"Magis ... Pro Nostra Sentencia": John Wyclif, his mediaeval Predecessors and reformed Successors, and a pseudo-Augustinian Eucharistic Decretal Augustiniana [Institutum Historicum Augustianum Lovanii], 45, fasc. 3-4 (1995), 213-245.

John Wyclif had not a high regard for Lanfranc. There were general grounds: though he lived three hundred years earlier, Lanfranc was on the wrong side of the great millennial divide. For the first one thousand years after the ascension of Christ, Satan, the father of lies had been bound, as the Apocalypse says. Consequently, in that time, there had been a succession of truthful teachers, "correctly logical, philosophers conformed to the faith of Scripture".1 Ambrose, Augustine and Jerome were the principal of these, and "any of them is one thousand times more valuable than a dozen subsequent doctors and popes, when the enemy of truth is free and sowing lies contrary to the school of Christ".2 There were, moreover, particular grounds which moved Wyclif to go far beyond despising Lanfranc's authority. He both made him an object of invective, and also directed reason, as well as, scriptural and patristic authority against him.

There was the manner of Lanfranc's attack on Berengarius, to whom Wyclif had a most ambiguous relation. He was strongly enthusiastic for the decretal "Ego Berengarius" which recorded the confession of Berengar. But this was, after all, an enforced retraction!3 They were, in Wyclif's view, fellow soldiers in the army of truth. Like the Berengar of the decretal, Wyclif held both that the sacrament of the altar was truly, even, "substantially", the body of Christ, and also that the identity of the sacrament and Christ's body was figurative. The decretal calls the sacrament both bread and wine, and also the true body and blood. Thus, as Wyclif would wish, Berengar seems to stand both for real presence and also against a transubstantiation which would annihilate the bread and wine.

Lanfranc, "though he would be a holy man, had proceeded in another manner in his artificial invective" against Berengar. Not only was the invective inappropriate to saints, but it was merely negative, produced no evidence, and wrongly construed the ancient fathers.4 Secondly, and fundamentally, Lanfranc was "one of the first cultivators of the theory of accidents".5 This theory if maintained, would require the church to canonize Aristotle and Porphyry, detaching substance and accidents so that the consecrated sacrament must be either substantially bread or substantially the body of Christ, not both. Thus it had ruined modern eucharistic doctrine.6

Wyclif's opposition to this corrupt doctrine was philosophic, a consequence of his realism. In his treatise de Eucharistia, St. Augustine is first employed as an authority that "no accident is able to exist without an underlying subject", and his
early philosophical tract, *de Quantitate Animae*, is quoted often and at length. But later, after an attack on St. Thomas Aquinas' eucharistic doctrine, as an example of this bad teaching without basis in Scripture or the greater part of the doctors, Wyclif comes to that "decretal, which, with its gloss, among all the decretals of the saints, makes most for our position. For [in it] Augustine distinguishes between the sacrifice and the sacraments. ... So he calls the sacrifice an aggregate, not something which results by means of a composition of parts [namely] of sensible sacrament and the body of Christ with his blood. Moreover Augustine approves of figurative speech [in this matter] ..." The bitter and astonishing irony is that what Wyclif quotes as Augustine against Lanfranc and his followers are the words of Lanfranc himself! More importantly, the passage quoted is inconsistent with the genuine teaching of Augustine, known to Wyclif, and was recognized as such by earlier theologians.

Master Wyclif is quoting a passage which Gratian's *Decretum* falsely attributed to Augustine and falsely labelled as the *Sentences of Prosper*. How Lanfranc came to be credited to Augustine, what Lanfranc's teaching in the passage was, how it is strikingly opposed to Augustine's own teaching on the nature of sacraments, and in what sense earlier mediaevals discerned and indicated that the passage was problematical, we must consider later. We shall discover that, two hundred years after Wyclif, Anglican Reformers of the sixteenth century, despite their advantages relative to Wyclif and other mediaevals in both the availability of genuine texts and the criticism of texts falsely attributed, made the same mistake as Wyclif. We should pause, in consequence, to consider carefully the root of his error, not only for what it reveals about him and his time, but also so that we can compare him to his predecessors and successors.

Wyclif's problem was not excessive gullibility. He neither accepted the doctrine nor the authenticity of what he found in the *Decretum* without question. Indeed, he inveighs against the gloss on "Ego Berengarius" in the *Decretum*, and, in his eucharistic and other treatises, it is the conception of authority and government which he discerns in them which he opposes above all. He speaks of the "stupid heresy of the decretalists" and opposes their authority. Certainly, he would correct the later decretalists by means of the doctors of the first Christian millennium as found both within and without the *Decretum*. It is part of his pleasure and pride as a dialectician to turn the old against the new from within the same work. But, even when citing the fathers, he does not simply accept what he is given. He rejects, correctly, a passage ascribed to Augustine as spurious and suggests, incorrectly, a theory for the false ascription - it was by Augustine of Canterbury instead of Hippo. His critical grounds for throwing this text out of the Augustinian corpus are broad and sound: there are problems both of style and content, and it opposes what is often taught in his accepted books. "Never were
such words or opinions found in Augustine!"11 Moreover, it is clear, both from his long citations of de Quantitate Animae and, because of the grounds he used to reject what he takes as spurious Augustine, that he had whole books of the fathers available to him and that he had read many of them.

Why then does Master Wyclif not reject, or at least decline to use the decretal "Hoc est" in which the doctrine of Lanfranc bears the name of Augustine? Three features of his writing are suggestive: he writes polemically and for practical, not theoretical, ends, his view of church history enables him to treat with contempt theologians nearer to him than the fathers, and what he finds in Lanfranc presented as Augustine coincides with his philosophically determined eucharistic theory.

The contemporary reader, like the nineteenth century editors of these texts, is struck by the virulence of the attacks on the opposition.12 The mere fact that two of the treatises in which we find his eucharistic theology are entitled de Apostasia and de Blasphemia says enough. Both of them begin with, expand upon, and repeat again and again, Wyclif’s theories about the wilful and diabolical corruption of the modern church, corruptions he has experienced in terms of personal deprensions and losses at the hands of the ecclesiastical government. His attack on modern eucharistic theology takes place within an attack on the structure and exercise of government in contemporary Christendom. We are told that Wyclif considered some of these treatises to be part of his Summa Theologica; if so, its theoretical character is secondary.13 Certainly mediaeval theology had always to struggle to free itself from the urgent and practical concerns of the church, and its language was often polemical and harsh, but Wyclif’s eucharistic treatises belong at the extreme end.14

Generally among the mediaeval theologians there was a division between the treatment accorded the authorities of the Christian past and contemporaries. The beginnings of Latin eucharistic controversy in the ninth century are characterized by a civility, calm and contemplative freedom which did not last. It seems, moreover, that Paschasius Radbertus and Ratramnus did not directly address one another.15 Panic was first aroused when it appeared that the controversy set the fathers against one another and Augustine against himself.16

The next major round of conflict about the eucharist, between Lanfranc and Berengar, was full of personal animosity, bitterness, and contempt.17 The texts of the venerated fathers were hurled back and forth like spears. The results were opposed. There was both an increased consciousness of the differences between the texts, with the consequent suspicion that some were spurious, and also the desire to accumulate as many as possible "for our position".18 The concern to
amass authoritative texts, harmonized from one's own standpoint, resulted in a development of the *florilegia*. These collections of texts detached from the books to which they belong had existed from the beginning. Indeed, the genuine *Liber Sententiarum* of Prosper of Aquitaine was compiled during Augustine's life or just after. Its *sententiae* are all from Augustine and are all authentic. But the genre develops. Next, we get the mixed *florilegia* - a number of fathers and scripture strung together on a matter - and the use of earlier *florilegia* to provide the texts. As in Bede these may serve as a biblical commentary. Then, we arrive at the arrangement of texts from diverse sources for doctrinal argument and polemical assertion. The pseudo *Sentences of Prosper* is just one example of this development. The fact that theological argument in this period (as it will be again in the sixteenth century) was so often the polemical interpretation of a patristic text, or an accumulation of texts, made the confusion of ancient and modern authors the more easy.

The next stage in the development of theological forms proceeds naturally from this one. The reconciliation of diverse authorities is the aim of Gratian's *Decretum*, the source for Wyclif of his passage of Lanfranc under the name of Augustine. The *Decretum* is, in fact, entitled: *Concordantia Discordantium Canonum*, i.e., *The Concordance of Discordant Canons*. Reconciliation is the ultimate aim also of Peter Abelard's *Sic et Non*, of the *Decretum* and *Panormia* of Ivo of Chartres, and of Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*. But neither in the twelfth nor in the sixteenth centuries can theology remain satisfied with such a form. It proved necessary in both periods to separate *lectio*, the reading, exegesis and commentary on texts, from systematic theology proper. In the thirteenth century, characteristic results of the need for new theological forms appear in the commentaries by Thomas Aquinas on biblical, patristic (he commented on the *Divine Names* of the pseudo Dionysius), and philosophic texts, in his use of the *quaestio* in the commentary on Lombard's *Sententiae*, and in the existence, independently of these commentaries, of the great *summae*, especially the *Summa Theologiae* which was inspired by the need to unite theological form and content. With the second stage of reformed theology in the sixteenth century, we come to Richard Hooker's *Laws of Ecclesiastical Politie* and John Calvin's, equally systematic, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. In both the twelfth and the sixteenth centuries, the scientific logic which forms theological discourse must cease to be hidden assumption. It must come out into the open. Theological science must become itself a theological object. Wyclif can only be understood as part of the late mediaeval development of this philosophical self-consciousness in theology.

