revitalizing empire and curing their people.<sup>28</sup> At the time of the Holocaust Germany had been undergoing radical social changes for years. All this change led to insecurity for the general population which led to the population being more susceptible to propaganda, ethnocentric self-glorification, self-protection of in-group, and aggression directed towards scapegoats of out-group.<sup>29</sup>

The ultimate goal for the German ingroup was to win the

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<sup>25</sup> John Hanson and Michael McCann, “March Madness,” *The Situationist*, 27 March 2007, 29 November 2007 <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/03/27/march-madness/>>

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Gunz, “Double”.

<sup>28</sup> Robert J. Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1986), 489.

<sup>29</sup> G.M. Gilbert, *The Psychology of Dictatorship: Based on an Examination of the Leaders of Nazi Germany* (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1950), 270.

'competition of the races'<sup>30</sup> by freeing the Aryan race from all impure races through segregation, deprivation of education, exclusion from all but menial occupations, and finally with decimation.<sup>31</sup> The other goal for the ingroup was the complete destruction of communism. What the propaganda was able to do was to link these two 'evils', that of the Jew and that of communism, to make them into a single outgroup. This was not a difficult task as diaries show that many in the military linked Bolsheviks with Jews.<sup>32</sup> This link between Jews and Bolshevism continued to be hammered home through the propaganda and speeches by the Nazi party. For the SS and Einsatzgruppen many of their orders specifically linked Jews with Bolshevism.<sup>33</sup> In 1939 the Wehrmacht was issued booklets which explicitly stated the National Socialist world view which included this link.<sup>34</sup> This link between the two grew so strong that by 1941 'Jewish Bolshevism' had "assumed a life of its own that drastically diminished the military's ability to perceive reality".<sup>35</sup> Another link made was to create the Bolshevik as subhuman whether they were Jewish or not. In a message that was to be read to the men it was written that "[t]he goal is to wipe out the species of subhuman Red represented by the rulers in Moscow".<sup>36</sup> The point of all this creation of the outgroup was to create "a psychological distance between German soldiers and enemies through continual degradation and dehumanization of the latter in order to make killing easier".<sup>37</sup> What is most interesting, however, is that the world view created by this torrent of propaganda was so great that the average German's norms were so shaped into

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<sup>30</sup> Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 460.

<sup>31</sup> Gilbert, *Nazi*, 292.

<sup>32</sup> Wette, *Wehrmacht*, 43.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 94.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

<sup>35</sup> Christopher R. Browning, *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 248.

<sup>36</sup> Wette, *Wehrmacht*, 98-99.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.

the Nazi view that, for the Order Police, they did not need to be given overly antisemitic teachings and pamphlets until after the first massacres.<sup>38</sup> It was just taken for granted that Jews were a threat to the system and the ingroup and that a protection of this threat,<sup>39</sup> or not getting rid of this threat, was akin to murdering your own blood.<sup>40</sup> This way of thinking became so ubiquitous that Hoess referred to having emotions against killing Jews as a “betrayal against the fuhrer”.<sup>41</sup>

One thing that made the killings easier was that there was a pervasive form of antisemitism in both the military and amongst the general German population. This is not to say that antisemitism caused the killings, as per the 'Goldhagen Theory',<sup>42</sup> but it certainly was a factor that helped it. There had been a “legacy of German antisemitism” that allowed for the more extreme form propagated by Nazism to gain ground.<sup>43</sup> It was so great in the military that Gustav Noske admitted before German National Assembly in 1919 that there was a great antisemitic feeling in the armed forces.<sup>44</sup> This led to the fact that there was very little outcry when the Nuremberg Laws were put in place. If anything, these laws strengthened the belief that Jews deserved their fate as sub-humans.<sup>45</sup> Once the racist system was put in place and codified in law it became very easy for people to justify it. People will rationalize the status quo, whatever that may be, and see it as good, fair, legitimate, and desirable.<sup>46</sup> It was not just the laws and system put

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<sup>38</sup> Browning, *Ordinary*, 177-182.

<sup>39</sup> Cohen, *Human*, 7.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 226.

<sup>41</sup> Hoess, *Commandant*, 174.

<sup>42</sup> Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 9.

<sup>43</sup> Finkelstein and Birn, *Nation*, 14.

<sup>44</sup> Wette, *Wehremacht*, 47.

<sup>45</sup> Harbour Fraser Hodder, “Fortune’s Favour: The Lucky Effect,” *Harvard Magazine*, March 2003, 28 November 2007 <<http://harvardmagazine.com/2007/03/the-lucky-effect.html>>

<sup>46</sup> Aaron C. Kay, John T. Jost et al, “Panglossian Ideology in the Service of System Justification: How Complementary Stereotypes Help Us to Rationalize Inequality,” *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 30 (2007), 305.

in place that helped the antisemitism to flourish, however. The propaganda element also played a large role in determining people's thoughts. Many civilians admitted that when they saw a Jew on the street they did not think of him as a person "but as a Jew"<sup>47</sup> and that the "category of human was not applicable".<sup>48</sup> The population was unable to see the Jew rationally because people's brains are not wired to do that. Once people associate themselves with a political ideology or system, in this instance many people associated themselves with Hitler himself as seen through his popularity, then any instance which seemed to contradict the image of 'Hitler doing good' was willed away in their brains. People regularly do this as in Dr. Drew Westen's experiment where he has avowed Republicans and Democrats read statements that contradict their respective party's platforms:

Confronted with the unwelcome contradictions, each subject's network of neurons associated with distress and regulating emotions (the right frontal lobe, the insula and amygdala) lit up. But soon the subjects found ways to deny that there was any significant contradiction, and calm returned. "The neural circuits charged with regulation of emotional states seemed to recruit beliefs" — even false ones — that would eliminate the distress each subject was experiencing, he writes. Meanwhile, the reasoning centers of the brain... were quiet. What's more, the neural circuits responsible for positive emotions turned on as soon as the subject found a way to resolve the contradictions — reinforcing the faulty reasoning. Dr. [Drew] Westen summed it up: people think with the gut.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Milton Mayer, *They Thought They Were Free* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 124.

<sup>48</sup> Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 280.

<sup>49</sup> Patricia Cohen, "Counselling Democrats to Go For the Gut," *New York Times*, 10 July 2007, 29 November 2007 <[http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/arts/10west.html?](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/arts/10west.html?ex=1341720000&en=b102202a7cd936ab&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss)

[ex=1341720000&en=b102202a7cd936ab&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/arts/10west.html?ex=1341720000&en=b102202a7cd936ab&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss)>

The Waffen SS had this idea in mind when they trained their officer corps. "The educational goal was not to make the officer-candidate capable of exercising a rationally controlled critical faculty, but rather to make him *identify* with the ideology".<sup>50</sup>

The propaganda machine became so effective that, using the stereotype that Jews shirked from work as an example, some Germans, upon arriving in Poland, were surprised at finding Jews who did manual labour.<sup>51</sup> This sort of propaganda was also used in the armed forces as when General Hans Rottiger, who commanded panzer troops in the east, spoke to his men and declared that the "struggle against bandits that we were waging had at its ultimate aim the exploitation of the military for the purpose of ruthlessly exterminating Jewry and other unwanted elements".<sup>52</sup> That propaganda could be used that contained such specific wording towards extermination is not a surprise when one views the increasingly antisemitic stances of the German people during that time. For example, when Germans would give up their seats to Jews on a streetcar in 1941 they were met with approval, however by 1942 the same action was met with jeers.<sup>53</sup> That being said, the antisemitism in Germany did not lead to many, if any, popular assaults on Jews.<sup>54</sup> However, the amount of effort put in to teaching that this was an ideological and racial war against a 'subhuman' enemy led to a, based on letters and diaries, "surprisingly large number of servicemen adopt[ing] the complete National Socialist view of the world,<sup>55</sup> including the 'ethnic community'".<sup>56</sup> The antisemitic propaganda, coupled with the an-

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<sup>50</sup> Bernd Wegner, trans. Ronald Webster, *The Waffen-SS: Organization, Ideology and Function* (London: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1990), 173.

<sup>51</sup> Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 285.

<sup>52</sup> Wette, *Wehrmacht*, 206.

<sup>53</sup> Finkelstein and Birn, *Nation*, 52.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

<sup>55</sup> Stein, *Waffen*, 272.

<sup>56</sup> Wette, *Wehrmacht*, 181.

tisemitism already present in Germany, did help prime the men to be able to more easily kill innocent civilians.

Even if one was not racist to begin with it quickly became difficult to escape it. There have been two psychological tests done recently to prove how easy it is to become biased. Using the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which is a test that measures differences in time between how long it takes a person to associate positive words with certain cultures or races and negative words with others, it was shown that “[o]nly 7 percent of white college students at University of Wisconsin and Northwestern University showed no racial bias. When shown images to create bias (Chinese characters linked with negative images) only those who showed no racial bias seemed unaffected by the classical conditioning test”.<sup>57</sup> In another test two races were made up. Subjects were told about an individual from each race. One individual had 12 positive traits and four negative ones, the other individual was the exact opposite. When asked about the races the two people came from the subjects expressed no explicit bias in what they said, however they did express a bias through the IAT. After a few days the subjects were asked about the two races again and this time they expressed both implicit as well as explicit biases.<sup>58</sup> Without positive actors to ward off negative stereotypes, of which there were few if any regarding the Jews in Germany,<sup>59</sup> it becomes almost impossible to stay unbiased.

Another process used to make the killings easier was “deindividuation”. This is the process of removing those aspects which separate an individual from a group. In the case of the

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<sup>57</sup> Robert Livingston, “New Study Discovers Why Few People Are Devoid of Racial Bias,” *EurekaAlert!* 24 September 2007, 28 November 2007 <[http://www.eurekaalert.org/pub\\_releases/2007-09/afps-nsd092407.php](http://www.eurekaalert.org/pub_releases/2007-09/afps-nsd092407.php)>

<sup>58</sup> Brian Nosek and Kate Ranganath, “Judging One by the Actions of Another,” *The Situationist* 16 October 2007, 28 November 2007 <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/10/16/judging-one-by-the-actions-of-another-eventually/>>

<sup>59</sup> Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 442.

armed forces and Einsatzgruppen this was giving them each uniforms, removing them from their family and loved ones (though this was also a military necessity), and creating an “unquestioning obedience to military [which caused] many people to lose sense of individual responsibility and personal guilt”.<sup>60</sup> This sense of deindividuation empirically creates more violent reactions. In a Milgram-like experiment, having subjects shock a stranger based on the instructions from a 'teacher', “‘deindividuated’ women delivered twice as much shock to victims as comparison women did”.<sup>61</sup> In terms of real-world evidence anthropologist R.J. Watson found that when societies changed the appearance of their warriors before going to war there was an 80 percent chance that they would brutalize their victims, whereas in societies that did not change their warriors appearance there was only a ten percent chance that their victims would be brutalized.<sup>62</sup> The deindividuation of perpetrators helped them to be more brutal and careless with regards to human life.

The deindividuation was not limited to just the perpetrators, however. Jewish men and women would have their hair shaved and be stripped of their clothes before massacres and upon entering concentration camps. Eventually numbers would be tattooed onto their arms upon entering work camps thereby removing the need to have names. Rudolph Hoess, the commandant at Auschwitz, admits that they were to not think of their charges as men but as 'Russians' or 'kanakas'.<sup>63</sup> Being referred to as 'Russian' in this instance is telling as Hoess admits that the Russians were given so little food that they would kill each other to steal food or even kill each other so as to be able to cannibalize the victim.<sup>64</sup> So,

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<sup>60</sup> Wette, *Wehrmacht*, 158-9.

<sup>61</sup> John Hanson and Michael McCann, “Deindividuation and Seung Hui Cho,” *The Situationist* 21 June 2007, 29 November 2007 <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/06/21/deindividuation-and-seung-hui-cho/>>

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> Hoess, *Commandant*, 84.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 136-7



in his mind and in the minds of many other Germans, to be Russian was to be without humanity.

Attacking a group outside of their own also provided an outlet for personal frustration.<sup>65</sup> It has been shown that when suffering from lower levels of self-esteem than normal, that the more one attacks an ethnic other than one's own, whether attacking physically, verbally, or economically, the more one's levels of self-esteem raise back to their normal levels.<sup>66</sup> The group to attack was made abundantly clear through ideology as well as practically. For those frustrated with the war effort, or being away from loved ones, or from having to actually fight, attacking Jews made oneself feel much better.

Being primed with hostile images and violent words made it easier for the perpetrators to commit their acts. In another Milgram-like experiment run by Charles Carver it was found that the subjects would administer longer shocks when primed with hostile words.<sup>67</sup> As shown earlier, the Wehrmacht, SS, and Einsatzgruppen were all inundated with propaganda denoting the hostile nature of their enemies and of the Jews. The Order Police also usually had hostile or violent statements before entering into an "engagement" against civilians. Before their first massacre Major Trapp reminded his men of the "bombs falling on women and children in Germany".<sup>68</sup> Major Weis, of Police Battalion 309, told his men that it was a "war against Jews and Bolsheviks... proceed ruthlessly against Jews".<sup>69</sup> In the concentration camps the guards, and supervisors, were repeatedly ordered to treat the prisoners roughly.<sup>70</sup> As soon as guards began to treat their prisoners roughly

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<sup>65</sup> Gilbert, *Psychology*, 288.

<sup>66</sup> Gunz, "Double".

<sup>67</sup> "The (Unconscious) Situation of Our Consciousness—Part I," *The Situationist* 15 November 2007, 29 November 2007 <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/11/15/the-unconscious-situation-of-our-consciousness-part-i/>>

<sup>68</sup> Browning, *Ordinary*, 2.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>70</sup> Hoess, *Commandant*, 84.

other guards could easily soon follow their examples and adjust to the environment.<sup>71</sup> Once the first violence was perpetrated by someone each subsequent violent action became easier and more natural.

Violence also begets other violence. The process of venting, that is using violence to release anger, actually makes people resort to violent actions more often out of frustration. This 'venting' of frustration actually makes people twice as aggressive as those who do not vent.<sup>72</sup> The reason this happens is because "previous experience in a situation can make some neural connections stronger than others, tipping the scales in favor of a previously performed action".<sup>73</sup> Many people showed shock and horror at their actions after their first killings. Rudolph Hoess and Adolf Eichmann both 'shuddered' and 'trembled' after seeing their first gassing victims.<sup>74</sup> Many units involved in killing civilians had strong reactions such as these, however, all their reactions are very similar to those soldiers who have just been involved in combat for the first time.<sup>75</sup> Hoess admitted that he thought the orders to kill the Soviet political commissars made it easier to kill the civilian Jews.<sup>76</sup> For the men in the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS killing civilians was just another extension of their normal duties as soldiers. For the Order Police and the concentration camp guards their killing of civilians was, for most of them, their first taste of 'battle'. However, they soon became habituated to their duties. For the Order Police it became less like killing and more like the

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<sup>71</sup> Cohen, *Human*, 231.

<sup>72</sup> I would recommend watching *Penn & Teller: Bullshit – Anger Management* to learn more about this.

<sup>73</sup> "The Situation of Reason," *The Situationist*, 9 November 2007, 29 November 2007 <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/11/09/the-situation-of-reason/>>

<sup>74</sup> Hoess, *Commandant*, 21; Jochen von Lang ed., trans. Ralph Manheim, *Eichman Interrogated: Transcripts from the Archives of the Israeli Police* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1983), 76.

<sup>75</sup> Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 221.

<sup>76</sup> Hoess, *Commandant*, 163.

drudgery of a job that some found distasteful.<sup>77</sup> For those in the concentration camps it was a similar experience. Though they tended to delegate many of the tasks they still became conditioned to the factory-like atmosphere of killing that the concentration camps engendered.<sup>78</sup> Delegating the tasks made their work as killers easier on the minds of those involved.

In the concentration camps many of the tasks were delegated to prisoners. The prisoners were in charge of moving the gassed bodies to the crematoriums, as well as in charge of maintaining discipline over the other prisoners. The order police also tried to distance themselves from the tasks. They would give the worst tasks to the Trawniki<sup>79</sup> and many Order Police would drink before engaging in the killing of civilians.<sup>80</sup> The only complaints the Order Police had with giving the tasks to the Trawniki was not that they were killing the civilians, but that they took so much joy from it.<sup>81</sup> The reason for this is that the more remote one is from the killing the easier it would be. In Stanley Milgram's shock experiment he found that the way to induce full complicity in performing the maximum amount of shock was to have the subject not pull the lever themselves, but to give the order to someone else to pull the lever.<sup>82</sup>

The greatest reason for why an ordinary person could turn into a killer would be in their situation. The situation, in this case, is the "behavioral context that has the power, through its reward and normative functions, to give meaning and identity to the actor's roles and status".<sup>83</sup> In the concentration camp situation the

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<sup>77</sup> Browning, *Ordinary*, 85.

<sup>78</sup> Cohen, *Human*, 9.

<sup>79</sup> Browning, *Ordinary*, 77.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.

<sup>81</sup> Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 227.

<sup>82</sup> John Hanson and Michael McCann, "'Situation' Trumps 'Disposition' - Part II," *The Situationist* 9 August 2007, 29 November 2007 <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/08/09-situation-trumps-disposition-part-ii/>>

<sup>83</sup> Phil Zimbardo, "Person X Situation X System Dynamics," *The Situationist* 30 July 2007, 29 November 2007 <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/07/30/person-x-situation-x-system-dynamics/>>

rewards were based on who could best keep the prisoners under control and kill them. In the case of the Order Police, Wehrmacht, and SS the rewards were given to those who could best follow orders to kill civilians. Though the process of getting the rewards, killing human beings, seems barbaric, that was the norm for these men. An example of normal people succumbing to social and situational pressure can be seen in Dr. Phil Zimbardo's 'Stanford Experiment'. In this experiment college students with no behavioural problems were randomly assigned either the role of 'guard' or 'prisoner' in a 'prison'. The prisoners were to remain under guard 24 hours a day with guards working 8 hour shifts. The guards were to not physically attack the prisoners but could use everything at their disposal in their power to maintain control. The experiment had to be stopped after only six days due to almost half the 'inmates' suffering emotional breakdowns. The guards, with no prodding, subjected those under their care to being forced into sexually humiliating poses, sleep deprivation, dehumanization through forcing them to walk around naked with bags over their head, and verbal degradation. This experiment showed that "given certain conditions, ordinary people can succumb to social pressure to commit acts that would otherwise be unthinkable".<sup>84</sup> A modern example was through a study of Brazilian policemen who acted as interrogators/torturers:

Torturers were not unusual or deviant in any way prior to practicing their new roles, nor were there any persisting deviant tendencies or pathologies among any of them in the years following their work as torturers and executioners. Their transformation was entirely explainable as being the consequence of a number of situational and systemic factors, such as the training they were given to play this new

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<sup>84</sup> Phillip Zimbardo, "From Heavens to Hells to Heroes—Part I," *The Situationist* 12 March 2007, 29 November 2007 <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/03/12/from-heavens-to-hells-to-heroes-%e2%80%93-part-i/>>

role; their group camaraderie; acceptance of the national security ideology; and their learned belief in socialists and Communists as enemies of their state.<sup>85</sup>

The men believed the ideology and the fact that Bolsheviks and Jews were enemies of the state. Many of them may not have actually hated Jews for being Jews but did 'recognize' that they were enemies of the people.<sup>86</sup> For the soldiers and Order Police this was drummed in through the pamphlets and propaganda. The Wehrmacht soldiers received constant reassurances in that what they were doing was right for both the massacres they may have been involved in as well as the war effort in general.<sup>87</sup> The same was true of the concentration camps this was constantly repeated from the head of the concentration camp system on down.<sup>88</sup> It must also be made clear that it was not just Germans who were under this situational control, however. Apart from just the Trawniki, the Order Police were actually mostly of non-German origin. Only between two and ten percent were German, the rest being drawn from the local population.<sup>89</sup> As well, the concentration camps that had mostly non-German guards and those Order Police units made up of mostly non-Germans showed little difference in their actions.<sup>90</sup> Even though the antisemitic "moral current" had been operating in Germany for far longer than other nations, those citizens too were drawn into actions against the Jews.<sup>91</sup>

The massacres and the concentration camps existed under a different set of rules from normal society.<sup>92</sup> Hitler set this tone

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<sup>85</sup> Phillip Zimbardo, "Situational Sources of Evil – Part II," *The Situationist*, 23 February 2007, 29 November 2007 <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/02/23/situational-sources-of-evil-part-ii/>>

<sup>86</sup> Hoess, *Commandant*, 147.

