

Chapter Seven

Secundum rei vim vel secundum cognoscentium facultatem: Knower and known in the Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius and the Proslogion of Anselm

Wayne J. Hankey

1. Introduction

The character of subjectivity in pre-modern Christian theological and philosophical writings has been and remains a question. Partly this is owed to the anti-modern purposes of the nineteenth century revival of scholasticism in the Roman Church. In that campaign a shift from being to the subject was associated with modernity (Hankey 1998a, 141-152; Hankey 1998b, 157-188; Inglis 1998). At present we have a post-modern retrieval of the Platonic traditions which also wishes to get back beyond what it depicts as closed and totalizing modern subjectivity to a human identity which is open, living, incomplete; a human self on a journey beyond itself (Hanby 1999, 109-26; Marion, 1998, 265; Pickstock 1997: 95, 199, 114, 118, 192, 211-12, 214). In general, these revivals and rereadings set strong walls of difference between the modern and pre-modern, between Platonism and Aristotelianism and between philosophy (and thus Hellenism) and Christian theology (Hankey 1999b, 387-397; Hankey 1998a). Accounts of the relation between the knower and the object of knowledge are at the heart of these divisions and oppositions.

I will engage none of these recent enterprises here, but judge that the anti-modern and post-modern representations of the history of Western subjectivity show the need to rewrite the history of philosophy and theology in the Patristic and Mediaeval periods. We need a history freed from both anti-modern and post-modern manipulations. An account of the ways in which the subject and the object of knowing are constituted relative to each other in that history will be essential. The twentieth century recovery of Neoplatonism within the Catholic Church in reaction against Neoscholasticism has helped to move us a great distance toward that new history (Hankey 1998a; 143-161; Hankey 1998b; 182-186; Hankey 1997b, 405-416; Hankey 1999c; Hankey 2000 and Crouse 2000). A positive appreciation of the role of Neoplatonism in Patristic and Mediaeval Christianity allows us to understand how the human self in quest of salvation is the point of departure of philosophical theology in these periods, a starting point which determined how the goal was represented. This in turn enables a fuller understanding of the unity between philosophy and theology (Hankey 1999b, 407-408; Hankey 1998a; 168-173; Hankey 1997a), between the Greek and Latin Christian traditions, as well as between the Classical tradition and Islam, Judaism and Christianity both in the Hellenistic period and among the mediaevals.

As part of this drawing back together what has been polemically opposed, I examine in what follows two opposed structures of subjectivity in two *itineraria*: Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy* and Anselm's *Proslogion*, and point toward the problematic of their meeting in the twelfth century and beyond. Within these *itineraria* subjectivity may be understood, provisionally, as the substance or essence which knows and wills and which may move. A moving human subject is essential to all three, though subjectivity is not confined to the human. I will try to show something of how the subject and the object of knowing are constituted relative

to one another on these journeys and something of how the object of knowledge is created by the knower. For one of the two structures we shall consider, the ultimate subject -- defined now as that which founds the human self and is source and origin -- is above and before being, substance, knowing, choice, self-reflection and alteration. Subjectivity, as it is constructed in the Latin West by the synthesis of two opposed traditions found in but developed beyond Plotinus, holds self-reflexive knowledge and will within a prior simplicity, or, put differently and in Christian terms, contains Augustine within the pseudo-Dionysius. The fundamental structures of Christian spirituality as it is developed in the Latin West in mediaeval times are established within the Hellenic tradition.

2. Creative Contemplation

The fifth and last book of the *Consolation of Philosophy* refutes a divine determinism to which the argument of the work as a whole seemed to lead. By a formula about the relation of the subject and object of knowing, Boethius dissolves a necessity which had threatened to deconstruct his *Consolation*. Lady Philosophy declares: it is not true that all things are known "by the power and nature of the objects known. Totally the contrary, for all which is known is comprehended not according to the power of the thing itself but rather according to the capability of those who know it." (Boethius 1973, 5.4; pp. 408-10, lines 72-77: ... *omnia quae quisque novit ex ipsorum tantum vi atque natura cognosci aestimat quae scitur; quod totum contra est. Omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem*).

This formula by which subjectivity is centralized, and by which the proper differentiation of its forms becomes essential, had a two hundred year history before Boethius (c. 480-525) used it. Its likely source is the commentary of Ammonius (died c. 526) on the *De Interpretatione* of Aristotle, a book on which Boethius also commented twice. There, Ammonius, like Boethius in his second Commentary and in the *Consolation*, is attempting to argue against the notion that divine foreknowledge abolishes the contingent. By protecting contingency both authors aim to maintain the efficacy of prayer. Ammonius solves the problem by a position which he ascribes to Iamblichus (died c. 330): "knowledge is intermediate between the knower and the known, since it is the activity of the knower concerning the known" (Ammonius 1998 9 135.14; p. 98).

Despite ascribing it to Iamblichus, Ammonius would also certainly have known the doctrine from his teacher, Proclus (410-85), in whose works it occurs in several contexts. In common with Ammonius and Boethius, in those contexts where Proclus is treating Providence, the doctrine serves to dissolve a determinism seemingly required by divine knowledge of the future; contingency is saved for the sake of human freedom (E.g. Proclus 1977-1982, 1:61-65 and 2:80-84). The ultimate source for both Ammonius and Proclus may be Porphyry (died c. 303), *Sententiae* 10, where we are told that everything is in the intellect according to the mode of intellectual substance.

