Neoplatonism and Contemporary Constructions and Deconstructions of Modern Subjectivity
a response to J. A. Doull’s “Neoplatonism and the Origins of the older Modern Philosophy”
for Situating Contemporary Freedom: A Doull Reader

Introduction: James Doull, Étienne Gilson and George Grant

Not many in Canada can be compared to James Doull as the creator of a philosophical school based in an interpretation of the whole history of Western philosophy. When one adds that his school has continued to reproduce itself for a half a century through several generations of students, that it remains central to the life of vibrant institutions, and that this power of regeneration stems from its union of a linguistically and philologically disciplined reading of texts with a total system of philosophy, Professor Doull’s accomplishment is virtually incomparable in our country. Only Étienne Gilson’s creation of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto and George Grant’s unparalleled drawing of an extraordinarily diverse and large group of Canadians into philosophical reflection on their culture and its future come to mind.

Doull and Gilson have in common that they unite textual erudition with a philosophical project and that institutions and generations of scholar disciples carried on their work. But in Canada the institutions with which Gilson is associated have failed or their scholarly work has ceased to serve his philosophical and theological enterprise. Moreover, and this is important for the essay of Doull to which I am responding, the texts and Gilson’s interpretative scheme ultimately fall away from one another because of Gilson’s opposition to Neoplatonism. While the criticism of Neoplatonism unites them, our two philosophical historians separate sharply over its place and character. Gilson opposed Neoplatonism as part of his campaign against modern idealism. In contrast, for Professor Doull, the Hegelian historian, Neoplatonism, though a necessary development, must give way so that the proper freedom of philosophy can be restored in the modern world.

Situating Platonism in relation to modernity was at least as important to the thought of George Grant as it was to that of James Doull or Étienne Gilson. Plato’s philosophy represented for Grant the union of knowledge and love which founded a contemplative relation to the cosmos against which he set the contemporary willful nihilism of the West. Placed against Heidegger’s reading of Plato (which he rejected) and Heidegger’s account of Western modernity (which he accepted), Grant’s Platonism was in a general way Neoplatonic. The Good is beyond knowledge and approached by love through ethical practice and religion. Though, like Doull, he moved from the United Church to the Anglican, their attitudes to Augustine, upon whom everything with these three thinkers turns, were profoundly opposed.

A quotation from Augustine is chiseled into the headstone of Grant’s grave, “Out of the shadows and imaginings into the truth,” nonetheless, Augustine’s identification of God with esse made him at best an ambiguous figure for Grant. He found in Eastern
Orthodoxy the continuation of the Platonic Christianity the Latin churches had betrayed by the Augustinian *filioque* and their embrace of Aristotle. Like many of those we shall consider later in this essay, he saw in Aristotle a rationalism, an absolutising of ontology and a reduction of God to cause in all of which he discerned the seeds of modernity’s evils.

In fact, Grant was a Christian Platonist and never wrote about Platonism itself. He used it and the history of philosophy generally only to paint his pictures of our present. There was no disciplined contemplation of the texts and Grant left no school of scholars to continue or engage his representation of our philosophical history. Friends and rivals, Grant and Doull were both scions of the Pictou County Presbyterian intellectual tradition which embraced modernity more fully and thought about it more critically than the Catholic and Anglican alternatives within Nova Scotia. In consequence, they divided over the relation between Plato and Hegel, about whom Grant acknowledged that he had learned much from Doull. Grant’s work is elegiac because modernity’s destructive triumph over Platonism seemed to him irresistible. In this he was close to the anti-modernism of Gilson, even if he set Plato, not existentialist and anti-Platonic Thomism, against Hegel and the modernity Doull embraces.

All three seek freedom from contemporary historicism. For Grant, Plato represents such freedom, but this is a freedom lost. For Gilson, it is attained at one moment. Alone among philosophies the existentialism Gilson found in St. Thomas was free from the vicissitudes of history. Exodus 3.14 guaranteed Thomas’ metaphysic of *esse*. Nothing philosophy or empirical science could discover could touch it. It was both metaphysical and revealed. With Doull the freedom is in the philosophies which comprehend both what precedes and comes after them: Aristotle and Hegel (and Augustine rendered philosophical by Hegel). The question before us is whether this comprehension, which is at the cost of understanding Neoplatonism through Aristotle and Augustine and understanding Augustine through Aristotle, Descartes and Hegel, extinguishes philosophical difference. Does the control over history Doull attains distort it?

James Doull’s Account of Neoplatonism

My comparisons of these three major figures in Canadian philosophy bring us to the elements of Doull’s treatment of Neoplatonism. First, as in all Doull’s writing, there is an exemplary deep and wide reading of the primary philosophical texts pondered for decades in the languages in which they were written. This is matched by an extensive knowledge of the best present day scholarship. Interpretation primarily demands that philosophy be shown to be historical and that this history be the one given it by Hegel. The Hegelian philosophy which correctly understands the history preceding it also includes as partial moments of itself the thought which succeeds. As a result, the comprehension of the past, shown to have included the totality of the logical moments, contains and determines the future and the relation of future philosophy to the past. Certainly for Doull, what follows Hegel is only worthy of being called philosophy so far
as it is written from within his system. But beyond this, Doull’s paper excludes a proper return to the pre-modern except through his Hegelian route.iv

Second, within the history which leads to Hegel’s comprehension of it, Neoplatonism is a transitional moment of subjective freedom leading to Hegel, on the one hand, who “discovered in thought a coincidence of the objective good and individual freedom”v and the restoration of that freedom in Christian form by means of what Descartes did with Augustine, on the other. In modernity “the idea is sought through a sensible world itself belonging to self-consciousness and the agreement of what is there discovered with the understanding.” In consequence, Neoplatonism is properly terminated with the advent of modern philosophy.vi

Third, Doull’s treatment of Neoplatonism is determined by its beginning and its end. Nothing more divides Doull’s history from that of the 20th century scholars whose work he uses, and from the philosophers and theologians who have retrieved Neoplatonism in our time outside or against the Hegelian perspective, than how these are understood. For Doull the principle of Neoplatonic philosophy is the One as undivided self-consciousness. Its term is Augustine identified with Descartes.

In opposition both to contemporary interpreters and to the Neoplatonists themselves, for Doull the Neoplatonic One is the heir not of Plato’s Good nor of his One Non-being but of Aristotle’s God as self-conscious Nous. The history explicates “this point of unity beyond division where the individual had contact with the ground of his freedom.”vii Doull writes: “The One as self-consciousness beyond the division of noeton and noesis and as absolute good beyond finite relations was Aristotelian and not Platonic.”viii To this we might directly contrast, for example, Emmanuel Lévinas commenting on the Enneads: “The unity of the One excludes, in effect, all multiplicity, whether it be that which takes shape already in the distinction between thinker and thought or even in the identity of the identical conceived under the guise of self-consciousness where, in the history of philosophy, one will go someday to find it.”ix

Augustine’s place in the history is equally both exceptional and altogether essential. Already found in Augustine is what the whole development of Neoplatonism seeks.x In consequence, Augustine is outside the history of Neoplatonism and is explicitly equated with Descartes.xi Moreover, Augustine’s notitia sui is seen as retrieving Aristotle and they are combined.xii For Doull “the implication of the Aristotelian divine idea has its further philosophical development in Augustine and then in the older modern philosophy.”xiii In this sense, Aristotle is both the alpha and the omega of the history and remains above it.

Fourth, Christian modernity is the permanent result of the history of philosophy and religion and neither ought to be nor is in fact escapable. However, modern freedom also needs correction which it has from Neoplatonism. Neoplatonism and modern
philosophy are to be compared as "the primacy of the negative over positive theology." These are, in effect, also two Augustinianisms. Doull writes:

the most radical difference occurs between those who saw the completion of Augustinianism in an integration with the Neoplatonism of Proclus and Dionysius and those who brought it together with Cartesianism in the seventeenth century.

In general, the postmodern Augustine is the Neoplatonic one. Doull’s assessment of this retrieval is altogether ambiguous. Everything that is problematic in his representation of Neoplatonism as Aristotelian, in his representation of modernity as terminating Neoplatonism, and what is polemical and exclusive in his relation to contemporary philosophy and theology is found in this assessment.