<sup>87</sup> Wette, *Wehrmacht*, 175.

<sup>88</sup> Hoess, *Commandant*, 83.

<sup>89</sup> Finkelstein and Birn, *Nation*, 121.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.

<sup>91</sup> Cohen, *Human*, 241.

<sup>92</sup> Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 175.

when in 1934 he dismissed the prison sentences handed down to to prison guards for their sadistic treatment of prisoners.<sup>93</sup> This was followed five years later by the dropping of a prison sentence for the murder of 50 Jews by an SS officer and military police.<sup>94</sup> In the concentration camps the first head of the system, Eicke, would punish the guards for any perceived lapse of duty so it was quickly learned that it was better to do more than one felt necessary for fear of punishment.<sup>95</sup> If one could not do the duties of the camp the guard would actually be expelled, bringing a sense of shame and failure upon the individual.<sup>96</sup> This necessity for violence became especially true after the institution of a bounty for killing prisoners.<sup>97</sup> Many also felt that it was in their career's interest to be as brutal as possible,<sup>98</sup> this being true both in the concentration camp system and in the east. The lack of punishment for brutalizing the Jews can be best expressed in the number of photographs showing the actions of the Order Police, SS, and Wehrmacht, even with the rules expressly forbidding photographing the abuses.<sup>99</sup> With the situation created that violence towards Jews would not be punished, but in fact be rewarded, it should come as no surprise that only ten to twenty percent of the Order Police did not kill Jews in the east.<sup>100</sup> These situational factors overrode the fact that one could opt out of killing Jews and civilians with relative ease.

It bears mentioning just how easy it was to opt out from killing. Even if one's superior did not offer to let people leave before a massacre, as Major Trapp did with his men, many officers could request to be left out of an action.<sup>101</sup> Amongst the regular

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<sup>93</sup> Cohen, *Human*, 250.

<sup>94</sup> Stein, *Waffen*, 271.

<sup>95</sup> Hoess, *Commandant*, 264.

<sup>96</sup> Cohen, *Human*, 246.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 251.

<sup>98</sup> Browning, *Ordinary*, 169.

<sup>99</sup> Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 241.

<sup>100</sup> Browning, *Ordinary*, 159.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

trooper as well, they could request to not be forced to shoot and, apart from some berating by their superior,<sup>102</sup> they were normally allowed to leave. Some officers even disparaged their men when they chose to take the not kill when given the option by the officer.<sup>103</sup> Some who did not want to participate in the killing of civilians just wandered off and pretended to look for runaways rather than actually kill those Jews in front of them.<sup>104</sup> These men were never missed, however, as there were always plenty of volunteers ready to take part,<sup>105</sup> especially amongst those men who had never been in combat.<sup>106</sup> In terms of the other groups of perpetrators already mentioned before the most extreme form of punishment for not doing your duty in a concentration camp was to be expelled. Those in the police battalions as well as the Einsatzgruppen could request transfers to leave their units.<sup>107</sup> Though it could look bad requesting a transfer or refusing to follow your orders people saw that there was little punishment, if any, handed down by their officers.<sup>108</sup> The common soldier, guard, and Order Policeman ignored this and followed their orders, even if they believed the orders were wrong.

Orders coming from a superior or authoritative source are extremely difficult to ignore. In repetitions of Stanley Milgram's experiments it was found that 61 to 66 percent of subjects would continue administering higher and higher doses of shocks to victims even if they were unconscious. These numbers do not vary from country to country or from year to year.<sup>109</sup> In another experi-

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 103.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 112.

<sup>107</sup> Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 380.

<sup>108</sup> Browning, *Ordinary*, 170.

<sup>109</sup> Phillip Zimbardo, "Situational Sources of Evil—Part I," *The Situationist*, 16 February 2007, 29 November 2007 <<http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/02/16/when-good-people-do-evil-%e2%80%93-part-i/>>

ment “all but one of 22 nurses flouted their hospital’s procedure by obeying a phone order from an unknown doctor to administer an excessive amount of a drug”.<sup>110</sup> Many of the men involved in the killings would later have thoughts similar to Rudolph Hoess; I should have refused the orders, but that thought never crossed my mind.<sup>111</sup>

The situational forces that the Nazi system exerted on its rank and file, that of antisemitism, a linking of Jews with their ideological adversary (communism), the use of violent imagery, rewards for violent behaviour and punishments for non-compliance, and the authoritative power from which the orders to kill emanated, all coalesced to form a near inescapable situation for the common man. These forces, all beyond the control of the ordinary individual,<sup>112</sup> led them to becoming killing machines. These situational forces were even able to impose their will upon inmates within the concentration camps, as survivors recall that the Kapos, those prisoners in charge of keeping the other prisoners in line, were more cruel than the guards themselves.<sup>113</sup> Many of those committing grievous acts, such as the Einsatzgruppen, suffered mental breakdowns due to the fact that they knew what they were doing was wrong but they continued to do it anyway.<sup>114</sup> The ability to go along with something, even though you know it is wrong, is a powerful tool. In the Solomon Asch experiment subjects were asked to compare a set of lines in order of length. Unbeknownst to the subjects, a number of confederates were placed within the group and purposefully instructed to give obviously false answers. 70 percent of the subjects ended up agreeing with the confederates even though they were obviously wrong.<sup>115</sup> Obvi-

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Hoess, *Commandant*, 23.

<sup>112</sup> Florence R. Miale and Michael Selzer, *The Nuremberg Mind: The Psychology of the Nazi Leaders* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1975), 4.

<sup>113</sup> Finkelstein and Birn, *Nation*, 63-64.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Carrie H. Kennedy and Eric A. Zilmer ed., *Military Psychology: Clinical and Operational Applications* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2006), 265.



ously giving the wrong answer to what line is longer is not comparable to murdering thousands of people. However, if the social situation is powerful enough one can do something that is obviously wrong.

## Two Years Before the Mast: Reading Between the Lines

Jacob Posen

In 1834, a young Harvard student, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., made a bold decision to leave his privileged lifestyle and join the merchant marines.<sup>1</sup> Dana's decision was remarkable; he left behind a comfortable lifestyle in order to join the crew of the merchant ship, the *Pilgrim*. Dana was vastly overeducated for his sailing job, but his Harvard education was of little use on board the *Pilgrim*. During his time at sea Dana kept a journal which he later published as *Two Years Before the Mast: a Personal Narrative of Life at Sea*. Dana's book was very well received and Daniel Vickers and Vince Walsh, the renowned authors of *Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail*, pay tribute to his importance.<sup>2</sup> They place Dana in the company of other great American writers and maritime historians: "When the great American sea-authors of the nineteenth century – Cooper, Dana and Melville..."<sup>3</sup> Throughout his book Dana explores many different aspects of the history of

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<sup>1</sup> Richard Henry Dana, Jr., *Two Years before the Mast: A Personal Narrative of Life at Sea* (New York: Random House Inc., 2001), v.

<sup>2</sup> James Fennimore Cooper wrote the book *Ned Myers: A life before the Mast* and other non-seafaring related books. Herman Melville is the famous author of *Moby Dick*, among other things.

<sup>3</sup> Daniel Vickers with Vince Walsh. *Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), 250.

<sup>4</sup> Living before the mast has a double meaning. On the one hand it refers to the sailors who slept in the hold that was in front of the mast on a ship; on the other hand being before the mast also meant that the sailor was not an officer, and would therefore not have his quarters located after the mast.

seafaring from the perspective of a crew member who lives before the mast.<sup>4</sup> Analyzing Dana's book proves to be a difficult task because of his skillful writing and engrossing narrative, but a few major themes can be identified within his story. The importance of the masculine identity aboard a ship; the connection to land while aboard a ship; the interpersonal relationships aboard the ship; as well as the business-like aspect of the merchant marine.

One of the more prevalent themes that surfaces throughout the narrative is the nineteenth-century concept of masculine identity. On several occasions Dana nonchalantly risked his life and refused to show fear in order to retain the respect of his colleagues. In chapter eleven of *Two Years Before the Mast* Dana demonstrates this concern for mental and physical toughness, "A well man at sea has little sympathy with one who is sea-sick; he is too apt to be conscious of a comparison favourable to his own manhood."<sup>5</sup> As Dana explains, sea-sickness would not garner sympathy from any of the crew members.

Masculinity applies to much more than just sea-sickness. In chapter six the crew are faced with a tragedy at sea, the death of George, one of their colleagues, who was apparently lost overboard. Death at sea is treated very specially. From Dana's account one notices a useful ritual which functions much as a funeral or wake would on land. Soon after the crew and officers have agreed that all the necessary precautions were taken to search for George's body, the Captain proceeds to auction off all of his belongings. While this may seem bizarre and even offensive, the redistribution of George's clothes grants the crew closure. While Dana is affected by George's death, careful analysis of his writing

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<sup>5</sup> Dana, Jr., *Two Years before the Mast*, 78.

<sup>6</sup> Mortality becomes a serious issues again for Dana in chapter thirty-five, when some of the crew of the *Alert* developed scurvy. What is baffling about this is that by 1836 the causes and cures for scurvy were well known. Why then, did the crew not take adequate steps to ensure this sort of problem would not occur? Economic restrictions, cargo constraints and social hierarchies aboard the ship may explain this to an extent, but not entirely.

suggests that within a few days the crew has dealt with George's death, and normal daily activities resume.<sup>6</sup>

In contemporary society, it is assumed that during his time at sea, a sailor actually spends the duration of voyage on a ship, at sea. Dana illustrates that this is not the case. A large portion of Dana's time 'at sea' is spent either on land, in preparation for land, in harbour, or leaving harbour. Dana himself spends a significant amount of time off a ship completely when he is curing hides in California. This time ashore was accepted as being at sea, as illustrated by Dana's comment at the end of chapter eighteen: "I stood on the beach while the brig got under weigh [sic] and watched her until she rounded the point, and then went up to the hide-house to take up my quarters for a few months."<sup>7</sup> In total Dana only spends two years at sea, and apparently he is going to spend a few months of that completely off of the ship. This is a significant amount of time, especially when one factors in the time spent in port, which is constant throughout his time in California.

The connection to land is made more interesting by the fact that the ship is cleaned obsessively as it nears port. As Dana explains in chapter thirty five, "No merchant vessel looks better than an Indiaman, or a Cape Horner, after a long voyage; and many captains and mates will stake their reputation for seamanship upon the appearance of their ships when she hauls into the dock."<sup>8</sup> This would seem rather peculiar, as the reader assumes that after a long, difficult voyage, the ship would return in very poor shape, and would need time for repairs. Dana shows that this is not the case, and explains that the reputations of the captains and mates rested upon the ship's cleanliness. This suggests an inter-ship competitiveness; the captain with the cleanest ship must be the best. Again the reader can see that issues of the masculine identity were prevalent in many areas of life at sea.

One of the most intriguing aspects of life at sea, as told by

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<sup>7</sup> Dana, Jr., *Two Years before the Mast*, 155.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 377.

Dana, is the love-hate relationship that the sailors, in particular the crew, have with their jobs. As the *Alert*, the second ship which Dana sails on, nears its final destination, Boston, one sees that not only is Dana extremely excited to be home, but that all the men are anxious to get to shore. In the following excerpt Dana discusses the men's preparations for shore: "We went below, and had a fine time overhauling our chests, laying aside the clothes we meant to go ashore in, and throwing overboard all that were worn out and good for nothing."<sup>9</sup> This sorting of clothes is reminiscent of the excitement seen in a young child getting ready for his first day of school. What is contradictory about this is that all of the men, with the notable exception of Dana, will soon be back on another ship, working another job that Dana describes as their "evil fortune".<sup>10</sup> This brings up important questions. For example, are the men doing their jobs because they have no choice, or do they actually find some fulfillment in their sailing life? The answer is beyond the scope of this essay, but it likely lies somewhere in the middle between enjoyment, and limited options. One issue with this section of Dana's narrative is whether his personal biases are clouding the reality. Dana himself understands that he will not be back on a ship; he is a Harvard student, from a privileged background, so his extreme excitement at leaving the ship may have been projected onto the other men by Dana.

Personal relationships play a large part in the sea life as Dana describes it. These relationships can be further broken down into two areas: relationships among the crew, and those between the officers and crew. Intra-crew relationships are dominated by the fraternal bond that is shared among the crew members. This fraternity among crew members is most evident in chapter seventeen when the demoted mate, Foster, runs away. In the preceding chapters Dana describes the problems with Foster: how he is despised among the crew, and how he deserves his demotion. Yet,

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 383

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

when Foster runs away the crew protects him and makes no real effort to help find him. Dana had this to say on the events: "The next morning, when all hands were mustered, there was a great stir to find Foster. Of course, we would tell nothing, and all they could discover was that he had left an empty chest behind him, and that he went off in a boat".<sup>11</sup> Clearly the fraternity among the crew is stronger than personal feelings.

What makes the fraternity issue even more fascinating is that class divisions from land were still an underlying issue. In chapter twenty nine, Captain Thompson tries to force Dana back onto the *Pilgrim*, his former ship from which he had transferred. Dana knows that the captain cannot force him back on because of his connections in Boston and his upper-class background. The captain then chooses another man from the crew, Ben, who is not from the upper-class like Dana and has no connections in Boston, to take Dana's place on the *Pilgrim*. This move causes a real stir among the crew in the *Alert*, and they clearly side against Dana. They very quickly pick Ben's side and alienate Dana because of his background. Dana describes his situation in the following excerpt: "The notion that I was not 'one of them,' which, by a participation in all their labor and hardships, and having no favor shown me, had been laid asleep, was beginning to revive."<sup>12</sup> Clearly this fraternity has limits that are the deeply ingrained class divisions at home. In the end Dana finds another man whom he pays to take his and Ben's place aboard the *Pilgrim*, but the event still leaves the reader with a feeling of betrayal on Dana's behalf, although Dana himself is quick to forgive.

For Dana one of the most pressing issues aboard the ship was the separation between the officers and the crew. The division was not only a division of power but a physical division as well. The crew lived in the area before the mast, hence the title of the book, while the officers lived in the officers' quarters after the

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 291.

mast. This division even extended to food. Dana discusses food in great detail throughout his narrative, but he rarely mentions the officers' food. It is almost as if it were taboo for Dana to contemplate the food the officers were eating. In chapter thirty one the *Alert* is having difficulties getting around Cape Horn and everyone is getting slightly frustrated. Dana vents his frustration in the following excerpt where he explains the difference in food and drink quality between the captain and crew: "The Captain... can have his brandy and water in the cabin, and his hot coffee at the galley; while Jack, who had to stand through everything, and work in wet and cold, can have nothing to wet his lips or warm his stomach."<sup>13</sup> As Dana says, the crew was forced to work through the poor weather facing the ship as it rounded Cape Horn, without warm food or drink, while the Captain enjoyed hot coffee and brandy. The hierarchal divisions on the ship are a constant issue aboard both the *Pilgrim* and the *Alert*, and from Dana's narrative one can assume that the divisions aboard ships were the cause of tensions on ships everywhere.

The hierarchal tensions were exacerbated with the flogging incident in chapter fifteen. In this chapter, Captain Thomson becomes extremely angry at Sam, one of the crew members. Dana explains that the Captain has been in a foul mood over the last few days and in particular has been picking on Sam. The Captain really loses his temper in this chapter and orders the mates to grab Sam so he can be flogged. At this time John the Swede, another one of the crew, intercedes on Sam's behalf. The Captain, who at this point is so angry that he is beyond reason, orders John flogged as well. This is the first incident of real hierarchal violence in the narrative and it clearly affects Dana very deeply. This entire chapter is written in extreme detail, which suggests that the event was so moving that it was burned into his memory like a nightmare. Dana describes the change in the mood after the incident in the following excerpt; "The flogging was seldom if ever alluded to by us in the fore-castle. If anyone was inclined to talk about it, the

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 328.

others, with a delicacy which I hardly expected to find among

them, always stopped him.”<sup>14</sup> Clearly Captain Thompson overstepped his bounds, at least in the minds of the men, when he flogged Sam and John the Swede. An interesting aspect of this is that flogging was legal on ship, and if one looks at the laws one might not have been surprised to see a flogging. Flogging was legal, but clearly it was not commonplace; had it been the norm the crew would have thought little of a flogging. Instead they were deeply affected by its occurrence.

The flogging incident also brings forward an interesting point regarding the crucial role of the mates on a ship. The mates were supposed to act as mediators between the Captain and the crew. In chapter twenty three Dana contrasts the chief mate from the *Alert* with the chief mate from the *Pilgrim* and points out that the chief mate in the *Alert* works much more effectively with Captain Thompson:

He was quite a contrast to the worthy, quiet, unobtrusive mate of the *Pilgrim*: not so estimable a man, perhaps, but a far better mate of a vessel; and the entire change in Captain Thompson’s conduct, since he took command of the ship was owing, no doubt, in a great measure, to this fact.<sup>15</sup>

While it appears Dana liked the mate aboard the *Pilgrim*, he also recognizes that his relaxed management style was completely ineffective, especially with Thompson’s complete lack of tact and diplomacy when dealing with the crew. The reader will also notice that aboard the *Alert* there is no flogging, and no serious violent incidents that can be attributed to the captain.

According to Dana this is due to the effectiveness of the chief mate. Clearly the hierarchal nature of the ships was a sensi-

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 118.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 203.



tive subject. The captains had to be wary of being too oppressive and risk alienating the crew, but due to the social divisions aboard a ship between the crew and the officers, the captain's might appear overbearing. The role of the mates was integral in balancing the divisions between the captain and the crew- a skilful mate could off-set a tactless captain. A timid mate might cause more problems by being overly relaxed towards to the crew, while a tougher mate would allow the captain to focus on other things, and not interfere with the goings- on before the mast.