From Proclus the doctrine is picked up by the Arabic *Liber de causis*, supposed in the Latin West to be a work of Aristotle until its Proclean origins were understood in the second half of the thirteenth century by William of Moerbeke and, through him, by Thomas Aquinas near the very end of his writing. For Aquinas, the doctrine is hugely important (Henle 1956, 328-333; Aquinas

1996, xxvi). It has for most of his life, the authority of Aristotle, and Aristotle is understood in such a way as to accommodate the teaching. After Aquinas knows its Proclean origins, he continues to use it with the same, if not even greater enthusiasm (See Hankey 1997a, 87-90). In the *Liber*, its context is the wider question of the knowledge by intelligences of what is above and below them and takes the form of a general assertion that, because it is a substance, every intelligence knows according to the mode of its own substance (Proposition 8 of the *Liber* and see the translation in Aquinas 1996, 60). The source for the *Liber* is the *Elements of Theology*, proposition 173, which proposition 8 of the *Liber* more or less reproduces (See Proclus 1963, p. 150, line 22-p. 152, line 7).

In the *Consolation*, "all is understood according to the power of the knower" is an assertion made as the total contrary of an error: the supposition that all knowledge derives only from the nature and power of what is known (Boethius 1973, 5.4; pp. 408-10). Boethius gives no hint here of the source of this error. In Plato and Aristotle, the emphasis is on the object of knowledge which defines and determines the powers of knowing, but it is not likely that Boethius would have been criticising either of them. In fact, the poem preceding the second rendition of the formula is explicit that he has the Stoics in mind (Boethius 1973, 5.4; pp. 412-14 and 5.6; p. 422, lines 1-5) and the deterministic destiny which rules their cosmos.

Boethius shifts from the objective to the subjective side in order to prevent confusions between diverse forms of knowing and being. Employed more radically, the doctrine has enormous consequences for the creation of the cosmos, for its structure, and for the activity by which its various intelligences are related. Noting this more radical and positive development requires us to consider also what underlies the doctrine of Boethius and Ammonius, and, indeed, what was before Porphyry, namely, the creativity of contemplation in Plotinus.

In *Ennead* 3.8.7: "On Nature and Contemplation and the One," Plotinus brings out two contrasting sides of contemplation. Both depend upon differences in the modes of being of the subject and the object of knowledge. The first considers the object as accommodated to a knower below it, the other considers the assimilation of the knower to what is above. Both are productive but we shall attend only to the first kind of productivity.

Plato's Demiurge in the *Timaeus* creates by looking to the ideas above him. In this *Ennead* Plotinus considers the making which occurs when what is higher and thus more simple is contemplated by a lower and thus less unified being. He writes: "All things come from contemplation and are contemplation ... some by sense-perception and some by knowledge or opinion." Contemplation of the One is the origin of everything beneath it; but everything else differs from the One. In itself the One neither thinks nor has being. Being is beneath the One and everything exists there by a reflection upon a cause which has a higher mode. In the movement downward from the One, eternal thinking and perceiving literally bring the One into being as Mind and Soul. This model of creation depends upon the difference between the simplicity of what is known and the knower. The higher simplicity of the known prevents its being known as it is in itself; in consequence, contemplating it brings something new into existence. Ultimately this model is a result of the exclusive simplicity of the One.

The other side of Plotinian contemplation is an upward movement, where, to quote Plotinus: "contemplation ascends from nature to soul, and from soul to intellect, and the contemplations become always more intimate and united to the contemplators, and in the soul of the good and wise man the objects known tend to become identical with the knowing subject ... [because in intellect] "thinking and being are the same." (*Ennead* 3.8.8; 3:384, lines 1-8 Armstrong). When this intellectual assimilation of thinking to being (here Plotinus is quoting Parmenides), and of subject to object is considered, we arrive at another way of uniting knower and known, opposed to that articulated by Boethius. This way, which is in Plotinus the life of *NOUS*, subordinate to the One because it remains with thought's duality of subject and object, is the way taken by Augustine (354-430) and by Anselm (1033-1109). Those like Edward Booth who see in Augustine and his followers a continuation of Aristotle's noetic divinity are not mistaken (Booth 1977-1979; Booth 1985; Booth 1989; Doull 1988, 61; Doull 1997, notes 9, 58 & 62; Hankey 1998c, 44-49; Hankey 1999a, 116). If, as with Aristotle, Augustine and Anselm we take this way where creativity is primarily the conception of a word within the thinker, the highest will have a unity which includes multiplicity.

We return, however, to the first kind of creative contemplation when we consider the pseudo-Dionysius and his heirs. The hierarchical logic and activity of spiritual reality, as described in the Dionysian *corpus*, would be impossible without the contemplation which creates by a conformity of the higher more simple objects of thought to the different, ever diminishing, levels of spiritual knowing. These gradually diminishing contemplations both constitute the angelic hierarchy and enable the purposes it serves (Hankey 1997a, 74-89). Eriugena was the first successful translator of the pseudo-Dionysius and was also the first of his heirs in the Latin West to develop the ontological consequences of his doctrine in order to construct a complete cosmic system.

Eriugena grasped the crucial point. Creative contemplation in the Iamblichan /Proclean tradition with its strong elevation of the One above being, enables the single absolute source to remain unmoved, and even beyond being, and thus both ineffable and unknown in itself, while it is multiplied as it comes into being in the diverse forms of what is other. Diverse forms of being and non-being correspond to diverse forms of knowledge and ignorance. Different perceptions will transform one and the same ultimate object into all the different, hierarchically graduated and interconnected forms of reality. To this Proclean structure, Eriugena added the Christian recentering of the cosmos around humanity understood prominently but not exclusively through Augustine. In the *Periphyseon*, human apprehension in its diverse modes actually causes the varied forms of being. Ineffable non-being, before all definition, being and multiplicity, comes into definite, varied, and perceptible being by passing dialectically, or "running through," intellect, reason, imagination and sense, faculties all contained in the human *mens*. Human *mens*, at the middle of what is and of what is not, unites all the created kinds as diverse forms of unity and division. What knows all makes all. So, "in the human everything is created" ("in homine ... universaliter creatae sunt" Eriugena 1865, 4, 8, *PL* 774A).