If, in fact, he retains the two Augustinianisms as mutually necessary and corrective of one another, we arrive at a result which may be favourably compared to that of the most sophisticated postmodern philosophies. It is true that these involve Neoplatonic turnings to negative theology, to the ethical and to religion against the Cartesian Augustine, but, as postmodern this turn depends upon and assumes modernity. Doull could with equal justice turn back toward the modern in a recognition of the continuing mutual necessity of both Augustinianisms.

If, however, Doull’s movement is to the Cartesian Augustine as exclusive successor to Proclus and Dionysius, his result is one-sidedly modern and the position from which he judges is ahistorical. Then Hegel, and Hegel exclusively, holds the Neoplatonic and the modern together and the postmodern retrievals of Neoplatonism are not a movement beyond Hegel. They are a retreat from philosophy to naturalistic immediacy. Philosophy after Hegel “has known only historical, temporal spirit.” The “logical exposition” of Augustinian ‘sapientia’ disappears and it “appears ... more as a mixture of religion and borrowed philosophical concepts than as a strict and unified science.” Confronted with this judgment, the immediate response of the historian is to establish that this description exposes that Doull does not understand what philosophy is for Augustine. For those working to understand Patristic and mediaeval Augustinianisms in their own terms, philosophy is such a mixture and Doull’s description is the other side of an anachronistic prescription.

Neoplatonism and Augustine on the Way to Modernity or a Way Beyond It

My response cannot engage the full extent of Doull’s account. I wish, however, to suggest that Doull is closer to the postmoderns who retrieve Neoplatonism in various ways than he admits himself to be. There are two ways of looking at his very negative relation to post-Hegelian philosophy and postmodern philosophy particularly. One alternative is that Doull needs them as a counter to his own one-sided positions, a one-sidedness of which he is unconscious. The other alternative, and the one to which I
tend, is that Doull’s positions are intentionally polemical when directed against post-Hegelian philosophy. If this should be the case, he would recognize that his own work also comes after Hegel’s and is postmodern. He would accept an affinity with his own contemporaries which he does not admit. The affinity would make his own position more comprehensive than he represents it as being.

Looking at the juncture between the contemporary scholarship Doull uses and his own interpretation of the phenomena involves considering, at least indirectly, all the elements of Doull’s representation of Neoplatonism I have sketched. This is because the French scholarship on which Doull relies to guide him through what is now known of Neoplatonism is, in general, associated with anti-modern or postmodern philosophical and theological projects. It depends on a strong distinction between the One-Good and Nous. It also traces a strong difference between a kataphatic and ontological tradition emerging as a possibility out of the Porphyrian interpretation of Plotinus and an apophatic and henological tradition which follows from the Iamblichian reaction against this. Thus, it does not, as Doull does, write one continuous history. It is set against erecting Augustine as the theologian through whom ancient Christianity is summed up and in which Neoplatonism has its result. So far as it turns to Augustine, it is critical of him, if he be seen as the root of modern Cartesian rationalism and its progeny. Alternatively it finds in Augustine what stands against this kind of reason.

The French scholars, philosophers and theologians who are crucially important for present day Neoplatonic study are usually working against the Hegelian philosophy as well as against the interpretations of Neoplatonism derived from it. Jacques Derrida sums up the French situation well when he writes that “we are at the dawn of a new Platonism, which is the day after the death of Hegelianism.” Their interpretations of Augustine and of the Neoplatonists, as well as their retrieval of the Greek Fathers, especially the Pseudo-Dionysius, and of the pagan Neoplatonists, are intended as the corrective of modernity. Significantly, Doull’s Hegelian opposition to postmodern Neoplatonism also occurs within contemporary French philosophy in the position of Claude Bruaire who repudiated apophatic theology.

In consequence, Doull’s account of the relation of Neoplatonism to the “older Modern philosophy” engages the great questions in contemporary philosophy and scholarship. Like those he opposes, Doull writes within a great hermeneutical circle which includes the whole of western philosophy. In responding to him we enter the same circle.

Over the last several years I have published a series of articles which are moving toward a position midway between Doull’s Hegelian account of Neoplatonism and that of the French postmoderns and their English followers. With my teacher I see a self-deceiving anti-modern polemic in the postmodern refusal to acknowledge that Augustine belongs to the origins of Latin kataphatic theology, of its elevation of being and thought into the Divine, and of the Western turn to the subject by way of self-certainty established relative to a positively knowable God. From the same attitude derives a refusal to
recognise the crucial role of skepticism in constructing pagan and Christian Neoplatonism, to find in it a decisive turn to the subject and, in that turn, the basis and necessity for philosophy as total system.\textsuperscript{xvii} Another false relation to our past, coming out of an acceptance of Heidegger’s criticism of Western onto-theology, blinds postmodern theologians and philosophers to the determination of pagan and Christian Neoplatonists to preserve the integrity of philosophical reason and the completeness of \textit{theoria}.

With our contemporaries, while the transcendence of the Good is strongly embraced, the division between the noetic and the sensible and the substantiality of the noetic are strongly rejected. Ancient Neoplatonism is radically transformed when used to squeeze out the intellectual by an immediate joining of the phenomenal and the unthinkable and when employed to sublate \textit{theoria} into a moment within an total \textit{praxis} and \textit{poiēsis}.

However, I seem to be moving outside Professor Doull’s interpretation of our history when I consider that it is equally one-sided to refuse as authentic the mediaeval and modern Augustinianisms which found in love beyond rational comprehension the consummation of intellect. If we are open to see the logical necessity in the actual historical development, we will recognise the reason in those who found in the Pseudo-Dionysius either what Augustine lacked or that by which what was unseen in kataphatic, ontological, intellectualist, and anthropomorphic developments of Augustine was disclosed.

The great \textit{summae} of the Latin West and the modern systems which succeeded them owed as much to the Pseudo-Dionysius as to Augustine, as much to Plato as to Aristotle, and as much to Proclus and the dialectic between the One non-Being and the One-Being become a dialectic of subjectivity as to the several sciences of the diverse forms of being.\textsuperscript{xxi} They are total systems as well as complete collections of sciences. Aristotle needs Plato as much for what he failed to take from his master as for that in which he exceeds him. \textit{Mutatis mutandis}, the same is true for Augustine and the Greek fathers, for Iamblichus and Porphyry, Aquinas and Bonaventure, and so on. The Pseudo-Dionysian tradition is not only important to defining Eastern Orthodoxy in its difference from the more Augustinian West. The Areopagite was even more influential in the West itself. What in Iamblichus and Proclus Doull recognises as beyond Porphyry\textsuperscript{xxii} is also beyond Augustine, and the need for it explains the persistence of Dionysius within the West at least until modernity.\textsuperscript{xxiii} If modernity should in fact be Augustinian in such a way as to require the suppression of this persistent tradition which Doull identifies with a Neoplatonic in opposition to a Cartesian Augustine, then the postmodern is not only demanded but will necessarily involve a retrieval of Neoplatonism.

In what follows I look at Neoplatonism in its relation to Aristotle and Augustinianism as these are seen in postmodern alternative accounts to what Professor Doull represents as an Hegelian history of the construction of modern subjectivity.\textsuperscript{xxiv} Whether Doull or these French and English revivers of Neoplatonism are right about what Hegel thought I do not judge. It is clear that the postmoderns are deconstructing modern subjectivity by
another account of its construction than Doull’s or at least by another evaluation of its elements than his. This requires another account of Neoplatonism than Doull’s. What emerges from looking at the two accounts together is that to save Augustine from disappearance in the necessary collapse of an abstract and one-sided modernity erected by subsuming him into what Descartes took from him, he needs once again to be reconciled with the Neoplatonism of Proclus and Dionysius. Were such a reconciliation to take place, then another history of the relation of Neoplatonism and the older Modern philosophy would be required, one which recognises and demands the persistence of what Doull in his polemical moments represents as superseded. To save modernity and Augustine we must recognise more in it and in him than a philosophy and a figure which could be set against Neoplatonism.