Throughout the narrative Dana also touches on another important theme, the enormous role played by cargo within the merchant marine ships. The merchant marines only make money by having a full ship both to their destination and on the return voyage. This can be seen in Dana's narrative when he is forced to spend months on the California coast curing and storing hides. Dana says early in this part that to leave California the *Alert* needs to have forty-thousand hides, an enormous number! So the men stay in California trading for and collecting hides until they have enough to fill the ship and go back to Boston. This reveals two important things. First, the merchant marines functioned rather like trucking companies today; unless they are full they do not make money. Second, this means that the sailor's wages were set before they left. They were contractors; they were not paid hourly or daily, but solely on the completion of the job. This is apparent because while in California no one, not even the agents of the company, urges the sailors to work any faster collecting hides for any reason other than getting home to Boston and getting away from California as soon as possible. Throughout the narrative one sees that economics played a very large role in sea life, and Dana's time in California reminds the reader that the merchant marine was a business, and was organized accordingly.

Dana also describes California in great detail. Particularly striking are Dana's description of Monterey society in chapter eleven, and his description of Californian society in chapter twenty one. His persistent, if somewhat prejudiced, view that

California has great economic potential if only the locals, Mexicans, would develop a stronger work ethic is, is particularly resonant in light of the wealth evident in today's Californian lifestyle. Dana also makes an almost prophetic remark in chapter twenty-six; when describing the potential for a port in the San Francisco Bay, he says "If California ever becomes a prosperous country, this bay will be the center of its prosperity."<sup>16</sup> What Dana did not know at the time is that Oakland, which is on the San Francisco Bay, would eventually have one of the largest ports on the Pacific Coast of the United States. Dana also makes some interest comments in his appendix, titled "Twenty-Four Years After." Dana notes that San Francisco has become a bustling metropolis and California has changed drastically. This is of course a result of the famous 1849 California Gold Rush. Dana was originally in California around 1836; by the time he returns in 1860 the economy had grown exponentially.

Dana's work can also function as a study in leadership and power, similar to Niccolo Machiavelli's *The Prince*. Dana's book is obviously a memoir, which *The Prince* is not, but Dana's astute notes on the power structure within a ship, as well as his description of the social hierarchy within a ship could function as an educational tool for aspiring leaders in contemporary society.

In conclusion, *Two Years Before the Mast* is both a gripping narrative and a useful historical database. It can be looked at as a story about a young man going through an extremely difficult journey on the route to adulthood. In the course of that journey, he learns about the basis of his own masculine identity, comes to grips with the realities and limits of social relations among individuals from different social groups, and develops an understanding and appreciation for the fundamental economic realities which underlie the romantic notions of seafaring. The book is also a historical document. Contemporary historians can derive a plethora of historical knowledge about social and economic conditions both at sea and on land, as well as interesting first-hand information

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 249.

regarding the frontier orientation of nineteenth century California. Particularly striking is Dana's description of Monterey society in chapter eight, and his description of Californian society in chapter twenty-one. His prescient, if somewhat prejudiced, view that California has great economic potential if only the locals, Mexicans, would develop a stronger work ethic, is particularly resonant in light of the wealth evident in today's Californian lifestyle. Dana's careful notes regarding the power structure, social divisions and the interaction between the crew and the officers, as well as his observations on the power structure and relations among locals in California, provide a useful guideline on how to successfully lead a socially stratified conglomeration of people, be it a ship or a kingdom.

## Radical Self Critique: An Analysis of the 1952 Egyptian Revolution

Tomas Hachard

The Free Officer's Movement of 1952, which ended the parliamentary monarchy system in Egypt, created a split in the country's 20th century history. In his book on Egyptian historical scholarship, Anthony Gorman writes how "the period from 1919 until 1952 is characterized by great political volatility," as opposed to the period after 1952 where "the Nasser regime appropriated, then monopolized, the field of legitimate political activity."<sup>1</sup> Nasser himself describes the Revolution as having crystallized Egyptian society, which before was "boiling over and restless."<sup>2</sup> Ultimately both men agree that following the revolution the political atmosphere became far more stable than before. This change can be attributed to Nasser's autocratic policies as much as to his leadership, yet one must not dismiss the whole revolution because of these actions. Regardless of what the revolution resulted in, Nasser is correct in stating that it was the culmination of a national struggle which, if not traceable to the early 19th century and Muhammad Ali, certainly escalated in the decades following the 1919 revolution of independence. This essay seeks to show how, while in large part caused by external forces – the British imperial presence, the Arab Nationalist ideal, and the Israeli issue – the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 was primarily a moment of self-critique

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<sup>1</sup> Anthony Gorman, *Historians, State and Politics in the Twentieth Century Egypt* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 112.

<sup>2</sup> Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes & Marshall Publishers, 1959), 52.

where Egyptian society restructured itself on its own basis and thus became truly independent after decades of political turmoil.

The 1952 Revolution was an extension of the 1919 fight for independence in that it sought to accomplish the goals that the latter had failed to carry out. It fought against British colonialism and for self-governance because Egypt had not in fact achieved these goals after 1919. Rather, as Nasser writes, “tyranny became more arbitrary whether it was in the form of the open forces of occupation or their veiled cat’s paws, headed by Sultan Fouad and later by his son Farouk.”<sup>3</sup> Consequently, the 1952 revolution was as much a battle against internal problems as against external occupation. The two came hand in hand, and it was the internal government structures that were found to be causing the continued British presence. The battle against the British was essential, but it became clear that a change in the Egyptian political structure needed to occur in order to get rid of them. The desire to remove the British did not warrant much discussion between political groups. It was the realization of the country’s internal problems which created the tumultuous political atmosphere that the revolution arose from.

In his *Philosophy of the Revolution*, Nasser acknowledges these separate facets of the struggle when he describes the two aspects of the Free Officer’s Movement, the political and the social. The former he equates with the recovery of “self-government from an imposed despot, or an aggressive army occupying its territory without its consent,” the latter with the internal class struggle that results in “justice for all countrymen.”<sup>4</sup> These two separate revolutionary moments can be associated with the external and internal battles described before. The former is a fight against an external occupying force, the latter against internal social problems. However, the significant internal problems in pre-revolution Egypt were more than just a need for social reform. In fact, after World

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 37

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 36.

War II all the main political groups had adopted at least partially socialist agendas.<sup>5</sup> Issues of social reform were important but did not constitute the main point of contention for Egyptians. The larger problem was the parliamentary monarchy system and its increasing inability to meet the people's demands. By 1952 it was clear that the whole political structure would need to be replaced, and Nasser was able to take advantage of this convergence of opinion, at least in terms of the problem, to lead the Free Officer's coup. James Jankowski is generally correct in stating that "the Egyptian parliamentary monarchy was dead before the military coup of July 1952... because the generation inheriting it had lost all hope in it,"<sup>6</sup> however this consensus only came to be in the few years before the revolution. The realization that Egypt's external problems were only being aggravated by its inept parliamentary monarchy arose slowly from the events of the 1930's and 1940's.

This period was one of great intellectual and political activity and can be approached through the growing unpopularity of the Wafd and the increasing power of the more radical groups, the Muslim Brethren and the Young Egypt Society. The latter groups "sapped the strength of the old establishment and made them unable to govern."<sup>7</sup> They symbolized the dissatisfaction of the Egyptians in the lead up to Nasser's coup and, as Michael Doran notes, while they all agreed on the major problem of the British imperialist presence, they also "viewed the inability of the traditional politicians to treat the disease as proof of its severity and of the need for a radical cure."<sup>8</sup> The "traditional politicians" Doran speaks of came to be represented in 1952 by the Wafd party. In the post-war period the party attempted to recover its old popularity, but fell victim to the growing nationalist fervour which it could no longer

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<sup>5</sup> P.J. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 340.

<sup>6</sup> James P. Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), 88.

<sup>7</sup> Vatikiotis, *History*, 357.

<sup>8</sup> Michael Doran, *Pan-Arabism Before Nasser* (New York: Oxford University Press,

claim to represent.

The Wafd was the party most associated with the 1919 revolution. From that time forward it consistently had the largest popular base in the country, and prided itself on acting as an umbrella party for all of Egypt's problems. However by 1952 it had become clear that it was no longer fit for that role.<sup>9</sup> It had become riddled with internal dissent and furthermore, due to its relationship with the British, could no longer justify its claim to be the representative of the will of the Egyptian people and its nationalist demands. Its growing unpopularity came to symbolize the slow realization of the parliamentary monarchy's ineffectiveness.

The party had experienced several schisms in its history but the most significant split in relation to the revolution occurred in 1942 when Makram Obayd, the finance minister in the Wafdist government at the time, was dismissed from the party after much infighting with party leader Mustafa al-Nahhas.<sup>10</sup> Makram formed the Wafdist Bloc and published the *Black Book*, which broadened and publicized his problems with the party. This particular split is notable because it only helped enhance public discontent with the party and "prompted all opposition parties and groups to come together in a united campaign against the Wafd Government."<sup>11</sup> The effect of Makram's book was due largely to the manner in which the Wafd government had been put in power: through British military pressure in what came to be known as the incident of February 4, 1942.

At the time, Britain's fate in World War II was uncertain. Egypt constituted an important strategic position that the Axis powers were rapidly approaching. Furthermore, the latter were bombarding Egypt with propaganda, which was heavily influencing radical groups like Young Egypt. Thus it was essential for Britain to have a government in Egypt that could mobilize the people

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<sup>9</sup> Vatikiotis, *History*, 333.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 352-3.; Zaheer Masood Quiraishi, *Liberal Nationalism in Egypt* (Delhi: Jamal Printing Press, 1967), 144-5.

<sup>11</sup> Vatikiotis, *History*, 354.

for their cause. Although the Egyptian government of the time asserted their loyalty to the British, the pro-Axis leanings of the Commander in Chief and the head of the Ministry of War indicated otherwise.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, that government's dissolution came "amidst demonstrations in Cairo crying 'Forward Rommel; Long Live Rommel'" in favour of the German general.<sup>13</sup> At the time, the Wafd "alone was straightforward in its anti-Palace and anti-Axis attitude" and it furthermore had large public support.<sup>14</sup> Believing that the Wafd were the only suitable party to have in power, the British sent King Faruq a message on February 4: "unless I hear by 6 p.m. that Nahhas Pasha has been asked to form a Cabinet, His Majesty King Faruq must accept the consequences." Upon rejection of this demand, the British sent a tank garrison to surround the Royal Palace, and the king was forced to ask Nahhas to form a Wafdist government.<sup>15</sup>

In the long-term, the February 4 incident was firm proof that that the Wafd no longer represented Egypt's true national interests. As Gabriel Warburg remarks in his essay on the event, quoting King Faruq's biographer, "Lampson's action brought down the very party the British had installed; it was the final inspiration and confirmation of their cause to those forces in Egypt working to rid themselves of Farouk and the British."<sup>16</sup> The Wafd lost its militant national wing to the Muslim Brothers due to the incident, making the party even more obsolete in the increasingly volatile political environment.<sup>17</sup> Nasser recalls his reaction to the event, writing to a friend, "what is to be done now that the catastrophe has befallen us, and after we have accepted it, surrendered

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<sup>12</sup> Quiraishi, *Liberal Nationalism*, 138.

<sup>13</sup> Vatikiotis, *History*, 348.

<sup>14</sup> Quiraishi, *Liberal Nationalism*, 140.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 141; Vatikiotis, *History*, 348.

<sup>16</sup> B. St. Clair McBride in Gabriel Warbur, "Lampson's Ultimatum to Faruq, 4 February, 1942," *Middle Eastern Studies* 11 (1975), 24.

<sup>17</sup> Warburg, "Lampson," 25.



to it and taken it submissively and meekly?"<sup>18</sup> The incident showed the stranglehold the British still had on Egyptian politics, but it was also a sign of the corruption of the Egyptian system itself, which could be manipulated by the British so easily. To argue, like Zaheer Mahood Quraishi does, that "the allegation of betrayal against Nahhas does not seem to be justified" is fruitless. Even disregarding the evidence that came out years after the fact through the British archives, which indicate that the Wafd suggested to the British that they intervene,<sup>19</sup> Nahhas' actions before the event show that whether or not he knew for certain it was going to occur, he knew the British were willing to intervene on his part. Even Quraishi writes how "efforts to form a coalition government [before the intervention] failed because the Wafd Party fully realized that Britain would ultimately have to rely on it."<sup>20</sup> Nahhas waited out in order to form a Wafdist government, rather than a coalition.

Makram's dismissal and the publication of the *Black Book* came within this imposed government, which by this point had garnered much anger from the opposition parties and from the King. His protests only further demonstrated the problems of the Wafd, this time by showing its internal corruption. His ability to unite the opposition came also as "the King was taking every opportunity to dismiss Nahhas."<sup>21</sup> Eventually the Wafd government would be asked to resign, but it is indicative to the situation that this only occurred when the British decided it was not necessary to their security to have them in power, thus only reaffirming the ineffectiveness of the Egyptian government system.<sup>22</sup> At this point the Wafd's unpopularity was still only a growing problem, the true breadth of which would become evident in 1952. However, the February 4 incident further demonstrated the growing internal

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<sup>18</sup> Nasser, *Philosophy*, 30.

<sup>19</sup> Warburg, "Lampson," 27.

<sup>20</sup> Quraishi, *Liberal Nationalism*, 139.

<sup>21</sup> Vatikiotis, *History*, 354.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 335.

problems that were a part of the anti-British struggle.

The growing unpopularity of the Wafd was only one aspect of the pre-revolution political climate. Another was the rise of other far more radical parties, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and the Young Egypt Society.<sup>23</sup> Both groups were of great importance in bringing about the dissolution of the parliamentary monarchy because they gave the revolution its intellectual footing and radicalized the masses. The two parties emerged during the 1930's and represented a turn away from Islamic reform and the ideas of the West to a more radical religious and nationalist character.<sup>24</sup> The various radical groups that emerged during that time sought to counter the West, be it in its Christian missionary movements, its secular ideals, or its imperialist policies.<sup>25</sup> They fought for the emergence of an Arabic society, and in the post-war period both Young Egypt and the Muslim Brothers would call for the boycott of anything associated with Britain, to the extent of burning books written in English.<sup>26</sup> By the start of World War II both were adamant in the defense of Islam, positing the solution to Egypt's problems within an Islamic framework.<sup>27</sup> While neither group would ever completely implement their policies, the political environment that led to the Revolution was created mainly due to their work.

P.J Vatikiotis and James P. Jankowski have attempted to show how the Young Egypt Society's ideology in particular directly influenced the ideas of the Free Officers Movement once they got into power, however it is questionable whether an actual causal relationship existed between the two. Nasser indicated that

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<sup>23</sup> For the sake of simplicity I will be using the term Young Egypt Society throughout the essay rather than the group's various changing names.

<sup>24</sup> Vatikiotis, *History*, 323.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 326. Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood fit all of these, although it is the Young Muslim Men's Association that offered an alternative to the missionaries mostly.

<sup>26</sup> Doran, *Pan-Arabism*, 47.

<sup>27</sup> Jankowski, *Young Rebels*, 81.

as an adolescent he had been a member of Young Egypt,<sup>28</sup> and the two groups certainly shared similar perceptions on Egypt and the world, but to create a direct link between the two groups is too simplistic an analysis.<sup>29</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood for their part infiltrated the army and were therefore able to influence the future Free Officers as well.<sup>30</sup> The very reason Nasser and his group were able to stage a coup by themselves is because they were influenced by a wide spectrum of the groups in pre-revolution Egypt. We must work instead under the framework that Vatikiotis sets up at another point in his book:

The Free Officers who assumed power in 1952 were not... the only vanguard group capable of leading a reformist or revolutionary movement in the country. They constituted a miniscule section of the new, post-Second World War younger radical nationalist elite of the country.<sup>31</sup>

The Free Officers were part of an intellectual and political climate created by the Young Egypt Society and the Muslim Brotherhood and in which all of Egypt at that time was immersed. The influence of the two parties was felt by the whole of Egyptian society, not only the Free Officers.

Young Egypt is particularly interesting to study in respect to the radical groups' role in the revolution because its policy changes from the 1930's until 1952 reflect the country's intensifying political climate. The original Young Egypt Society, while being radically anti-government and anti-British, wholeheartedly supported the monarchy. Its slogan, "Allah, Fatherland, and King," attests to this. The monarchy still represented something which could be maintained and defended within a nationalist

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<sup>28</sup> P.J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and his Generation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 33.

<sup>29</sup> Jankowski, *Young Rebels*, 124.

<sup>30</sup> Vatikiotis, *Nasser*, 40.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

stance and the society's primary objective at the time was to save Egypt from its foreign influences, which included British imperialism as well as Western, materialist customs in general.<sup>32</sup> The important transitions in the party for our purposes come in 1940 when the party changed its name to the Islamic Nationalist Party and 1949 when it became the Socialist Party of Egypt. Both represent important changes in the Egyptian political landscape and the growing realization of the country's internal problems.

The switch to being the Islamic Nationalist Party came at the beginning of the Second World War and represented "the last step in the movement's defensive effort to combat the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood on its own ground, that of the defense of Islam which it had begun in 1938."<sup>33</sup> The growing following garnered by the Muslim Brotherhood, and the fact that Young Egypt was forced to react to it, indicates the increasing radical nature of the Egyptian populace. A quick digression on the Muslim Brotherhood will help explicate this point.

Christina Phelps Harris describes the general ideology of Muslim Brotherhood founder and leader Hasan al-Banna in the following manner:

In view of the fact that the Muslim Brothers considered the progressive secularization of Egyptian life to be a threat to traditional Islamic institutions and an encroachment on the Islamic way of life, and in view of the further fact that all secularizing tendencies could obviously be attributed to the multitudinous impacts of the West on Egyptian society, the Muslim Brotherhood took a strong position against the westernization of Egypt. Hasan al-Banna rejected, in theory, westernism in all its forms.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Jankowski, *Young Rebels*, 47-48.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>34</sup> Christina Phelps Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964), 166.

The Muslim Brotherhood represented a complete defense of self-identity against the encroaching other. Al-Banna further believed “that foreign residents imported and practiced, and thereby encouraged, a foreign pattern of social behavior.”<sup>35</sup> It was this foreignness that was completely unacceptable. The Egyptinization of Egypt was essential, and this involved removing the influence of everything foreign and corrupt. By no means is this drastically different from Young Egypt’s viewpoint. Both groups were fighting against the influence of “insidious Western ideas” and the difference was that “for the Muslim Brothers, the British presence encouraged people to stray from the fundamental tenets of Islam; for the followers of Young Egypt, it corrupted the national character.”<sup>36</sup> In growing closer to the Brotherhood’s ideas, Young Egypt was following the general populace and distancing itself slightly from its “nationalist” points of view to an Islamic stance that was more opposed to the political structure in general.<sup>37</sup> In retrospect then, Young Egypt’s change to become the Islamic Nationalist Party can be seen as a middle point in the society’s growing awareness that the Egyptian political structure was the true problem. Consequently, while it still supported the monarchy at this point, it was only a matter of time before this would end as well.

This final change occurred when the party became the Socialist Party of Egypt in 1949. The party’s slogan changed from “Allah, Fatherland, and King” to “Allah, Fatherland, and the People.” The party turned “on the monarchy which it had supported so ardently a decade earlier”<sup>38</sup> and began to call for total revolution and the implementation of a socialist government. As Young Egypt’s ideology became more violent towards the government, the political turmoil in Egypt was becoming increasingly violent

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 168.

<sup>36</sup> Doran, *Pan-Arabism*, 18.

<sup>37</sup> Muhammad al-Ghazali states the difference clearly in one of his chapter titles, “Islamic, not National rule,” in Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Our Beginning in Wisdom* (New York: Octagon Books, 1975).