The doctrine that a thing is known according to the mode of the knower is found, then, in the most authoritative Latin, Arabic and Greek sources of mediaeval thought. No Latin mediaeval will follow Eriugena into everything which such a total dialectic between subject and object allows for the construction of reality. But none of the Latin disciples of Dionysius, who endure to the 17th century and beyond, will refuse some at least of its possibilities (Hankey 1998d).

However, Eriugena, first, and every Latin after him also encountered the opposed principle for relating the divine and the human associated with the pre-eminent Latin authority, Augustine. The *itinerarium* shaped by Augustinian subjectivity is clearly displayed in the *Proslogion* of Anselm.

3 The Structure of Subjectivity in the Boethian *Itinerarium*

Eriugena's *Periphyseon* is a cosmogony before it is, and in order that it might be, the saving *itinerarium* of the soul. The *homo* in which all is created is universal. In order to see how creative subjectivity works in the journey of an individual to salvation, and in order to establish one of the elements of our comparison, we must return to the *Consolation*.

In Boethius philosophy is a way of life which brings repose and freedom (Boethius 1973, 1.4, p. 144, lines 1-4: *Quisquis composito serenus aevo/ Fatum sub pedibus egit superbum/ Fortunamque tuens utramque rectus/ Invictum potuit tenere vultum*. See Hankey, 1998c, 34-35). In an explicit reiteration of the Platonic conversion of the soul, the prisoner in his cell, like the prisoner in Plato's cave, by sitting up, turning around, moving and standing erect, represents his passage through ever higher modes of knowing (Hankey 1997c, 245-47). As in the mediaeval *itineraria* which follow it, the passages from one form of cognition to another are explicitly stages in the pilgrimage of human beings on their way towards or away from God (Inglis 1998, 12, see also 241, 242, 252, and 258).

The conversion takes place by a recovery of true self-knowledge and freedom. The initial books of the *Consolation* are devoted to stripping the self and restoring its poise at its center so that it is able to turn (Hankey 1997c, 245-46). In the third and fourth books, what had been placed outside the simplified self become aspects of its interior complexity, i.e. its different and mutually related aspects. The reward and punishment of humans are in the choices they make. These choices lie within them and within their power because, in truth, they are choices between selves (Boethius 1973, 2.5, pp. 204, lines 80-89). Humans choose to live in accord either with their lower or their higher aspects. Reason, the power of mind to which choice belongs, may conform to the intellectual above it or to the sensual below it. Turning to intellect, and to the unity of the Good, which intellect knows, results in power and self-sufficiency. Turning to sense leads to subservience to the multiple objects beneath us, themselves governed by an order beyond them, and so results in fatal weakness (Boethius 1973, 2.5-7, 3 and 4, *passim*). Saving the freedom which belongs to human reason is essential both to the whole theodicy of the *Consolation* and to preserving prayer, without which there is no human access to the simple First Principle.

The conclusion of the *Consolation* is an exhortation to prayer, already discovered to be necessary and already invoked. Unless the human, defined by *ratio* (Boethius 1973, 1.6, p. 168, lines 35-6) which divides the One when knowing, can reach beyond itself by the prayer which also fulfills it, there would be no consolation. It is by this reaching, which must be at once within and beyond the human, that the human can be carried to the *intellectus* which understands the simple Good. Ultimately, the prisoner's consolation is an *itinerarium* to the changeless center, the still point of secure repose and simple intellection around which all else moves. This intellection is the perspective of Providence (Boethius 1973, 3.9, pp. 264-70; see Hankey 1997c, 246-47).

By the end of Book Four the consoling *itinerarium* has twice carried the prayerful prisoner to the Providential view by which all things are seen in the unity of the Good. First, in Book Three, having made a positive beginning from the prisoner's dream of happiness, the argument moves until all is seen in the light of the simple Good (Boethius 1973, 3.1, p. 230, lines 17-18: He will be led "Ad veram ... felicitatem, quam tuus quoque somniat animus ... "). In the penultimate Book, all is looked at from the same perspective but this time, the beginning is negative: the prisoner's unforgotten grief, the apparent existence and the apparent triumph of evil. But this twice secured result creates a problem: the vision of all things from the perspective of the Good seems to destroy the subjective freedom by which the prisoner reached his journey's end. Unless the problem is solved, the argument would deconstruct itself; the ladder marked on the dress of Lady Philosophy, of which the prisoner is finally reaching the top, would collapse.

The perspective of Providence which consoles the prisoner is that of a simple, pure and stable intelligence which governs and disposes all things. This position is beyond the alteration of choice. Since the intellect which infallibly governs all is changeless, it would seem that the order it knows and determines must be equally changeless and so totally necessitated.

There is a solution: in the final Book, the argument according to which the certainty of the divine knowledge of future events would depend upon their being necessitated by Providence, is overcome by the distinction between reason's knowing, on the one hand, which is temporal, and an eternal intellectual knowing, on the other hand. The apparent destruction of human freedom of choice occurred because human reason had imposed its mode upon the realm of Providence which can only, in fact, properly be understood intellectually. Thus, Boethius finally introduces the fundamental principle which has in fact governed the entire argument. As Aquinas, will put it, "an intelligence understands according to the mode of its own substance."

Evidently, for this principle to solve the problem, it is not enough that there should be different modes of knowledge and that they not be confused. If freedom is actually to exist in a sphere of substantial existences with their own inherent principles of motion, different kinds of reality must conform to the different modes of knowing. So, our principle about the conformity of what is known to the knower has ontological consequences. Indeed, it has two kinds of consequences and its operation has two sides.