This demand, therefore, that the logic through which theology is systematized and its content understood be itself directly a subject for theological
reflection is a later mediaeval development, though its necessity rises out of problems in the earlier history. The divisions about which logic is appropriate, and the direct and self-conscious connection of these logics to the theological character of their systems, belong especially to the theologians of Wyclif's own time. But, just as his veneration for authorities from the first Christian millennium enables him to treat moderns and contemporaries with contempt, to feel no need to come to agreement with them even about commonly used texts, so also it forces him and them to misuse these texts and these venerated authorities. The ancient texts must answer modern questions posed in modern form, and in the old authorities must be found the philosophical logic for contemporary theological systems.

As already indicated, the first use of Augustine in Wyclif's *de Eucharistia* is of his *de Quantitae Anima*. This early, purely philosophical dialogue is supposed to provide authoritative grounds for rejecting the separation of substance and accidents essential to eucharistic theology after Lanfranc. He finds in it the metaphysic which is generally recognized as determinative of his eucharistic theology, a fiercely anti-nominalist Platonic realism. Michael Tresko's account of Wyclif's "metaphysics of Scriptural integrity" discerns a similar relation to the ancient authorities:

There came a time ... when he experienced a new insight into the way meaning is contained in Scripture ... The turning point that Wyclif describes was his conversion to realism. He came to consider this metaphysics a tradition that had been upheld by the providence of God ... For without universals, he held, there can be no truth, and without a philosophy that relies upon universals there can be no assurance of truth ... He describes this event in *De Dominio Divino*. "For I cannot demonstrate and understand the creature except through demonstrating and understanding God. I went a long time before I understood this theory of ideas from Scripture. But I discovered it unexpectedly when I received illumination from God, whereupon I gave joyful thanks to him, along with his servant Augustine and all the others, whom God ordains from eternity to minister to me and help me to this understanding."

It is not surprising that Wyclif should give credit to Augustine for helping him arrive at a theory of universals. Augustine understood knowing and reality in a way which owed much to the Platonic tradition, though, importantly, the form and content of his philosophical and theological logic were very different from their character in the fourteenth century. But, as Michael Tresko remarks, "What is most striking here is that Wyclif claims to have found universals in the teaching of Scripture."
One half of our own century would have been less surprised than we are. The so-called "biblical theology" and Etienne Gilson's discovery of what he takes to be Aquinas' philosophical logic in Exodus with its "philosophy of esse" are positions analogous to those of Wyclif. But many of the dilemmas of theology in the second half of the twentieth century are owed to the now evident impossibility of reading theology and philosophy immediately into, and, as a result, out of, the Bible. Revelation no more teaches philosophical realism - as opposed to nominalism - than it opposes transubstantiation, as Wyclif claims it does, because it calls the food of the eucharistic meal "bread". One or another philosophical logic or theoretical construction may be more or less capable of giving rational content to what revelation gives, of enabling us to live in a world that is complete for reflection, and of sustaining itself dialectically. Because the believer would understand, he is far from indifferent to philosophical theory. But the Scripture does not save him from the pain of the labour of philosophic reflection.

What is the doctrine of "Hoc est"? How does it differ from Augustine's teaching so that some earlier mediaeval theologians either rejected its doctrine as being from Augustine's pen, or indicated that it did not fit his other teaching, or freed themselves from dependence on its authority? Why does Wyclif regard it as above all other decretals magis ... pro nostra sentencia?

Gratian indicates its purposes for him in the title: "The sacrifice of the church consists in the sacrament and in the reality signified by the sacrament (res sacramenti)". And quotes what he designates as Augustine in libro sentenciarum Prosperi as follows:

the sacrifice of the church consists of two things: in two it remains: of the visible form of the elements and of the invisible flesh and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ; both of the sacrament and the thing signified by the sacrament: even as the person of Christ stands and consists of God and man, since he is true God and true man, for everything contains in itself the nature and truth of that in which it consists. Now the sacrifice of the church consists of two things: the sacrament and the thing signified by the sacrament, that is, the body of Christ. Therefore there is both the sacrament, and the reality to which the sacrament refers, that is, the body of Christ.

The first part of Wyclif's quotation is drawn from these words.

Gratian goes on to quote, what he supposes are the words of Augustine, further:
1. There is his flesh, which we receive in the sacrament working in the form of bread, and there is his blood, which we drink under the form and taste of wine. Evidently flesh is sacrament of flesh and blood is sacrament of blood. By flesh and blood, each invisible, spiritual, intelligible is signified the body of our Lord Jesus Christ, visible and palpable, full by grace and by divine majesty of all virtues. 2. As the heavenly bread, which is the true flesh of Christ is called the body of Christ, since in very truth it is sacrament of the body of Christ, namely of that body which being visible, palpable and mortal was put on the cross; and, as that immolation of the flesh which is made by the priest's hands, is called the passion, death, crucifixion of Christ not in the very truth of the thing but in a signifying mystery, so the sacrament of faith, i.e. baptism, is faith. 29

A gloss - explanation - accompanied this decretal in the form the authors we consider found it:

The heavenly sacrament, which truly represents the body of Christ, is called Christ's body, but not in plain speech. Therefore [the author] says "in a certain way", not in the truth of the thing, but by a signifying mystery; so this is the sense: it is called the body of Christ, it signifies it [the body]. 30

Wyclif also used part of the second section of the decretal and its gloss.

In 1926, M. Lepin traced the process by which Lanfranc's De Corpore et Sanguine Domini (PL 150,421-425), was chopped up, rearranged, abridged and entered eucharistic controversy for 500 years primarily, but not exclusively, as Augustine's Sentences of Prosper. (Parts of it were still credited in the sixteenth century to Ambrose and Gregory the Great, for example.) This was an ironic twist to give Prosper's faithfully reproduced Sentences from Augustine! Subsequent scholarship has only refined the relation between Ivo of Chartres and Alger of Liège in the transmission of the text. In De Corpore et Sanguine Domini, Lanfranc is responding to Berengar and in particular to Berengar's citation and interpretation of a portion of Augustine's Letter to Boniface. 31 This letter entered eucharistic controversy right at the beginning with Ratramnus' De Corpore et Sanguine Domini, and is quoted at length as well as in fragments and abridgements throughout the eight centuries we are considering. In every debate, both sides consider it their own, pro nostra sententia. Moreover, since, as interpreted by Berengar and reinterpreted by Lanfranc, it enters collections like Gratian's Decretum, Abelard's Sic et Non and Lombard's Sentences, it is found on both sides of questions! This is, however, another story which I hope soon to tell in another place. While Berengar cites the letter often in his works, he gives only a few words
or at most one sentence (always the same words and the same sentence) to make only one point. The sentence is "For if the sacraments had not a certain likeness to the realities of which they are sacraments, they would not be sacraments at all", the point: there is a likeness (similitudo) between sacrament and thing, not an identity or equality (identitas, equalitas).32

But if Berengar's reaction to Lanfranc's eucharistic theories was conservative, old fashionedly Augustinian and doctrinally simple, the opposite is true of Lanfranc's developments.33 He has convinced Jean de Montclos, in our time, and the arguments of this exact scholar, though complex, also persuade me, that Lanfranc's interpretations and developments of Augustine were necessary both for the reconciliation of the diverse aspects of Augustine's doctrine and also for furthering it in the eleventh century. Moreover, Lanfranc's contemporaries were so convinced of this that they identified Lanfranc's words as those of Augustine and other fathers.

From Rabanus Maurus on, the realist side of the controversy - here 'realist' is opposed not to 'nominalist', the philosophical position opposed to Wyclif's, but to 'figurative' or 'sacramentalist', the position in the eucharist controversy taken by Berengar, Ridley, Cranmer and Jewel, for example, and perhaps by Ratramnus - was also assisted by the identification of texts written by Paschasius Radbertus as the words of Augustine. These, as M. Lepin showed, substituted for Augustine's teaching on the body of Christ a new teaching which is essential for the new doctrinal developments:

while for St. Augustine there are three manners of understanding "the Christ": as God, as God made man, and as identified with the entire body of the church, of which he is the Head, Paschasius speaks of three manners of understanding "the body of Christ", which is entirely different. And the explanation which he gives to his thought is in effect very divergent: the body of Christ is able to be: his natural body, his eucharistic body, his mystical body: the Church.34

There is nothing more important to the western doctrinal developments than the changes in the understanding of Christ's body.35 Finally, however, it is necessary when judging which side, realist or figurative, was most faithful to Augustine to consider a curious fact.

While the words and doctrines of Paschasius and Lanfranc were identified as those of Augustine, Ratramnus' De Corpore et Sanguine, more nearly an exegetical lectio of Augustine than a dialectical quaestio, comes to be identified as written by John Scot Eriugena, regarded as a heretic. Moreover, Ratramnus'
treatise disappeared from view until the sixteenth century, except for this brief ignominious appearance in the eleventh century because Berengar had read part of it. Evidently, the theologians in that Augustinian age of the western church recognized him in the doctrinal developments made by Paschasius and Lanfranc. J.P. Bouhot has made much the same kind of case for Paschasius as true disciple of Augustine that Monclos made for Lanfranc, and regards Lanfranc, not Berengar, as the heir of both Paschasius and Ratramnus. For, with the exception of a piece of deception by Godescalc, we are not confronting intentional fraud, only, what we now call, "communication problems".