Modern, anti-modern and postmodern

Opposition to the modern which also assumes it has characterized philosophy since Hegel. But Hegel himself is not the least of the 19th century postmoderns. As Doull indicates, for him Descartes is the essential new beginning for philosophy so that reason might regain and expand the freedom which belongs to its ancient Greek origins. Nonetheless, our contemporary postmoderns are following in the path he traced when they retrieve the pre-modern to set the limits of modernity.

For Hegel ancient substantiality must ground and correct a Cartesian subjectivity which is as much self-deceived as it is made self-certain by its immediate givenness for experience and the Kantian transcendental subject which is as much empty and hidden as it is necessary condition. Beyond Hegel, Marx, on one side, would smash the destructive delusions of bourgeois independent individuality. The historical dialectic which had progressed to a final crisis also found something positive in earlier, more organic, forms. Nietzsche, on the other side, though he would not subordinate the hero to the group, was as concerned as any of our contemporaries to expose the fraud of bad grammar manufacturing a substantial ego. When Heidegger uncovered the progressive hiddenness of being by looking to what was before Socrates he followed a path Nietzsche had traced. Wittgenstein would turn us inside out so that there is no beginning from inner depths or substantial self-certainties. For him the depths of the self are excavated from the outside inwards. Equally, Heidegger with whom Wittgenstein acknowledged that he had something fundamental in common,

xxxv deposed the Augustinian immortal and historical, rational and sensible individual from its throne where it is established as mirror of the divine. Thrown into time and experiencing history as fatal, it longs for a unveiling of what was also before and underlies. Along side this philosophical movement, and allying itself with it where possible, the anti-modern crusade of the Catholic Church is waged.
The Catholic Anti-modern Crusade and Neoplatonism

The Christian battle against modernity is waged across the spectrum of the churches. Whatever their differences, the war is generally against the autonomy which modern philosophy claims and which it confers on individuals and secular institutions. Remembering that the limitation of philosophical reason is essential to Scholasticism, let us not forget that Protestant theology became scholastic immediately after Luther’s rupture with mediaeval Aristotelianism. During the 19th century post-revolutionary terror, while the Roman Church was retrieving Aquinas, the Protestants were reaching back to the Church Fathers.xxxvi In our time, no one embraces the postmodern more enthusiastically than the theologians. However, uniquely among Western Christians, from the beginning of its reaction against modernity, the Catholic Church attacked both rational autonomy and the modern turn to the subject simultaneously.

The 19th century revival of Thomism and mediaeval scholasticism are explicitly directed against Descartes and what follows on and from him. Being and objective realism are set against the subjective and Idealism. Aquinas is cut away from the history of philosophy and theology to which his works belong. He is represented as an Aristotelian after that came to mean the opposite of Platonist. His thought is supposed to remain within substantial being and is set in opposition to a Neoplatonism for whom the work of theology is to manifest the total system in which the simple Good above being and understanding reveals itself. Unfortunately for the ultimate success of such a characterization, what thus becomes incomprehensible or hidden are the existence of theology as systematic summa, its possibility and necessity, and the dynamic of its logic.

Transcending Hegel’s modern Neoplatonism

With the move among scholars of mediaeval philosophy beyond an exclusively Aristotelian Thomas, we find that which also separates those who call themselves postmodern, and are our immediate contemporaries, from Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein.xxxvii At our end of the 20th century, Neoplatonism is explicitly embraced to assist the overcoming of modernity. Catholic philosophers and theologians who had been and remained fellow warriors in the war against modernity but who found Thomism, as revived by Pope Leo XIII, and sometimes even Aquinas himself, to be weapons that went off in their own hands, led the way.

A survey of Neoplatonic scholarship employed for philosophy and theology in our century reveals immediately the dominant role played by Catholics. They move to situate and limit objectifying and calculating reason within the mystical. Here a crucial figure is the French Dominican André Festugièere. He was a student of the leading French historian of philosophy in the first half of the 20th century, Émile Bréhier, a notable scholar of Plotinus. Bréhier combined a positivistic disbelief in the metaphysical entities of which Plotinus spoke with an Hegelian interpretation of his thought. Neoplatonism was a transitional moment within a strictly humanistic, secular and progressive picture
of the history of philosophy as the evolution of modern freedom. In contrast, at our end of the century, as Derrida indicated, Neoplatonism now belongs to a turn away from Hegel and the modern. In the revival and reinterpretation of Neoplatonism in our time, we encounter something central to the deconstruction of the modern self. The Catholic priests who served this revival and reinterpretation also served philosophical movements beyond their own ecclesiastical world.

As Doull shows us, the Hegelian system gives absolute priority to self-conscious Nous. In such a view, the One of Plotinus and his successors must be another form of the thinking which is both for itself and for us. If thought at the end of its journey were to meet in the One what is beyond it, Plotinus would have passed from western rational freedom to mysticism and thus from philosophy to religion. This, in the account of E.R. Dodds and others, the successors of Plotinus in the Iamblichan tradition were supposed to have done. This is not Doull’s view. If, as for him, the One be self-consciousness, no move into it could take us beyond what intellect can recuperate as itself.

As in all great shifts, philosophy in our century involves a transvaluation of values. That which freedom aware of itself requires for Hegel is just what closes and entraps it for postmoderns. The conformity of subject and object belongs within the fatal history of the self-closure of subjectivity. The Cartesian logic by which being is established and given its character by the thinking for which it is an object is a trap. This trap is opened only so far as what constitutes thinking, and is the given for thinking, lies always also beyond it. The transcendence of the One-Good in respect to noetic self-consciousness gives it the power to liberate.

It is of the greatest importance, then, that the characteristic reinterpretation of Neoplatonism in our time, against which Doull revives an Hegelian account, has been to rediscover the difference between Nous and the One. We have reshaped the history of Neoplatonism so as to make the move to the ontological and noetic only one possible tradition in it. The origins and influence of that direction within Platonism have been discovered and explored. However, the greatest labour of scholarship, philosophy and theology in the 20th century has been to recover an appreciation of another Neoplatonic tradition in which the transcendence of the One is the first requirement. Entry into this other tradition is by way of the radically critical negation of thinking and by religious practice which elevates us toward what cannot be known. Recuperating this tradition in an effort to liberate the self implies more than a rejection of Hegel. Since for Neoplatonism the human self and the substantial spiritual realities conform, the return of the transcendence of the One and Good involves a deconstruction of the modern self.

Festugière against Bréhier: the recovery of Platonic mysticism

For Festugière, in his turn against Bréhier’s humanistic positivism and Hegelian Platonism, Plato was, as he had been for Plotinus and his followers, not ultimately a philosopher for whom reality was grasped in the stability of the ideas which united
thought and being. Instead, Plato was in last analysis a theologian and mystic for whom
the ultimate was the Good and the One beyond being and knowing. For Festugière
Neoplatonism was the true heir of the mystic Plato. Bréhier strongly objected to this
judgment at the heart of his student’s work.

Festugière was only one of many priest scholars who carried Catholic thought over from
what one of them called *une philosophie aristotélico-thomiste* to a Platonic unification of
spiritualité and reflection by means of everything from an new critical edition of the
Greek text of the *Enneads* and editing, translating and explaining the greatest works of
the later Neoplatonists, to rethinking the work of Augustine so as to locate him within
the history of Platonism, the retrieval of the works of the Greek Fathers (because they
were considered to be more securely within the tradition of mystical Platonism than
Augustine was), and even to locating Aquinas and his mediaeval contemporaries as
much or more within the Platonic as within the Aristotelian tradition. The general aim of
these scholar priests was to exorcise philosophy as autonomous rationality. For them
such philosophy established a scientific objectification of reality and divided the
knowledge and manipulation of the objectified universe from the religious quest.
Philosophy as autonomous reasoning might become, and had, in fact, become the basis
of an independent and ultimately atheistical secularity. George Grant would have
appreciated their analysis.

One of them must be singled out in this response because he linked the Augustinian and
the Hegelian account of subjectivity and being and connected this to the problems all
perceived with modern Western rational subjectivity. More importantly, he set against
this an alternative which he found primarily in Proclus. Thus, the French Passionist
priest Jean Trouillard posed the central questions of this essay.