Because a knower existing in one mode of substance conforms to a thing in a different substantial mode to the knower's mode, there is a transformation of the object in the subject. The effects of this transformation can be epistemological only or also (as most notoriously in Eriugena) the effects can be both ontological and epistemological. In the latter case, conforming something in one mode to a different mode actually causes its being in the new mode. When being *in intellectu* and *in re* are more sharply separated and truth alone is at issue, this principle requires the knower to recognise and respect the difference between the mode of the knower and the mode of the object.

The determinism in the *Consolation* was produced by confusion. Reason reduced the object known properly by the divine simple intellection to its own mode. Reason pictured eternity as if it were at the beginning of a temporal process, a process it had to determine infallibly in order to ensure the certainty of its knowing. The solution is to distinguish the modes of knowing, to purge

the structures which belong to reason and imagination from our understanding of eternity, and to recognise that, as the forms of knowing differ, so also do the realities themselves. Thus, Boethius saves his book by saving *ratio* and its reality, the reality of individual substances with their own motions. The realm of reason and of individual substances with inherent self-motion is no more to be collapsed into *intellectus* and its unity than *intellectus* is to be destroyed by being conceived according to the divided and dividing structures of *ratio*.

Ultimately, the Boethian solution requires system: system in which all the possible differences, both subjective and ontological, are developed and known. All the forms of knowing, and thus of reality, must be known and all the relations between them must pass into knowledge. Self-sufficient enjoyment of the simple Good is human happiness, but the simple Good cannot be understood adequately and possessed in itself by us. Rather the simple Good is known in what is other than it, in its difference from these lower modes of existence, in the relations by which everything from top to bottom is connected, and in the human movement between the different modes. This system the *Consolation* suggests in its portrait of Lady Philosophy. Its best image is the diverse concentric motions by which the kinds of reality and their correlative modes of apprehension are related (Boethius 1973, 1.1, p. 132, lines 8-22; 3.9 (meter), pp. 270-272; 4.6, pp. 360ff.; 5.4 & 5.5, pp. 410ff). But if this complex of inter-related and different spiritual motions brings to mind Plotinus, as developed in the line of Iamblichus, Proclus, Dionysius and Eriugena, Anselm's dialectic is rather that of Plotinus and Augustine. All else is concentrated in the knowledge of God and the soul (Hankey 1999a, 117-122).

4 Anselm's Quest and an opposed subjectivity

Anselm tells us that the *Proslogion* was undertaken because he wanted an argument for the existence and nature of God which conformed to the divine nature. He was dissatisfied with the form of the *Monologion* which he characterized as a concatenation of many arguments woven together. He wanted, instead, *unum argumentum* which by its own simplicity and self-sufficiency imaged the divine self-sufficient unity (Anselm 1946, *Prooemium*, p. 93, lines 5-7). The quest for a thinking which conforms in this way to its divine object led him to his famous proof and constitutes an *itinerarium mentis in deum*. Anselm's quest derives from what in Augustine most distinguishes him from his pagan Neoplatonic sources and even more from his contemporaries, but has good grounds in Aristotle, namely a conformity of thought's ultimate object and the human *mens* because the first principle is self-reflective (Hankey 1999a, 116-123; Crouse 2000, 42).

Anselm's quest for *one argument* in which his reasoning about God has the same form as its object brings him to a state of fatigue and despair because he is able neither to reach what he desires nor to give up the search. The object of his quest seems to belong to him and to be easily reachable, but it slips away each time he tries to grasp it. In the depth of his helpless misery, what he sought is given. Because it was sought, when given it is recognised and "eagerly embraced" (Anselm 1946, *Prooemium*, p. 93, lines 15-16). The search which led to despair, and in despair received what it sought, involved a comparison carried out by human reason between itself and its divine goal. Reason is not of itself able to pass over immediately by its own power into the divine thinking, but reason is able to know the character of the difference and to compare

itself to what is thus for it and beyond it. The difference is bridgeable because the ultimate simplicity contains difference.

The God at whom Anselm arrives is more trinitarian in the Augustinian sense than is the simple Good of Boethius. The human and divine trinitaries mirror each other. The trinitarian *unum necessarium* which is the satisfaction of Anselm's quest is able to give its very essence to the human, and the human is able finally to remain with and to be satisfied with the divine Goodness (Anselm 1946, 23-26, pp. 117-22). The end of Anselm's quest is union of the human with the absolutely First, a unity in which human reason is preserved and in which every good is found and enjoyed. Anselm's God includes in itself the divided activity and the quest which belong to reason. In consequence, the ultimate result is not a systematic development of the forms of knowledge and reality. The satisfaction of Anselm's desire does not require the production and maintenance of the differentiated cosmos. Rather, a direct dialogue between the human and the divine dominates from beginning to end. So, when Anselm was forced to give the work a title, he called it *Proslogion, id est alloquium* (Anselm 1946, Prooemium, p. 94, lines 8-13).

Throughout the *Proslogion*, Anselm's address, or exhortation, is alternatively to himself and to God. To make this evident, the first address to himself and to God in Chapter One begins with the same word, *Eia*, "Go" (Anselm 1946, 1, pp. 97-98: "Eia nunc, homuncio ... Eia nunc ergo tu, domine deus meus ..."). Significantly, when the goal of the quest is reached, there is no division between the seeker's address to himself and to God. In the last Chapter, God is asked affirm that the seeker has reached what the Lord counseled him to demand and Anselm asserts that he will go on seeking and receiving in accord with the Lord's command (Anselm 1946, 26, p. 120, lines 23-25 and p. 121, lines 19-21).