Just after Berengar's favorite sentence from Augustine's letter to Boniface, the Bishop of Hippo writes:

From this similitude, commonly they have the names of those things (of which they are sacraments). So therefore in a certain way the sacrament of the body of Christ is the body of Christ and the sacrament of the blood of Christ is the blood of Christ, so likewise the sacrament of faith is faith.

I think it may be allowed that one does not become a partisan in the centuries long debate over the meaning of this text to say it admits of ambiguity; the \textit{secundum quendam modum} is not specified. The connection made with naming leads Thomas Cranmer and others in the sixteenth century to settle matters by translating it "after a certain manner of speech", but this is an interpretative translation and is both reasonably objected to by his opponents and reasonably justified by him. Wyclif takes the same approach as Cranmer, interpreting the passage thus:

this mode Augustine explains not according to substance but according to signification. I say then that this ought to be understood according to a certain allegory and figure and not according to identity or nature.

But there is another side to the passage and, if A. Sage is right, to Augustine. The connection between the sacrament of faith, i.e. baptism, and faith is not simply nominal. To quote the Twenty-fifth of the Anglican Articles of Religion:

Sacraments ... be not only badges or tokens of Christian men's profession, but rather they be certain sure witnesses and effectual signs of grace... by which he [God] doth work invisibly in us...

The sacraments signify a reality which also works through them. In any case, logically, similitude requires some element of identity between the terms
compared. For the sacramental realists like Lanfranc and Paschasius, the similitude between the eucharistic sign and the thing it signifies requires real, not merely nominal, identity. The identity is not just in the subjective acts of signifying, rather signifying has itself an objective presupposition. Because, for them, the subjective side is covered by the sacrament as *figura*, i.e. as signifying, *veritas* requires an identity belonging to *essentia*.

Happily, we do not need, for the purposes of this paper, to explain the precise logic which compels and gives meaning to the passages which became known as the *Sentences of Prosper*. We are doubly fortunate in this because not only is this step in the development of eucharistic realism a difficult one, but also even Lanfranc’s most sympathetic followers, mediaeval and modern, agree that his philosophical logic is not adequate to his argument. Berengar is simpler, clearer, more intelligible, - his way of using Augustine’s *ad Bonifacium* is indicative - which is doubtless why he never really conceded that his position was wrong. He never had reason to think it was! Neither the conceptual language necessary to the doctrine of transubstantiation, nor the term itself, were used by Lanfranc. Moreover, the problems encountered by Lanfranc’s successors - for example, Alger of Liège and Guitmund of Aversa - in rendering his statements intelligible and reconciling them with what they took to be the other *dicta* of Augustine and the fathers made it clear not only that he had made a leap forward, but that another leap was required. The Aristotelianisms of the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries and their employment by Aquinas and others in the service of the doctrine of transubstantiation have, in this context, theological necessity, there is no idle or extraneous importation of philosophy into faith.

We must, however, follow Lanfranc this far: the mode of the similitude between the sacrament of the altar and the reality it signifies requires for him both a difference, so that the sacrament remains a signifying *figura* and also an essential identity, so that it is effective *in veritate*. Thus, as the first part of "*Hoc est*", quoted above says, the sacrifice of the church is not only of the sacrament as distinguished from its reality, but also of the reality of the body and blood of Christ. The immolation at the hands of the priest is in a signifying mystery, there is no new death of Christ in real fact, but the sacrifice is nonetheless of the reality, not just of the sacramental sign. And, as the second part says, the body is a sacrament of itself, an invisible thing is sacrament of another invisible reality. Or, to put it negatively, sacraments are not just outward and visible signs of inward invisible realities. Difficult as the decretal is, it does say something. For Lanfranc, because of the relations to one another of the sacramental, the heavenly, and the earthly bodies of Christ (clearly distinguished for him,) and because of the union in the eucharistic sacrifice of the sacramental sign and the reality signified thereby (which remain for Lanfranc distinguished as well as identified,) the representative,
figurative and mystical immolation in an external liturgical action at the priest’s hands makes effective and really present for the ever recurring needs of the sinful world the historical bodily death of Christ without really slaying him again or affecting the impassibility of his glorious and ascended body (this requires a distinction and identity of liturgical mystery and sacramental reality,) it must be said both that the church offers as her sacrifice the reality to which the sacrament refers, and also that the body of Christ is a sacrament of itself, signifying and signified; the invisible is sacrament of the invisible.

The assertion in the first part is necessary in order to draw together diverse statements of Augustine. He certainly makes the distinction of sacrament and sacramental reality and he certainly writes of an offering by the church of her own reality in Christ as contained in Christ’s offering of himself. But the two are never drawn together in the manner of the so called Sentences of Prosper. The second of Lanfranc’s assertions clearly contradicts both words of Augustine well known to our authors, and also the specific character of what we call his Platonism. These points granted, our problem will be to explain how the first part of the decretal could be claimed as authoritative Augustine by the sixteenth century Anglican reformers, for whom the doctrine of eucharistic sacrifice involved was the worst of the “popish” blasphemies, and how anyone could claim the second part belonged to Augustine.

The problem is increased when we recognize, as we must, that not everyone did swallow all of it. Despite its difficulties, the text is sufficiently clear that the problems with the second part became evident very soon. The first indications were in the efforts of Alger of Liège and Guilmund of Aversa to reduce to some logical consistency what they inherited from Lanfranc. But they, like most of their successors on either side of the question, were too absorbed in the exigencies of controversy to inquire into the lineage of their sources. Then, there is the fact that Peter Abelard includes it, along with other, quite different, Augustinian texts in Sic et Non; this implicitly raises the question of how it fits. The existence of what John Jewel called “the very barbarous gloss” shows that the fit is felt to be tight. The commentator is having trouble with the notion of a self-signifying sacrament, a self-signifying body, indeed, with how, as “heavenly”, the body signifies at all. Peter Lombard makes the fact of a problem evident. As Nicholas Häring reminds us, the Master of the Sentences introduces our passage with a formula which “generally heralds a troublesome text”:

He goes on to tell us that St. Augustine was conscious of the obscurity of his own words (quia obscure dixerat), a fact which prompted him (i.e. Augustine) to say that “the bread is called the body of Christ although in
reality, it is the *sacramentum* of Christ's Body ... just as the sacramentum of faith is called faith.52

Häring draws to our attention the hero, so far as criticism is concerned, of the whole history, Gerhoh of Reipersberg, who, about 1136, wrote in a book whose title is as interesting as its contents - *Libellus de eo, quod princeps mundi huius iam iudicatus sit* or *Liber de simoniacis* i.e. *A Pamphlet on this: the prince of this world is already judged*, the following:

Since a sacrament is a visible sign of invisible grace, I dare not apply the word "sacrament" to Christ's body secret and hidden from our sight. I dare not call it a sacrament because it does not signify something sacred unless perhaps it be called sacrament by virtue of its effects as it sanctifies the worthy recipient ... For that reason, I cannot but feel amazed at the view of some masters who affirm that by Christ's body and blood - both of which are invisible, intelligible - is signified the visible and palpable body of Christ. After all, as a rule invisible things are signified by visible things rather than visible things by invisible.53

He then goes on to quote the "authority of St. Augustine which affirms this" and gives the *locus classicus* from *de Doctrina Christiana* 2.1: "A sign is a thing which beyond the specific form it impresses on the senses causes some further object to enter our cognition". (For latin text see note 47).

By the thirteenth century, a head on confrontation with difficult texts could be avoided because the movement of theology was not from text to text, as in *lectio* or exposition, but from question to question. The logical structure which theology had in the mind of the master begins to dominate. He took up texts and placed them within his questions so as both to form his question as he willed and to bring out only that aspect of the text which served the completeness and movement of theology. A vastly larger and more explicit philosophical logic also served to free the theological argument from the morass which the textual tradition in this area had become. However, despite the use of the *quaestio* in commenting on Lombard's *Sentences*, the problematic texts deriving from Lanfranc had to be dealt with somehow. Aquinas considered them in the *expositio textus* following on his theological questions in proper form, and Bonaventure similarly dealt with them in *dubia*. With the still greater freedom of his *Summa Theologiae*, St. Thomas uses the Lanfranc texts, ascribing their source to Augustine and Gregory, but only so far as they are necessary for the complete formation of the theology of the sacraments.54
Bonaventure certainly faces the contradictions squarely; it is wrong to say, he observes, that the flesh is sacrament of the flesh because nothing is a sign of itself and, if you should respond that in diverse states something can be both sign and what is signified (Lanfranc's way of thinking,) Bonaventure draws to your attention that a sign must be better known than that to which it points, so what is invisibly in the sacrament can hardly be a sign of the body visible in heaven. Again, if you should say, (as Lombard does,) that the flesh signifies flesh in the form of bread, Bonaventure observes that it is the bread which is visible and palpable. However, finally, and determinatively for Bonaventure, Augustine says that the visible flesh is signified by the invisible flesh (our text). Bonaventure answers by a demonstration that there is a double, not a single use of figurative speech; "because what belongs to the sign is attributed to the signified and what belongs to the signified is attributed to the sign."55 The key for him is what is contained in the sacrament. Thus, in the end, his solution is Lanfranc's and all the texts are saved. Bonaventure's determination is different from what we shall find in Aquinas. Paradoxically Bonaventure had proceeded from an Augustinian view of human knowing to a doctrine of the sacraments which contradicts Augustine.56 Aquinas will do the opposite.