**The Neoplatonic Alternatives**

Trouillard’s Neoplatonic philosophy and theology is anti-metaphysical and essentially
postmodern. Trouillard boldly proposed that philosophy and Christian theology should
turn from its Augustinian and Thomist science of God as Being, *ipsum esse subsistens*, to
God represented as the One and Good, *to hen*. Trouillard’s Procline *hénologie* stands
sharply against Hegelian interpretations of Neoplatonic texts. His negative theology and
radically critical philosophy is developed as an alternative to what he regards as the
Hegelian conclusion of the way in which Augustine developed what he took from
Plotinus. With Trouillard we arrive at a truly surprising point in the 20th century turn
away from modern subjectivity. The alternatives placed before us are two forms of
Neoplatonism. This surprising point is also the place where Professor Doull divides
from his French guides. For him both traditions belong to one philosophical movement
which leads to Augustine.

One of these is the tradition, ultimately Latin, which derives from Plotinus via Porphyry
and comes to Augustine through Marius Victorinus. This Augustinian Platonism has as
its possible or necessary result a cosmos where ontology is final. In the last analysis, Being belongs to Nous and is for self-reflective rationality. This is the Augustine who is at the foundation of modern philosophy and subjectivity in Descartes. For the subjectivity which belongs to this onto-theology, all relation to an other external to the self will become the othering of the self. For postmoderns this ontological and noetic Augustinianism is the center of Western subjectivity, that which must be deconstructed, decentered or escaped.

One contemporary alternative to this center is a different account of Augustine, a post and anti-modern account. With some important caveats, we may agree with Doull in regarding this as a Neoplatonic Augustine who was reconciled with and completed by Proclus and Dionysius in mediaeval, Renaissance and contemporary thought. For this alternative Descartes is not the heir but the betrayer of an Augustine for whom reason serves an analogical ascent toward God with whom we are united in the love of love. Reason’s inseparability from existence in our thinking is not the self-certain foundation for the grasp and manipulation of the objectified other. The unity of being, knowing and loving which makes the human mind an image of God is not realised by its modern uses but is rather debased in them. The image of God in us is not properly employed to overcome a skepticism fictitiously set up to establish rational certainty as a platform from which we can analyze and enjoy the world. Instead, the trinitarian mind is an image intended to point us to union with its archetype, a union never achieved in a comprehending knowledge but which instead eternally draws the self beyond itself in love and praxis.

So Augustine may be seen as at the origin of what in Western modernity makes it self-confident and dominating or, alternatively, the premodern Augustinian spirituality is where we might find a way within our own tradition which will carry us outside ourselves. Because he may be both, Augustine is at the center of the questions about our self-construction and deconstruction. This is why wrestling with Augustine is characteristic of postmodern philosophers and theologians from Hannah Arendt, Wittgenstein and Derrida to Jean-Luc Marion and John Milbank. This wrestling is not, however, what Trouillard contributed instead he set out a third way.

The third alternative emerging from within Neoplatonism is that which follows from Iamblichus’ rejection of Porphyry’s interpretation of Plotinus. Professor Doull agrees with our French Neoplatonic scholars that the tradition from Iamblichus guards the difference between the One and Nous and, simultaneously, requires and allows the descent of the human into the sensible realm. Though from the perspective of the scholars, of the Neoplatonists themselves, as well as of postmodern theologians and philosophers like Trouillard or Lévinas, having started with the One as Aristotelian self-consciousness simplified, Doull could never understand what Iamblichus and his heirs are about. Doull distorts by intellectualizing.
Because of its account of the One and the human self, this Iamblichan tradition demands what Doull inadequately calls “a religious interest,” i.e. a spirituality which looks outward and upward by means of liturgy, sacrament and material symbol. In order for the descended individual soul to ascend toward the ineffable One, theurgic union with the gods is required. As well as sacred material objects and rituals, theurgy needs priests who have the contact with the gods above in a way those for whom they perform these rituals do not. Thus theurgy requires hierarchy and the great teachers of later Neoplatonism are also theurgic priests. In this spiritual tradition the self is oriented to the Other which is beyond it in order to be both within it and always beyond it and mounts a hierarchical ladder toward mystical union with the divine One-Good supereminently exceeding Being.

Owing to his exclusively modern (or late mediaeval) prescriptive conception of philosophy, Doull is unable to recognise that here philosophy remains philosophy by recognizing its need for religion. Religion in this period is not an “interest” for philosophy but a necessity. Both Neoplatonic and Patristic theology (including Augustine) in this period are philosophy in a way Doull excludes. Robert Crouse makes this point in his contribution to this volume. I would modify Crouse’s language (not, I think, the substance of his position) by noting that Augustine is to be distinguished from Iamblichus, Proclus, etc. only in so far as the Greeks work out more fully what the mutual relation of philosophy and religion (Crouse’s Augustinian “hermeneutic circle”) entails, and by some features of the religions upon which philosophy depends. In fact, in the course of late antiquity Neoplatonic Hellenism and Christianity tend more and more to converge as religions. Augustine has his “completion” in Proclus and Dionysius precisely because better than his their theologies, anthropologies, understandings of religious practice and systems, make explicit what is involved in the recognition by philosophy of its need for religion. As compared with them Augustine is deficient because, like Doull, he remains too Plotinian, too intellectualist.

Pierre Hadot’s Porphyry

How Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity is understood is at the center of the questions about the character of these alternatives, and the consequences of taking them. To enter this question, we must concede, as Professor Doull does, the results of Pierre Hadot. He demonstrated that behind the trinitarian doctrine of Marius Victorinus lay Porphyry’s telescoping of the hierarchically ordered Plotinian hypostases (the One, Nous and Soul). Augustine followed and extended the crucial steps taken by Porphyry and Victorinus when he understood the persons of the divine Trinity as co-equal and interpenetrating substantial activities of being, knowing and loving. Certainly what Augustine took from Plotinus via Porphyry determined what he made of the human and the divine; he is explicit about that. Without the Platonists, Augustine would not have known that substance could be immaterial. The Augustinian self is Plotinian in this...
regard. But Augustine unifies the selves which in Plotinus are divided and he makes
equal the divine hypostases which Plotinus subordinated to the One.

For Plotinus each of us is many. With Plotinus we do not need to deconstruct the unity
of the rational self, we are before its problematic unification. This ‘before’ is part of the
attraction of Plotinus to deconstructing postmoderns. There are at least three selves in
Plotinus: (1) a thinking individual self eternally established in the divine Nous, (2) its
psychic image in time, chained to and concerned with the body, and (3) the individuality
both founded in and seeking to transcend itself in union with the One. The first self
remains always above and exists by a continual contemplation of which the historical
self is only rarely conscious. The second, the temporal image of this noetic idea, exists by
conversion toward what is established in the realm of true being. The third is the ground
of what appears in the other forms of perception but its apprehension is better described
as erotic union with the super-abundant source than as cognition. Because the self as it
exists in the One is certainly not self-reflective, these selves cannot be unified.

With Plotinus as with Augustine, the true self is immortal mind but, beyond Plotinus,
the unified Augustinian human self is simultaneously above and below, intellectual and
historical, both wisdom turned toward its archetype in God and also science,
imagination and sense turned toward the physical world. Remembering is not only that
by which the soul retrieves its knowledge of the principles above, but is also that by
which mind gathers its historical experience into its eternally established self. The
human individual is immortal and intellectual as well as historical, self-conscious and
soul. Its being is as self-related self-conscious subject. The human historical individual is
trinitarian image and placed face to face with God because mind is a circular activity of
remembering or being, self-knowing and self-loving.