The first address (Chapter 1) is by the one who seeks to himself as other and in his otherness. He seeks rest and joy in an inner place of peace but is "exiled a long way off", weighed down by occupations, tumultuous thoughts, cares, and labours. This externalized self is identified in the first Chapter as belonging to the fallen Adam who lost and remembers bitterly a former fullness. In the next Chapter (2), he reappears as the Fool who has said "There is no God". In his various identities, this is someone who can say what neither he nor anyone can think, because of the externality of words to their meanings.

Such a one must be exhorted to turn inward toward God. God is addressed with the demand that he reveal his face hidden "in inaccessible light," (Anselm 1946, 1, p. 98, line 4) a place where he ought to be known because it is light, but where, in fact, he is inaccessible because, as we discover later, God is greater than what is able to be conceived (Anselm 1946, 15, p. 112, line 15). The work depends upon the self-division such addresses and demands, such a quest and comparison of the states of the self, such a difference between ought and is reveals, requires and intensifies.

Though Anselm begins with an exhortation to search, the fundamental problem is that he must search. But search is inescapable for the believer. Faith by its nature, distinguished as it is from vision, *intellectus*, and possession compels search. Continuing the quest, which requires acknowledged loss, involves both the intensification of the self-division, and also the intensification of its accompanying sense of loss. Both intensifications are essential for attaining

the object of the quest and thus healing the divided self. To resolve the dilemma which the search entails, the questing, reasoning and choosing self must be embraced, what is negative in desire must be overcome. So the seeker prays that God will accept his labours and strivings, will reveal Himself to seeking (Anselm 1946, 1, p. 100, lines 8-12).

Intensified quest leads again and again to the despair whose structure is exhibited in the *Prooemium*. In Chapter One the kinds of self-alienation are elaborated. There are the problems implied by search and desire themselves and those involved in not being able to see what is everywhere. Problems arise also from the incapacity to know the Cause for and by which we are made and from the willful loss of what was fully possessed. The human will which seeks seems itself to be evil. "I reached out for God and I fell upon my own self" (Anselm 1946, 1, p. 99, lines 11-12).

The problems have, however, correlative solutions. While the inadequacy of faith to its object compels the search for vision, understanding and possession, faith is also the way beyond the loss it both makes evident and creates. The self can remember what it lost and who it was because it remains an image of the Creator even if a darkened one: "You have created me in your own image so that I remember you I know you and I love you" (Anselm 1946, 1, p. 100, lines 12-13). The trinitarian soul is itself the basis for union with its trinitarian source and contains the means of recognizing what it seeks and willing what it has lost. The unknown Cause can remake what it has made and the remaking and renovation are in and through the one who suffered the loss.

The solution is in the relation between two selves, or more correctly between two aspects of the self which reason compares. Comparison is the very heart of this work. Its famous proof of God's existence, the name of God on which the proof depends and the demonstration of the divine nature and attributes, all make this clear. The proof depends upon comparing two ways of existing: what is *in intellect only* and what is both *in intellect* and *in reality* (Anselm 1946, 2, p. 101, lines 13-18). The name reaches to what is *maius*. The demonstration depends on a comparison which attributes to God *whatever it is better to be than not to be* (Anselm 1946, 5, p. 104, line 9).

It is in the course of showing what God is (Anselm 1946, 5, p. 104, line 11: "Quid igitur es, domine deus, quo nil maius valet cogitari" that both the intensification of the self-division, and also the intensification of its accompanying sense of loss occur so as to lead to solution. These intensifications result from comparisons, comparisons consequent upon the quest to know God's existence by a single argument depending on no other. These are comparisons consequent upon the quest to know God's nature by same formula through which God's existence has just been demonstrated. The formula requires comparing thoughts with one another. But these are thoughts about a being in which thought and existence cannot be separated. Further, being is hierarchically graded. Objects of knowledge are more or less true in virtue of their degree of being, and are more or less knowable or beyond knowledge because of their degree of being. Finally, and crucially, the knower ought to know the divine and would if he had not forsaken his true self. On this account, and because knowledge is equivalent to enjoyment, and because the knower acquires its being and its well being from the divine object of knowledge, there is a direct correlation between the state of the knower and the degree to which the divine is grasped

or lost. Failure or success in the knowledge of God determines the knower's ontological status and moral worth.

What kind of human subject do we have here? Anselm's human subject is inherited by him from Augustine. We may call it concrete, in comparison with the stripped down Plotinian subject founded in the One, a subject so abstract as to cause the post-Iamblichian reaction against it. In contrast for Anselm the whole human self demands satisfaction. In Chapter One, the lost fullness *ructabat saturatite*. Anselm never surrenders his demand that even the sensual in the human be satisfied in the single Good. All goods must somehow be found in that Good, just as even the divided, questing, varying activity of reason must take us there.

This concreteness adds to what is at stake in the quest. Everything is at stake. In coming to know, and thus to enjoy the divine object of the quest, we are either fully satisfied and fully ourselves, or utterly lost and empty. In consequence each experienced failure to know and enjoy what God is produces a crisis, and each crisis is worse, until we finally come to a principle by which the ever growing distance between knower and known can be bridged.

The first of these crises, reiterating in form the crisis described in the *Prooemium* is in the middle of the work at Chapter Fifteen, showing that God is greater than can be conceived. Chapter Five began the demonstration of God's nature and attributes: "That than which nothing greater can be conceived" is the greater or better which lacks no good. Attributes are ascribed to God so understood in the chapters from Six to Fourteen so that God has perception without being a body, omnipotence without being able to do everything. God has compassion and is also passionlessness, just and merciful, and all these contradictory things without self-contradiction.