In his Sentences commentary, Aquinas gives far less attention than does Bonaventure to addressing and reconciling all the texts. For him there seem to be contradictions in what derives from Lanfranc. In another passage of the old Archbishop of Canterbury, there is the statement that "this is and this is not the body", and the part of our text from which Bonaventure started seems to be "false" because nothing is a sign of itself. Aquinas saves it, not by anything as elaborate as a double allegory, but rather by reference to the same key as Bonaventure used: "these species [of bread and wine] with the flesh contained are called invisible flesh".57 However, in Aquinas, the definition of sacrament is not directly touched. When he takes this up in his Summa Theologiae, the changes he carried through in the structure of theological argument show their importance.

In asking "what is a sacrament?" Aquinas seeks first to determine to which genus it belongs, and inquires as to whether it belongs in the category of signs. He introduces, in objection two and the sed contra, i.e. on both sides of the question, two of the very well known statements of Augustine which define a sign as sensible and make sacraments visible signs.58 But, while acknowledging that this creates problems for sacraments insofar as they are also hidden, St. Thomas determines this article by placing sacraments in the genus of signs without stressing their sensibility. The question of the second article is "whether every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament?" Here what is essential about signs is not their sensible aspect but rather that they lead us from the known to the unknown, and what he emphasizes about sacraments is that they make men holy.59 'Thomas' use of our
The very fact that the term 'sacrament' signifies the reality which sanctifies means that it should signify the effect produced. For this notion is understood in the very concept of sanctifying cause just as sanctifying.

The fourth article of this question, "whether a sacrament is always a sensible thing", makes clear that, by this point, we have established only that a sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing in as much as through it humans are sanctified. The question of its sensibility remains unsettled. It must now be faced. For our purposes, the use of Augustine's authority here is crucial: he once again is found on both sides of the question - in objection three and in the sed contra. Moreover, the philosophical authority most important here for understanding the relevant logic is Aristotle; the determining sacred authority is Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite. The matter in the end turns not on the authority of Augustine, who is represented both as thinking that sensible things are the least of things "without which humans are able to live well", and also that sacraments involve a physical element and the coming of the divine word. These are, the two of them, genuine statements of Augustine difficult to reconcile. Thus the matter turns rather on the question of human nature. If humans have intellectual intuition, then they do not need sensible signs to lead them to the holy. On this aspect of anthropology, Augustine and his followers are at best ambiguous. As heirs of one tradition of Neoplatonism they seem to allow for an intellectual intuition independent of sensation. Dionysius is Aquinas' source for another tradition of Christian Neoplatonism affecting western mediaeval theology. For it we humans cannot come to the intelligible divine realm except through the sensible. And so, signs which would lead us must be sensible, not because signs are by nature sensible, but rather because what God would use to make us holy must be adapted to our condition. By this route we come back to affirm the genuine text of Augustine, the de Doctrina Christiana text which appeared in the first objection of the first article in this series:
And hence what are principally called signs are what are offered to the senses, as Augustine says in the second book of *On Christian Doctrine* "a sign is something which over and above the specific form which it impresses upon the senses causes some further object to enter our cognition". Intelligible effects, however, do not have the essential reason of signs unless they are made known through some sign.64

Because the invisible body is not itself sensible, it could then only be called a sacrament "in so far as it is signified through something sensible" (*quodammodo sacramenta inquantum sunt significata per aliqua sensibilia*). Augustine's definition is saved by means of an Aristotelian and Dionysian philosophical theology.

In sum, the pseudo-Augustinian *Sentences of Prosper* are not rejected as such. But their teaching is not able to overcome Augustine's genuine definitions of sign and of sacrament as visible sign. Theology has freed itself from the confused condition of the Augustinian textual tradition. The theology of the sacraments is determined by Aquinas' fundamental understanding of God and the human. Finally, the theological anthropology which provides a place for Augustine's definitions is very different from that of Augustine. It is likely that Thomas' doctrine of the sacraments also differed importantly from Augustine's; this was certainly the opinion of the sixteenth century reformers. Whether or not they were right is a question too large for us, and even more is the question as to whether Aquinas and Augustine are better or worse at the points where they differ. This, however, I think can be shown: the sixteenth century Anglican reformers were not better than their mediaeval predecessors either in discerning which texts were genuine Augustine and which texts were illegitimately fathered on him, or in their willingness to use texts polemically, tendentiously, and without care for their proper sense.65

Let us not begin with the worst but with the best. The Anglican Bishop John Jewel, the official apologist for the English Reformation,66 must have some of the praise we have given to Gerhoh of Reichersberg. In the first place, he rejects a passage from the *Decretum* of Gratian with a doctrine like ours - it derives from Paschasius rather than from Lanfranc.

These words are bastard and misbegotten, as nothing resembling either the sense nor the words of St. Augustine, but rather contrary to them both. They are alleged only by certain late writers, as namely by Gratian, by Peter Lombard, and by Algerius, as other things also be without any great choice or judgement.67
Then, having thrown this text out of the corpus of Augustine on good grounds, he prevents the subversion of Augustine's definition of a sacrament by using it to interpret Tertullian:

Here is imagined another strange kind of figures. For Christ's body itself is now become a figure... And St. Augustine saith: *Signum est quod speciem ingerit oculis*; "A sign is a thing that offereth a sight unto the eyes". Wherefore, by M. Harding's judgement, Christ's very body appeareth outwardly, and is seen in the sacrament with our corporal eyes. If so, how then is it there secretly, as he said before, and under covert? If not, how then can it be called a figure?\textsuperscript{68}

Finally, having discerned the contradiction involved in the use of figure in this way, his practice has some approximation (at least comparatively) to his understanding. Unlike other Anglican reformers of this period, he does not use the first part of "*Hoc est*" as the authoritative words of Augustine. And in one case only does he quote a version of the second half of our decretal:

Which thing may also plainly appear by St. Augustine himself in the same place. For thus he writeth: [and Jewel gives his abbreviated latin text] ... He saith, (not the form, not the shew, not the accident, but) "The bread, that is the body of Christ (not verily or indeed, but) after a manner, is called the body of Christ; whereas it is indeed a sacrament of the body of Christ ..."\textsuperscript{69}

So the text as he uses it has been changed to make it conform to his needs - he can use it as he does because he omits *caelestis* from the text. The printers had already dropped the *vere* which, in fact would have made it "verily the body of Christ"!\textsuperscript{70} Elsewhere he quotes only the gloss, which, as we have noted, he calls "very barbarous" but which, at any rate, has a inherent sense closer to the sense in which he uses it and which is not of course ascribed to Augustine.\textsuperscript{71}

Before leaving Bishop Jewel with our ambiguous praise of his ambiguous position, we should note a point of agreement with Aquinas which I suspect is significant. Jewel, like Aquinas, makes Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius agree in order to strengthen the union of the sensuous and intelligible sides in Augustine.\textsuperscript{72}

What does this history of criticism of "*Hoc est*" demonstrate? First, perhaps, that there is so little criticism that calling it a history of criticism is too strong. Then, that the meaning of the text is sufficiently clear to make evident its contradiction of genuine texts of Augustine on the sacraments as sensible signs.
Again, that those who accommodate the contradictory doctrines to one another recognize the contradiction. Further, that at least from Peter Lombard forward, the authority and the sense of the text and of its sanctified author do not determine by themselves the weight they have in the formation of eucharistic doctrine. Bonaventure, after all, does accept a form of intellectual intuition for humans just where Aquinas does not. Herein lies the weight he gives it in determining the definition of sacrament. Finally, Anglican theologians supporting the reforming position in the sixteenth century look to be no better than their predecessors from the days before Renaissance learning in their judgement about and in their use of this text. But we may be able to conclude more clearly if we return to them and Wyclif to investigate how they used it.

Of the reforming Anglicans who have their works published in the Parker Society collection, beside Jewel, Thomas Cranmer, Thomas Becon and Thomas Cooper employ "Hoc est" as an authority ascribed to St. Augustine. For none of them does it form their doctrine of the sacrifice or the sacrament; indeed, it runs in the opposite direction from their teaching, nonetheless, they find in it what they need.

Thomas Cranmer declares himself exercised "in the study of scripture and divinity" from his youth and therefore able "to go alone, and do examine, judge, and weigh all such weighty matters" himself. In contrast he characterizes his opponent Bishop Gardiner as "utterly ignorant in holy scriptures and doctors ... obstinately bent to pervert the true doctrine of this holy sacrament". The Archbishop does "neither willingly go about to deceive the reader in the searching of St. Augustine, (as you use to do in every place,)" nor does he trust "man or friend herein". However, he thanks God

I am neither so arrogant nor so wilful, that I will refuse the good advice, counsel, and admonition of any man, be he man or master, friend or foe.

And indeed, when he lists the places where Augustine especially teaches that the body of Christ "is not corporally present, and corporally eaten", he displays a wide knowledge of genuine texts of the old bishop of Hippo. Nonetheless, in the debate, he is sometimes the first to introduce texts from the Decretum of Gratian, he uses both genuine and spurious texts, and he brings "Hoc est" into the argument of his own accord, not just in order to answer its use by an adversary.