Augustine did not achieve this result immediately, simply by a radical transformation of
the Plotinian hypostatic hierarchy and the plural Plotinian selves. In between, Porphyry
intervenes. As a result, reconstructing what Augustine really did and what its
consequences are is preceded by questions about the meaning of what scholarship has
identified with Porphyry. These questions become more and more momentous. There is
an increasing tendency to find the origins of Greek Christian as well as Augustinian
trinitarian theology in what is identified as Porphyry’s work. Behind the difference
between Augustine and the Pseudo-Dionysius may lie a common filiation from
Porphyry. Christian Trinitarian theology, what many would regard as what most
distinguishes Christian theologians from pagan Neoplatonists, may in fact have its most
fundamental logic in a move within Neoplatonism. The credibility of Doull’s account
depends in large part on how he locates Augustine’s teaching on the Trinity with respect
to Porphyry. In fact, as I have indicated, Doull is deeply ambiguous here because
Augustine is for him both within the history of Neoplatonism (and so is completed when
integrated with Proclus and Dionysius) and outside it as its term (and so is equated with
Descartes).
As a result of the intermediation of Porphyry between Plotinus and Augustine, the following questions occur. Is Christian trinitarian theology the development of a logical possibility within Neoplatonism? Is a totalizing ontology one of the alternatives within Neoplatonism? Is this the alternative taken and disseminated by Augustine? Is Augustine taking up possibilities within the Neoplatonic turning of philosophy from substance to subjectivity? Put another way, is Doull’s Cartesian Augustine, as well as his Proclean-Dionysian Augustine, also contained as a possibility within Neoplatonism. Is Neoplatonism, or better, are the plural Neoplatonisms as much at the origins of the modern self as they also contain alternatives to it? To begin answering some of these questions we must return to Hadot’s work.

The interpretation of the Parmenides of Plato is at the center of Neoplatonism. In common Neoplatonists made the first hypotheses within the dialogue’s dialectic of unity, being and plurality the primary hypostases, i.e. subsistences, of the spiritual world. However, the differences between the great teachers in this school resulted from how they related these primary realities. In general, starting with Plotinus, the Neoplatonists sharply differentiated the One non-being (as hypostasis, the One, the absolutely simple) from the One-being (as hypostasis, Nous, mind). Putting it most directly, the commentary Hadot maintained to be by Porphyry moved them toward each other by finding a form of being which may belong to the highest, namely what he designates by the infinitive to einai (in Latin, esse, which, at the other end of the history which Hadot also traced, Aquinas will call the highest and proper name of God). This “to be” which is without subject or predicate is distinguished from particular and participated being. The “to be” belongs to the One non-being but allows a connection between it and the One-being. At stake here is what Plotinus himself declares to be the greatest of mysteries: how the One is productive, how thinking which is dual because it has being as its object comes forth from the absolutely simple. How does Nous, the first emanation of the One, come forth from what has no object of its apprehension, not even itself?

Porphyry’s solution may be regarded as illuminating Plotinus or betraying him. Porphyry may be regarded as making a form of Neoplatonism into a step in the systematic totalizing of ontology or as the founder of a tradition of the negative theology of being which stands against that. Certainly, his einai exists in the dynamic between negative and positive and the intellection for which it exists is not a conceptual grasp of a particular form. The character of Augustine’s treatment of being and subjectivity rouses the same questions.

Porphyrian Questions about Augustine and the Answer of Trouillard

Augustine’s interpretation of Exodus 3.14, “I am that I am”, as meaning that God is ipsum esse, is decisive for Latin theology and philosophy. It is equally decisive that this esse is in the circumcession of the triad, being, knowing and loving, which is the essence of both God and the human. But the import and fate of these bindings is the pressing question. Has Augustine bound being to knowing so that it is no more than its object
and is thus the subject of manipulating will? Or, alternatively, are both being and knowledge pulled away from any such reduction by being carried over to love? (This is the postmodern alternative). Or is our history the complementarity, confluence and conflict of these opposed alternatives? (My own view).

Which ever may be the case about Augustine lui-même, Trouillard was conscious of the reductive possibilities within the Augustinian tradition. With his priestly colleagues Trouillard turned toward the post-Porphyrian Neoplatonism formed in the criticism of Porphyry. His giving of being to the First was strongly opposed, as indeed was his intellectualism. For Trouillard and the later Neoplatonists, the reduction to ontology must be countered by a henology, a strongly negative theology and a restoration of what in religion raises us beyond what we can understand.

Trouillard found Augustine’s trinitarian speculations dangerous. His view of the Augustinian center in Western thought was that of those who would now deconstruct it. This center did not adequately protect difference, otherness, transcendence because it remained within the Plotinian-Porphyrian tradition of the exegesis of the Parmenides. For Trouillard, in seeking to found self-reflexive subjectivity in the divine, the Augustinian tradition projects the finite unto the infinite. As he wrote, Augustine’s trinitarian speculations:

reduplicate under the pretext of founding them in the Absolute, the distinctions inherent in created spirit. One of the weaknesses of the Augustinian tradition is to work within one side of the Plotinian exegesis of the Parmenides. It does not understand the need for a criticism and a religious life which will converge toward the liberation of the Transcendent from all that would draw it within the Intelligible. Without this we risk a perpetual quiproquo which finally arrives at the Hegelian dialectic where one cannot tell the difference between the human and the Divine.

Against Augustinian reduplication of human subjectivity in the divine, Trouillard would have us reflect on the power of negation, the indeterminate and absence. In a move which reminds us of a postmodern deconstruction, Trouillard writes that the Platonic tradition brings before us “the infinity of absence which all presence implies, more exactly the positivity and efficacy of this absence. A mental intention defines itself as much by that which it excludes as by that which it posits.” He goes on:

If then the normative dominates presence and absence both, if it commands both possession and privation, the name Être is badly chosen to designate it. The normative is ‘une hyperontologie.’ It is être in the measure where it is realised in what derives from it and it also imposes on them ‘la distance.’ It is unity in the sense that it rules diversity but it is equally the source of the multiplicity and variety of what exists.
This equalizing of the positive and negative is a deconstruction of the ontological and positive account of reality and the self. Both Trouillard and those we are more accustomed to call postmoderns take this as the centre of the Western tradition. Their deconstructions repeat his.

I am not able here, even if I were able at all, to explore the various postmodern attempts to deconstruct or escape the modern western self. Nor can we complete the exploration of how this engages Augustine or Neoplatonism. For example I cannot and will not describe the variety of Derrida’s many engagements with Augustine and negative theology nor what Lévinas takes from Plotinus nor how Jean-Luc Marion’s turn to Dionysius belongs to his following of Lévinas rather than Heidegger. I want only to show that this engagement is real, to show that it belongs to the actuality of contemporary philosophy, to indicate why Augustine does not fall outside Neoplatonism, and thus why Neoplatonism cannot be regarded as a surpassed moment. In doing this we must now turn to describe how some postmoderns use the retrieval of what they regard as marginalized features of Augustine’s thought or of post-Porphyrian Neoplatonism to open the self-certain and thus closed self.

Why Trouillard and John Milbank love Eriugena

We can approach something common to these deconstructions and their complementary reconstructions by recalling that for Trouillard the most attractive Christian system is that of Eriugena rather than of Thomas Aquinas and considering why. This enthusiasm for Eriugena is common to Trouillard and the explicitly postmodern English theologian John Milbank, though the reasonings by which they reach it are somewhat different.

For Trouillard, part of what attracts is Eriugena’s balancing of Augustine’s affirmative theology and exaltation of being with the negative theology of Dionysius. Thus, for Eriugena, non-being which is beyond perception, is higher than being which is defined as what we can grasp. That of which we are ignorant is higher, what we grasp in a concept is finite. Humans and God share the privilege of ignorance of what we are because we share infinity. We share God’s non-being and we know both of God and of ourselves that we exist but not what we are. This denial of self-knowledge and of theoria as foundation makes for common ground with Milbank.

Milbank’s position differs from that of Trouillard but the differences are more about how to characterise historical positions than they are substantial. His characterization of Augustinianism is the opposite of Trouillard’s and he determinedly avoids his exaltation of the negative, fearing the nihilism of modern subjectivity. He has Trouillard’s result without his henology because, for Milbank, “the Platonic Good [is] reinterpreted by Christianity as identical with Being.” Milbank’s Augustine is a theologian who subverts philosophical reason. This subversion is necessary because philosophy is at root “a secularizing immanentism, an attempt to regard a cosmos independently of a performed reception of the poetic word.” Performance and poiēsis are the requisites
for opening the self and overcoming modernity. Plato the theologian pointing logos beyond the cosmos is to be recuperated. Certainly the Cartesian use of Augustine’s psychology is a perversion, because, for Milbank’s Augustine, neither being nor self are grasped in knowledge.