<sup>38</sup> Jankowski, *Young Rebels*, 93-94.

as well. Violent terrorist acts occurred throughout Egypt and culminated in the burning of Cairo on January 26, 1952, an event which, if not started by members of Young Egypt, was certainly promulgated by the groups' insidious anti-foreign press campaign in the year before.<sup>39</sup>

An analysis of Young Egypt's development indicates an important point about the radical groups. While they certainly were founded on certain principles, these were generally quite broad. Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood were there to defend and act on the part of Islam and Egypt. In doing so they fought against anyone who opposed their ideas of the two, eventually turning on the Egyptian government itself. Most importantly, their actions sparked reactions from all facets of Egyptian society. Young Egypt's connection to the 1952 violence was direct, yet the Muslim Brotherhood had already begun this sort of action years earlier right after World War II:

[The Brotherhood's] decision to lead a guerrilla war against the British in the Canal Zone had an electrifying effect on Egyptians. The government became apprehensive; the rebels everywhere, but especially in the army, became excited, envious and worried over the possibility of their being left out of this 'popular, national struggle'<sup>40</sup>

Both groups created a violent and intellectual environment that eventually could only result in revolution, since the problems they were presenting, and which the people were realizing still existed even after 1919, could not be properly addressed by the current parliamentary monarchy. In 1952, these protests became directed at the ruling Wafd party, which by now was facing external as well as internal opposition to its policies. Although the party had at times been in agreement with the radical groups, by 1952 it was

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 102-104.

<sup>40</sup> Vatikiotis, *Nasser*, 92.

seen to represent what Young Egypt decried as the failure of the whole parliamentary monarchy after 1919, after which the British had “broken the unity of the nation” and “succeeded in domesticating Egyptian politicians.”<sup>41</sup>

In order to fully understand the defeat of the parliamentary monarchy in 1952 the nature of Anglo-Egyptian relations at the time needs to be analyzed since it was by trying to end British influence in Egypt that the internal problems of the government structure came to light. The violent atmosphere that arose in late 1951 was an extension of the intellectual, political climate which had been fermenting since the 1930's; however it was relations with Britain that acted as a catalyst. While it is important to emphasize the important self-critique that occurred in Egypt leading up to the revolution, one cannot gloss over the importance of Anglo-Egyptian relations to the events of the day. It is over the British issue that Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood were able to criticize the Wafd, and eventually it was British actions that provided the final push towards revolution.

The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty set the tone for all future relations between the countries until the 1952 coup. The treaty entrenched British presence in Egypt and also required that Egypt support any forthcoming British military campaign. This included allowing British military presence in Egypt and keeping British control over the Suez Canal. The treaty became increasingly unpopular to Egyptians in the early 1940's, and by the end of WWII there was consensus that it needed to be abolished. This posed tremendous problems for the Egyptian government, who attempted to negotiate with a British government unwilling to concede to the fundamental demands of the Egyptian people: the complete withdrawal of British troops from Egypt and the recognition of Egypt's control of the Sudan. Doran makes the British position clear in his book, stating that for them “nothing less than the future of

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<sup>41</sup> Jankowski, *Rebels*, 47-48.

Europe... was at stake in the Middle East."<sup>42</sup> Various meetings were set up in the post-war period to attempt negotiations with the British and finally the Egyptians made a plea to the United Nations to hear their case.<sup>43</sup> The British, however, at no point made the concessions required by the Egyptian people.

It was in protesting negotiations with the British that opposition groups were most often able to unite. In 1947, the left wing of the Wafd party was able to unite the Muslim Brothers, Young Egyptians, and Communists against the government's attempt to revise, rather than abolish, the 1936 treaty.<sup>44</sup> The evacuation of British troops from Cairo and Alexandria in 1946 was also met with protest:

For Egyptian nationalists, the bottom line was this: Bevin [the British Foreign Minister] himself had insisted that a vacuum would not be left in Egypt; clearly, then, the British did not intend to leave, but rather to substitute one form of control for another.<sup>45</sup>

On the British issue there was no division between groups. All demanded the full evacuation of British troops from Egypt and were "sharply against the perpetuation of the Anglo-Egyptian alliance in any form."<sup>46</sup> By 1947 the Egyptian government was consistently calling for the same thing from the British, and its continued failure to achieve results became increasingly criticized.

In 1950 the Wafd formed a coalition government which attempted to represent a wider breadth of Egyptian society by including more radical individuals from the Muslim Brotherhood, Communist and Socialist groups.<sup>47</sup> Although filled with internal

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<sup>42</sup> Doran, *Pan-Arabism*, 24, 48.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>44</sup> Quraishi, *Liberal Nationalism*, 172.

<sup>45</sup> Doran, *Pan-Arabism*, 36.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>47</sup> Quraishi, *Liberal Nationalism*, 172.



disagreements on most major issues, the government “took the drastic step of presenting to the Egyptian Parliament drafts of decrees for the unilateral Egyptian abrogation of the Treaty of 1936 and the Sudan Conventions of 1899.”<sup>48</sup> At this moment the government acted on the national consensus, and it is the British decision to not acknowledge the validity of the government’s demands that set off the final drive towards the revolution. The Wafd had not anticipated the unwavering British adherence to the 1936 treaty and this set off a violent struggle in the Suez Canal zone between British troops and Egyptian guerrilla forces, led by the radical parties.<sup>49</sup>

Here the government made a pivotal and ultimately self-defeating decision. Realizing the increasingly violent atmosphere created by the conflict, the Wafdist-led government attempted to control the situation, eventually by prohibiting the meeting of political organizations and confiscating the radical groups’ journals.<sup>50</sup> Ahmad Husayn, leader of Young Egypt, stated at the time:

The government has begun, under the influence of reactionary circles and under the influence of the class and interest groups of which it is composed, to turn its weapons and its force against the people themselves.<sup>51</sup>

For the radical parties it became clear that “the Wafd government was not prepared to risk armed combat with British troops.”<sup>52</sup> The party no longer represented the nationalist Egyptian mindset, a fact made all too clear by its attempts to accommodate the British.

It became apparent that the problem with the British was due largely to a problem with the Egyptian government, which was unable to fulfill the requirements set on it by the Egyptian

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<sup>48</sup> Jankowski, *Young Rebels*, 98.

<sup>49</sup> Vatikiotis, *History*, 370.

<sup>50</sup> Jankowski, *Young Rebels*, 101.

<sup>51</sup> Ahmad Husayn in *Ibid.*, 101.

<sup>52</sup> Vatikiotis, *History*, 371.

people. In a sense, the problem with the British was not a problem at all. In the post-war period the solution was clear to the majority of the Egyptian population, the complete removal of the British and its influence. What was revealed was the inability of the present Egyptian government structure to bring that goal to fruition. It was this fundamental problem that the Egyptian Revolution set out to solve primarily, because through it the problem with the British would be resolved as well. Internal problems with the government structure needed to be addressed before the relationship with the British could be altered. This was not because of the government's failure solely, but was also connected to the British unwillingness to negotiate on the fundamental terms presented by Egypt. Within that framework the only solution was to have a group in power able to take firm action without negotiation, at which point the problems Egypt faced with the British could be handled in the proper manner.

The same can be said for the two other external aspects associated with the revolution: Arab Nationalism and Israel. The former cannot be emphasized over the principal goal of the Egyptian Revolution, which was to attain full independence for Egypt. Doran asserts that "while the call for the 'Unity of the Nile Valley' certainly occupied a place of importance in the pantheon of Egyptian national claims, it did not enjoy greater importance than the call for total independence." He is speaking of the unity of Sudan and Egypt here, but the statement can be broadened to include Arab unity as well. Even though it was certainly in the Egyptian mindset prior to the revolution and became an important part of Nasser's ideology afterwards, Arab Nationalism was forced to wait until Egyptian independence had been achieved.<sup>53</sup> An Egypt still under imperialist influence could not realistically form part of a truly Arab union.

Likewise, although the Palestine War of 1948 was a pivotal moment in the Arab world, Nasser states in his *Philosophy of the Revolution* that it must not be seen as the impetus for the revolu-

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<sup>53</sup> Doran, *Pan Arabism*, 42.

tion. While in Palestine, Nasser writes, all he and his fellow officers could think about was the situation in Egypt. Nasser's fellow army officers "spoke to [him] of the future of [Egypt]," and along with the experiences of the war only made Nasser realize the fundamental problem of imperialism, which intensified his need to save Egypt from it.<sup>54</sup> The Palestine War, and the Zionist problem in general, was certainly important to the Arab world, but one must make the distinction between how it affected Arab nationalism and how it affected the Egyptian Revolution. As Adeed Dawisha notes, the whole Palestinian issue, starting in the 1930's, gave life to the Arab nationalist movement:

Here was a concern that would unite the Arab nationalist, the Islamist, and the believer in Greater Syria. From their different loyalties and perspectives, they all would agree on the need to resist the demographic changes that were under way in Palestine.<sup>55</sup>

However, the Egyptian Revolution was, as we have said, not primarily an Arab Nationalist movement. The coup was a moment where Egypt asserted its full independence by establishing a government on its own terms. All policies dealing with foreign elements (the Suez canal, Arab Nationalism, the fight with Israel) were to come after.

So why Nasser? Why the Free Officer's Movement? In such a politically volatile environment the biggest surprise is that one small group of officers who before had had negligible impact on the political landscape were the ones to step in and take power. In his book on the coup, Vatikiotis states importantly: "[the officers] lacked a clear political objective. They were simply committed to removing the British from Egypt."<sup>56</sup> The Free Officers were a small

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<sup>54</sup> Nasser, *Philosophy*, 29.

<sup>55</sup> Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 107.

<sup>56</sup> Vatikiotis, *Nasser*, 103.

part of the political environment created by groups such as Young Egypt and the Muslim Brothers, yet they were willing to act against the problem without set parameters. In his book Nasser writes that the difficulty following the Free Officer's coup was that "every leader we came to wanted to assassinate his rival. Every idea we found aimed at the destruction of the other."<sup>57</sup> Thus he argues that he and the Free Officers were the only people willing to ignore group rivalries in order to take power. This is somewhat exaggerated since unity between the opposition groups had occurred before and because Nasser in the end would also turn his back on all political groups when he banned political parties. However, Nasser's willingness to act certainly cannot be ignored as a reason why the Free Officer's were able to take power rather than any other group.

Ultimately Vatikiotis offers the most compelling reason for the success of the Free Officers: their inclusive ideology and timely action. The Free Officer's Movement "carried with it the political influence of the radical agitation and terrorism generated by Young Egypt, the Ikhwan and National party in the preceding decade"<sup>58</sup> and therefore could appeal to the masses that were living in the political landscape created by those groups. Importantly, though, the coup was an unexpected move:

The Free Officers relied on secrecy with a view to a sudden coup at a propitious time when the public at large would be so thoroughly alienated from their rulers as to eagerly embrace their new soldier saviours. Above all, with the firm seizure of the army, the largest state institution, the conspirators would be able to impose their will on the rest of society.<sup>59</sup>

Nasser appeared at a time when the government needed to

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<sup>57</sup> Nasser, *Philosophy*, 33.

<sup>58</sup> Vatikiotis, *Nasser*, 108.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 110.

change and he and the Free Officer's had the means of acquiring it. Nasser offered firm, charismatic leadership which Egyptians embraced. The other parties in the meantime were left to look on as he took advantage of their hard work.

Ideologies like those of Young Egypt or the Muslim Brothers offered Nasser's generation what Erik Erikson calls "overly simplified yet determined answers to exactly those vague inner states, and those urgent questions which arise in consequence of identity conflict."<sup>60</sup> It was groups such as Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood that created the Egypt which Nasser was a part of and would come to lead. When Nasser later stated that the Free Officer's Movement was the crystallization of a tumultuous Egyptian society, he forgot to add that this revolutionary, political turmoil was not inherent to Egyptian society but was created by the radical groups of the time. The rise in popularity of these groups signified the emergence of an Egyptian populace which once again began to demand full independence after the long-term failure of the 1919 revolution. The Wafd's inability to meet these demands the way it had in 1919 only solidified this viewpoint, and showed that the parliamentary monarchy was incapable of leading to significant change.

While in the end it was the Free Officers who led the coup, it is important to recognize the circumstances in which they came to power: a political landscape marked by a conflict as to what Egypt was and should be, and a fervent desire to resolve that conflict through a revolutionary self-critique. In the end, the external factors – the British, Israel, and Arab Nationalism – were secondary to the internal Egyptian problems, although the latter only emerged as a result of a confrontation with the former. There was a realization over time that the ineffectiveness of the parliamentary monarchy needed to be addressed in order to proceed to confront the country's other problems. Regardless of the actions of Nasser's regime thereafter, and whether the relatively calm political environment reflected his leadership or his autocratic policies,

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<sup>60</sup> Erik Erikson in *Ibid.*, 57-58.

the 1952 Egyptian Revolution created an Egypt formed on its own basis and with its own principles, and thus allowed it to move forward to its other problems.

## One Hundred Thousand Ears and Eyes: The Evolution & Legacy of the *Rondas Campesinas* in Peru

Hugh Pouliot

It is a peculiar feature of the human condition that, from time to time, we can be so fully absorbed in the truth of an idea, and so convinced of its universal benefit and validity, that the thought of *asking* seems to completely evade us. The force of an idea can blur the line between thought and action, and convincing others of its benefit becomes secondary, unnecessary, and ultimately forgotten. Friedrich Nietzsche, the quintessential postmodern philosopher, spoke of the *Übermensch*: a being seeking to replace metaphysical knowledge with action; to create new values; to affirm itself in the face of eternal change and recurrence; and to literally move “over” its state of being into a greater height. The Peruvian Shining Path, an insurgent movement of self-assured Maoism, would appear to have taken up a self-conception much like that of Nietzsche's *Übermensch*. In the name of the impoverished and neglected peasantry, the Shining Path, or *Sendero Luminoso*, took up arms in 1980, vowing to raze the edifice of capitalism and colonial domination to its bare foundations, and refashion Peru anew. Sendero centralized this vision around the peasantry: their labours fed the country, and their suffering had weathered a long history of social, environmental, and political crises. This was to be their utopia. Yet such a millenarian vision, which sought so fervently to turn the historically established social and economic structures on their heads, bore no space for revisionism. With the papers of Sendero ideologue Abimael Guzmán drafted, and the peasantry downtrodden and precarious, Sendero held all

that it theoretically needed to “move over” the world and make revolution real.

Sendero's war drew out over nearly two decades, wreaking havoc on Peru's political order and social institutions, embedding terror into the hearts of peasants and city-dwellers alike, and leaving innocent death tolls in the tens of thousands. The complex nature of the war between guerrilla and professional military outfits could have seen the war run on indefinitely; however, it came to a sharp turn in the early 1990s due to the resistance efforts of a rather unlikely demographic: the peasantry. Held between the uncompromising force of Sendero Luminoso and the racist brutality of the Peruvian armed forces, the peasantry were compelled to form what would come to be known as *rondas campesinas*, or peasant patrols to organize the systems of self-defense and local reconstruction which would ultimately deal the critical setback to Sendero advances in the countryside.

Some years after the Peruvian government lifted their state of emergency, and the provisions for the *rondas campesinas* were removed from national legislation, the meaning of the Shining Path war bears the feeling of mournful irresolution. Any casual observer might note that the Peruvian state remains largely unreformed, the peasantry still suffers much of the same poverty and isolation it did prior to 1980, and, surely, Sendero Luminoso did not actualize their objectives; but in every loss, there is a lesson. The *rondas campesinas*, apart from their astonishing struggle during the war, have given the world a legacy to learn from, which I will attempt to describe in the following pages while considering, in a more Nietzschean sense, the ways in which the *rondas* themselves were able to create new values, overcome their state of being, affirm themselves in the face of immense adversity, and elevate the Peruvian peasantry to a new height.

Since the 16th century, the life of the Peruvian peasant has been synonymous with political exclusion and economic scarcity. Peru's economy was historically shackled to successive dictates of



Spain, England, and the United States,<sup>1</sup> and following some administrative staggering during the early 20th century, economic self-determination in Peru remained a myth until the 1960s.<sup>2</sup> Despite sweeping agrarian reforms during General Juan Velasco's military regime, by the late 1970s the state of affairs in the department of Ayacucho crystallized the failure of Peruvian government to establish an amicable economic agenda to improve the plight of the poor and disenfranchised. Ayacucho's acute lack of paved roads, electricity, news media and radio communication had kept the department isolated politically and economically,<sup>3</sup> producing a veritable powder-keg of dissent and disillusionment. Moreover, a widely felt attitude of animosity toward the police – renowned for corruption, abuse, livestock theft, and the oppression of peasant mobilization efforts and land takeovers<sup>4</sup> – coupled with an environment of poverty and political distrust to foster a relative openness to the advent of *Sendero Luminoso*.

Broadly speaking, peasants were superficially, though not necessarily ideologically, enticed by Sendero's initial actions, such as livestock redistribution, killing of notorious drunkards and thieves, and attacks on the police. However, their appeal was largely symbolic, and could not be sustained over the long run in the face of astonishing displays of violence against peasants, economic severance from the cities and prolonged commodity shortages,<sup>5</sup> violations of traditional religious structure and ritual,<sup>6</sup> and

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<sup>1</sup> James Francis Rochlin, *Vanguard revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 28.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>3</sup> German Nunez Palomino, "The Rise of the Rondas Campesinas in Peru," *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* (1996), 90.

<sup>4</sup> Mario Fumerton, *From Victims to Heroes: Peasant Counter-rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, 1980-2000* (Amsterdam: Rozenburg Publishers), 75.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 78.

<sup>6</sup> Carlos Ivan Degregori, "Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho," *Shining and Other Paths*, ed. Steve J. Stern (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 133-4.

the fundamental one-dimensionality of Sendero ideology. In December of 1982, nearly three years after the first violent surges of Sendero insurgency in Peru, in light of the corruption, low morale, and often complete operational ineffectiveness of the police,<sup>7</sup> the government dispatched the military, provoking another two years of unadulterated violence. The primary tactic of the military at this stage, similar to U.S. tactics in Vietnam, was known as "relocation", by which massive rural settlements were removed from their habitats and replaced into "strategic hamlets" in order to create vast, empty legitimate "killing zones".<sup>8</sup> However, the boundaries were enormous, ambiguous, and many peasants were unwilling or unable to relocate. The coordination of relocation was both arbitrary and brutal, often seeing even the most casual disobedience by peasants met by summary execution. Much of this brutality was informed by the intrinsic racism of the marines, typically bred from coastal urban centres, who viewed indigenous Ayacuchans with a particular loathing and disregard.

Internal refugee migrations occurred at a tremendous rate,<sup>9</sup> and the policy of relocation produced more open territory for Sendero to absorb, meanwhile aggravating the tension and sorrow felt by peasants caught between a formidable rock and a hard place. The words of one marine captain quite aptly summarizes the reality of the situation: "We don't have enough soldiers to patrol and control the countryside. We don't have the capacity."<sup>10</sup> That said, the situation was more complex than numbers: the armed forces did not have the linguistic expertise, nor the territorial knowledge, nor the cultural sensibilities to continue their operations in the countryside. A new strategy was necessary.

The history of the peasant patrols in Peru extends beyond

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<sup>7</sup> Palomino, "The Rise of the Rondas," 94.

<sup>8</sup> Fumerton, *Victims to Heroes*, 88.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 91.

