Ratio, reason, rationalism (ideae)


Reason, as Augustine understood it, has been obscured to us by fundamental changes in the relations between reason and revelation, and between philosophy, theology and religion. There is now mutual incomprehension and indifference, division and opposition between them. In Augustine, there was, across religious divisions, a common reason in respect even to theological questions (c.Acad. 3,20,43; conf. 7; ciu.dei 8 & 10). Within the Christian religion, reason, faith and understanding were different modes of apprehending a single truth. The end of religion was to pass from faith to understanding, i.e. to intellectual vision. Reason was necessary for faith to have an object and to assist in the passage to vision (sol. 1,6,13-7,14; quant. 33,76; lib.arb. 2,2,5-6; doc.chr. 2,12,17; praed.sanct. 2,5; s. 118,1; ep. 120,3; trin. 8,5,8; 12,12,25; 14,1,3).

For Augustine, reason (ratio) characterizes the human, and it, or mind (mens), is the best part of soul (c.Acad. 1,2,5; retr. 1,1,2). It proceeds and ends by self-knowledge and the knowledge of God, which are inescapably intertwined, and include the knowledge of all else (uera rel. 39,72; conf. 7,1-2 & X; en.Ps. 41,6-8;145,5; trin. 14,12,15f.). Augustine can say that he wants to know only God and the soul (sol. 1,2,7). Participating in the divine wisdom according to the interiority essential to reason, makes the human so close to God that it is the divine image. Between God and the rational soul, nothing intervenes. Nothing is closer to the divine, nor better among creatures (quant. 34,77; diu.qu. 51,2; Gn.litt.imp. 16,60; ciu.dei 11,26; 10,2).

Reason, as that which apprehends their objects, is necessary to faith and love. Faith is moved by love to become the understanding which is the mode of
eternal fulfillment and happiness. The intellectual vision of the eternal ideas, which are the reasons of all things, brings beatitude to the human, or rational, soul. God enables this vision by the infusion of an intelligible light given so far as the purified soul adheres to the uncreated divine ideas by love (sol. 1,4-8; diu.qu. 46,1 & 3; trin. 10,5,7). The self-certainty of our existence as reasoning life remains essential to us, belonging to the nature of immortal mind, even when our being, understanding and loving are directed to God, and act in and by God’s own trinitarian life (conf. 9,10,24-25; trin. 14,14,18; 14,19,26; 14,15,25; retr. 1,2). On this account some contemporary commentators accuse Augustine of rationalism and intellectualism.

Because of the fundamental differences between our ways of thinking about reason and Augustine’s, hermeneutical problems add to the inherent difficulty of treating the notions of reason and idea used throughout Augustine’s writings as unified concepts.

**Faith and Reason:** Problems arise when we deal, as in this case, with concepts, belonging to philosophy, in the work of a thinker for whom Christianity is itself true philosophy (c.Iul. 4,14,72). For, despite this new context which Augustine, and his fellow Christians, give to reason, there is clear continuity with the non-Christian philosophical schools, a continuity both in respect to reason’s context and its conclusions. To understand ‘reason’ for Augustine, we must treat it and ‘idea’ as if they were philosophical concepts, at one and the same time belonging to the common intellectual tradition of his civilized world, requisite to thinking the content of Christian faith, and to achieving its purpose. Between him and the ancient philosophical schools, there is agreement that reason serves what we would generally recognize as personal salvation.
Augustine is one with the neoplatonic theologians on both sides of the non Christian - Christian divide when he either includes philosophy within theology, or identifies them. Augustine’s modifications to and synthesis of the elements he adopts from philosophy are inspired by his lived understanding of the divine self-communication. The dialogue between revelations and reason in the context of religiously integrated life is also characteristic of the non Christian neoplatonic theologians. Augustine agrees with the pagans about the need for saving communication from the divine, about its character, as well as about the content of what is known to be true.