The esse of Augustine’s God is not particular graspable being. In accord with his formula for understanding Christian theology’s identification of God and Being, Augustine’s ontology is already the hyperontologie Trouillard demands and which was given for him and for Eriugena in the superessentia of the Dionysian God. Milbank finds no need to turn to this Proclean and Dionysian tradition as an alternative to Augustine. Instead Milbank’s Augustine is reinterpreted so as draw him toward an apophatic Neoplatonism realised in charity and praxis.

Responding to my article “Theoria versus Poesis,” Milbank writes that he is unconvinced by the:

contrast of a Porphyrian Augustine and theurgic Dionysius ... Augustine also places the soul within the cosmos and in the Confessions finally realizes his own self-hood through losing it in cosmic liturgy. Nor is the Augustinian cogito Cartesian, for in Augustine our certainty of our own being, life and understanding is a certainty of intentional opening to these things, which are taken as innately transcendental realities exceeding their instantiation in us. Thus no res cogitans, enclosed upon itself, is here reflexively established, as by Descartes.

Completing the intentional openness of being, life and understanding in Augustine, love draws the self into the openness of praxis and poiësis. Here we meet what unites Trouillard and Milbank in their embrace of Eriugena.

Eriugena’s God creates himself by coming into being and only as created is known. Thus, knowledge follows on a self-othering poiësis and is subordinate to it. What is true for God is also true for the human. The human fall is a refusal of immediate self-knowledge. We cannot know ourselves in an Augustinian unity of being, knowledge and love. In contrast to this Augustinian circle, for Eriugena, the primary logic of spirit is substance, power and activity, a triad he derives from Dionysius and which requires mind to manifest its being in activity beyond itself.

The human substance is hidden in God. God creates and manifests himself through the human and, equally, the human is only known through finding itself in all creation, because the human is the workshop of creation. The human is in the all and is known in the all because all is created in homine. Self-knowledge is attained only as a result of a complete externalization. Psychologically, it requires the procession from intellect through reason to sense. Ultimately, self-knowledge is only in the total cosmic exitus and reditus, a self-othering which is the divine self-creation and the creation of the world in
and through the human. Such a human subjectivity has the openness which our critics of its classical modern form demand.

Poetic Subjectivity overcomes Modernity: Milbank and Pickstock

Our postmodern present is getting over theoretical objectivity because to get over the deceits of objectifying reason is to get over modernity. Milbank writes: “The end of modernity ... means the end of a single system of truth based on universal reason, which tells us what reality is like. ... [T]he point is not to ‘represent’ ... externality, but just to join in its occurrence, not to know, but to intervene, originate.” Thus, *praxis, poiēsis* and *eros* assume *theoria* within themselves. Milbank maintains that:

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\text{[P]ractice cannot claim to ‘know’ the finality of what it treats as final. ... We know what we want to know, and although all desiring is an ‘informed’ desiring, desire shapes truth beyond the imminent implications of any logical order, so rendering the Christian *logos* a continuous product as well as a process of ‘art’. ... Now desire, not Greek ‘knowledge’ mediates to us reality.}^{\text{i}}\]

As I indicated above, Milbank has no need to supplement Augustine with the Dionysian negative theology because he finds what Trouillard discovers in Proclus and Dionysius within Augustine himself. His use of the notion of “cosmic liturgy” to describe that by which Augustine achieves complete selfhood brings us to one of his disciples, Catherine Pickstock. She shares his interpretation of Augustine but turns toward Plato understood in line with the theurgic Neoplatonism of Iamblichus, Proclus and Dionysius in order to break open what she regards as the solipsistic closure of modern subjectivity. Her position is given in the title of her recent book, *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy*.\(^{\text{ii}}\)

Like Milbank, for the restoration of a living subject, with a definite but open identity as against what she regards as the closed modern subject, Pickstock requires us to get over philosophy as conceptualizing *theoria*. Just as Milbank overcomes philosophy by theology as *poiēsis*, she overcomes it by liturgy. Pickstock is as fearful as Milbank is of modern and postmodern nihilism and she does not take up Trouillard’s theology of the One non-being, even though she is with Trouillard in a retrieval of theurgic Neoplatonism.

To reconstruct the living and open subject, Pickstock would restore speech in opposition to Derrida’s “all is text.” Against Derrida she celebrates Plato as leading “dialogue ... *into* doxology, which for Plato is our principle human function and language’s only possibility of restoration.”\(^{\text{iii}}\) Doxology belongs to liturgy and Pickstock invokes the power of the old Latin Mass against the modern logic of subject and object. What in it has power over modernity is its theurgic aspect. In the Mass, as in theurgy, material things are numinous and are addressed as if personal. Milbank agreed with me that I am correct in linking him and Pickstock with “the Dionysian legacy of theurgic
neoplatonism.” Like Milbank’s, her Christian supplement to Platonism is found in the church as historical and practical intersubjective community. Overcoming modernity, opening the subject, requires life as poiēsis, language as doxology, the elevation of eros and praxis over theoria.

The Good as Ourselves and The Good Beyond: Henry and Marion

Returning to France, I conclude with two postmoderns, Jean-Luc Marion and Michel Henry, who also turn to what in Neoplatonism is beyond theoretical grasp in order to get the modern subject out of itself, to make it ecstatic. What is opposed in their approaches are the two sides of the presence of the One-Good.

In general we can say that Marion seeks in Augustine and Dionysius what would correct modernity so far as that is Cartesian. Against the Cartesian union of thought and being, he places an Augustinian conversion of the will and a Dionysian eminence of the Good to which we have access not by theory but by praise. Marion’s attempt “to shoot for God according to his most theological name - charity” and thus to move “hors-texte,” transcending the historical conditions of philosophy, is also Augustinian. Augustine’s voluntarism attracts him and, like Trouillard, he detaches himself from the Augustinian ontology, even if he will not follow Trouillard into a explicitly Neoplatonic henology. Trouillard and Marion meet because in charity a Neoplatonic move to the One-Good beyond being and to the will beyond the noetic can be united. The context of Marion’s postmodern turn to Neoplatonism is defined as much by Lévinas as by Heidegger.

In his first book L’idole et la distance the religious side of Neoplatonism provides a way around Heidegger’s naming of the idols of Western ontology: The Dionysian negative theology is radicalized to stand even against Neoplatonic theory. Marion writes, “The most appropriate name is no more found in the One of Plotinus than in the most gross sensible idol.” The same negation forbids as well the objectifications of ontological metaphysics and objectifying subjectivity:

the distance, radically prevents holding God as an object, or as the suprême being, and escapes the ultimate manifestation of the language of the object - the closure of discourse and the disappearance of the referent.

Marion does not see himself as a Neoplatonist. Rather, he associates himself with Dionysius in that understanding of the pseudo-Areopagite which conceives him to execute a radical Christian subversion of Platonic philosophy. Neoplatonism (and, in my view, the historical Dionysius) remains too theoretical for him. As with Milbank the separation of theology from philosophy is crucial to Marion’s project but is, nonetheless, philosophically determined. Determining is his acceptance of Heidegger’s analysis of the fate of Western ontology — even if he and his French contemporaries are distancing themselves further and further from Heidegger’s actual account of the history. However,
Marion’s own intentions do not, in fact, prevent his position from occurring within the logic of the appropriation of Neoplatonism as a solution to problems philosophy now perceives in modern subjectivity. To move to an emphasis on will and charity in Augustine is not, in fact, to move against Neoplatonism but with it. For Plotinus, we are related to the One through “Intellect in love”\textsuperscript{lxviii} and later Neoplatonism’s exaltation of the One involves simultaneously and necessarily a deepeningly of the vision of the cosmos as moved erotically. In fact, Marion gives both Augustine and Aquinas a Neoplatonic interpretation in order to accommodate their ontological metaphysics to a post-Heideggerian world.

In \textit{L'idole et la distance} and in \textit{Dieu sans l'être}, Aquinas was placed among those who conceive God in terms of being because he made \textit{esse} the first of God’s names. But more recently Marion has Neoplatonized the teaching of Thomas as a \textit{théo-onto-logie}. Thus God is before being which he gives even to himself, a position in fact found in \textit{Ennead} VI 8. Marion shifts his Aquinas toward Denys and Proclus in much the same way as Milbank moves Augustine toward them. We have a negative theology of being.