<sup>10</sup> Mario Fumerton, "Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War: Peasant Self-defense Organizations in Ayacucho," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 20:4 (2001), 488.

the Columbian history of Latin America however, the modern tradition of the *rondas* took form in the northern Peruvian department of Cajamarca, a phenomenon which has been quite magnificently documented by Orin Starn. The Cajamarcan *rondas* emerged in the 1970s to combat livestock rustling and internal violence, but evolved into an entire alternative system of judicial arbitration and political organization.<sup>11</sup> The model of the Cajamarcan *rondas campesinas* provided both inspiration and namesake for the *rondas* of the south, however, they are distinctly different in nature, formation, and activity. The southern *rondas*, which shall remain the primary focus of my paper, were the outcome of a politically barren countryside, in which peasants struggled to maintain the every day processes of subsistence, while suffering the pressures of an “ideologically myopic”<sup>12</sup> guerrilla insurgency and an equally unsympathetic, almost “colonial”<sup>13</sup> military.

The first *rondas* were organized by the military in 1983,<sup>14</sup> with the task of patrolling the empty mountain corridors created by previous “depopulation” efforts. Within a decade, the *rondas campesinas* numbered an estimated 4,200 units, comprised of roughly a quarter million *campesinos*;<sup>15</sup> a figure not terribly shy of the United States' Army National Guard's total head count. While being fundamentally concerned with routine patrols of strategic communities, or providing advanced guard for military operations, the functions of the *rondas* evolved continually until the turn of the millennium. Their internal relations and relations with exte-

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<sup>11</sup> Orin Starn, “I Dreamed of Foxes and Hawks: Reflections on Peasant Protest, New Social Movements, and the *Rondas Campesinas* of Northern Peru,” *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*, eds. A. Escobar and S.E. Alvarez (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 90.

<sup>12</sup> David Scott Palmer, “Terror in the Name of Mao: Revolution and Response in Peru,” *Perspectivas Latinoamericanas*, no. 2 (2005), 95.

<sup>13</sup> Ponciano Del Pino, “Peasants at War,” *The Peru Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. O. Starn, I. Degregori and R. Kirk (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 378.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 377.

<sup>15</sup> Palomino, “The Rise of the *Rondas*,” 97.

rior groups continued to evolve as well.

Despite the vast spread of *rondas* throughout Peru, for the purposes of specificity as well as diversity of comparison, I would focus on those which operated in the departments of Ayacucho and Apurímac. While the similarities between the two groups are numerous, they can be easily distinguished by the extent to which each was able to fashion and exercise a degree of autonomy. In this sense, the Apurímac *rondas* represented a vibrant exception to the rule. Pre-existing community organizations in the region had established networks of communication and organization which allowed peasants to more readily refuse Sendero Luminoso, and organize to defend themselves when the time came. Apurímac *rondas* were often conceived independent of the armed forces, and thus able to elect their own leaders, obtain their own funding, purchase their own weapons, and feed their own communities.<sup>16</sup> The key to the Apurímac *rondas*' sovereignty, however, was their ability to sustain financial autonomy from the Peruvian state through active trade with Colombian drug trafficking organizations. While prices for traditional exports such as coffee, peanuts, and cacao plummeted during the mid-1980s, the Apurímac *rondas* capitalized on a burgeoning demand for the export of coca paste.<sup>17</sup> The subsequent revenues were used to acquire advanced rifles and medicine, establish health clinics, and pay for food or emissarial trips to Ayacucho or Lima.<sup>18</sup> The organizational and combat efficiency of the Apurímac *rondas* was such that even the police and the military were required to request permission to conduct patrols in certain regions;<sup>19</sup> all things considered, that they became a seminal inspiration for newborn *rondas* throughout the country is not so surprising.

By contrast, the various methods of autonomy exercised by the Apurímac River Valley *rondas* illuminate the fundamental

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<sup>16</sup> Fumerton, *Victims to Heroes*, 116.

<sup>17</sup> Del Pino, "Peasants," 382.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 384.

<sup>19</sup> Fumerton, *Victims to Heroes*, 144.

problems of the less developed, more dependent defense committees of Ayacucho. Compulsion is generally identified as the impetus for the formation of the *rondas campesinas*: the military responded to peasant communities hesitant to form patrols through defiant displays of violence and terror, and the sheer brutality of Sendero in turn strengthened the resolve of many communities to request, support, and consolidate a network of patrol and defense.<sup>20</sup> Generally speaking, the military assumed the organizational and logistical end:<sup>21</sup> dealing orders, and leaving the *ronderos* themselves to carry them out. By this conception, the Ayacuchan *rondas* were – whether by choice or not – largely an extension of the military wing. The arms, financing, and autonomy conceded to the average *ronda* was scant. For nine years, the *rondas* were responsible for arming themselves, and were usually forced to do so illegally.<sup>22</sup> In 1992, President Alberto Fujimori authorized the distribution of several thousand short-range shotguns among the *rondas*.<sup>23</sup> However, the types of weapons available for legal acquisition were not numerous, generally inferior to the arms possessed by Sendero, and the ratio of arms to *ronderos* pathetically low. In a most basic sense, the *rondas* were effective simply because the majority of the country would choose and support them over Sendero Luminoso.<sup>24</sup> While they enjoyed widespread affectionate support, many distrusted the notion of the *rondas campesinas*, and were actively engaged in undermining them, often even while encouraging their development.

There is a real sense of a continual dynamic surrounding the *rondas campesinas* which had nothing to do with “defense”, as such. However hushed or implicit, there was a notable discourse, and no doubt a watchful eye, over the *rondas*’ capacity to affect

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 90.

<sup>21</sup> Palmer, “Terror,” 115.

<sup>22</sup> Adam Jones, “Parainstitutional Violence in Latin America,” *Latin American Politics and Society* 46:4, 141.

<sup>23</sup> Fumerton, “Rondas,” 488.

<sup>24</sup> Rochlin, *Vanguard*, 69.

change – politically, economically, spiritually, and so on. To what extent would the *rondas* represent the status quo? To what extent would they represent a revolution of their own? In the majority of cases, the *rondas*' capacity to cultivate their power and ultimately affect broad change was metred out by the government and military, which might have seemed appropriately prudent at the time. Consider the case of the Guatemalan civil defense patrols, cultivated by the military to "[consolidate] military domination of rural communities, [and separate] civilians from the leftist insurgents in the highlands." These *patrullas*, which bore numerous similarities in makeup and spirit to the *rondas campesinas*, were responsible for 18% of the human rights atrocities committed during the 1980s.<sup>25</sup> The case of paramilitary self-defense groups in Colombia presents a similarly alarming picture, as well as a peculiar resemblance to *rondas* in the Apurímac River valley: initiated in the 1960s and 1970s to assist the military in counterinsurgency efforts, they gradually developed a formidable power base within the country's criminal and drug-trafficking networks, and over time, despite their outlaw, have outgrown the state's capacity for control. The conflict between left and right-wing paramilitaries at this stage is vastly more territorial than political, centring around drug-producing areas, where both groups now derive the vast majority of their income, and subsequent ability to purchase and expand.<sup>26</sup> The Colombian case, which saw roughly 23,000 murders between 1988 and 1997 at the hands of paramilitaries, exhibits little space for hope or optimism.<sup>27</sup>

Adam Jones affirms that a paramilitary faction answerable to, but socially dissociated from, the military is an instrumental component of any military operation.<sup>28</sup> Peru is perhaps one of the

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<sup>25</sup> Jones, "Violence," 139.

<sup>26</sup> Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability* (Santa Monica: RAND Co., 2001), 55.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>28</sup> Jones, "Violence," 143.

purest testaments to this grim truth. The *rondas campesinas*, in comparison to a plethora of disastrous paramilitary counterinsurgency endeavours elsewhere, were generally kept in close check by the ruling authorities. Against speculation that the *rondas* phenomenon could produce a new dirty war between paramilitary and government factions, from the outset, the Peruvian government was profoundly calculated with their containment of the rising ranks of counterinsurgents.

The governments preceding Alan García (1985-1990) and Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) were openly hostile to the very notion of the *rondas campesinas*, ironically, fearing the development of parallel institutions,<sup>29</sup> when evidently it was an acute lack of government protection which had made the *rondas* necessary to begin with. This sentiment translated less overtly into most of the government legislation and military attitudes which followed the widespread creation of peasant patrols. The *Rondas Campesinas Act* (Law 2451), implemented only in November of 1986, fully legitimized the *rondas*, and granted them a margin of autonomy, and even granted them some weapons, but in turn placed them under the directional and political authority of the state. Laws 740 & 741 further described the responsibilities of the *rondas*, exploiting their organizational capabilities while restricting them to generally non-subversive activity.<sup>30</sup>

Under Fujimori, the *rondas* were placed under direct control of the military, effectively making them a subordinate wing of the armed forces. Fujimori also restricted the *rondas'* to the use of shotguns and the bolt-action Mauser,<sup>31</sup> an expensive long-range rifle which had been out of use since the First World War, and was more commonly found in European museums than battlegrounds by the 1980s. The ones possessed by the *rondas* were usually lacking in sights, and were often held together by no more than string and scotch tape; and many a *rondero* would wonder why his gov-

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<sup>29</sup> Palomino, "The Rise of the Rondas," 117.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 118.

<sup>31</sup> Fumerton, *Victims to Heroes*, 186.

ernment was legislatively under-arming the *rondas* against an enemy known to possess better long-range weapons. Why, if they were deployed to fight Sendero Luminoso, were they not equipped with the superior rifles and explosives technology of the armed forces? Instead, it is as though they were armed comparatively in relation to the Peruvian armed forces, in such a way that they would be a perpetually inferior force, technologically speaking.

The posture of the military, an organization composed of coastal recruits with little to no personal attachment to the defense of the countryside, mirrored that of the government. For the first decade of Sendero's insurgency, soldiers were loathsome and distrustful, and skeptical of the ability of rural indigenous communities to make effective use of their advice.<sup>32</sup> The *rondas* were regularly forced to sell their scarce supplies of livestock to pay outrageous fees for the purchase of weapons from the military, often upwards of \$1000US for a rifle. They were even forced to purchase their own bullets; and as if to add insult to injury, the military adamantly maintained that the rifles "donated" to the *rondas* were to be returned following the cease of hostilities.<sup>33</sup> In the words of one *ronda* commander, "[i]t is just that a civilised country, in circumstances of social-political crisis, should sell arms to their own citizens? It's a horrible shame that, as a matter of necessity, so as to defend themselves from Sendero's attacks, the communities must sell their pigs and their cows in order to buy those Mauser rifles."<sup>34</sup>

The role of the Peruvian military in the orchestration and administration of the *rondas campesinas* was one of routine day-to-day manipulation, often coupled with outright cases of abuse. Should a *ronda* become noncompliant, or fail to fulfill a dictate of the local authorities, soldiers would respond most commonly by confiscating all of the community's weapons, leaving it completely

<sup>32</sup> Palomino, "The Rise of the Rondas," 97.

<sup>33</sup> Fumerton, *Victims to Heroes*, 188.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 187.



vulnerable.<sup>35</sup> No *ronda* was immune to the reality that they had become obliged to fulfill the necessary processes of patrol and defense, which was properly the obligation of the state, in what Orin Starn calls the “reinscription [sic] of Peru’s colonial hierarchy of town over country, state over peasantry.”<sup>36</sup> Political reliance on the *rondas* virtually disappeared following the defeat of Sendero. Fujimori’s government oversaw the arrest and imprisonment of dozens of innocent *ronda* leaders – many of whom were tied to the left and had become vocal critics of the regime’s authoritarianism and economic failure – on false charges of terrorism.<sup>37</sup> Opinion among development organizations came to falsely view the *rondas* as paramilitary death squads,<sup>38</sup> often leaving them excluded from discussions of community development. Indeed, most NGOs bypassed the *rondas* in their efforts to reforest, reseed and irrigate the countryside, and projects encouraged dependence on the government rather than the *rondas*.<sup>39</sup>

The *rondas campesinas*, possessing the knowledge and sensibilities to get the job done, were valued by the state and urban society to the extent of a convenient political utility. Despite an indispensable role in the defeat of Sendero Luminoso, the peasant patrols were subject to a calculated denial of the arms and political sovereignty necessary to engage in broader forms of radical, subversive activity. They had their wings clipped, though among their own circles, it was affectionately held that “the *rondas* will end every injustice.”<sup>40</sup>

Thinking about the legacy of the *rondas campesinas* on a more micro-political scale reveals some of the internal issues

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 141.

<sup>36</sup> Orin Starn, “War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes,” *Shining and Other Paths*, ed. Steve J. Stern (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 241.

<sup>37</sup> Starn, *Nightwatch*, 265

<sup>38</sup> Fumerton, “Rondas,” 493.

<sup>39</sup> Starn, *Nightwatch*, 265.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 270.

which characterize their history. What I find to be the most weighted among the critiques of the *rondas* is the position that women were systematically excluded from active, primary participation, and have been consequently excluded from the social revelry and pride which had supposedly befallen the countryside following the defeat of Sendero. The first half of this position is debatable; the second half is untouchably correct.

If one were to formulate that efforts against Sendero by the *rondas campesinas* were many parts comprising a whole, and *à mon avis* it is important to do so, it is even possible that women bore a heavier weight than men during the Shining Path War. To be straight, and perhaps largely due to the strict influence of the male-dominated Peruvian armed forces in the authorization of defense committees and patrols in Ayacucho, women were scarcely involved in patrolling. On the other hand, in Apurímac, the gender make-up of patrols was also predominantly male, thus one would deduce that the dispersal of roles within the struggle against Sendero Luminoso accrued from long-standing social conventions spanning most world cultures, by which men leave home to fight, and women stay behind to tend the home, children, and means of livelihood. To dispute the existence, nature, and details of this convention is not the intent of my paper. Rather, within the framework of this convention, it should be clearly established that while men left the homestead to walk with the *ronda*, women remained home, cooking, sewing, nurturing both children and crops, and ultimately providing a final line of village defense with nothing but "clubs and kitchen-knife tipped spears."<sup>41</sup> Mothers' clubs, as well, are associated as a female counterpart to the male-dominated *rondas*.<sup>42</sup> Thus, I find it difficult to argue that women did not play a resilient, not to mention essential, role in defeating Sendero. The problem is that, without proper revelation and recognition, women might as well have stayed in bed all day; and

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<sup>41</sup> Starn, "War and Counterrevolution," 240.

<sup>42</sup> Fumerton, *Victims to Heroes*, 286.

this reality of “recognition” speaks to all moments and ideas in history.

It is therefore no secret that war and militarization essentialize and confine the roles of gender, and the necessity of “hypermasculinity” which becomes associated with warfare isolates women from both violent participation in war, as well as recognition for their non-violent contributions.<sup>43</sup> In light of the newfound respect by the Peruvian national community for the peasant patrols, Kimberley Theidon remarks, “[i]f the war has permitted subaltern sectors of the rural population to seize the national stage in a slow and intermittent construction of citizenship, then armed participation against [Sendero Luminoso], and the relationship the *rondas campesinas* formed with the armed forces have reinforced patriarchal relations within these villages, resulting in an unequal exercise of rights and sense of belonging to that imagined community called the nation.”<sup>44</sup> In a game of *futbol*, it is the sustained struggle of eleven players on the field which culminates in a goal; half the players on the team will quite possibly never notch a goal in their careers, even though their efforts contribute to every goal and every moment of victory that their team enjoys. In other words, history is truly a game of recognition, with severe “intergenerational implications.”<sup>45</sup>

The *rondas campesinas* perpetuated an age-old Andean ideology of female subordination and second-class citizenship<sup>46</sup> – and this much I shall not dispute either, for it formed their single most crippling and unforgivable flaw – yet these conceptions exist within a certain realm of “recognition”. The tragedy that history and social perspectives frame gender as they do might have been beyond the scope of the *rondas*’ project; and in this way, the *rondas campesinas* might not seem so overcoming, or postmodern, at all.

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<sup>43</sup> Kimberley Theidon, “Disarming the Subject: Remembering War and Imagining Citizenship in Peru,” *Cultural Critique*, no. 54 (Spring, 2003), 71.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 68.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

<sup>46</sup> Starn, “War and Counterrevolution,” 240.

In a similar manner, due in part to a variety of social and political pressures, the *rondas* were never able to form a larger network among themselves to coordinate defense, or on a broader scale, to represent the interests of the indigenous peasantry. The extent and range of differences between the *rondas* which developed from Apurímac to Ayacucho certainly represents this fact. Within themselves, the *rondas campesinas* were never connected or coordinated on a national scale; instead, the Peruvian government and armed forces formed the unifying bond between the *rondas*, severely limiting their potential to become significant national organizations. The Peruvian state, with the exception of the Velasco regime (1968-1975), has historically been hostile to peasant demands for political representation and land reform,<sup>47</sup> manifesting this hostility in attempts to localize and isolate peasant organizing efforts. Deborah Yashar posits that, “[w]ithout sustained political liberalization and a sustained developmentalist state in the countryside, it has been difficult to construct a national peasant movement. And without peasant networks, it has been difficult to construct indigenous identity and organization that transcends their localized referent.”<sup>48</sup> Had there existed a network of peasant organizations, for example, at the advent of Velasco's land reform to engage in the political discourse over needs and distribution, the reform of 1968 might have been a remarkable success.

That the *rondas* do not tie into a broader campaign for change in the countryside forms one of their larger, albeit more debatable, shortcomings. As far as faith in national politics is concerned, voter turn-out in areas where the *rondas* were most active is at a peculiar national low.<sup>49</sup> Following the decline of Sendero, and the ensuing reinsertion of international development organizations, the *rondas* were continually sidelined first by a government less than keen on their expanded political inclusion, and sec-

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<sup>47</sup> Deborah Yashar, “Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America,” *Comparative Politics* 31:1 (October, 1998), 37.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>49</sup> Starn, “War and Counterrevolution,” 214.

ond, by the international opinions generated therefrom. Peasant and *ronda* leaders were rarely consulted on development projects during the post-Sendero era; instead, peasant efforts were directed towards reconstruction of pre-existing infrastructures, schools, clinics, and so on.<sup>50</sup> There is an opinion among some scholars, however, that, “given time and with skills training for its members, the [*rondas campesinas*] might have been able to transform themselves into appropriate vehicles for the pursuit of developmental priorities, and so obtain financial and organisational support from external aid donors and the local non-governmental agencies they sponsor.”<sup>51</sup> However, they were not given time; they were not given much at all. Instead, the *rondas* remained a localized force for reconstruction, which despite its intrinsic worth, still fell short.

At the same time, much of the successes and contributions of the *rondas* can be credited to their very localized nature. As isolated, individualized organizations, each *ronda campesina* faced its own unique challenges and circumstances, and their histories are as tragic as they are inspiring. The politics of postmodernism reject a reading of history as meta-narrative or teleological. Rather, the investigation of a phenomenon such as the *rondas campesinas* requires a cellular reading, which appreciates the specificities and challenges of each case.