He regarded what he took from the “books of the Platonists” (conf. 7,9,13f.) as an essential condition of his conversion to Christianity. He makes an explicit choice of Platonism from among the philosophical schools (c.Acad. 3,11,26; 3,17,37-18,41; 3,20,43; ciu.dei 8,2f.; 10,1), although even it cannot possess what philosophy seeks (sol. 1,4,9). His view of reason, of its relation to human being, and of the self-transcending interior knowledge by which it reaches certainty are, in a general way, Platonist. So is his view that the knowledge of the ideas or forms seen in and by the light of the Good above them is essential to wisdom and beatitude.

With the Platonic schools, Augustine is in a mutual relation, simultaneously polemical and imitative. His combination of an identification of philosophy and religious life, on the one hand, with a confidence that across religious differences there is, on the other hand, rational certainty and intellectual objectivity, is problematic for us. This combination unites him with his non Christian contemporaries and divides his concept of reason from ours.

**The ideas and God:** The relation of mind and idea in God presented difficulties for Christian orthodoxy. A problem arises when, with Plotinus, and what we call neoplatonism, the ideas, or forms, are not only represented as in the divine mind,
but also become the divine mind itself. In Plato, these intelligible structures of reality are distinct from the first principle (the Good in Republic 6,508-509) and from the maker of the sensible world (Timaeus 5,28). The demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus, makes the sensible world in accord with the already given forms which he beholds. Though Augustine’s almighty creator cannot presuppose matter and the forms in this way, the ideas or reasons of things, by which he creates, have an independence and stability like the plan of an artisan (Io.eu.tr. 1,17; uera rel. 22,42; Gn.adu.Man. 1,8,13).

For Plotinus, however, following Aristotle’s view that mind is what it thinks (de Anima 3,4,429b29-3,5), the dialectical relation of the ideas is the divine as intellectual activity (Enneads 6,1,7; 6,7,9; 5,5,1-2). He can allow this movement and multiplicity in the divine mind because the highest divinity, the One, remains absolutely simple. Augustine’s “books of the Platonists” translated into Latin included at least a few treatises of Plotinus (b.uita 1,4; ciu.dei 10,14; 10,23). Among these was Enneads 6,1, “On the three principal hypostases.” Its language is reflected in Augustine’s “Quaestio ‘de ideis” (diu.qu. 46). But Plotinus’ subordination of the divine mind, the second divine hypostasis, is not possible for Augustine.

Augustine speaks of the ideas and reasons which give form and order to creatures as contained in the divine intelligence (diu.qu. 46,2-3). Though he associates his position with Plato’s (ciu.dei 12,27), it must be distinguished both from Plato’s doctrine and from Plotinian neoplatonism. Augustine’s Middle Platonist position assumes the Aristotelian modification of Plato, because Aristotle demolished the ontological independence of his ideas or forms and made them the objects of divine thought (de Anima 3,5; Metaphysics 12,9,1074b15-1075a5).
For Augustine, and for Christian theologians generally, whose trinitarian theology requires this, the ideas belong to the eternal Word (Verbum). In the way that the Word is spoken intellectually by the Father, so that the Son is his perfect expression, the ideas are what the Word speaks. The divine trinitarian self-relation is understood to be analogous to human mental operations (on the extent and limits of the analogy see trin. 15,7f.). Equally, in and by the Word, the world is made (Gn.litt. 2,6,11-13; lo.eu.tr. 1,4-12; Gn.litt.imp. 3,6). However, as well as the eternal and uncreated reasons, forms or ideas “in” the mind of the creator, there are also more fundamental forms which are divine attributes (trin. 15,4-6). These must be identified with the divine being. In Augustine’s thought, however, there is neither complete systematic development nor perfect consistency.