Marion is not the first or only French phenomenologist to take a theological turn and to associate it with a Christian Neoplatonist. Another, Michel Henry, turned to Eckhart, a move which it was inevitable that someone within this world would take. His is the complementary approach to that of Marion. Marion aims to prevent the reduction of the source of knowledge to the conditions of the subject and to do so adds to phenomenology a theory of donation. Our knowing presupposes a giving of what is for us. In having an object of knowledge we are thus pointed beyond ourselves and the object; idol becomes icon. Henry wants to protect the affectivity of the subject against objectification and, in contrast, his analysis is of the subject’s internal structure. But there is another difference.

Marion wants to keep philosophy and theology strictly apart. On the basis of his theory of donation, there is to be no move from within phenomenology to a transcendent Giver. Reaching a transcendent Giver would require phenomenology to become metaphysics: “we do not imply that we reclaim a transcendent Donor ... we do not imply that this phenomenology restores metaphysics.”\textsuperscript{lxix} It would destroy itself as phenomenology by a theological enterprise beyond its power. Henry understands Marion’s refusals in terms of a proper post-Heideggerian determination not “to subordinate God to being the preliminary to being”\textsuperscript{lxix} but sees in his own following of Eckhart a way around this problem.

With Henry the auto-affectivity of the self is represented as true Christianity. In this auto-affection the absolute reveals itself in us. In its immanent activity there is the revelation of the transcendence itself because the experience of the individual subject is not subjective in the derisory sense. The self is in immediate union with the absolute and exists only in and by that union. Henry turns to Eckhart for support for such a view. Because the God of Eckhart is beyond all representation, He is also at the heart of the
self. God determines “the essence of the immanence and constitutes it.” I quote Henry on Eckhart in a passage which will recall Eriugena. Henry differs from Eriugena because the emphasis is not on the creation of the cosmos but on the self. His aim, like that of other postmoderns, is to open the self to the absolute, but the modern turn to the subject has been conceded in order to be subverted.

The Life auto-affects itself as myself. If with Eckhart one calls the life “God”, then one will say with him: “God engenders himself as myself.” But this Self, engendered in the Life, and holding the singularity of its Self by its thisness, and holding its thisness only in the eternal auto-affection of life, carries here in itself the life, because to the extent that each person is carried by life, he or she only comes to each instant of life by it.

The life is communicated to each from the Son so there is nothing which does not contain in itself this eternal essence of the life. Henry concludes this passage with a quotation from Eckhart: “God engenders me as himself.” [“Dieu m’engendre comme lui-même.”]

With both Marion and Henry we are again in a Christian Neoplatonism which depends on the radical difference of the One and Nous. This difference allows God to be both the external source of knowledge beyond reduction to objective conception and also the internal constitution of the subject so that the self is not dependent on its self-objectification. The human subject is affected from within by union with the absolute which constitutes its being. The One is altogether beyond grasp and representation but it is also the immediacy of my life; therefore experience is the life of Divinity. With Marion and Henry taken together, in virtue of the indetermination of the One, we are at both sides of the object and the subject simultaneously.

Christian theology is beyond philosophy, even philosophy as phenomenology, but also there is no separation of the visible and the invisible. Postmodern Christian Neoplatonism cancels the Platonic division of the sensible and intellectual. Henry, Marion and Milbank all call their positions Christian as distinguished from Neoplatonic because Neoplatonism depends upon the division which they have canceled in virtue of the immediate union between the phenomenal and the Good. The title of one of Henry’s books, an essay in Christian apologetics, is: The Truth is Me [C’est moi la vérité]. In it Henry maintains that “In Christianity nothing opposes itself to reality, there is nothing but life.” His turn to Eckhart rather than to Hegel in order to find the unity of self and God is determined by his finding that in Hegel the sensible and the intellectual remain divided.

This brings us to the fundamental question for a consideration of Doull’s Hegelian account of Neoplatonism and that belonging to contemporary Neoplatonism. For Doull, the telos of Neoplatonism is “the integrated individual [who] knows his freedom as resting on a unified relation of the two worlds to the One.” In the modern Christian drawing together of the One and the self as the relation of creature to creator, Doull
claims that the difference of sensible and ideal is sublated. This is also the result for the postmodern Christian Neoplatonists. Does Doull’s Hegelian telos of Neoplatonism include that of those he would exclude from philosophy or does it merely stand against it as an alternative?

Conclusion

The aim of my account of the role of Neoplatonism in some postmodern attempts to deconstruct the modern subject has been to take Neoplatonism out of the place Professor Doull assigns it between ancient and modern philosophy with the result that any return to it is the forsaking of philosophy. From the perspective of an Hegelian completion of philosophy, Doull placed Neoplatonism between Aristotle and Augustine. Aristotle is its arche, Augustine its telos and Hegel the unity of its negative and positive moments. My aim has been to return all three to history not only so that we can be more open to the actual character of the history of philosophy but above all so that philosophy can be discovered to be actual in the present.

Laws which govern that present have appeared. When would-be postmoderns use a return to the pre-modern against the modern, the connections which link them reassert themselves. The antagonism to modernity which drives the postmodern enterprise results in a distortion of the premodern. This distortion manifests the unbreakable bond between all three. The postmoderns remain moderns opposed to an aspect of what they are. Modernity is a proper development of what precedes it and a representation of the pre-modern set in opposition to modernity must be one-sided. The same logic demands, however, that if modernity be constructed by selecting one element of what precedes and removing from it the ambiguities of its original context as well as the multiplicity of meanings it acquired in its history, its deconstruction is an inevitable good. Excluding Augustine from the history of Neoplatonism and tying him to modernity, and modernity to him, can only result in requiring us to get over them both. A different relation of the contemporary and the modern and of Augustine to both is necessary. My judgment makes of the postmodern a proper corrective, a recovery of something lost or forgotten in the modern, but neither are or can be independent or true and complete simply as alternatives. When we see the two sides together, we understand best how what we are is constructed.

It will have become apparent in what we have surveyed that we are constantly dealing with different sides of the same thing. The alternatives set against each other in the course of history are both present in the origins. In Plotinus, the human soul finds its prior and ground both in Nous and in the One. When Augustine unifies the Plotinian selves, both orientations remain present in his mens. Porphyry’s triad does reveal how the One is and becomes Being, and yet his successors are right to reassert the difference. The self of Augustine’s historical journey in the first 9 books of the Confessions is finally realised by being included in the cosmic liturgy of books XII and XIII, but Augustine is still asserting his cogito sum against the Skeptics when mens is joining its own activity to
the triadic life of God in the last books of the *De Trinitate*. Eriugena, Milbank and Pickstock are right to find Dionysius in Augustine, but Descartes is also an Augustinian when he bases his human *cogito* in a positive knowledge of the infinity of God’s being.

If that Cartesian Augustine becomes exclusive and imagines itself to be complete or self-sufficient, we need to be reminded that the persistence of Dionysius in the West is well grounded in the balance of negative and positive in the Neoplatonic origins. Neoplatonism is system because the dialectic of subjectivity is more than science but it is also philosophical science. If one side asserts itself, the other must appear also.

The postmodern Neoplatonic deconstruction of modern subjectivity consists in breaking its rational hold on being as its object and thus freeing it from self-objectification. The self becomes ecstatic toward and in the other in virtue of a union with the Good. What is eliminated from ancient Neoplatonism in the canceling of the difference between the sensible and the intelligible is the ascent through theory. For the ancients, the One is only approached by us through *Nous* and theurgy. The union with the holy in the material is for the sake of rising to the immaterial. The ancients would be surprised by the postmodern endeavour to unite the transcendent One-Good and the immediate experience of life, by the endeavour to use the Good to remain within an endless temporal *praxis* and *poiēsis*. If our postmoderns have removed the intellectual center of ancient Neoplatonism, we must ask where it reasserts itself in their own positions. Has modern science in fact disappeared? Or does it remain the presupposition of postmodern ecstasy? Is this the hate which loves what it hates and hates what it loves because of its dependence on it?

The postmodern deconstruction of modern rational subjectivity reveals the logic by which it is constructed so that the construction and the deconstruction are bound together. Indeed, the deconstruction is a reconstruction. What Marion and Henry take from Neoplatonism makes this clear. First, the inner and the outer are shown to be united in the One and to be united for us in virtue of its generosity as the Good. Second, the union is shown both to be beyond knowledge and for knowledge, constituting it.