Peru is not so different politically today than it was in 1980, which, if nothing else, seems to illuminate the great chasm that exists between historical thought, and actual historical revelation. I feel comfortable positing that people, in general, are innately adverse to political change which will not materialize within their lifetimes, or perhaps the lifetimes of their children. The Shining Path War presented Peruvians of all walks with a one-dimensional ideological struggle, with no foreseeable end short of wholesale slaughter; it was a revolution that few but a dedicated minority

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<sup>50</sup> Fumerton, *Victims to Heroes*, 269-70.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 270.

could truly buy into. Real change takes lifetimes. This in mind, we come back to the concept of the *Nietzschian Übermensch*, or “overman”; the being which affirms itself in the face of eternally recurring change and adversity. If, as Nietzsche writes, we live in a universe of finite matter and space, and infinite time, then history becomes a cyclical process, in which only the *Übermensch* can affirm each of his actions, forge on, and be truly happy. However, the *Übermensch* itself is a myth, or a “journey” by which humanity strives toward self-mastery. There is no such physical thing as the *Übermensch*, and the self-assuredness of Sendero Luminoso, more specifically Abimael Guzmán, as having mastered eternal recurrence was a true manifestation of hubris, one which reaped the lives of 69,000 people, and unalterably affected many more.

The poor and disenfranchised of Peru watched the *rondas campesinas* fight the police, abusive merchants, cattle thieves, corrupt judges, drunk husbands – in other words, the real perceived enemies of the peasantry – in the same way Sendero had, yet in a way which did not require a “war machine,”<sup>52</sup> and they were truly inspired. The *rondas* were able to show the countryside a way of life beyond eternal victimhood,<sup>53</sup> becoming “a rallying point for identity and pride, and...a vehicle for autonomy and self-government in the valley.”<sup>54</sup> Apart from patrols against Sendero, many *rondas* were able to expand to form local democratic assemblies to elect community leaders, arbitrate family and land disputes, supervise small public works projects, and construct health clinics.<sup>55</sup> During the war, they organized delegations to the cities for medicine and aid, as well as work parties to irrigate communal crops, and construct defense structures around villages.<sup>56</sup> Some *rondas* reactivated parent-teacher associations and women's

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<sup>52</sup> Degregori, “Harvesting Storms,” 135.

<sup>53</sup> Starn, “War and Counterrevolution,” 247.

<sup>54</sup> Del Pino, “Peasants,” 382.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Starn, “War and Counterrevolution,” 245.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 252.

groups, and even organized *fish-frys* and *futbol* tournaments.<sup>57</sup> Historian Ponciano del Pino has called this phenomenon of the *ronda* weaving itself into the everyday fabric of Andean life *interiorización*;<sup>58</sup> whether imposed or not, the institution became an integral node of every day life in the Peruvian countryside for almost two decades. *Interiorización* came to represent the internalization of the struggle to overcome and strive on a most fundamental basis. Orin Starn has commented further that,

“...in light of the tremendous, sometimes almost preposterous, courage demanded to make even modest gains against the grain of the savage dangers of the contemporary order...from shantytown soup kitchens in Honduras to indigenous federations in Ecuador to the *rondas* in northern as well as southern Peru, activism from below means the margin of survival in daily life as well as a challenge to the very terms of cultural domination and political exclusion between the elite and the dispossessed, the white and the brown, the rulers and the ruled.”<sup>59</sup>

A consensus among scholars of Peru during the 1990s seemed to have been that the *rondas* would survive the Shining Path War, and carry on into the 21st century,<sup>60</sup> however, on New Year's Day 2000, Alberto Fujimori officially dissolved the *rondas campesinas* from national legislation. In an address on that day, he extended deep gratitude to the Clubes de Madres and Comedores Populares for their continued efforts in resisting Sendero Luminoso, yet somehow, with particular magnificence, managed to make no mention of the *rondas campesinas*.<sup>61</sup> What place does this leave them in history?

Against the self-assuredness of Sendero Luminoso, the *ron-*

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<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 245.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 242.

<sup>60</sup> Fumerton, *Victims to Heroes*, 281.; Del Pino, “Peasants,” 384.

<sup>61</sup> Fumerton, “Rondas,” 494.

*das campesinas* presented a markedly divergent attitude and position, one which was constrained by innumerable social and political factors, yet found meaning within its own striving to discover and overcome. The *rondas* were shown every obstacle and disadvantage, and they won. In spite of their flaws and shortcomings, they undertook to overcome, so to speak, with “preposterous courage,” as well as tremendous loss, and from this legacy is passed on a myriad examples and teachings for social movements to come. In every loss, there is a lesson; and here we have a humble case in point.



## Jewish Women and the Nazi Vision

Jessica M. Adach

A colossal bigotry against women was applied in different ways by the Nazi regime leading up to and during the Holocaust. The unique differences between how Jewish men and women were treated throughout this period defined their experiences and potentially, affected the outcomes for both. Life for all women under the Third Reich was restrictive and precise, involving specific roles they were subtly forced to undertake, such as providing a positive home environment for “Aryan” children – a necessity for the future success of the German race. For Jewish women societal restrictions were more intense and multifaceted – from slow depletion in the work force to eventual ghetto life – which increased in the years leading up to the Holocaust itself. In extermination camps, Nazi policy made certain that Jewish women felt the brunt of the Final Solution, even if the Nazis implementing these regulations were female themselves. Women’s memoirs of events that took place throughout the Nazi reign, and especially during the Holocaust, paint a different picture than that of men. Of course, “the final solution was intended by its creators to ensure the annihilation of all Jews...yet the road to annihilation was marked by events that specifically affected men as men and women as women.”<sup>1</sup> Simply put, the treatment of Jewish women differed from that of men because of Nazi rationale and its inherent vision for what comprised their ideal of world domination. The different facets of Nazi ideology resulted in the exploitation, physical and

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<sup>1</sup> Raul Hilberg, *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), 126.

emotional torture and murder of Jewish women.

Nazi society was male-dominant in the extreme. When the Nazis came into power they held intense biases against all women, allowing only certain roles for them, as well as imposing a variety of limitations. Primarily, no women were allowed in politics under the Nazi regime. Between 1919 and 1933, 111 women were elected to the Reichstag as deputies; however, the National Socialists did not have one female Member of Parliament.<sup>2</sup> In fact, the *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, one of the Nazi periodicals, stated:

The National Socialist movement is an emphatically male phenomenon as far as the political struggle is concerned. It regards women in parliament as a depressing sign of liberalism...we believe that every genuine woman will in her innermost being, pay homage to the masculine principle of National Socialism; for only then will she reemerge as a whole woman.<sup>3</sup>

Clearly, the Nazi party represented chauvinist values that signaled men as the superior sex. In addition, "Aryan" women were encouraged to return to traditional roles, most important of which, was motherhood. Hitler explained in his Party Day speech of 1934 that "the man's world is the state, woman's the home and the two worlds complement each other; women ought not attempt to penetrate the world of men."<sup>4</sup> Several initiatives were taken to promote this idea, such as awards given to productive mothers and loans for women to start families. In German society there was a definite underlying theme that advocated the superiority of men. This premise affected all women regardless of religion, how-

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<sup>2</sup> Matthew Stibbe, *Women in the Third Reich* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2003), 16.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 16

<sup>4</sup> Leila J. Rupp, "Mothers of the 'Volk': The Image of Women in Nazi Ideology," *Signs* 3:2 (Winter 1977), 362.

ever for Jewish women it was overpowering, as “Jewish women suffered both as Jews and women from anti-Semitism and sexism.”<sup>5</sup>

In contrast to the non-Jewish female population, daily life for Jewish women was steadily diminished because, “between 1933-39...they saw their economic livelihoods imperilled and their social integration destroyed.”<sup>6</sup> Just at the point the Nazis came to power, Jewish women were beginning to thrive in the workforce. Shortly into Hitler’s reign, however, this prosperity for Jews ended, especially for Jewish women. In fact, the Nazis “scheduled an official boycott of Jewish businesses and professional establishments for April 1, 1933. On that day, storm troopers stood in front of Jewish stores, threatening and exhorting shoppers to ‘buy German.’”<sup>7</sup> This, and other measures of the “April Laws” that were passed by the Nazis, as well as events like “Crystal Night,” or “Night of Broken Glass” in November 1938, had a devastating impact on Jews and their role within society, as 91 Jews were murdered and 7,500 shops destroyed. Jewish working women were affected “because...fifty-three percent of Jewish women worked in business and commerce...they lost their jobs as family businesses and Jewish shops closed down.”<sup>8</sup> As opposed to men, who were able to maintain or find replacement work as more opportunities were available to them, Jewish women had to be extremely versatile and resourceful in order to provide for their families. In fact, women “trained for new jobs and then retrained when they lost newly acquired jobs. One woman took a speed course in becoming a corsetiere. Although Jews could no longer be licensed by the

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<sup>5</sup> Joan Ringelheim, “Women of the Holocaust: A Reconsideration of Research,” *Different Voices*, ed. C. Rittner and J. Roth (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991), 374.

<sup>6</sup> Marian A. Kaplan, “Jewish Women in Nazi Germany: Daily Life, Daily Struggles, 1933-39,” *Different Voices*, ed. C. Rittner and J. Roth (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991), 188.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 195

time she finished, she quickly developed private customers and supported herself.”<sup>9</sup> Jewish women could not escape the injustices of Nazi society, and loss of job was not the only way in which this ideology manifested itself.

Jewish women suffered loss of self and participation in terms of the social aspects in which they could no longer be a part. Jewish women as mothers, housewives and storeowners were deeply involved in their communities through institutions, volunteering and organizations. Truly, their lives bridged the gap between family and community.<sup>10</sup> However, once the Nazis established the “April Laws”, the Nuremberg Laws, and merely through their favouring of the “Aryan” race, the women were excluded by these institutions and groups. One woman recalls that she stopped going to her monthly gatherings with friends as she thought the non-Jewish members would respond awkwardly to her presence:

Later one woman tried to convince me that they were all still my friends, so I decided to go to the next meeting...I couldn't sleep at all the night before the gathering. I was worried about my Christian friends, but I was also worried about myself...I knew I would observe them very carefully. I would notice even a shadow of their discomfort at my entry...But I didn't have to read their eyes or note a change in their tone. The empty table in the booth where we had always met spoke loudly and clearly.<sup>11</sup>

Jewish wives were also directly targeted in an outpouring of propaganda that demanded Christian husbands divorce them.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Marian. A. Kaplan, “Keeping Calm and Weathering the Storm: Jewish Women’s Response to Daily Life in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939,” *Women in the Holocaust*, D. Ofer and L. Weitzman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 41.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 40

<sup>11</sup> Kaplan, *Different Voices*, 193.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 217.

In addition, Jewish mothers not only had to deal with their own humiliation among their social groups, but console their children who were getting the same treatment from friends and teachers at school. One mother reported:

That her daughter cried, not because she couldn't go to the theatre [with her class]...she cried because she was ostracized from the group, as though she wasn't good enough for her classmates...I believe the Nazi teacher was ashamed of herself...because she phoned me several times and asked that I not send the child to school on the days when something enjoyable had been planned for the children.<sup>13</sup>

In general, Jewish women were the demographic that was most oppressed by the implementation of Nazi ideologies. While they adapted to new types of jobs outside the business or commercial realm within which the majority were familiar, they were also trying to provide for their children and families regarding these new social changes, familiarize themselves with their new role societal status, and find alternate means to keep their household expenses down and under control. In fact, Kaplan quotes the League of Jewish Women as it said, "it is the duty...of the Jewish woman to regulate the schedule and organization of the household so that everyone is satisfied...she has to adjust without being subordinate. This is more necessary than ever, given today's living arrangements."<sup>14</sup> Due to these factors regarding social and household life, it is obvious that Jewish women were affected by the Nazi regime in ways that were harsh and devastating, in ways that differed from both Jewish men and Christian women.

During this interim period, after the Nazis gained power and before the Holocaust, Jews had to deal with the "maelstrom

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 197.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 198.

that led to the Holocaust; impoverishment and ostracism for most; emigration for many; hiding for a handful; and ghettoization, forced labour and extermination for the rest.”<sup>15</sup> Indeed, emigration was a top priority for many Jews. However, more men actually followed through with these plans to leave their country. Fewer Jewish women emigrated for various reasons – they had to take care of their children, they feared for their elderly parents who could not make the journey, and they truly believed Nazis would spare women and children of severe sentences, as “men faced more immediate physical danger than women and were forced to flee promptly.”<sup>16</sup> Thus, Jewish women encouraged men to emigrate for safety. In fact, statistics from the Jewish Agency show that, between 1933 and 1942, 27,202 men immigrated to Palestine from Germany in comparison with 24,977 women.<sup>17</sup> As a result, more Jewish women and children were forced into ghettos when the Nazis, unfortunately, did not spare this demographic from serious harm as the women had hoped.

As well as the fact that fewer Jewish women emigrated, there existed a higher female population in Germany due to male losses in World War One; thus it is no surprise that more women were contained within ghettos and subsequently sent on to concentration camps. Even until that point however, daily life for women in the ghettos was incomparably worse than those conditions they struggled with as an immediate affect of the Nazi rise to power in German society. First and foremost, the ghettos offered horrible living situations as, in the Warsaw ghetto between October 28 and November 15 1940, thirty percent of Warsaw’s population was herded into two percent of its land.<sup>18</sup> This type of overcrowding under any circumstances is bound to cause enormous

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 189.

<sup>16</sup> Kaplan, *Women in the Holocaust*, 49.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 50.

<sup>18</sup> Dalia Ofer, “Gender in Ghetto Diaries and Testimonies: The Case of Warsaw,” *Women in the Holocaust*, D. Ofer and L. Weitzman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 152.

difficulties; however, combined with the lack of food and money, ghetto life truly tested the human will to survive. The majority of Jewish women in the ghettos were single mothers and, because employment was mainly open to men, women had to find other means to provide for their family. Often women traded household belongings for food and other necessities or they smuggled items from the "Aryan" side back into the ghetto at an increasingly higher risk, as the punishment became death.<sup>19</sup> The journal entries from one young girl in the Lodz ghetto acts as a statement on how hard mothers worked for their families:

March 11, 1942...I ate all the honey. I am selfish. What will the family say? I'm not worthy of my mother, who works so hard. Other than the hard work at the resort, she also works for a woman who sells underwear in the street. My mother looks awful, like a shadow. She works very hard. When I wake up at twelve or one o'clock at night she's sewing, and at six in the morning she's back on her feet. I have no heart, I have no pity. I eat anything that lands near me...March 14 1942...mother brought the bread ration from the resort. I don't know what she lives on. She works the hardest and eats the least.<sup>20</sup>

Indeed, Jewish mothers in the ghettos did have a great deal to balance between scrounging for money and food, and taking care of their families adequately, with much more peril than previous societal life. Caring for the children was a primary concern as both parents tended to be preoccupied with work or finding sustenance. There were actually reports of three and four year old children sneaking out of the ghetto in order to find food, which could

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 156.

<sup>20</sup> Michal Unger, "The Status and Plight of Women in the Lodz Ghetto," *Women in the Holocaust*, D. Ofer and L. Weitzman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 134.

<sup>21</sup> Ofer, *Women in the Holocaust*, 162.

be a fatal mistake.<sup>21</sup> Ultimately though, no matter what precautions and securities women undertook to supply their families, they and their children were deported to the camps.

There existed a vicious cycle for Jewish women in ghettos which added to their vulnerability and increased their deportation rate. The first selected for deportations from the ghettos were those who were unemployed and those on welfare. Of course, significantly less job opportunities were open to women and single mothers, and therefore it follows that those being unemployed were the ones most reliant on welfare.<sup>22</sup> This being the case, it was inevitable that more women than men be sent to camps. In fact, in the Lodz ghettos between January and May 1942, sixty-two percent were women, and additionally, women who were between the ages of 20-40 were sent in numbers double that to men of the same age.<sup>23</sup> One specific event that reflects this sentiment is known as Black Tuesday. On July 16th, 1942, 9,853 women and children were taken on a transport to Auschwitz in comparison with 3,031 men.<sup>24</sup> The ghetto experience for Jewish women was distinctive from men who maintained work and were not as burdened with household chores, seeking food, and care of children.

In the camps, it is apparent that Jewish women were treated differently as well. Three main facets of Nazi ideology solely targeted women and were inflicted upon them in the camps – the enforcement of male-dominated authority, exploitation of women simply because of their biology and Nazi perception of same, and finally, putting an end to Jewish reproduction.

The idea of a patriarchal society resonated within the camps, both in the guards and, at times, even the male prisoners as well. Although in the camps prisoners were all meant to have the same fate, in some cases the Nazis tended to favour men over women, resulting in perhaps a better chance at survival for those prisoners. Men were generally given the leadership roles within

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<sup>22</sup> Unger, *Women in the Holocaust*, 126.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 126.

<sup>24</sup> Weitzman and Ofer, *Women in the Holocaust*, 5.



the camp if one needed to be filled. In *Theresienstadt*, all twelve members of the *Judenrat* were men during the entire three and a

half years the camp existed.<sup>25</sup> In addition, in the labour camps and German factories, in which wages were paid to the prisoners, women got paid less than men at an average of 1.25 marks a day as opposed to 1.75 marks a day – even when performing the same duties.<sup>26</sup> These aspects of higher rank and pay may have provided men with a better chance of survival. However, while it can only be speculated on what authority and money can offer a prisoner, in most cases, women simply did not receive support in that way.

Although Jewish men were given the leadership roles among the prisoners, female SS guards did exist. In fact, “nearly every concentration camp had its women’s section and small brigades of booted, uniformed women guards.”<sup>27</sup> These guards had a profound effect on the women prisoners because it was so difficult to comprehend how a woman could inflict brutal punishments, let alone upon other women. Many believed that, “for a woman to become a guard required so major a departure from the normal values and experiences of women, perhaps the few who ended up on camp assignments were more apt to be deprived or deranged than the men.”<sup>28</sup> Although female SS guards were less prominent than male guards, the women prisoners maintain specific memories of these guards being exceptionally atrocious. One survivor, Susan Cernyak-Spatz, recalls:

“In my experience the matrons were cruel, more vicious (sadistically vicious) than any SS man. These women who,

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<sup>25</sup> Ruth Bondy, “Gendered Suffering?” *Women in the Holocaust*, D. Ofer and L. Weitzman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 321.

<sup>26</sup> Unger, *Women in the Holocaust*, 133.

<sup>27</sup> Claudia Koonz, *Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the family and Nazi Politics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 404.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 404.

as I read later, ranged from baronesses and countesses to prostitutes were the most vicious. You rarely found SS men who played games with their dogs in which the point was for the dog to get the prisoners' derrieres, but the matrons did."<sup>29</sup>

It seems almost unimaginable for women guards to commit these horrific acts upon other females, however numerous testimonies by women prisoners affirm this cruelty. Jolana Roth confirms that "the ones you did see – they were worse than men. I will never forget the one who would stand at the peephole of the gas chamber just because she wanted to."<sup>30</sup> Roth remembers another guard, a "tall, blonde SS woman would stand in her knee breeches, hands on her hips, with a whip and laugh as people went into the gas... A sadism no one can explain."<sup>31</sup> The female guards were malicious in general, however, there are some particular SS women who stand out among others for their brutality.