**Union and Illumination:** This problem of the relation of mind and idea has another aspect when the impulse for union with the divine dominates. The mediating ideas are multiple in the single Word to the extent that the ideas concern creation and when the Word is regarded from the perspective of the creature. But, knowing as real possession requires immediate union of the divine Word and the human mind. In that unification of the divine and the human, the ideas are subordinated.

For Augustine, the perfecting moment of mind is love, and real knowing is proportionate to the love of what is known, even if we may in some sense know what we do not love (mag. 11,38; sol. 1,4-8; lib.arb. 2,12,34-13,35; trin. 8,6f.). Within a Christian trinitarian and incarnational correspondence between the divine and the human, he pushes towards its limit what was present from the beginning in the Platonic tradition. The ideas for Plato receive their intelligibility in the light of the Good, the ultimate object of desire (Republic 6,508).
Placing everything within the perspective of union with the Good is the systematizing work of the neoplatonism begun by Plotinus (Enneads 6,9,9). For him, intellectual union required moral and ascetic purity, and the aspiration and adhesion of love, from our side, as well as illumination of our interior eye from the divine above (Enneads 1,6,6-9; V,1:1-2,5 & 7; 6,9[9],9). Here Augustine self-consciously follows the Platonists (ciu.dei 8,7-8; 10,2; 11,25), and his language reflects that of Plotinus (diu.qu. 46; lo.eu.tr. 15,19-20).

For Augustine, also, illumination of the human mind by the divine intellectual light from above is essential. It can only discern its own structure and the ideas when they are seen and loved in the light of their principle. This relation to what is above altogether replaces a proposal of Plato in the Phaedo (72e) and Meno (81d-84). Plato suggested that gaining knowledge of the principles of reason is a remembering of something forgotten from a past life. Augustine definitively retracts and rejects this view (retr. 1,4,4; 1,7[8],2; trin. 12,15,24), which earlier he too seems to have considered a possible explanation. He retains, however, a view of reason which makes memory altogether essential.

Like Plotinus (Enneads 5.1; ciu.dei 10,23), Augustine holds that we must recover the knowledge of ourselves as rational, immaterial, immortal beings, and so regain the knowledge of our origin in God. Further, memory gives access to the principles of reason and to the eternal truth. Thus, even God is found there, so that his beauty is, for the converted Augustine, both an old memory and something altogether new (conf. 10,8-27; 10,35-37). The illuminating activity of the first principle is essential to the recovery of what we have forgotten (Enneads 5,3,17; ciu.dei 8,7; Gn.litt. 5,13,30; lo.eu.tr. 1,3-4; 15,19-20; b.uita 4,35; sol. 1,6,12; retr. 1,4,4). The theological problem is found in the text of Plotinus: “the light is from him [the One] and is him ... the sun is not seen by another light than its own.” Ultimately, knowledge requires union and the unmediated action of God. For Augustine, real
knowledge depends upon the right relation to God. But, he did not conform all else to this conclusion.

Descartes developed the Augustinian potentialities for unifying the divine and human minds. The encounter between the divine and human subjectivities reduces the ideas to creatures. In fact, the question of the divine-human relation already underlay the controversies, between Aristotelians and Augustinians in the high and late Middle Ages, about the character of divine illumination. From Eriugena onwards, whether the divine ideas are created is in question.

After Descartes, ontologism appears. It is associated first with Malebranche, and is condemned by the Catholic Church. Though condemnations begin as early as the late 17th century, with the placing of books on the Index, the formal condemnations of ontologism itself belong to the 19th. In that century, its lineage is traced generally to Platonism and to the Augustinian tradition. As the treatment of Augustine by Étienne Gilson (and the subsequent ones of R. H. Nash, B. Bubacz, and G. O’Daly) makes clear, these condemnations still color the view of Augustine and make difficult giving some texts their natural sense.

Put most generally, the interpretation of Augustine feared is one which would allow direct access to God by the knowledge of the ideas in the divine mind. Knowing these ideas is essential, according to Augustine, to human knowing and communication. When such knowledge of God becomes ordinary, and a step in philosophical method, the distinction of grace and nature appears to collapse. The problem here is both Augustine’s and ours.