Deconstruction disassembles but it does not destroy. The elements remain, as do the connections between them. None worked out more completely than the ancient Neoplatonists all the elements and moments in the structure of reality. Postmodernity exhibits the substantiality and acuteness of its understanding by its appropriation of theirs. But when it tries to run away with one aspect of what the ancients united, then the truth of what moderns understood reasserts itself and vice versa. If modern philosophy be Christian, Augustinian, kataphatic, Protestant, comprehending rationality then to remain philosophy it must needs become Hellenic, Jewish, Dionysian, apophatic, Catholic, and theurgic.

The logic of the history of philosophy is tragic. Perhaps it is more, but it is not less than tragedy. Professor Doull finds in Neoplatonism that by which it might also be comic.\textsuperscript{xxv}
In our time to become comic philosophy must write herself into the play, otherwise she will understand neither her past nor her present and will have no future. If our teacher would be our Aristophanes, he must make himself a character in his comedies.

Wayne J. Hankey February 23, 2000


v. Doull, “Neoplatonism and the Older,” 487 and see 495: “Its freedom rests in the unity of the ideal and the sensible world.”

vi. Ibid., 515 and 486.

vii. Ibid., 487.

viii. Ibid., 487 and see note 4 and pp. 486 and 499.


xi. Ibid., notes 9 and 62 and more explicitly Doull, “Neoplatonism and the Cartesian,” note 1: “a free Cartesian (or Augustinian) subject” again: “Descartes (or Augustine)”; and note 2.


xiv. Ibid., 515 and Doull, “Neoplatonism and the Cartesian,” 10: “The intelligible basis of this freedom is to be sought not only in Neoplatonism but also in the older modern philosophy. Both philosophies are necessary to a correction of contemporary dogmas.”


xvi. I have in mind, for example, Jacques Derrida as represented in K. Keirans, “Beyond Deconstruction,” Animus, 2 (1997).

xvii. This is my conclusion in W.J. Hankey, “ReChristianizing Augustine Postmodern Style: Readings by Jacques Derrida, Robert Dodaro, Jean-Luc Marion, Rowan Williams, Lewis Ayes and John Milbank,” Animus 2 (1997): 81.

xviii. Doull, “Neoplatonism and the Cartesian,” 7 and note 5.


xx. Ibid., 62.

xxi. Robert Crouse’s contribution to this collection: “The Augustinian Philosophy and Christian Institutions.”

xxii. In his articles Doull uses and sometimes engages the work of E. des Places, A. Festugière, H. Saffrey, J. Trouillard, P. Hadot, J. Combès and others associated with the scholarship, theology and philosophy of the revival of Neoplatonism in France.


Neoplatonism, this was not because he either understood it well or himself advocated such a turn, see J.


rarely give notes except for direct quotation follows I shall take my publications listed above as providing the evidence for what I write below and shall provide a framework in which the Pseudo Martyr Vermigli and Boniface VIII: Courcelles August Bibliothek de Spenser, Richard Hooker and the Cardinal de Bérulle, xxxiii


xxxii. See W.J. Hankey, “Augustinian Immediacy and Dionysian Mediation in John Colet, Edmund Spenser, Richard Hooker and the Cardinal de Bérulle,” in Augustinus in der Neuzeit, Colloque de la Herzog August Bibliothek de Wolfenbüttel, 14-17 octobre, 1996, sous la direction de Kurt Flasch et Dominique de Courcelles, éd. D. de Courcelles, (Turnhout: Editions Brepols, 1998), 125-160 and W.J.T. Kirby, “Peter Martyr Vermigli and Boniface VIII: The Supreme Hierarch and the Unity of Civil and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction,” Archiv fur Reformationsgeschichte, forthcoming. Dr. Kirby judges that Augustine and Aristotle provide a framework in which the Pseudo-Dionysian Lex divinitatis is transformed. For me the facts that the polis has become the Christian commonwealth and the spiritual and human cosmos hierarchical suggest the opposite or at least a mutual metamorphosis. In any case as with Hooker, Dionysius persists within the ideology of the Protestant ecclesiastical state.

xxxiv. In order to be able to sketch a part of the development of this alternative history in the space permitted and in order to avoid repeating arguments and references given in extenso elsewhere, in what follows I shall take my publications listed above as providing the evidence for what I write below and shall rarely give notes except for direct quotations. In this sparing use of notes I shall at least this once imitate Professor Doull.


xxvii. Although Heidegger was a very important inspiration to many in the postmodern turn to Neoplatonism, this was not because he either understood it well or himself advocated such a turn, see J.-M.

xxxviii. There is not however a large literature on the Hegelian interpretation of Neoplatonism. Apart from the important study by W. Beierwaltes, Platonism und Idealism (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), there is an unimportant essay by M. de Gandillac, “Hegel et le néoplatonisme,” in Hegel et la pensée grecque, ed. J. D’Hondt (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974), 121-131 and occasional critical remarks en passant: e.g. C. D’Ancona, ASeparation and the Forms: A Plotinian Approach,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71:3 (Summer 1997): 370, which notes Hegel’s influence on Zeller’s treatment while criticising Zeller and indicating that his history has been generally abandoned, or Plotin, Traité sur la liberté et la volonté de l’Un [Ennéade VI, 8 (39)], Introduction, texte grec, traduction et commentaire par G. Leroux, Histoire des doctrines de l’Antiquité classique 15 (Paris: Vrin, 1990), 17, which notes that new study of the texts has the effect of countering the too great systematization of Plotinus resulting from Hegel’s influence.


xlii. For Platonism in the Middle Ages and the problems in Doull’s interpretation of it, see R.D. Crouse, “The Augustinian Philosophy and Christian Institutions,” in this collection. Owing to Doull’s imposition of a modern conception of philosophy, he mischaracterises the post-Plotinian Neoplatonic as well as the Patristic and Mediaeval Christian philosophy and excludes it from philosophy because of its interpenetration with religion. In a multitude of other articles Crouse has shown much of Augustine’s difference from and his interaction with the various Platonisms of the Middle Ages.

xliii. Doull, “Neoplatonism and the Older,” 502: “the first step [beyond Porphyry and Plotinus] was to set the One beyond all finite relations to what was other than itself” and see 504-505.

xlv. Ibid., 496.


xl ix. Doull sees, rightly, that Porphyry’s integration of the self remains incomplete: “the unity was abstract and exclusive of the negative, and the abstractness appears in a divided relation of the soul to the One.” Ibid., 502 and see note 34.

l. Confessiones 7, particularly 7.9.13f. on the “libri platoniciorum”; translated into Latin, these included at least a few treatises of Plotinus, see De beata uita 1.4; De ciiuitate dei 10.14 and 10.23 (where Augustine distinguishes between Plotinus and Porphyry on the Trinity). Among these was Ennead V 1. Its language is reflected in Augustine’s “Quaestio de ideis” (De diuersis quaestionibus 46). On his choice of Platonism from among the schools, see Contra Academicos 3.17.37ff.; De ciiuitate dei 8.2f. and 10.1. For a characteristically concise, exact and illuminating treatment of scholarship on Augustine and Neoplatonism which places Augustine within it (if understood broadly), see R.D. Crouse, “Paucis mutatis verbis: St. Augustine’s Platonism,” Augustinian and his critics, ed. R.J. Dodaro and G.P. Lawless, (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 37-50.

Christianisme rien ne s’oppose à la réalité, il n’y a rien d’autre que la vie.


iv. Ibid., 231-35.


vi. Ibid., 43.


xi. Ibid., 27.

xii. Ibid., 28.

xiii. Ibid., 29.

xiv. Ibid., 30.

xv. Ibid., 31.

xvi. Ibid., 32.

xvii. Ibid., 33.

xviii. Ibid., 34.

xix. Ibid., 35.

xx. Ibid., 36.

xxi. Ibid., 37.

xxii. Ibid., 38.

xxiii. Ibid., 39.

xxiv. Ibid., 40.

xxv. Ibid., 41.

xxvi. Ibid., 42.

xxvii. Ibid., 43.

xxviii. Ibid., 44.

xxix. Ibid., 45.

xxx. Ibid., 46.