But, in every case, God is discovered to have all these qualities in a way opposite to the way in which humans have them: "according to your nature, not according to ours" (Anselm, 1946, 10, p. 109, line 2). Because of the difference between our mode of being and God's, the more God is known, the more distant he becomes and the less he is knowable by us. This contradiction between our way of being and God's is developed more intensely when, first, the difference between the way in which God has qualities and the way creatures have them is brought out. Unlike creatures: "Whatever you are, you are through nothing other than yourself" (Anselm 1946, 12, p. 110, line 6). Next, the divine spiritual substance is located relative to other spiritual beings: God alone "is, as a whole, at the same time, everywhere" (Anselm 1946, 13, p. 110, line 22). Since Anselm supposes that he knows God best as imaged in his own soul, these reflections bring him to ask "How and Why God is seen and not seen by those seeking him" (Anselm 1946, 14, p. 111, line 7).

There, midway in his *itinerarium*, Anselm asks himself the same questions he asked at the beginning, i.e. whether he has found what he sought and why he does not perceive what is in its entirety everywhere. God has become yet more distant and is still not perceived (Anselm 1946, 14, p. 111, line 14: *non te sentit*.) Increased light has brought increased darkness. Because God's illuminating light is the principle of human reason, the knowledge that God is hid in inaccessible light undermines the basis of human knowing (Anselm 1946, 14, p. 112, lines 5-6ff.) Attending to that basis, the knower is pushed deeper into ignorance and from his consciousness of this ignorance he is moved to a mixture of despairing questions and urgent addresses to God. Learned

ignorance brings him to discover another consequence of the name of God graciously given to the faithful seeker: God is "a being greater than can be conceived." From this discovery we return to the initial paradoxes: what is everywhere is not seen. God dwells in light, but humans are incapable of seeing in it. We know just enough to grasp what is hidden and has been lost. No contradiction could be worse, yet the following chapters only increase the pain.

Every delight is in God: *harmonia, odor, sapor, lenitas, pulchritudo* (the stress on the sensible here is crucial), but in a manner unique to himself and beyond us. We are tossed about *in darkness and misery* (Anselm 1946, 17, p. 113, line 9). In Chapter Eighteen the despair has become wild: "And behold, again confusion. Behold, again grief and mourning meet him who seeks joy and gladness" (Anselm 1946, 18, p. 113, lines 18-19) This depth is, however, the point at which the argument turns.

Chapters Eighteen to Twenty-one, which consider how God contains everything, are the decisive turning. Out of this deepest despair, enfolded in darkness where he does not find what he sought but rather what he did not seek, Anselm prays. In the words of the Psalmist used at the very beginning of the work he demands to see God's face. But this time Anselm asks as well for what Boethius decisively prayed in the *Consolation*. There the prisoner sought to pass from ratiocination to intellection, from a form of knowing appropriate to the temporal, moving and divided to another which grasps the eternal, simple point around which all else moves. Like the prisoner, Anselm also wants to pass over to another way of thinking: Anselm prays to be lifted beyond himself: *Releva me de me ad te* and to have his eyes illumined "so as to intuit you" (Anselm 1946, 18, p. 114, lines 10-12). He wants God to reach across the infinite distance between them and bring him over. Nonetheless, he recognizes that he cannot know the many aspects of the divine goodness as God conceives them: *in one simultaneous intuition* (Ibid., line 17). The *Proslogion*, like the *Consolation*, goes on as if the prayer has been answered, but the answer given Anselm is different from that given Boethius in the same way in which Augustine differs from Proclus. The divine simplicity includes rather than excludes multiplicity.

In the *Prooemium*, Anselm indicated that the *Proslogion* was the result of his dissatisfaction with his own earlier argument. The move from the one kind of argument to its opposite requires that the seeker who is through another and whose reason is a passage from one thought to another should not only pass over to the simple self-sufficient fullness which is through itself, but also that he should know this simplicity by a form of thinking appropriate to it. What the *Proslogion* has reached so far is, instead, the knowledge of a greater and greater difference between the human being and knowing, on the one side, and the divine being and knowing, on the other side. Thus, everything now depends on whether what is other than God, yet existing through God, as through another, is, in fact, contained in God. Is the other (especially the human in the questing otherness which is both the cause and the continuing sign of its Fall, which quest now defines it) excluded from God's ever more recognized difference from us? Or, on the contrary, does God's self-sufficient being include what is in principle divided, and divided from it?

The answer emerges. God is simplicity itself: "you are unity itself which no understanding can divide" (Ibid., line 24). But although God is without parts, understanding his relation to the spatial and temporal is the key: "You are not in place or time but all things exist in thee." "You fill and embrace all things." The divine eternity has been separated from the temporal so

completely that the temporal can be restored to it. The divine eternity contains (*continet*) all times, just as God is in all things but is not divided into parts in the way that spatial things are (Anselm 1946, 20, p. 115, lines 9-10: *omnia sint te plena et sint in te, sic tamen es sine omni spatio*). This notion of a simplicity which embraces and contains is so powerful that by Chapter Twenty-two, Anselm has completed the programme set out in the *Prooemium*. He has shown that: "Thou art nothing except the one and supreme good; thou art all-sufficient to thyself, and needest nothing; and art he whom all things need for their existence and well-being" (Anselm 1946, 22, p. 117, lines 1-2: *non es nisi unum et summum bonum, tu tibi omnia sufficiens, nullo indigens, quo omnia indigent ut sint, et ut bene sint.*) This unique good can be the *unum necessarium*, because God contains rather than excludes all else in his perfection.