On his part, a difficulty is present from the beginning (sol. 1,4,9) about whether knowledge is real apart from loving union with its ultimate object, the true God. Wrapped up with this is his relation to the Platonists, simultaneously dependent, and defensively polemical. When Augustine’s Christianity asserts itself polemically against his Platonism, the immediacy of the divine-human
relation inherent in his view of reason and of the effective knowledge of the ideas dominates. Then, it appears that only the Christian has knowledge of the truth which is God, because the divine will enables the true love of what knowledge seeks. The Platonists never get beyond self-frustrating imaginations and efforts which have only the power of their own unfree wills (conf. 7, ciu.dei 10; en.Ps. 140,19).

The immediate relation of the divine and human which is fundamental to the origins of modern subjectivity disposes us to divide aspects bound together in Augustine’s conflict ridden thinking. We attend alternatively to the ideas and the divine mind, not to both. In fact, reason, which is vision for Augustine, requires seeing both, though in this life we can sustain sight of neither, and God is usually the implied rather than the direct object of knowledge (lib.arb. 2,3,7-6,14; conf. 7,17,23; 12,25; ciu.dei 11,2; trin. 9,7,12; 12,14,23; 14,15,21).

**Reason:** Augustine’s philosophical sources are more than Platonic, but then the Platonism of his time was eclectic. (See Edward Booth, “St. Augustine’s ‘notitia sui,’” *Augustiniana* 29 (1979), 106; idem, “St. Augustine’s *de Trinitate* and Aristotelian and neo-Platonist Noetic,” 487-490; Brian Stock, *Augustine the Reader*, 42-74; and G. O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind*, 8-79.) So his self-consciously Platonic positions in respect to reason and the ideas are modifications of elements traceable at least to Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic patterns of thinking. He adopted them from synthetic modifications, e.g. Cicero’s, as well as from writings of the Platonic school.

Reason is established against the Skeptics in a decisive step Augustine took early (c.Acad. 3,9,19; b.uita 2,7; sol. 2,1,1; imm.an 1,1; lib.arb. 2,3,7; conf. 5,10,19, 5,14,25 & 6,11,18; trin. 15,12,21; ciu.dei 11,26). Here he follows a path which he knew Plotinus had taken (*Enneads* 5,1,1). The content of teaching about the
structure of true reality is united with what is both the perspective on, and the way into that fundamental structure, the soul. And here we find also the method, namely, recovering the understanding of our true selves and of our origin, by getting over our too great, and therefore, sinful attachment to what is in fact lower, the sensuous. With Augustine, as well as with the Plotinus, humans must move inward to pure thought. But what is reached is different. Augustine establishes a landing in reason and rational self-consciousness, where Plotinus, determinedly ascending, does not stop (Enneads 6,7,20ff.).

For Augustine, the human mind is unshakably certain of its own being at the point where, in pure self-knowing, it finds the unity of being, reason and life (or being, thinking, and willing). This self-related reason is trinitarian. It is both an inadequate (though best) image of, and also an analogous way to, the trinitarian divine first principle to whom humans must ascend (conf. 13,11,12; trin. 8ff.). Our ladder is the ideas in the divine Word. They are the changeless laws of reason above created minds which prescribe for them, as well as the reasons giving form and order to creation. Human reason is not self-sufficient and the human mind must not remain an object to itself (trin. 14,12,15; retr. 1,1,2; en.Ps. 121,6).

Augustine regards himself as learning from the Platonists to understand God and the human soul through the immateriality of reason (conf. 7,1; ciu.dei 8,5; trin. 5,1,2,5). This is contrary to the Stoic conception of the first principle. In an Aristotelian and Stoic way, but not Plato’s, he conceives that absolute first principle as self-related mind. His position is most usefully compared to alternatives in the Middle or neo Platonic schools.