When he introduces and uses both parts of "Hoc est" as an authority with the weight of Augustine behind it, i.e. as a text pro nostra sentencia (to use Wyclif’s phrase,) the Archbishop finds things which are indeed in Lanfranc’s teaching, and
thus also in the text, but the points he makes with them are other than those at which the text aims. In common with Lanfranc, Cranmer finds in "Hoc est" that there is a difference between the sacrament and what it signifies, and that the connections between sacrament or, in the case of the oblation, liturgical action, and what they signify are "a calling", "mystical", "not in real truth" or "literally", but "figuratively", "in some manner". For example, he translates them in this way, treating the gloss here as part of the decretal:

"The offering which the priest maketh, is called improperly the passion, death, or crucifying of Christ, not that it is that, but that it signifieth it" and "the heavenly sacrament which truly representeth Christ’s flesh is called Christ’s body, but improperly. And therefore is said, after a manner, but not in the truth of the thing, but in the signifying mystery: so that the sense is this, it is called the body of Christ, that is to say, signifieth".

For him, "the words of St. Augustine being so plain, that none can be more":

And this one place is sufficient at full to answer whatever you can bring of the presence of Christ in the sacrament of bread and wine. For after consecration the body and blood of Christ be in them but as figures, although in the godly receivers he is really present ...

The passages quoted here come from a point in the long debate with Bishop Gardiner where the two really work at this passage. Thomas Cranmer comes close to recognizing that the teaching here is not all the same as his own, for he acknowledges that the comparison in the first part of the decretal with the union of natures in the person of Christ does not serve his interpretation of the relation of sacrament and reality in the sacrifice of the church:

But yet this resemblance is not altogether like, as you say truly for so much; for the person of Christ consisteth so of his Godhead and manhood, that they be both in him in real presence and unity of person. But in the sacrifice it is otherwise, where neither is any such union between the sacrament and the truth of the sacrament, nor any such presence of the body of Christ.

We may be surprised that the failure (from his perspective) of the simile in the decretal does not alert him to its proper sense, especially as he has grasped, and rejected, the decretal’s real point. But in this he is one with Thomas Becon whose uses of the text are comparable to Cranmer’s. In relation to the section we are considering, Becon says:
that as the person of Christ consisteth of two natures, that is to say, of his
manhood and of his Godhead; even so the sacrament consisteth of two
natures, of the elements of bread and wine, and of the body and blood of
Christ. If the elements of bread and wine remain, if that which we see with
our eyes be bre
[205x630]ad, who then perceiveth not evidently the manifest error of
the popish transubstantiation ...

Thomas Cooper employs the decretal once where in fact he quotes the gloss
(acknowledging it as gloss). His purpose is contained within those of Archbishop
Cranmer.

So by route of what are regarded as his heirs, we return to Master John
Wyclif and his employment of this decretal which of them all magis facit pro
nostra sentencia. What did he find in it? How did it match his understanding and
his purposes?

We may begin to answer these questions by returning to the point at which
we left Thomas Cranmer and Thomas Becon: the comparison in Lanfranc
between, on the one side, the union of the sacrament and thing signified in the
sacrifice of the church and, on the other side, the union of the two natures of
Christ in his person. The aspect of Wyclif, which, with Luther, affirmed "Ego
Berengarius" and its eucharistic realism, finds here a way of affirming the
coincident presence of the substances of bread and wine and the substance of the
body and blood of Christ. As with the natures of Christ, both are wholly and
simultaneously present. There is no distinction and separation of accidents from
substance, for Wyclif the fatal distinction. In this consubstantiation, related as
with Luther to an understanding of the hypostatic union, his Platonic realism and
his eucharistic realism are united, his philosophical and theological logics are one.
A text which does so much is magnus indeed. But there is still more. As Thomas
Cranmer put it, "This one place is sufficient at full to answer whatever you can
bring...".

Recollect: Wyclif has an ambiguous relation to Berengar. He affirms
Berengar's renunciation, "Ego Berengarius", in order to lay claim to Berengar's
demand that "This is my body" be understood allegorically, figuratively. The body
of Christ is both really and also figuratively present. For Wyclif, in the second part
of "Hoc est":

this saint speaks metaphorically as also Scripture does and teaches that the
body of Christ is hidden there so that it is not seen there [in the sacrament]
with the bodily eye.
For this Platonic Augustinian, reality is not grasped corporally, sensibly, but inwardly, intellectually. The whole body of Christ is really and substantially present with the whole substance of bread and wine, but the sensible particular is also only figure, the point of departure, not the place of true substantial being. Just so "the codices, the sensible words [of Scripture do]... not possess the truth but point to it... Wyclif accordingly does not allow that the Scripture perceived by the sense is actually Scripture... this level of Scripture is only called Scripture metonymically". 88 This feature it shares with "This is my body".

Michael Tresko draws out this comparison:

There is a significant correspondence between Wyclif’s view of the Bible and his view of the eucharist. In neither case would he allow that the sensible material sign had the capacity to be the divine reality. Neither were themselves the object of veneration. In both cases their sacredness lay for Wyclif in their efficacy, their utilitas, for the transformation of the believer... It is the believer who is changed in the eucharist... There the believer becomes the body of Christ... When a Christian reads the Bible he takes on the essential qualities of Scripture. 89

In the second part of "Hoc est", Wyclif discovers a view of the sacrament which coincides with his philosophical realism and the understanding of Scripture coherent with that. Wyclif, like Bonaventure, thinks humans suited for intellectual intuition in this present life and will not be surprised that the saint who helped him to the theory of ideas would teach the view of the sacrament which coheres with it. In the theory of knowledge, in the theology of the eucharistic sacrament, and in the metaphysics of Scripture, freedom from the sensible particular is both the truth and the human goal. Probably, if Wyclif had to choose between this text and the genuine texts of Augustine on the sacrament as sensible sign, he would prefer "Hoc est". Perhaps also Lanfranc’s eucharistic doctrine as found in it is in fact a true and necessary development of Augustine’s thought. Either that or Aquinas is an authentic Augustinian and Bonaventure and Wyclif are not. In any case, given the decreal’s union for Wyclif of philosophical and theological truth, it is no wonder that he thought it magis facit pro nostra sentencia 90.

Wayne Hankey

Notes

annis post ascensionem Domini (ut dicitur Apok. XX, 2). Tempore autem huius ligacionis successerunt doctores veridici, recti loyci atque philosophi conformes fidei scripture.


4. de Eucharistia, p. 283: Iste autem Lanfrancus, licet fuerit sanctus, aliunde tamen in sua inveccione inartificiose procedit, quia sine evidencia nunc contendit, see also pp. 225 and 288 and de Apostasia, p. 194

5. de Eucharistia, p. 9: Lanfranci qui videtur fuisse unus de primis cultoribus accidentis.


7. de Eucharistia, p. 3: per multiplex testimonium Augustini quod nullum accidens potest esse sine subiecto and see pp. 5 and 133. Dziewicki, introduction to de Apostasia, p. xxi, asserts: "His doctrine of the Eucharist is an evident deduction from his Realism". This is the position also of the introduction to de Eucharistia, of Workman, op. cit., ii, pp. 30 ff.; Leff and Phillips in the articles cited in note 3 above, see it arising from Wyclif’s realism and the inconceivability of the annihilation of substance for him. M. Keen, art. cit., treats this view (p. 10) and modifies it; Wyclif was motivated in his campaign against transubstantiation "rather from the point of view of abuse than of a metaphysical system" (p. 11). Keen’s view is also that of Cato, art. cit. But no one doubts the centrality of his philosophical realism and commitment to the theory of indivisibles for his theology, as Keen makes clear at "The Influence of Wyclif", in A. Kenny, ed., Wyclif in his Times, p.

8. The two parts of the quotation are taken from Gratian's Decretum, treatise de consecratione, distinction 2, chapter 48, with the standard accompanying gloss or explanation, known, from its first words, as "Hoc est". The best present edition is by A. Friedberg in Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 1 (Lipsis, 1879 - reprint Graz, 1959) at columns 1331 and 1332. Gratian's title for the decree is Sacramentum, et res sacramenti sacrificium ecclesiae conficitur and he credits it to Augustinus in libro sentenciarum Prosperi. Wyclif's remarks at de Eucharistia, p. 224, are: Doctum est autem quod sentencia Thome sit nimis debilis in hac parte; nec dubito quia nulla nova sufficiencia subinrabit, quia non fundatur in scriptura vel maioribus doctoribus...notandum quod inter omnia decreta sanctorum istud decretum cum glossa sua magis facit pro nostra sentencia. Augustinus enim distinguens inter sacrificium et sacramenta dicit quod "sacrificium conficitur ex sacramento et re sacramenti que est corpus Christi et sanguis", ut est in ipso Christi, non quod deitas et humanitas sint partes Christi est eius quidditates, quarum utraque est totus Christus. Sic sacrificium dicit aggregative et non per via compositionis ex partibus sacramentum sensibile et corpus Christi cum sanguine. Ulterius Augustinus approbans locucionem tropicam ita scribit: "Caro Christi et quam sub forma panis opertam in sacramento accipimus... si quod caro est corporis et sanguis sanguinis sacramentum." Hic patet quod iste sanctus loquitur tropice ut scriptura et docet quod corpus Christi ibi absconditur sic quod non ibi videtur oculo corporali. Et...explanat et applicat hunc sensum expressius: "Panis", inquit, "celestis qui vere est caro Christi suo modo vocatur corpus Christi cum revera sit sacramentum corporis Christi" quod exponit anterius per hoc quod istic signatur vera caro Christi et sanguis. He then quotes the gloss to the effect that the heavenly sacrament is called the body of Christ improprie and returns to the decretal where it says that the immolation made by the priest's hands is the passion, death and crucifixion non rei veritate sed signandi misterio.