Irma Griese was one guard who was notorious for her unexplainable and horrendous conduct towards her prisoners. One memoir offers insight into specific punishments Griese imposed on the women in Auschwitz. Leitner writes about an incident involving her sister Chicha:

It is said Chicha appeals to [Irma Griese]. This manifests itself only in the fact that she always recognizes her and either tortures her more than the others or...(on one occasion) does not send her off to die...the girl resting on the ground was caught in the act by Griese. But Griese attributed the "crime" not to the girl, but to Chicha...she yanked Chicha out of the line to punish her...She made her kneel, lifted Chicha's arms high in the air, and placed two heavy rocks in her hands. She then ordered Chicha to hold

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 404.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 405.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 426.

her arms straight up for the duration of the [roll call]. "And no wavering of the arms! If you do, you die!"...endless hours passed. At last, Griese returned...she knew she had been defeated..."put the rocks down," she said.<sup>32</sup>

It is impossible to understand why female guards felt it necessary to inflict such pain upon their women prisoners. It is clear that the women in the camps believed the female guards were often much worse, however it can be speculated that "women guards seemed more cruel because their behaviour deviated farther from our conceptions of 'feminine' models than men guards' behaviour departed from stereotypes about men."<sup>33</sup> Whatever the reasoning might be, the women under the guard of female SS had an unusual experience being treated in such manners by other women – their biological peers who, one would expect, understand the essence of femininity. Whether these SS guards were in fact harsher is hard to measure, but the impact they had on the women prisoners was obviously profound.

The second factor that separated women from men in the camps was the fact that the Nazis cared less about them than men because they could not benefit the Nazi scheme. Therefore, due to their biology, women were generally seen as weak and utterly useless. Thus, "[women] usually disappeared in fire and smoke."<sup>34</sup> In fact, women were deemed to be ineffective and worthless on a scale different than men. For instance, on a transport to Auschwitz, March 5, 1943, eighty-four percent of the

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<sup>32</sup> Isabella Leitner, *Fragments of Isabella: A Memoir of Auschwitz* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1978), 53.

<sup>33</sup> Claudia Koonz, *Mothers in the Fatherland*, 404.

<sup>34</sup> John K. Roth, "Equality, Neutrality, Particularity: Perspective on women in the Holocaust," *Experience and Expression: Women, the Nazis and the Holocaust* (Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 2003), 16.

<sup>35</sup> Joan Ringelheim, "Women and the Holocaust: A Reconsideration of Research," *Different Voices*, ed. C. Rittner and J. Roth (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991), 395.

women and children were gassed right away.<sup>35</sup> For those who did remain in the camps, especially the female camps, women suffered a horrible standard of living. One camp commandant said that the “general living conditions in the women’s camp were incomparably worse [than in the men’s camp]. They were far more tightly packed-in and the sanitary and hygienic conditions were notably inferior.”<sup>36</sup> In fact, one survivor recalls that she and the other prisoners of the women’s camp were not permitted to bathe for 67 days.<sup>37</sup> Women were continually exploited and abused in this way, all because the Nazis had even less use for Jewish women than Jewish men.<sup>38</sup> Lastly, although this did not happen too often due to “racial shame” felt on behalf of the Nazis, women prisoners were sexually assaulted in various ways. Actually, the guards “especially liked to put lesbians to work in the brothels. They thought it would shape them up.”<sup>39</sup> As women were constantly living with the prospect of being treated in these especially degrading ways, this made their camp experience a different kind of hell than that of men.

The final aspect of Nazi ideology that was implemented against women in the camps was putting an end to Jewish regeneration. A quotation from Himmler sums up this Nazi dogma as he stated:

“We came to a question: what about the women and children? I have decided to find a clear solution here too. In fact I did not regard myself as justified in exterminating the men – let us say killing them or having them killed – while

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<sup>36</sup> Sybil Milton, “Women and the Holocaust: The Case of German and German-Jewish Women,” *Different Voices*, ed. C. Rittner and J. Roth (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991), 228.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 228.

<sup>38</sup> Ringelheim, *Different Voices*, 392.

<sup>39</sup> Claudia Schoppmann, *Days of Masquerade* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 21.

<sup>40</sup> Ringelheim, *Different Voices*, 392.

letting avengers in the shape of the children...grow up. The difficult decision had to be taken to make this people disappear from the face of the earth."<sup>40</sup>

Of course, this affected women in several different ways and, thus, was probably one of the most hideous facets of camp life that women had to deal with. It is clear that the Nazi rationale behind killing was quite specific when it came to women, as they did not want Jewish women to produce more Jewish generations. It is true that "the mother/child relationship was one that the Nazis aimed to destroy; nothing about the Final Solution was more definite than that" and the Nazis ensured measures would be taken to enforce this.<sup>41</sup> One action that was taken is revealed by a survivor who was a young girl in Auschwitz: "Three weeks pass and I do not menstruate. Neither does anyone else. With amazement we all realize that menstruation has ceased in the camps... There is bromide in our food, we are told by old-timers. Bromide is supposed to sterilize women. The Germans are experimenting with mass sterilization."<sup>42</sup> In fact, "the Nazis invested considerable time and energy to find the most effective ways to sterilize them, but the 'final solution' for this 'problem' was death."<sup>43</sup> Thus, in each 1942 transport to Auschwitz, women of childbearing age, fifteen to forty-nine, were sent to the gas chambers at twice the rate of men the same ages.<sup>44</sup> By sterilizing and killing potential mothers, the Nazis were making certain the least possible amount of Jewish children, and future generations, were born.

However, many women were already pregnant upon arrival in the camps. For the women in the family camp of *Theresienstadt*, life was more secure than those in extermination camps.

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<sup>41</sup> Weitzman and Ofer, *Women in the Holocaust*, 8.

<sup>42</sup> Livia E. Bitton Jackson, "Coming of Age," *Different Voices*, ed. C. Rittner and J. Roth (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991), 80.

<sup>43</sup> Roth, *Experience and Expression*, 8.

<sup>44</sup> Ringelheim, *Different Voices*, 379.

<sup>45</sup> Weitzman and Ofer, *Women in the Holocaust*, 7.

They were allowed to give birth until July 1943 when a law passed that all pregnant women had to abort their babies. Any woman who disobeyed was sent on the next transport to Auschwitz.<sup>45</sup> Of the approximate 230 births that did take place there, only twenty-five of the children survived.<sup>46</sup> In contrast, pregnant women in extermination camps were inevitably condemned to death.

Gisella Perl is a survivor of Auschwitz and was a prisoner who worked in the hospital, as she was a doctor before the war. Her haunting memoir explains how pregnant women were actually treated and the torture they all endured under Dr. Mengele. Upon arrival in Auschwitz,

SS chiefs would address the women, encouraging the pregnant ones to step forward, because they would be taken to another camp where living conditions were better...I happened to have an errand near the crematories and saw with my own eyes what was done to these women...They were beaten with clubs and whips, torn by dogs, dragged around by their hair and kicked in the stomach with heavy German boots. Then, when they collapsed, they were thrown into the crematory – alive.<sup>47</sup>

This horrific event inspired Perl to take action.

[I would] save the mothers, if there was no other way, than by destroying the life of their unborn children...I delivered women pregnant in the eighth, seventh, sixth, fifth month, always in a hurry, always with my five fingers, in the dark, under terrible conditions...First such delivery was a woman called Yolanda...Yolanda's little boy was born...I

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<sup>46</sup> Lawrence L. Langer, "Gender Suffering? Women in Holocaust Testimonies," *Women in the Holocaust*, D. Ofer and L. Weitzman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 316.

<sup>47</sup> Gisella Perl, "A Doctor in Auschwitz," *Different Voices*, ed. C. Rittner and J. Roth (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991), 113.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.

took the warm little body in my hands, kissed the smooth face, caressed the long hair – then strangled him and buried his body under a mountain of corpses waiting to be cremated.<sup>48</sup>

Perl was ecstatic when Dr. Mengele decided that pregnant women could, in fact, deliver their babies. This meant the women would no longer have to hide their pregnancy and thus, not give birth in the horrible conditions of the latrines where Perl was performing this procedure. However, Perl “had two hundred and ninety two expectant mothers in my ward when Dr. Mengele changed his mind. He came roaring into the hospital, whip and revolver in hand, and had all two hundred and ninety two women loaded on a single truck and tossed – alive – into the flames of the crematorium.”<sup>49</sup> It was this type of unspeakable behaviour by the Nazis that Jewish women had to endure and bear witness to. Women being exposed to this first hand, had to somehow learn to cope with the brutality of losing friends, family and children in this manner.

Women responded and dealt with their emotions in different ways after losing their children. One thing they held in common was that the “tiny piercing screams of the babies, dragged from their cots in the middle of the night,” reached into the very core of women, especially mothers, as they were the ones directly confronted with this horror.<sup>50</sup> The majority of women felt immense guilt for not being able to protect their children from what would happen to them. One survivor explains in her memoir how she felt responsible for both her mother and her son’s death upon arrival in Auschwitz:

Children and old people were told off automatically ‘to the left.’ At the moment of parting came those shrieks of

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 115.

<sup>50</sup> Etty Hillesum, “A Letter from Westerbork,” *Different Voices*, ed. C. Rittner and J. Roth (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991), 49.

despair, those frantic cries, 'Mama, Mama!' That will ring forever in my ears ... Our turn came. My mother, my sons and I stepped before the 'selectors.' Then I committed my... terrible error. He classed my younger son Thomas with the children and [the elderly] which was to mean immediate extermination. He hesitated before Arvad, my older son ... 'This boy must be older than twelve' ... 'no' I protested ... I wanted to spare him from labours that might prove too arduous for him. 'Very well, to the left!' ... I had persuaded my mother that she should follow the children and take care of them...How should I have known. I had spared them from hard work, but I had condemned Arvad and my mother to death in the gas chambers.<sup>51</sup>

Some mothers were forced to resort to an inhuman response in coping with the loss of their children. Later in Gisella Perl's memoir she speaks of a mother with an infant:

The mother turned her back on it, wouldn't look at it, wouldn't hold it in her arms. Tears were streaming down her cheeks incessantly, terrible, silent tears, but she wouldn't speak to me. Finally I succeeded in making her tell what was on her mind. 'I dare not take my son in my arms, Doctor,' she said 'I dare not look at him, I dare not kiss him...I feel it, I know it, that somehow they are going to take him away from me...' And she was right...a new order came, depriving Jewish mothers of the additional food, a thin, milky soup mixed with flour, which swelled their breasts and enabled them to feed their babies. For eight days [she] had to look on while her son starved slowly to his death.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Olga Lenguel, "The Arrival," *Different Voices*, ed. C. Rittner and J. Roth (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991), 72.

<sup>52</sup> Perl, *Different Voices*, 116.



While Jewish women and mothers responded in various ways to their situations, one thing is definite: women, in comparison with men, endured camp life differently as theirs was not only the burden of their own survival, as a Jew and as a female, but also as the guardians of the children.

Jewish women, as seen before the war, were much more involved in their communities than men. This was repeated in a smaller and much different scale in the camps as well. Women provided support and council for other women in their surroundings, and this often helped them get through the camp struggles. One survivor, Charlotte Delbo, appreciates female sensitivity as her friend LuLu helped her through a crisis:

LuLu has a good look around us and seeing there's no kapo nearby she takes my wrist, saying: "Get behind me, so they won't see you. You'll be able to have a good cry." ... Dropping my tool upon the ground...I cry my eyes out... LuLu continues to work and stay on the lookout at the same time...LuLu suddenly pulls me: "that's enough now! Back to work." ... She says it so kindly that I'm not ashamed of having cried. It's as though I had wept against my mother's breast.<sup>53</sup>

It is clear that women were open to each other about their fears and emotions, and thus were more able to receive help from others. One survivor, Rose, tells it best:

We helped each other. We had to cling...you had to have somebody. We helped each other...women were picking each other like monkeys [for lice]...Never remember seeing the men do it. The minute they had lice they just left it alone; the women have a different instinct...[During roll

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<sup>53</sup> Charlotte Delbo, *Auschwitz and After* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 102.

call] the women holding each other and keeping each other warm...someone puts their arm around you and you remember...can you imagine how much it meant to us over there! Men were crouching into themselves – maybe five feet apart...as much as I saw in Auschwitz, the men were falling like flies. The woman was somehow stronger... woman friendship is different than man friendship you see...we have these motherly instincts, friend instincts more....men can be nice to each other, be nice to each other...but that's as far as it goes, you know? ...They talked to each other but they didn't, wouldn't, sell their bread for an apple for the other guy. They wouldn't sacrifice nothing. See, that was the difference.<sup>54</sup>

Through the memories of survivors, it is clear that women and men responded in different ways and used different methods to cope with the circumstances that surrounded them. It cannot be said that one gender acted better or more appropriately, but it is interesting to speculate on their differences. Even if the action was small, it meant something to the women. This is often how women showed their resistance as well.

Resistance on the part of the prisoners within the camps was never able to defeat the Nazi powers, however it was these acts that gave something for the prisoners to work toward, and a reason to maintain hope. There are examples of both male and female acts of resistance in the camps. For women, resistance included anything that kept their spirits up within the confines they were held and the horrors they were faced with everyday – teaching, giving gifts, singing, writing, praying and daydreaming with each other, allowed women to sustain themselves, and focus on something worth surviving for. One woman created a cookbook while in the camp, as she felt sharing recipes with one another helped women bond and take their minds off their strife: “exhausted, cold and hungry they [the women in her barrack]

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<sup>54</sup> Ringelheim, *Different Voices*, 380.

would talk endlessly about the food they longed for, about family meals they had shared and the dishes they would make if they survived to the end of the war...it seems as these stories...served as a talisman, sustaining their humanity and hope in a time of little hope."<sup>55</sup> Although seemingly meagre, these acts defied the Nazis in small ways, and the women, through bonding and helping each other were determined to stay alive.

In contrast, women performed some of the largest acts of resistance, as well. Women completed various tasks throughout the Holocaust that challenged the Nazi ideals and made a statement about the risks they were willing to take in order to survive. Women such as Zivia Lubetkin and Vladka Meed were resistance leaders in the Warsaw ghetto uprising. Franceska Mann shot an SS guard in the Auschwitz crematorium before she herself was murdered, and Mala Zimetbaum was the first female to escape Auschwitz. Even when she was caught and sentenced to hang, she took her own life in a final act of retaliation.<sup>56</sup> Probably the most famous act of resistance was the explosion of Crematorium IV in Auschwitz on October 7, 1944, by female inmates. Anna Heilman tells of her involvement in this scheme:

We were about seven or eight girls no more. Out of this friendship evolved the idea of resistance...how about taking gunpowder? We started to talk about the idea. The gunpowder was within our reach. We thought 'We can use it!'...we smuggled the gunpowder from the factory to the camp...the fourth girl, who was executed, was the one who used to give it directly to the man who worked in the crematorium. I think we were involved in it for about eight months.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Rochelle G. Saidel, *The Jewish Women of Ravensbrück Concentration Camp* (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 55.

<sup>56</sup> Anna Heilman and Rose Meth, "Resistance," *Different Voices*, ed. C. Rittner and J. Roth (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991), 130.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.

The plan was enough of a success that the crematorium was damaged, but four of the women were caught and sentenced to death by hanging in the camp. One of the women was Heilman's sister. Many acts of resistance were not as powerful as this example, nor were they always what the prisoners hoped for or expected. Nonetheless, these women shared a common passion to fight the enemy in order to preserve what was most important to them – their lives and the lives of those they loved.

Leading up to and throughout the Holocaust, Jewish women were singled out due to their societal roles, their biology, the prospect of motherhood, and the perceptions Nazis held them in. Essentially, Jewish women suffered in a ways that were distinctive from men, simply because they held even less status in the Nazi vision of world domination. It was true that “to the Nazis, Jewish women were not simply Jews; they were Jewish women, and they were treated accordingly in the system of annihilation.”<sup>58</sup> While the two genders faced unique struggles at the hands of the Nazis, women responded and reacted to these situations in different manners; whether it be through forming valuable friendships or resisting to the best of their ability. There was no better or more appropriate way to adapt or react in response to the events surrounding the Holocaust. They stand as testimony to illustrate a history that was exclusive to Jewish women and, it could be said, that many shine as tiny pinpoints of light in a very dark time.

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<sup>58</sup> Ringelheim, *Women in the Holocaust*, 349.

## Out of the Loop: An Analysis of Liverpool's Isolation From the Broader Atlantic World During the American Revolution, Based on the Diary of Simeon Perkins

Benjamin Carver

Simeon Perkins (1735-1812) lived through some of the most tumultuous and consequential events of the past five hundred years, namely those of the American Revolution. Living in the small town of Liverpool, Nova Scotia, Perkins exhibited a keen interest in these developments and took pains to record in his diary whatever scraps of foreign intelligence he received. A man of considerable standing who interacted with visitors from other ports on an almost daily basis, Perkins would have had better access to information than practically anyone else in Liverpool. Accordingly, his diary presents an excellent case study of the degree to which eighteenth-century Nova Scotians, at least those living in small coastal settlements like Liverpool, would have been able to inform themselves accurately of distant events. The paucity of information that Perkins received from abroad and the high incidence of erroneous information in his diary suggest that he and his contemporaries would have had, at best, a limited and ambiguous conception of the world beyond the horizon.

Born in Norwich, Connecticut in February 1735, Simeon Perkins was the fourth of sixteen children born to Jacob Perkins and Jemima Leonard. After spending the early years of his life in New England, Perkins moved to the recently founded town of Liverpool, Nova Scotia, in May 1762 as part of the New England Planter migration. He opened a store and quickly became in-

volved in a number of other commercial interests. Of particular note were his involvement in the local shipbuilding industry and his exchange of fish, lumber, and other commodities with such distant markets as the West Indies, the Thirteen Colonies, Newfoundland, and Europe.<sup>1</sup>

These enterprises helped Perkins to achieve status within the community, and he soon emerged as one of Liverpool's most prominent men. In January, 1764, Perkins was appointed Justice of the Peace and Justice of the Inferior Court, positions he would hold for the ensuing forty-six years. His involvement in public life continued to grow in 1770, when he was chosen Proprietors' Clerk and County Treasurer, both positions that he filled until 1802, as well as Town Clerk, a position that he held until his death in 1812. He was also appointed Judge of Probates for Queen's County in June, 1777, an office which he held until his resignation in 1807, and served as Deputy Registrar of the Vice Admiralty Court from 1780 to 1790. Additionally, Perkins represented Queens County in the colonial government from 1765 to 1799, with the exception of the years 1768 and 1769.

Another facet of Perkins's leadership in the Liverpool community was his involvement with the local militia. Serving as lieutenant-colonel of the county militia from 1772 to 1793 and colonel commandant from 1793 to 1807, Perkins played a leading role in coordinating the town's defense during some of its most perilous years. With the onset of the American Revolution in 1775, Liverpool came under the constant threat of attack by American privateers. The provincial government's reluctance to commit to Liverpool's defence compounded this danger, forcing the town to rely upon a small, local garrison for protection against increasingly frequent privateer incursions. Liverpool was thus in many ways a sitting duck, and consequently suffered heavy losses, particularly during the early years of the revolution.