Theologically, when compared to Plotinus, Augustine’s trinitarian interpenetration of remembering, understanding and loving (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), involves a flattening or telescoping of his vertically subordinated hypostases, or spiritual substances (the One, Mind, and Soul). Augustine’s
flattening was anticipated by Porphyry and by Marius Victorinus, a Christian Platonist. So, Augustine is moving with one direction of the logic inherent in neoplatonism when the vertically subordinated trinity of Plotinus becomes his horizontal trinity of equal substantial relations. Thus God is self-related being, thought and love.

Theology and anthropology move together. Plotinus’ division of the human soul into one part, always above, contemplating within the life of the divine mind, and another part, below in the sensible, also collapses in the thought of his successors (Enneads 4,3,12; 4,8,8; 5,1,11). Augustine is moving with them when breaking down this Plotinian division but his way is distinct. His place for this reduction is reason’s self-certainty in its unification of being, thought, and life.

Plotinus’ hierarchy is flattened out within the rational self-relation and certainty of a unified historical and immortal human individuality. Human reason, for Augustine, is simultaneously above and below, intellectual and historical, wisdom and science. Augustine can speak interchangeably of the human and the human mind as rational and intellectual, and designate the intellect as ratio superior. Reason is not tightly separated from intellect (intellectus), nor angelic from human cognition (lib.arb. 2,3,7; trin. 12,3,3; 14,12,16; Gn.adu.Man. 1,17,28; Gn.litt. 3,20,30; 4,32; 6,12,20-22; Io.eu.tr. 3,4; 15,19-20).

Equally, however, Augustine preserves the inherited hierarchy and subordinates reason to intellect, moving upward toward immutability and simplicity (ciu.dei 10,2; uera rel. 3,3; diu.qu. 46). Reason exists as science, which, looking to the temporal, considers what is below the soul, even if, in the temporal and mutable, it properly seeks the immaterial and eternal (trin. 12,7,10; 12,14,22-15,25; 13,1,1-2; 14,8,11; en.Ps. 135,8). Reason and science may also be opposed both to ratiocination, below them, and to intellect and wisdom, above. The point (acies) of the mind is the place of higher union.
Ratiocination (*ratiocinatio*) is the process of reason’s search, its discursive motion. Reason is mental sight or vision. In this contrast, its actuality is stressed against process. Science (*scientia*) is seeing the reality on which reason is focused (*quant. 23,53; imm.an 6,10*). But, *ratio* is characteristic of human as opposed to the angelic knowing. Angels have an intellectual vision of themselves and other creatures in the ideas in the creative divine Word. Yet, their self-knowledge in turning (*conversio*) toward God is the model for human knowing (*Gn.litt.imp. 3,7; Gn.litt. 2,9; ciu.dei 11,11-12; conf. 12,9,9*).

In the contrast with intellectual vision, the mutability of reason and the subordination of reason to intellect’s grasp of changeless divine truth, appears (*trin. 3,2,8; en.Ps. 121,6*). But, reason returns to its own. In it, the human self is bound together. Reason sees its own mutability and is aware both of its success and its failure. It discerns both the eternal and unchangeable above, and its own inferiority. The human mind judges itself, but not the superior light by which it estimates its own character and place, its truth and its error. Because mind grasps its own relation to its superior, Augustine can demonstrate to reason its dependence on the eternal truth (*lib.arb. 2,6,14; 2,12-14*). Because immaterial, mind is present to itself as a whole. It is knower and known. In consequence, being, intellect and love are commensurate and can move into one another as equals (*conf. 13,11,12; Gn.litt. 7,21,28; trin. 9,4,4f*.). The notion of reason as self-moving in a return upon itself is fundamentally Platonic and pervades Augustine’s thought (*c.Acad. 1,1,1-3; 1,8,23; 2,3,4-8; 3,19,42; ord. 1,1,3; 2,9,30-31; conf. 7,4,7; 7,10,16; 13,2,2-3,4*).