9. de Eucharistia, p. 126: stultam heresim decretistarum; also pp. 172 and 225.
10. de Eucharistia, pp. 23, 35, 163, 221, 288; de Apostasia, pp. 57, 64, 85, 109, 213 and elsewhere.

12. For this and what follows see notes 3 and 7 above, the introductory essays to the treatises cited, and Workman, op. cit. He considers ”Wyclif on the sacraments” within his chapter on ”Wyclif’s Concepts of Church and State”.

13. de Apostasia, p. vi and Kenny, Wyclif, pp. 82 and 93. The introduction to the Tractatus de Universalibus, ed. I. J. Mueller, (Oxford, 1985) and Ivan J. Mueller, ”A ‘Lost’ Summa of John Wyclif”, in Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks, eds., From Ockham to Wyclif, pp. 179-183 are useful on the structure of his works; Kenny, Wyclif, p. 45 gives the point at which his theological summa moves from speculation to the practical.

14. On this problem in relation to Aquinas, see L. Boyle, The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas, The Etienne Gilson Series 5, (Toronto, 1982). Is Thomas’ equanimity and charity in the treatment of those with whom he agrees and those with whom he differs, a result of his success in achieving theoretical freedom and appropriate form for theology?


16. In the opinion of Bouhot, ibid, pp. 125 - 7, Ratramnus did not understand the texts he quoted from Augustine (de Doctrina Christiana at chapter xxxiii and Epistola ad Bonifacium at xxxv) in his De Corpore et Sanguine Domini (ed. J.N.B. van den Brink, [Amsterdam, 1954], PL 221) as
contradicting themselves or the other fathers he cites. Nor is it necessary to regard the Fredugard to whom Paschasius writes as thinking them contradictory. But, at lines 72 - 4 (*Epistola ad Fredugardum* in Paschasius Radbertus, *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, ed. B. Paulus, CCCM 16 [Brepols, 1969], p. 147,) Paschasius asks whether "ipse... egregius doctor contra se diceret, ut recolo in sermonibus ad neophitos?" This sermon is spurious Augustine - see Augustine, *Sermones post Maurinos reperti*, in *Miscellanea Agostiniana*, vol. 1, ed. G. Morin, (Rome, 1930), pp. 18 - 20, "De Sacramentis in die paschae". Rabanus Maurus (*De Corpore et Sanguine Domini adversus Ratpertum*, PL 112 at col. 1513) is astonished at what he finds Ambrose to be reported as writing and thinks Augustine to dispute Ambrose; however, Rabanus is already dealing both with the very free handling of Ambrose by Paschasius Radbertus and with texts of Paschasius himself posing as Augustine. Heriger of Lobbes, whose treatise *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini* is incorrectly identified as written by Gerbertus (afterwards Pope Sylvester II) in PL 139, is labouring under the same problems as Rabanus but he still thinks the texts can be reconciled "si ad plenum et discrete essent intellectae", col. 179 B - D (see Bouhot, *op. cit.*, pp. 134 - 5).


18. Alger of Liège, *Liber de Sacramentis Corporis et Sanguinis Domini* (PL 180) [on which see M. Lepin, *L’idée du Sacrifice de la Messe d’après les theologiens depuis l’origine jusqu’à nos jours* (Paris, 1926), pp. 791ff.; N.M. Häring, "A Study in the Sacramentology of Alger of Liège", *Mediaeval Studies*, 20 (1958), pp. 41 - 78; Montclos, *op. cit.*, pp. 465 - 71] is the heir to the controversy both in terms of the diverse interpretations of texts and also in terms of the accumulation of pseudo texts. Significantly Alger begins with a view as to the variety in the writings of the saints on the body and blood of Christ and the errors in the tradition. He collects and tries to reconcile the *sententiae* and is an important source for Gratian and the twelfth century collections. He seems to have been influenced by Guittmund of Aversa who labours mightily in his *De Corporis et Sanguinis Christi Veritate in Eucharistia* (PL 149) to save Augustine from the interpretation of "*stulte et insipientissime Berengarii*" (1457C) and who produces a great range of Augustinian and pseudo-Augustinian texts. Much the same can be said of Durandus of Troarn’s *Liber de Corpore et Sanguine Christi contra Berengarium et eius sectatores* (PL 149). More briefly, but similarly, there is William of St. Thierry’s *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini* (PL 180) which recognized the apparent contradictions and obscurities of the fathers (359C and 360B) and gives a list of "*Diversae sententiae sanctorum patrum de corpore domini*" beginning at 362D. Hildebert of Lavardin is rather an exception with his *Brevis tractatus de sacramento altaris* (PL 171), which produces no massive compilation nor complex theory by which diversity and apparent contradiction are reconciled, but attempts to hold things together with a vague "*secundum modum tamen aliquem existendi*". Generally these theologians lead the way to the famous text books which the twelfth century produced for the rest of the mediaeval period and beyond.


22. See my God In Himself: Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae, (Oxford, 1987), pp. 19 - 35. Brevard S. Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological Reflection on the Christian Bible, (Fortress Press: Minneapolis, 1992), pp. 40 - 43 still treats Aquinas according to the early views of which Smalley later repented; but, at p. 49, he advances the argument when he notes that, while Calvin, like Aquinas, separates exegesis and theology, he does it for the opposite reason: "Thomas Aquinas wrote a Summa to encompass the whole of Christian teaching into which structure the Bible provided building blocks. In striking contrast Calvin reversed the process! The role of theology was to aid in interpreting the Bible. His
move was in the direction of dogmatics to exegesis". This contrast is enlightening and it sustains my fundamental point about the necessity of dividing the genres, but it is equally true that the fruit of philosophical and theological reflection is for Aquinas gathered back into his commentary on Scripture; see Carmelo Pandolfi, _San Tommaso filosofo nel Commento ai Salmi: Interpretazione dell’ essere nel modo "esistenziale" dell’ invocazione_, (Bologna, 1993) and Chenu, _Towards_, pp. 233 - 234 and 242.

23. For his historical schema, see note 1 above. Workman, _op cit._, ii, p. 35, note 5, indicates that Wyclif divided the history of eucharistic doctrine into three periods: the first millenium, from Berengar to Innocent III, modern doctors of the last 200 years.


26. For example at _de Apostasia_, p. 181, _de Eucharistia_, pp. 224 and 288; see Keen, "Wyclif", p. 12 and Kretzman, _art. cit._ for other philosophical positions derived from "the logic of Scripture".

27. For references see note 8 above, the text is: _Hoc est quod dicimus, quod omnibus modis approbare contendimus, sacrificium ecclesie confici duobus, duobus constare: visibili elementorum specie, et invisibili Domini nostri Jesu Christi carne et sanguine; et sacramento, et re sacramenti, id est corpore Christi, sicut persona Christi constat et conficitur ex Deo et homine, cum ipse Christus verus Deus sit et verus homo, quia omnis res illarum rerum naturam et veritatem in se continet, ex quibus conficitur. Confitetur autem sacrificium ecclesiae duobus sacramento, et re sacramenti, id est corpus Christi._ Item: 1. _Caro eius est, quam forma panis opertam in sacramento accipimus, et sanguis eius, quem sub vini specie ac sapore potamus. Caro videlicet carnis, et sanquis sacramentum sanguinis; carne et sanguine, utroque invisibili, spirituali, intelligibili, significatur corpus visibile Domini nostri Jesu Christi, et palpabile, plenum gratia omnium virtutum, et divina maiestate._ Item: 2. _Sicut ergo celestis panis, qui vere* caro Christi est, suo modo vocatur corpus Christi, cum revera sit sacramentum corporis Christi, illius videlicet, quod visible, quod palpabile, mortale in cruce est positum, vocaturque ipsa carnis inmolatio, que sacerdotis manibus fit, Christi passio, mors, crucifixio, non rei veritate, sed significanti misterio: sic sacramentum fidei, quod baptismus intelligitur, fides est._ The vere, to which I have affixed an *, is missing from the editions listed in the following note as well as from B. Rembolt, Paris, 1507 (CCCCXXXIII verso) and earlier printings. The reformers...
quote it without the *vere* and their opponents do not protest. I have found it first in a Parisian edition of 1612 which notes: *Haec eadem habentur apud Lanfrancum (ex quo citat Ivo) et apud Algerum (qui itidem ac Gratianus ex libro sententiarum Prosperi) non tamen eodem ordine collocata. Ex quibus quidem auctoribus nonnulla sunt emendata.* So it seems that later scholarship added the *vere* when it discovered the source of the text.