In Chapter Twenty-three the Trinity is introduced as this totally inclusive *unum necessarium*. As Trinity God is goodness multiplied as three equal substances. And, this does not break but rather shows the strength of the divine simplicity. "You are simple in such a way that from you nothing is able to be born of you which is other than what you are." Anselm exhorts himself to rise to the contemplation of this one thing needful. This simplicity is the all inclusive good which satisfies all desire: "This is that one thing necessary, in which is every good, indeed, which is every good, and a single entire good and the only good" (Anselm 1946, 23, p. 117, lines 20-22: *Porro hoc est illud unum necessarium, in quo est omne bonum, immo quod est omne et unum et totum et solum bonum*; see Luke 10.42.) Not multiplied, God includes otherness in his very simplicity, every good in his simple goodness, and thus, the quest of reason in the knowledge of his simplicity. Contemplation of this inclusive simplicity is a union which confers on the knower a mode of knowledge like that of the object known.

In consequence, the last chapters return to the quest for the enjoyment of God but with confidence because God is now known as simple but inclusive goodness. Nonetheless, because we still do not possess all our good directly in this good, it is not evident that the Trinity satisfies the quest as it was defined at the beginning. What is the character of Anselm's final solution?

Anselm makes clear that the complete enjoyment of all the good in the Divine simplicity, though in principle possible and indeed required from both the divine and the human sides, will necessitate a change in our mode of being. For the proper knowledge and enjoyment of God in himself we must pass from time to eternity. Nonetheless, and this essential is repeated in several forms, we are included in that other which is the only good and our good. For example, knowledge will satisfy every desire which the senses have. Further, our love for ourselves and our neighbour will be included in our love of God: "for they love him, and themselves, and one another, through him, and he, himself and them, through himself" (Anselm 1946, 25, p. 119, lines 6-7: *quia illi illum et se et invicem per illum, et ille se et illos per seipsum [diligent]*). In virtue of having the divine will, humans shall have the omnipotence which formerly divided the human and the divine (Anselm 1946, 7; and c. 25, p. 119, lines 8-9). Indeed, time itself and its process are included in our possession of that truly infinite good. Though we cannot possess it now, in virtue of being directed toward that good, we can make progress from day to day until we come to the fullness (Anselm 1946, 26, p. 121, lines 14-16: *Et si non possum in hac vita ad plenum, vel proficiam in dies usque dum veniat illud ad plenum.*)

Fruitless quest has become growth. Desire, quest, reason's activity have become activities toward the divine. Anselm now has confidence in and can accept the divine counsel to ask in order to receive the fullness of joy which the one who asks is promised (Anselm 1946, 26, p. 121, lines 18-22.) This is the subject of the concluding Chapter as a whole. What is positive in faith has emerged. The quest for God, in despair of our own efforts, is known as the activity of the divine in us. We are in God because otherness and what is through another are in God. All this is contained in "that than which nothing greater can be thought" because in this formula what is known and grasped has essential relation to what is not and cannot be thought. Reason and intellect are held together in a comparing thought which must thus be both.

5 Augustine within Dionysius: Their Meeting in the *Itinerarium* of Bonaventure

Both the Augustinian/Anselmian and the Dionysian/Boethian logics have crucial places in the *Itinerarium* of Bonaventure. But the Dionysian or Boethian contains the Augustinian. Within a threefold ascent up the wings of a Dionysian Seraph, who finally draws us to a union described in terms taken from *The Mystical Theology* (Bonaventure 1956, 7.5), the first step is, in large measure, derived from the *De Anima* of Aristotle modified by Augustinian Illuminationism. The middle step depends upon a purely Augustinian imaging of God through the mind's remembering, knowing and loving of itself. The last stage before mystical union involves another Dionysian image, the contemplative Cherubim. For our purposes the Cherubic vision is most important. It makes clear that the Augustinian knowledge of God through self-reflexive reason is only an intermediate stage for Bonaventure and that Bonaventure's understanding of intellect is Plotinian at the point where Augustine and Anselm divide from Plotinus and his successors.

Mind directed above itself so as to describe God is imaged in two Cherubim gazing towards each other across the Mercy Seat. When they look upward across it, the one who follows Augustine names God as being and sees the unity of essence. The other follows Dionysius, names God as goodness and sees the trinity of persons. When they gaze down at the Mercy Seat, they see a paradoxical union of opposites, for which the incomprehensible union of the one and the triad in God has prepared them, namely, the union of the two natures in the one Person of the Son.

Together, the two Cherubim and the irreducible duality of their visions manifest the inescapable duality which Plotinus and his successors found to be necessary to *NOUS*, before the self passes over into the union with the One accessible only to "Intellect in love," *nous erôn*. The final Sabbath rest requires that the duality of intellect be surpassed. There mind will transcend its very self; it participates in the Crucifixion and "dies." The *itinerarium* returns from Cherubic intellect to Seraphic love, and passes by means of a unitive or loving power to a "most mystical and most secret" state (Bonaventure 1956, 7.4-5), described in a quotation from Dionysius, where teaching is silence, light is darkness, manifestation is hiddenness.

Linking this simplicity above intellect to the Boethian principle from which we began requires a further consideration of the Cherubic visions. The opposed Cherubic visions of the divine essence lead to the unification of an even greater opposition, that of the two natures in the incarnate Divine Word (Bonaventure 1956, 6.4-7). This consideration is from each of the

Cherubic visions taken separately but our interest is with the vision of the Cherub who contemplates the unity of the divine being.

This Cherub looks first at the deductive interconnection of the attributes of the essence, e.g., primary being, simplicity, eternity, perfection (Bonaventure 1956, 5.6). He passes to what is yet more admirable, the fact that in each of these attributes there is a unity of opposites: the first being is also the last, the eternal is also the present, the actual is also the immutable. Vision is carried beyond this to something worthy of even higher admiration. The thought of either of these pairs leads to the knowledge of the other. Thus, since the first does all *propter se ipsum*, it is end to itself and also last (Bonaventure 1956, 5.7). Moreover, beyond this, there are yet further considerations.