The human mind includes all the forms of knowing, and beatitude requires the transformation of faith and reason into intellectual contemplation. As wisdom (*sapientia*), mind is directed to the eternal and immutable. Intellectual knowledge, the necessary ground of communication, is possible only by the turn inward to the
rational soul itself and upward to intuition of the divine ideas, which the access to God of our inner eye (acies mentis) enables (b.uita 4,35; sol. 1,6,12; diu.qu. 46,3; trin. 9,6,11-12; 12,15,24; en.Ps. 37,22; 51,10; 121,5; lo.eu.tr. 15,19-20).

This is the remains of the unfallen higher self of Plotinus. For him and Augustine, intellectual vision requires the reaching down of the divine light by which our own rational freedom is revealed and enabled. By love, we become what we are (conf. 3,5,9; 6,4,6; 7,1,1 & 3,5; 8,8,12; 11,9,25; en.Ps. 103, s. 4,2). For Augustine, reason keeps losing its grasp on its object. This pessimism about its power is like that of Iamblichus and Proclus in opposition to Plotinus and Porphyry. He lies between these opposed neoplatonic schools.

When the soul is moved to loving union with what its acies mentis beholds (or even touches s. 117,5) in God, it is transformed. In this apprehension, the soul moves beyond thinking about itself (conf. 9,10,25; trin. 15,15,25; Enneads 6,9,7,20-21; 6,9,11,24-25). Because the final moment of Augustine’s mental triad is love, this union is reason’s proper destiny and completion. But, this union is not to be set against the self-certainty of reason. And just as the last moment of the trinitarian mind is love moving to union, so also, its first moment, and the one corresponding to being, is memoria. There, in the enduring being of the self, which memory is, Augustine finds God within himself. (conf. 10,17-27; trin. 15,21-22).

Augustine’s resurrection faith is not intelligible if all the aspects of his human individual are not finally one. The rational historical subject, moved and self-moving, and the intellectual soul, seeing when illuminated by divine truth, and the self, stripped to its barest point, so as to be united only in silent unmoving rest, are one individual. Here, as against the multiple Plotinian selves, is Augustine’s decisive contribution. Self-certain reason never departs (conf. 7,10,16; 7,3,5; trin. 14,19,26 & 15,1, 12 & 14). Augustine is still asserting it against
Skepticism even when he is speaking of the resurrection and our eternal end as contemplation.

**Intellectualism and Rationalism:** We can now reply to the charges of intellectualism and rationalism against Augustine. His account of human nature and the fulfilling human end are intellectualist. He is an heir of the Hellenic tradition which judged that intellect, even if not defining the human, is our best part. By it we participate in the divine. It ought to dominate in us. Our happiness is contemplative vision which this participation enables (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6,2,1139a33; 10,7; *Metaphysics* 12,9). Augustine stresses the union of intellect and love so that vision is possession, but this does not divide him from the philosophic tradition.

He is not, however, a rationalist, if we mean that he brought to theology a God already comprehended by human reason. He is not more guilty of this than were his neoplatonic contemporaries (see Rowan Williams and Wayne Hankey versus Karl Rahner, Vladimir Lossky, Eberhard Jüngel, John Zizioulas, and John Meyendorf). This charge assumes the Cartesian and Kantian accounts of reason and involves a polemical opposition of Augustine’s trinitarian theology to that of the Cappadocians. Both are, instead, properly illuminated by their self-conscious relation to Platonism, by a better understanding of its evolution, of the relations of unity and the triad, and of reason and revelation in the Platonic tradition. If, however, by rationalism we mean that the rational and historical individual in its self-transcending but self-conscious relation to the divine becomes the human center as against the tendencies in the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition to divide the human, Augustine is guilty of this contribution to the foundation of the western self.
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Monday, March 23, 1998