30. The gloss reads *Coeleste sacramentum, quod vere repraesentat corpus Christi, dicitur corpus Christi, sed improprie. Unde dictur, suo modo; sed non rei veritate, sed significante mysterio; ut sit sensus, Vocatur corpus Christi; id est, significat.*


32. "Si enim sacramenta quandam similitudinem rerum earum, quarum sunt sacramenta, non haberent, omnino non essent" as quoted *Rescriptum III*, 190 - 192; his point may be found for example at *Recreriun II*, 2437 - 2444: "Cum legas in beato Ambrosio 'similitudinem preciosi sanguinis bibis 'legas et in beato Augustino in epistola ad Bonifacium episcopum: 'si sacramenta rerum, quarum sacramenta sunt, similitudinem non haberent' (non ait: rerum, quas fuerant), tu recorditer asseris esse in sacramentis altaris similitudinem non valere ad identitatem vel equalitatem scripsisti, indigne satis tua eruditione". His point here is the same as that made by Ratramnus: there is the same likeness both before and after consecration. Other references to this passage are I, 1526 - 1528, II, 2866 - 2868 and 2870 - 2871 and "La lettre d'Adelman de Liège a Bérengar de Tours", in R.B.C. Huygens, "Textes latins du XIe au XIIe siècle", *Studi Medievali*, serie terza VIII (1967), pp. 477, 38 - 40. Berengar and his opponents thought that the treatise by Ratramnus, which formed Berengar's eucharistic views, but which he had only read in part, was by John Scot Eriugena, regarded as a heretic (see note 36, below). Berengar was convinced that if Eriugena was a heretic so indeed were Augustine, Jerome and Ambrose (see texts in Huygen's article at pp. 455 and 456 and *Rescriptum I*, pp. 42 - 44). On Berengar's partial reading of Ratramnus, see Jean de Montclos at p. 457 of Huygen's article and *Epistola Berengarii ad Ascelium* (PL 150), 66B, lines 15 - 17. The only longer quotation of Epistle 98, 9 by Berengar is in "Un testo inedito di Berengario di Tours e il concilio Romano del 1079", ed. M. Matronolo, *Orbis Romanus Biblioteca di testi medievale*, 6 (Milan, 1936), p. 119; but it extends beyond the portion cited by Ratramnus and this treatise is now regarded as by a disciple of Berengar - see Montclos, *op. cit.*, pp. 7 - 8. Indeed, many problems surround the authenticity and dating of the remains of Berengar's writings, see O. Capitani, "Status quaestionis dei falsi berengariâni: note sulla prima fase della disputa", in *Fälschungen im Mittelalter. ii: Gefälschte Rechtstexte Der bestrafte Fälscher*, M.G.H. 33, 2 (Hannover, 1988), pp. 191-215.

33. See Southern and Montclos cited in note 17 above.

34. This is a translation of Lepin, *op cit.* at p. 765; for the development, see also Häring, *art. cit.*, and Montclos, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 405 ff. The last thinks Augustine inspired the development.


38. *Ex hac autem similitudine plerumque iam ipsarum rerum nomina accipiunt, sicut ergo secundum quendam modum sacramentum corporis Christi corpus Christi est, sacramentum sanguinis Christi sanguis Christi est, ita sacramentum fidei fides est*. See note 31 above, CSEL, p. 531, lines 5 - 9.

39. Thomas Cranmer, *Writings and Disputations relative to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper*, Parker Society (Cambridge, 1844), pp. 124 - 27; Bishop Gardiner of Winchester objects: "nor St. Augustine hath no such words, but only *secundum quendam modum*, after a certain manner, whereas to put 'of speech' is an addition more than truth required of necessity" (p. 126). Cranmer replies "read the place of St. Augustine who will, and he shall find that he speaketh of the manner of speech, and that of such a manner of speech, as calleth one thing by the name of another, where it is not the very thing indeed" (p. 127). John Jewel, *The Works of John Jewel*, 4 vols, Parker Society (Cambridge, 1845 - 50), i, p. 167: has "by a certain manner of speech"; ii, p. 570; iii. pp. 471 and 602: have "after a certain manner of speech"; but at i, pp. 489 and 503, he omits "of speech". Wm. Fulke, *A Defense of the Sincere and True Translations of the Holy Scriptures into the English Tongue*, Parker Society (Cambridge, 1843), p. 270 also translates "after a certain manner" without "of speech", so E. Grindal, *A Fruitful Dialogue between Custom and Verity declaring these words of Christ: "This is my body", The Remains of Edmund Grindal*, Parker Society (Cambridge, 1843), p. 61. But Nicholas Ridley, *Treatises and Letters of Dr Nicholas Ridley*, Parker Society (Cambridge, 1843), p. 40, has "after a certain manner of speech". Ridley probably introduced Cranmer to this passage since it seems he had made him acquainted with Ratramnus who quoted it at length and with whom it entered eucharistic controversy. On Ratramnus, Ridley and Cranmer, see J.N.B. van den Brink, op. cit., pp. 100 - 102 and the introduction by J.I. Packer to *The Work of Thomas Cranmer*, The Courtenay Library of Reformation Classics 21 (Appleford, Berkshire, 1964), p xvi: "The third milestone was a change in mind about the nature of the eucharistic presence, to which he came in
1546 when 'doctor Ridley did confer with me, and by sundry persuasions and authorities of doctors drew me quite from my opinion'. In the note Packer says: 'Ridley reached his new view of the eucharistic presence through reading Ratramnus' ninth-century tract ... printed at Cologne in 1532 and Geneva in 1541 ... This seems to have been in 1545.' There is, however, nothing in Ratramnus to justify this translation, and its defect is that, for Augustine, the similitude of the thing and the sacrament is the cause of the common name, but their identity is the work of the divine Logos and is not reducible to subjective acts of signifying or naming. What separates the Reformation from Augustine and the mediaevals lies in a difference between them on the relation of subjectivity to God and objective being. We must ask if Cranmer and his companions are capable of understanding Augustine on this matter. They regard reality from another perspective; see note 41 below.

40. *et illum modum explicat Augustinus, non secundum substanciam, sed secundum significacionem. Ego autem dico hoc debere intelligi secundum quendam tropum et figuram et non secundum quendam ydemptificacionem vel naturam. de Apostasia*, p. 51.

41. A. Sage, "L'Eucharistie dans la penséde saint Augustin", *Revue des études augustiniennes*, XV (1969), pp. 209 - 40: Le "secundum quendam modum" ... n'élimine pas le réalisme de la formule ... Le corps et le sang du Christ sont "in sacramento" aussi réellement present que foi dans le baptême (p. 219). He makes the necessary point that for Augustine the subjective and objective sides are united by the Logos "incréé" (p. 218) found in Scripture and understood both there and in Augustine's Neoplatonic philosophy as living and active, running through and uniting all things. H. Chadwick, art. cit., p. 419 says: "Certainly, Augustine used much symbolist language about the eucharist... [but his] doctrine of Eucharistic presence is not merely symbolist."


43. They are explicated in Montclos, op. cit., pp. 404ff.

44. See Peter the Venerable as quoted by Montclos at p. 460, the argument from p. 441 of *Lanfranc et Bérenger*, the articles we have cited by Häring and Chadwick, and Pelikan, op. cit., pp. 202 - 204. Leithart's negative treatment of Aquinas derives in part from a failure to understand the Aristotelianism of Thomas' predecessors and the unity of theology and philosophy in this period, (art. cit., pp. 296 - 306). On "transubstantiation", see Jospeh Goering, "The Invention of Transubstantiation", *Traditio*, 46 (1991), p. 158: which offers "the tentative hypothesis that the term 'transubstantiation' was first introduced at Paris around 1140, and that Robert Pullen was its inventor". On Aquinas, see most recently the issue of *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 77, #2 (Avril, 1993) devoted to *Saint Thomas d'Aquin et l' eucharistie: Un cas exemplaire d' échanges entre philosophie et théologie* with articles by R. Imbach, E. -H. Wéber, and P. M. Gy.
45. In so interpreting Lanfranc as teaching a real eucharistic sacrifice, because of the identity of sacramentum and res sacramenti, yet a sacrifice which is also figurative and not carnal, I follow Montclos, op. cit., pp. 410 - 15 who makes the point more strongly than Chadwick, art. cit., pp. 426 - 28. Häring is useful at this point, especially in showing how Alger of Liège and Guitmund of Aversa labour to clean up the argument of Lanfranc; Chadwick also makes the point. Guitmund's treatment of the matter is given at PL 149, 1455, which is translated in part by Francis Clark, *Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Reformation*, 2nd ed. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967), p. 406. Clark's general argument about the relation between the doctrines of eucharistic presence and eucharistic sacrifice is instructive, as is his consideration of mediaeval authors (pp. 404-409). Pelikan, op. cit., pp. 184 - 204 gives a survey of the teaching and controversies concerning the real presence in this period and points to the emphasis on the sacrifice. Useful on what this means is G.H. Williams, "The Sacramental Presuppositions of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*, *Church History*, (1957), p. 265. I have some remarks in "St. Anselm and the Mediaeval Doctors", *Atonement and Sacrifice: Doctrine and Worship*, ed., G.E. Eayrs, (St. Peter's Publications, Charlottetown, 1991), pp. 54 - 57.

46. See Augustine, *In Iohannis Evangelium* 26.11 (CCSL 36, 265), Sermon 292, *Ad Infantes de Sacramento* (PL 38, 1247), *De Civitate Dei* X, 20 (CCSL 47, 294) and XXII, 10 (CCSL 48, 828) as a beginning.