A higher contemplation looks at the unity of the two opposed sides as held together within each of the essential attributes. So, for example, Bonaventure, like Anselm, understands God's *esse* as what is both eternal and as also most present through the notion of what both encompasses everything and enters everything. But Bonaventure goes further than Anselm, he holds the two sides together in an image of what is at the same time center and circumference (Bonaventure 1956, 5.8, p. 86: *ambit et intrat, quasi simul existens earum centrum et circumferentia*). Considering how the most simple is also the greatest, another image comes to mind: What is wholly inside and also wholly outside all things "is an intelligible sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere" (Bonaventure 1956, 5.8, p. 86: *totum intra omnia et totum extra ac per hoc "est sphaera intelligibilis, cuius centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam."*) Again, gazing at the most actual which is also the most immutable, Bonaventure invokes an image through the words of the *Consolation*: what "remaining unmoved itself, gives movement to all things" (Bonaventure 1956, 5.8, p. 86: "Stabile manens moveri dat universa" see Boethius 1973, 3.9, p. 270, line 3). These coincidences of opposites within the attributes of the divine essence lead the vision of the first Cherub to contemplate the greater coincidence of opposites in the incarnate Son.

Significantly, all three of the examples in which the unity of two opposites is seen through an image require that God be understood through the Boethian picture of a center and its circles. Even if the image is transmuted according to the opposites it unites, a cosmos of moving circles with a common center is required as basic. Further, knowing these attributes is never a consideration of God apart from the created universe but rather in relation to it. Finally, beyond the endless and multiform opposing dualities, dualities both in the perspective of the knower and in what is contemplated, there remains a repose which transcends intellect. As with Nicholas of Cusa, there must be something beyond and prior to the coincidence of opposites. Bonaventure is a long way from being satisfied with Anselm's knowledge of a divine simplicity including unity and the triad of subsistences, essence and the multiple attributes. Boethius and the pseudo-Dionysius lie between them. So, in Bonaventure, different modes of seeing one and the same transcendent deity produce different objects.

The *Itinerarium* is a *progressus* through three states of mind. That *progressus* ends in our passage into the final union--the rest of the Sabbath Day. We arrive at rest and enjoyment in virtue of what we become both by taking these steps and by union with God in each of them. God is loved both in each of them and also by the movement upwards through the steps. They

are compared to the six days of the work of creation. In contrast to the final Sabbath rest, the stages of knowledge and love require human and divine work (Bonaventure 1956, 7.1, p. 96: *exercitum mentis nostrae*). Bonaventure's doctrine of grace here is the one general to pre-Reformation Augustinianism. In this movement and in each step, God's grace and human exertion operate together. Indeed, grace and work are also *graduatim*. For each of the three stages in which the knower knows God through a different kind of object, there is also a different kind of co-operation between divine grace and human knowledge and will.

The three states are, first, the relation of mind *to external bodies* below it. Its power for this is *animalitas* or *sensualitas* which knows the *vestigia* (traces) of God. The second state is mind at its own level: *intra se et in se*. This is *spiritus* which knows the image of God. The third state is mind's relation to what is *supra se*. Mind considered as this power is called *mens* which knows the likeness of God (Bonaventure 1956, 1.4). The three kinds of reality: traces, images and likenesses are hierarchically graded manifestations of the one and the same divine Trinity, ultimately beyond intellect, as the Trinity is reflected, represented and written (*reluget, repraesentatur et legitur*) by mind (Bonaventure 1882-1902d, 2.12.1, p. 230: *creatura mundi est quasi quidam liber, in quo relucet, repraesentatur et legitur Trinitas fabricatrix secundum triplicem gradum expressionis, scilicet per modum vestigii, imaginis et similitudinis ...*).

The Trinity is "reflected" when known sensually as trace. When mind uses its spiritual power to regard itself, the Trinity is "represented", because this power more adequately approximates the divine self-sufficiency. The Trinity is "written" when mind is reformed by what is above it to look above itself and by participation in the dual vision of Cherubic intellect actually become a likeness of the Trinity.

The cosmic structure here and its subjective constitution is best understood through the Boethian principle from which we began. The Augustinian and Anselmian intellectual objectivity has become a stage in a larger Neoplatonic logic developed by Iamblichus, Proclus and their successors, Christian and pagan, which contains and modifies it. This absorption is characteristic of the systems of what we call the High Middle Ages. The assimilation is compelled by the nature and limits of the two logics (See Hankey 1987, 47-54; Hankey 1992:133-42; Hankey 1995:236-39; Hankey 1997a, 74-93; Hankey 1997b, 435-38; Hankey 1997d, 252-53; Hankey 1998a, 164-72; Hankey 1998d, 159-60). If the analysis of Bonaventure (and later of Cusanus) be accepted, we may say that Augustinian *intellectus*, or Plotinian *NOUS*, is a duality which needs and seeks a higher stability. Western Christian subjectivity needs a more complete priority to difference than Augustine provides. Paradoxically, the larger Neoplatonic framework which founds human subjectivity in the *Li Non Aliud* of Cusanus permits and requires a recognition of the *poiesis* which human knowledge of its principle involves. Finally, thinking within that Neoplatonic framework also permits and requires a knowledge of human subjectivity and its principle in a complete and systematic relation to the whole cosmos whose coming into being is involved in human subjectivity. If modernity involves a Cartesian return to the Augustinian and Anselmian primacy of self-reflexive reason and ontology, the self of Bonaventure and Cusanus founded beyond these may reappear in Kant. We have at present what claim to be post-modern reassertions of Augustine and of the pseudo-Dionysius. They may or may not be genuine retrievals, but in any case, both the Latin and the Greek Patristic and Neoplatonic traditions are required for Western Christian subjectivity to understand its structure adequately.