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<sup>1</sup> C. Bruce Ferguson, "Simeon Perkins," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online*, accessed November 1, 2007 <<http://www.biographi.ca/EN/ShowBio.asp?BioID=36724&query=simeon%20AND%20perkins>>

This terror was somewhat mitigated midway through the war, when the Halifax authorities began sending reinforcements to Liverpool and citizens began outfitting privateers of their own—both developments to which Perkins was central. In 1779, Perkins joined with a group of Liverpool merchants to commission the town's first privateer, the *Lucy*. This marked the beginning of a counterattack against American privateers, which was first pursued as a defensive measure and later as a source of profit, that continued with fluctuating fortune until the conclusion of peace in 1803.<sup>2</sup> Of the six privateers that went out from Liverpool between 1799 and 1801, Perkins had an interest in five. Some of these ventures were lucrative, while others were costly, and it was this volatility that ultimately drove Perkins and his associates to abandon privateering in 1801.<sup>3</sup>

While Perkins was a leading figure in the Liverpool community, what made him truly significant was the fact that he took the time to record diligently the details of his daily existence in a diary. Spanning from 29 May 1766 to 13 April 1812, his diary is complete, except for the period from 22 November 1767 to 15 June 1769, when he returned to Connecticut; the year 1771, during which he recorded no entries; and the period from 5 March 1806 to 29 November 1809, the record of which has been lost.<sup>4</sup>

Whereas many diaries are intimate and introspective, Perkins's is remarkably terse and dispassionate. Rather than describing his own emotions or opinions, Perkins instead devotes the bulk of the diary to such varied topics as judicial proceedings, medicine, religious trends, shipping intelligence, and trade with far-off ports. As D.C. Harvey notes, "This is no ordinary diary concerned with personal affairs and private business alone; but rather a sort of unofficial journal or unpublished newspaper, which reflects through the eyes of one man the way of life and the

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<sup>2</sup> D.C. Harvey, ed., *The Diary of Simeon Perkins: 1780-1789* (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1958), xli.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Ferguson, "Simeon Perkins."

vicissitudes of an entire community, and its contacts with the wider world beyond the horizon." Indeed, Perkins's diary lends itself to numerous types of analyses capable of shedding considerable light on life in Liverpool during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

In particular, the way in which Perkins informed himself of developments that took place on far-off shores and seas presents an interesting field of inquiry. The diary shows that Perkins had a keen interest in foreign events and sought to learn as much about them as he could. It also shows that he faced significant challenges in doing so. Geographically and culturally isolated in the small town of Liverpool, Perkins had no means to obtain regular, reliable updates from abroad.<sup>5</sup> Instead, he was forced to piece together whatever scraps of information he could from the sources that were available to him, namely second-hand oral news accounts and newspapers printed in larger ports.

Further complicating matters was the fact that a significant proportion of the news Perkins received was distorted, contradictory, or flat-out wrong. Given that Perkins had no reliable means of assessing this information's veracity, it would have been virtually impossible for him to have achieved a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the world beyond Nova Scotia. Consequently, as John Bartlet Brebner observes, Perkins and his contemporaries in Nova Scotia almost certainly spent the years of the Revolutionary War in a state of "ill-informed and uneasy contemplation of the noisy progress of Anglo-American conflicts to their violent conclusion."<sup>6</sup> The deficiencies in the news Perkins received corroborate the traditional view of eighteenth-century Nova Scotia as a marginal, isolated colony that historians such as Brebner and George Rawlyk have advanced.

Given his isolation in Liverpool, Perkins had limited access to foreign intelligence—a reality evidenced by the fact that he re-

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<sup>5</sup> John Barlet Brebner, *The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony During the Revolutionary Years* (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1969), 106.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, xv.



cords receiving a mere 110 foreign news accounts between 1774 and 1783. He therefore had to rely on whatever information was available to him. This meant that the overwhelming majority of the updates he received from abroad came via either second-hand oral accounts or print accounts published in larger centres. In assessing information from these two types of sources, it becomes clear that while information of the former type was easier to come by, the latter type was significantly more accurate. However, as *Table 1* in the appendix illustrates, what is perhaps most striking in this comparison is not the disparity between the accuracy of print sources and that of oral accounts, but rather the degree of their shared inaccuracy.

Similarly, what stands out in a comparison of the news accounts Perkins received from various ports is not a significant difference in their respective accuracies, but rather their collective unreliability. As *Table 2* in the appendix demonstrates, no less than twenty percent of the information Perkins received from any given port or group of ports was erroneous. While some ports had even higher incidences of erroneous information—as high as forty-two percent—no port or group of ports provided accurate information consistently enough to warrant privileging it as a more reliable source of foreign intelligence than the others.

A year-by-year comparison of the news accounts Perkins records during the Revolutionary War period shows that while the proportion of erroneous information he received varied from one year to another, it remained consistently high throughout the war. Indeed, as *Table 3* in the appendix shows, no less than twenty-seven percent of the news Perkins received in a given year (from both oral and print sources) has since been proven inaccurate. Therefore, we can conclude that misinformation was as persistent as it was pervasive during this period.<sup>7</sup>

Having established the prevalence of misinformation in

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<sup>7</sup> Table 3 only charts foreign news accounts with stated ports of origin; therefore, it only represents 96 of the 110 accounts examined.

Perkins's diary, let us now turn to a qualitative analysis of the types of misinformation he records receiving. This sort of analysis is useful not only because it illustrates the various sorts of faulty intelligence that were passed along to Perkins, but also because it conveys a sense of how he must have struggled to differentiate fact from fiction as he sought to keep abreast of foreign events.

One of the most common characteristics of the false intelligence Perkins received was distortion. In many cases, distorted news was based on actual events but failed to reflect them accurately. In particular, casualty figures were often skewed. For example, on 11 June 1775, Perkins records learning of a battle on Noodle's Island during which "200 Regulars [were] killed and a few of the Provincialists wounded."<sup>8</sup> While such an action did take place, a mere two regulars died in conflict, or one-hundredth of the figure Perkins was led to believe.<sup>9</sup> The account of the Battle of Monmouth that Perkins received on 11 August 1778 is similarly flawed. While casualties were roughly equal on both the British and American sides, Perkins writes, "The News from the Army at New York is, that there has been an Engagement in the Jerseys, near Freehold Court House, that the Royal Army routed the Americans, and Killed Great Numbers, with a Small Loss."<sup>10</sup> Taken at face value, these sorts of reports would have fundamentally warped Perkins's conception of the war's progress.

Further compromising Perkins's ability to obtain an accurate understanding of foreign developments were the numerous sets of conflicting reports that he records receiving. On 27 June 1775, Perkins writes that he learned of an engagement between the King's troops and the Provincialists that resulted in the deaths of 300 provincials and 140 British soldiers.<sup>11</sup> The next day, however,

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<sup>8</sup> Harold A. Innis, ed., *The Diary of Simeon Perkins: 1766-1780* (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1948), 94.

<sup>9</sup> Allen French, *The First Year of the American Revolution* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934), 190.

<sup>10</sup> Inniss, *The Diary*, 211.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 94.

he receives a somewhat different account from a Captain White of Plymouth, who reported that 398 provincials had been buried.<sup>12</sup> Then, on July 4, Perkins writes that a group of men from Plymouth brought further news of the engagement, and notes, "The reports of numbers killed differ essentially."<sup>13</sup> Not only would these conflicting reports have confused Perkins, but they also failed to reflect the true result of the battle, as the death toll was actually closer to 140 provincials and 226 of the King's troops—an altogether different outcome than that which Perkins would have conceived based on the intelligence passed on to him.<sup>14</sup> While certainly misleading, these sorts of conflicting, erroneous accounts were by no means unique or aberrant in Perkins's diary.

Perkins's references to news of the Battle of Long Island provide another useful illustration of the way in which inconsistent news accounts would have obscured his understanding of foreign events. On 21 September 1776, Perkins writes that he received news that "the King's troops had landed upon Long Island, and killed eight thousand of the Americans, with the loss of 150 men, and that they drove them like sheep."<sup>15</sup> Two days later, he records receiving a different account, one supposedly originating from American military headquarters, which held that "5000 were killed, and 3000 taken prisoners, 800 drove in the sea and drowned."<sup>16</sup> As if reconciling these two versions of the battle were not confusing enough, Perkins notes reading an account in a Halifax newspaper on September 29 that put the American death toll at somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000.<sup>17</sup> Worse yet, none of these three divergent accounts provided an accurate description of the battle, as the British suffered approximately 400 casualties, while

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>14</sup> French, *First Year*, 94.

<sup>15</sup> Inis, *The Diary*, 130.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 130-1.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 132.

the American total was around 2,000.<sup>18</sup>

The difficulties that conflicting news accounts posed are further demonstrated by the different accounts of an engagement between the Americans and the British at Machias that Perkins received in 1777. On August 26, he records learning that "the fort at Machias is taken and some of the Town burnt."<sup>19</sup> However, a mere week later, on September 2, he writes that "A schooner from Cape Risue [?] bring news that the Machias people had drove off the King's ships, and done them some damage."<sup>20</sup> While this second account is historically accurate (Fort O'Brien at Machias did withstand a British siege in 1777), Perkins does not seem able to differentiate definitively between the false and the factual, as he questions neither of these contradictory reports.<sup>21</sup> It is therefore reasonable to conclude that he was at least somewhat confused by this conflicting intelligence.

Perkins's references to General Howe's army's purported defeat in July, 1777 offer still more proof of the confusion war rumours could cause. On July 20, Perkins writes, "We have a report that came from another privateer, lately from New England, that General Howe has been defeated, and wounded, and taken prisoner."<sup>22</sup> Three days later, he records that a Captain Gerrish of Newbury "contradicts the report that came from the privateer that General How was wounded and taken prisoner, and his army defeated, but says that General Prescott, with a party of men, was made prisoners."<sup>23</sup> While this second account is historically accurate (Prescott had been captured in July, 1777, near Newport, Rhode Island), Perkins had no effective means of corroborating either of these reports.<sup>24</sup> Even if he had access to more second-

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<sup>18</sup> Mark Mayo Boatner III, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution* (New York: McKay, 1966), 654.

<sup>19</sup> Innis, *The Diary*, 163.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 164.

<sup>21</sup> Boatner, *Encyclopedia*, 383.

<sup>22</sup> Innis, *The Diary*, 159.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>24</sup> Boatner, *Encyclopedia*, 886.

hand information, its reliability would have been equally dubious, so he still would have been left to make his own determination of which account was more plausible—a fact that hardly inspires confidence in his grasp of far-off developments.

The inconsistent accounts of the 1780 Gordon Riots that Perkins describes provide additional evidence that contradictory information impeded his ability to understand foreign events accurately. On August 20, Perkins notes learning of an insurrection in the city of London, during which there was “Said to be a mobb [sic] of 30 thousand; that they pulled down Lord North’s House; that the guards Dispersed them & Killed—Some say 700, others say 7000.”<sup>25</sup> Two days later, he notes receiving word from a Mr. McDonald of Lunenburg that “about 800 were Killed” during the uprising.<sup>26</sup> Whether these inconsistent accounts would have led Perkins to believe the death toll was closer to 700 or 7000 matters little. Since less than 300 rioters were actually killed, we can conclude that, regardless of which account Perkins chose to believe, he would have critically misunderstood these events.<sup>27</sup>

Perkins’s difficulty in conceiving the 1782 Battle of the Saintes off Martinique likewise attests to the limitations of second-hand information. On April 18, Perkins writes:

Elkenah Freeman from Halifax brings very Grand News, if True, viz: Admiral Rodney coming out from England to the West Indies with 14 sail of the Line, fell in with a Reinforcement Coming from France to the French Fleet in the West Indies, and Captured Nine Sail of Line of Battle Ships and 35 Transports; and that the English Fleet is 45 Sail of the Line. They have blocked the French Fleet into Martinique, & have 17 Sail of the Line to Cruise. This will determine the fate of the war for this Summer in America.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Harvey, *The Diary*, 36.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> Boatner, *Encyclopedia*, 440.

<sup>28</sup> Harvey, *The Diary*, 129.

However, two days later, Perkins finds this news contradicted by a Captain Elisha Hopkins of Halifax, who “only heard of Nine Sail of transports being taken, and that there is a reinforcement of twenty Sail of French Line of Battle Ships in the West Indies.”<sup>29</sup> In fact, neither one of these conflicting reports reflected the battle’s true course of events accurately, as Rodney’s fleet of 36 ships-of-the-line defeated a French fleet numbering 33 ships-of-the-line decisively off Martinique between 9 April and 12 April 1782.<sup>30</sup> The prevalence of this sort of misinformation in Perkin’s diary throughout the war years suggests that his understanding of foreign events must have been at least somewhat skewed by the false intelligence he received.

Even the news Perkins received of such a major development as the cessation of hostilities between America and Britain was flawed. On 5 May 1783, he notes speaking with a Captain Humphrey, who believed a cessation of hostilities had begun on March 3, while the crew of a sloop recently arrived from New York said it had taken place on April 3.<sup>31</sup> Further confusing Perkins was a Mr. Hussey of Halifax, who informed Perkins on May 8 that the truce had come into effect on March 3.<sup>32</sup> Whichever of these reports Perkins chose to believe, he would have been mistaken, as a formal cessation of hostilities between America and Britain was not actually proclaimed until 11 April 1783.<sup>33</sup>

In addition to having to discern between the various conflicting news accounts he received, Perkins was also bombarded by a stream of false but believable misinformation that would have further hindered his ability to accurately understand foreign

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> George Hagerman, “Naval Battles of the Saintes,” *Military History* 19 (2002), 30-31.

<sup>31</sup> Harvey, *The Diary*, 185.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 186.

<sup>33</sup> John R. Alden, *A History of the American Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1989), 478.

events. Indeed, Perkins's diary describes several military developments that simply never took place. For example, on 19 April 1776, Perkins writes, "I hear Mr. Bradbury brings news that Quebec is taken by scaling the walls on the 5th of March. That the Americans lost 700 men."<sup>34</sup> While this rumour may have seemed plausible, it had absolutely no factual basis whatsoever. Nor, for that matter, did the news that Perkins received on 15 November 1776, when he recorded hearing "that there is some invasion in this province by the New England people, and that Lieut. Gov. Francklin is taken prisoner."<sup>35</sup> Yet another example of this sort of misinformation is provided by his diary entry for 30 March 1778, in which he records learning "That General Howe and his army were prisoners, and that Barracks were preparing in Boston."<sup>36</sup> Again, this rumour was unfounded. However, since Perkins lacked a reliable means of either confirming or discrediting any of these rumours, it is easy to see how these sorts of false reports would have at least slightly obscured his understanding of the conflict's progress.

In this same way, a number of rumours describing false diplomatic and political developments would have further undermined Perkin's ability to achieve an accurate understanding of events abroad. For instance, on 23 August 1778, Perkins notes that he received "no material News, except a Report that the Parliament is about to come into a resolution of suspending Hostilitys [sic] till next June."<sup>37</sup> While such news would certainly have been welcome to Perkins and his war-weary contemporaries, it was simply untrue. Likewise, Perkins's diary entry for 26 May 1779 describes a false report that he received from the crew of a London ship, which claimed that the French were exhausted and had sued for peace.<sup>38</sup> An additional illustration of this sort of misinformation is found in Perkins's entry for 31 October 1779, where he de-

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<sup>34</sup> Innis, *The Diary*, 118.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 138.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 212.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 241.

scribes a report that “the inhabitants of Boston are in Great Confusion, Killing the French by mobbing, etc. many of them in jail for it.”<sup>39</sup> Again, there was no factual basis for this rumour, but nor was there any dependable way for Perkins to discern its falsehood. Accordingly, it seems implausible that Perkins’s conception of foreign diplomatic and political developments would not have been at least somewhat distorted by these sorts of erroneous reports.

Having examined some of the types of misinformation that Perkins received during the years of the American Revolution, it is clear that he not only received little foreign intelligence, but also that much of the intelligence he did receive would have been erroneous. This is not to say that all of this intelligence was faulty, for it was not. In fact, much of this information was remarkably accurate and would have given Perkins a reasonable grasp of the developments it described. However, given how infrequently he received updates from abroad—during four of the ten years examined, he records a mere nine foreign news accounts per year—and given that such a high proportion of this information was wrong, we should conclude that Perkins and his contemporaries must have had but a limited conception of the world beyond Nova Scotia and that this conception was at least somewhat skewed by false intelligence. In other words, eighteenth-century Nova Scotians would have had, at best, a vague understanding of the world beyond the horizon.

Considering the terse character of Perkins’s diary entries, it is difficult to know exactly how much false intelligence he actually believed or how he attempted to reconcile the obvious discrepancies between the various conflicting news accounts he received. Nonetheless, the rare flashes of insight he does provide reveal a good deal about how much credence he put in indirect information. For instance, on 20 September 1782, when Perkins hears a report that a schooner carrying a group of escaped British prisoners was intercepted by a British Man of War and the prisoners

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 261.



taken to England, he notes, "This Intelligence is pleasing, if it may be relied on, but So many mistakes are passing in these times, I dare not make much dependence upon it, but desire to wait with patience & pray God to fit me for whatever the event may be."<sup>40</sup> This reluctance to accept indirect news at face value is similarly demonstrated by his entry for 20 April 1783, where he records hearing news of an Anglo-American truce but is cautious not to put too much stock in it, noting, "We waite Impatiently to hear the News Direct from England."<sup>41</sup> These sorts of entries indicate that Perkins was aware of the deficiencies of second-hand information and was accordingly cautious in evaluating the news he received.

Without recourse to an authoritative source of information, the only way Perkins could attempt to assess the veracity of the news he received was by comparing it with other intelligence. For example, on 27 May 1777, he notes an account from a Captain Webb of Halifax, who reported that "an action has happened at Danbury, in Connecticut, between the King's troops, and the Provincials, that the King's troops destroyed a large magazine of provisions, and other stores...and that General Worster was killed."<sup>42</sup> The next day, Perkins records receiving a Malachy Salter, also of Halifax, who "confirms ye story of the engagement."<sup>43</sup> Since these accounts proved truthful, Perkins was correct in accepting them as fact.<sup>44</sup> He was likewise correct in treating an account of Lord Cornwallis's capitulation at Yorktown that he received on 19 December 1781 as "confirmation" of a similar report that he received three days earlier.<sup>45</sup> This approach was effective, for not one of the eight "confirmations" Perkins describes during the period examined proved incorrect.<sup>46</sup> However, because he had such limited access

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<sup>40</sup> Harvey, *The Diary*, 157.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 183.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> Boatner, *Encyclopedia*, 315.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 1246; Harvey, *The Diary*, 104-5.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 76, 153-154, 175; Innis, *The Diary*, 36, 94, 105, 108, 184.

to foreign intelligence, Perkins could only corroborate a small fraction of the news accounts he received; he would have been forced to use his own judgment to determine the veracity of the rest.

An assessment of the foreign intelligence Perkins received during the years of the American Revolution shows that he had limited access to information from abroad and that a significant proportion of the information he did receive was erroneous. Consequently, it would have been virtually impossible for him to have obtained a firm grasp of foreign developments or for him to have had confidence in the majority of the inferences he drew from the intelligence he received. Given that practically no one in the Liverpool community would have had better access to information than Perkins, his contemporaries in Liverpool and other coastal settlements in Nova Scotia would almost certainly have confronted these same difficulties. We can therefore conclude that Nova Scotia was indeed, as Brebner and Rawlyk have maintained, severely marginalized from events in the broader Atlantic World during the eighteenth century.

## Appendix

Table 1:




Table 2:





Table 3:



## **This Year's Contributors:**

*Madeleine Cohen* is a third year student at the University of King's College, and will be receiving her Bachelor of Arts next year, with a Combined Honours in History and Contemporary Studies.

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*Jesse Mintz* is a third year student at Dalhousie University, and will be receiving his Bachelor of Arts next year, with Honours in History. He is primarily interested in the study of Islam.

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