47. For example, "Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cognitionem venire". *De Doctrina Christiana* II, 1, 1, (CCSL 32, 32): "A sign is something which over and above the specific form which it impresses on the senses causes some further object to enter our cognition" which is found at Lanfranc, *de Corp. et Sang.* c12, PL 150, 422 B C; Ivo, *Decretum* II, 8, PL 161, 148C, *Panormia* I, 131, PL 161, 1074 A; Alger, *de Sacr.* I, 4, PL 180, 751C; Abelard, *Sic et Non* CXVII, 112, p. 407; Gratian, *Decretum III*, de cons. II, c33 (Friedberg i, 1324); Lombard, *Sententiae* IV, 1,3 (Grottaferrata ii, p. 233); Aquinas, ST III, 60, 1, obj. 2. A similar list could be given for "Sacrificium ergo visibile invisibilis sacramentum, id est sacram signum est". *De Civitate Dei* X,5 (CCSL 47, 277): "The visible sacrifice is the sacrament, i.e. the sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice." There is an important bibliographical note at p. 232 of Volume 2 of the Grottaferrata edition of Lombard's *Sententiae* (1981) and Häring, *art. cit.*, 72 has suggestive remarks on Alger's alteration of this text. Again there is "Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma": "a sacrament is a visible form of invisible grace", which we find equally well distributed. It becomes the standard definition and derives from Augustine, *Epistola* 105, 3, 12 (CSEL 34, 604). Important references are Abelard, *Sic et Non* CXVII, 109, p. 407; Gratian *Decretum III*, de cons., 32 (Friedberg i, 1324); Lombard, *Sententiae* IV, 1,2 and IV 8,6 (Grottaferrata, ii, pp. 232 and 284). Many others could be supplied.


49. See notes 18 and 45 above; in *Sic et Non* various selections from *Liber Sententiarum* Prosperi are found in the massive Quaestio CXVII: *De sacramento altaris quod sit essentialiter ipsa veritas carnis Christi et sanguinis et contra* (pp. 379 ff.), for example number 46, p. 389
50. Jewel, i, p. 503.
51. Sententiae IV, 10, 1 (Grottaferrata ii, p. 293).
52. Häring, art. cit., p. 74.
53. Cum enim sacramentum sit visibile signum invisibilis gratiae, corpus Christi secretum et nostro visui absconditum non audeo sacramentum appellantre, quia non significat rem sacram, sed est res sacra, nisi forte ab effectu dicatur sacramentum, quia digne participantem sacrat ... Unde sententiam quorundam magistrorum affirmantium, quod carne et sanguine Christi utroque invisibili intelligibili significetur corpus Christi visibile ac palpabile, cogor ammirari, cum potius invisibilia per visibilia, quam visibilia per invisibilia soleant significari, quod etiam affirmat auctoritas beati Augustini dicentis "Signum est res ...[de Doctrina Christiana II, 1,1]" in Libelli de Lite, Imperatorum et Pontificum, saeculis XI et XII, vol. 3, Monumenta Germaniae Historica (Hannover, 1897), p. 267, lines 21ff. I have followed Häring's translation.
54. For the argument here in general, see references at notes 21 and 22 above. Aquinas uses the authority of Lanfranc disguised as Augustine at ST III, 60, 3 s.c., ST III, 75, 5 s.c., ST III, 83, 1, s.c.; at ST III, 77, 1, Lanfranc is under the cover of Gregory the Great.
55. Bonaventure, Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, vol. 4 (Quaracchi, 1889), X, 1, dubia 4, pp. 226 - 27: Item quæritur de hoc quod dicit: Caro carnis et sanguis sacramentum est sanguinis. Videtur enim male dicere, quia nihil est signum sui ipsius. Si tu dicas mihi, quod idem sub diversis statibus potest esse signum et signatum, ut caro, prout est sub sacramento, sit signum sui, proust est in caelo, quod videtur dicere littera sequens; contra: signum debet esse notius sensibus quam signatum; sed caro, prout est sub sacramento est invisibilis et impalpabilis, in caelo visibilis et palpabilis; ergo non est signum eius. Si tu dicas, sicut dicit Magister, quod caro accipitur pro signo carnis, scilicet pane; contra: species panis est visibilis et palpabilis; sed Augustinus dicit, quod carne invisibili significatur caro visibilis. Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tropologicus est sermo nec tantum uno tropo, sed duplici, quia quod est signi attribuitur signato et quod est signati attribuitur signo. Species enim panis est signum, quoniam est visibilis, sed caro interius contenta est signatum, quia est invisibilis ... quasi vellet Augustinus dicere: caro Christi visibilis et palpabilis signatur et continetur a specie panis invisibiliter et intelligibiliter.
dicendum quod carnem quae significat, nominat ipsas species quae sunt signum carnis; et hoc tropice, ut Magister dicit. Et ipsae species cum carne contenta dicuntur caro invisibilis quia sub specie illa caro Christi non videtur ...

58. ST III, 60, 1, "Quid sit sacramentum", the texts of Augustine are de Doctrina Christiana II, 1, 1 and de Civitate Dei X, 5; see note 47 above.

59. ST III, 60, 2: per nota ad ignota pervenire, ut scilicet proprie dicatur sacramentum secundum quod nunc de sacramentis loquimur, quod est signum rei sacrae inquantum est sanctificans homines. I quote Piana in the Ottawa, 1944 edition.

60. ST III, 60, 3, s.c.: quod in sacramento altaris est duplex res significata scilicet corpus Christi verum et mysticum ut Augustinus dicit in libro Sententiarum Prosperi.

61. ST III, 60, 3, ad 2: Dicendum quod sacramentum in hoc quod significat rem sanctificantem, oportet quod significet effectum, qui intelligitur in ipsa causa sanctificante prout est sanctificans. Augustinus dicit super Ioan: "Accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum".

62. ST III, 60, 4, obj. 3: res sensibiles sunt minima bona sine quibus homo recte vivere potest and s.c.: On Augustine and his followers see notes 48 and 56 above; on Dionysius, my God In Himself, pp. 48 - 52. The reference for Aquinas, "Dionysius almost always follows Aristotle", is Scriptum super Sententiiis, II, dist. 14, 1, 2, (Moos, p. 350); the most complete consideration of the reason in and for this apparently strange association is E. Booth, o.p., Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers, Cambridge Studies in medieval life and thought (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1983). The anthropological implications of the unification are underlined in de Libera, art. cit., pp. 250 - 254.

63. I regret to be unable to agree with J. I. Packer's judgement of Thomas Cranmer's method: "having studied Scripture in its 'literal' (i.e. natural, grammatical, intended) sense, letting the one text comment on another and relating each author's statements to his overall scope, as the humanists taught all the Reformers to do, and having studied patristic theology by the same method, he had come to see that what the Fathers said coincided for substance with what the Scriptures said on each point dealt with." op. cit., p. xii, see note 39 above. Nor does the evidence indicate such a method for any of the Anglican reformers' use of "Hoc est". For another comparison of the treatment of Augustine by English Catholic and Protestant scholars in this period which reaches conclusions comparable to mine see Robert Dodaro and Michael Questier, "Strategies in Jacobean Polemic: The Use and Abuse of St Augustine in English Theological Controversy", Journal of Ecclesiastical History 44,#3 (July, 1993), 432-449.

64. ST III, 60, 4, ad 1: Et inde est quod primo et principaliter dicuntur signa quae sensibus offeruntur: sicut Augustinus dicit in II de Doctrina Christiana, quod "signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cognitionem venire." Effectus autem intelligibiles non habent rationem signi nisi secundum quod sunt manifestati per aliqua signa.

65. For the sense in which his Apology was official, see The Anglican Tradition: A Handbook of Sources, ed. G. R. Evans and J. R. Wright, (SPCK/Fortress Press, 1991), pp. xv - xvi.
71. See Jewel, i, p. 503; iii, p. 500; iii, p. 602.
72. Jewel, i, p. 476; ii, p. 591; iii, p. 370. The last instance I have cited is especially curious because either the Parker Society editor nor I have been able to find the text ascribed there to Augustine.
73. Cranmer, Parker Society, i, p. 223.
74. Ibid., 283.
75. Ibid., 223.
76. Ibid., 232.
77. Ibid., 126, 268 - 69, 272, 277.
78. Ibid., 128, 277, 282.
79. Ibid., 282.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
83. The Catechism, p. 268.
86. See note 3 above and Chadwick, art. cit., pp. 416 and 443.
87. See note 8 above for text.
88. Tresko, art. cit., pp. 178 - 79 see G. Leff, "The Place of Metaphysics", pp. 219 and 224: "the metaphysical principles of Wyclif's philosophical phase are also integral to his conceptions of the Bible, the Church and the eucharist ... the belief in an eternal archetype in God as the indestructible essence of everything in the world, independently of its temporal manifestations, provided the philosophical framework for Wyclif's concepts of the Bible, the Church and the eucharist" and note 7 above.
89. Ibid., 181.
90. This paper was initially stimulated by differences with James Doull over the interpretation of Augustine and the nature of the Augustinian tradition in a seminar we taught together almost a decade ago. It has been saved from many follies by the comments of Leonard Boyle, Robert Crouse, Richard U. Smith and Michael Carreker. Its production has been the gift of June Dauphinee. I thank them all.