Eriugena, master of the liberal arts, translator, philologue, poet, philosopher, and theologian, ‘reinvented the greater part of the theses of Neoplatonism’ (Trouillard 1983, 331), by his time largely forgotten in the Latin West. Such a profoundly authentic retrieval of the doctrines developed in the pagan Platonic schools of late Antiquity from Plotinus to Damascius would not be created again in the Middle Ages until Maître Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa—both, directly or indirectly, under Eriugena’s influence. His accomplishment is the more remarkable because made almost entirely without access to non-Christian authors, by drawing out philosophy largely from theological writings1—into which genres his own works almost entirely fall.

After Boethius, he was the first to unite the Greek and Latin Platonisms of late Antiquity; this enabled his reconciliation of Latin and Greek Christian theology. The Latin Fathers were foundational—pre-eminently Augustine, crucially Boethius, and importantly Ambrose. In *Periphyseon* they are contained within a single system with the Greek Fathers. The writings of the Greeks were known to him and affected his thought before he made his famous translations beginning with the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus. While producing them, he learned, and deeply reflected upon, the doctrines of the late Hellenic Platonists in the tradition from Iamblichus to Damascius, ideas he had not acquired by means of the Latins. Eriugena’s reconciliation was accomplished by extending the primarily Plotinian and Porphyrian Platonism of the Latin Fathers in the direction of notions from Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, and Damascius transmitted by the Greeks. The logical conclusion of pagan Hellenic philosophy, John encountered indirectly, first, by way of Boethius, and, then by way of the more radically apophatic theologies of Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Maximus the Confessor—to name the most influential sources. In general, in the Latin Middle Ages, when the earlier Platonism of Augustine met the later, most authoritatively conveyed by Dionysius, ‘this highest theologian’ (*Expos.* IV 189), 2 the later determined the systematic structure within which ideas were placed. Eriugena established the pattern which would prevail among the Latin medievals. He rode the wake of the interpretation of the first hypothesis of Plato’s *Parmenides* established by Plotinus (V 1 [10] 8) into meontology. In consequence, the divine ‘nothingness by excellence’ is ‘beyond all things which are and which are not’ (*Peri.* III 681A). This divine nature, which is said not to be ‘because of its ineffable excellence and incomprehensible infinity’ (*Peri.* III 634B), contains being. Nothingness underlies being, being emerges from it, and being returns into it. By plunging into it, Eriugena follows Dionysius into ‘the ineffable and incomprehensible and inaccessible brilliance of the divine goodness, unknown to any intellect’ (*Peri.* III 681A), where Augustine can no longer be his guide.3

---

2 The Patrologia Latina CXII edition of Floss’s Eriugena provides a common system of reference; I give, where available, its column numbers. I quote from the latest critical edition where one exists. Translations are my own.
3 Duclow 1977, Moran 1989, 212-240, Beierwaltes 1990, 60, Hankey 1998, 125-132, Carabine 2000, 34-43, Hankey 2002, 141-144, Rorem 2005, 105-112. There is an important alternative interpretation, which instead of viewing Eriugena’s thought through a Proclean and Damasean meontology derived from the Greek Fathers, sees the Greeks being accommodated to Augustine, and judges that both the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and...
A. Life
Although he does not call himself ‘Eriugena’ until his translation of Dionysius, we may accept that John was indeed a Scot—that is to say an Irishman—born and educated in Ireland. His Hellenophilia, language, script, and elements of his education, reflected in his writings, which include at least two commentaries on the Marriage Between Philology and Mercury of Martianus Capella, are characteristic of the Irish monastic schools. In succession to the Irish missionaries, their learned alumni established themselves in Gaul and Northern Italy. There was an Irish colony at Laon in the third quarter of the ninth century. Irish scholars, there and elsewhere, figured importantly in the Carolingian Renaissance playing the roles in which Eriugena was pre-eminently successful. From about 847, he taught the liberal arts at the moveable palace school of ‘the most glorious of Catholic kings’ (Trans. Dion. Prol. 1031A), Charles the Bald (823-877), Charlemagne’s grandson and Hellenophile patron of arts and letters. John held ‘no distinguished ecclesiastical office’ (Prudentius of Troyes, De praed. PL CXV 1043A). The King probably saved him from the negative consequences of his only intentional foray into doctrinal controversy. Eriugena seems to have lived under his protection at the abbey of Saint-Médard de Soissons from about the time of the first condemnation of his On the Divine Predestination, and throughout the 860s. Eriugena dedicated Periphyseon, written towards the end of that period, to its Abbot. He successfully developed the flattering arts of a royal poet. Most of his surviving poems are dedicated to Charles and depict him in Byzantine imperial terms as a sacred monarch. What may be one of his last texts, belonging to the same period as the unfinished Commentary on the Gospel of John, the poem, ‘Starry Halls’, celebrates the dedication of a church erected by Charles. We have no secure evidence of his life after 870 and he seems to have died during the 870s.

B. Thought

On Divine Predestination

By 850 Eriugena was sufficiently celebrated as a scholar that Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims and Bishop Pardulus of Laon urged him into ecclesiastical controversy. On Divine Predestination (c851) exhibits some of his characteristic doctrines and methods, but also an alien tone. Ultimately it pleased no one.

The trouble had been started by a Saxon monk Gottschalk (806-68), who used Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings to argue for the doctrine of double, or ‘twin’, predestination—i.e. God directly wills both the election of the blessed and the damnation of those destined for eternal fire. While the language Gottschalk had used may give some justification for Eriugena’s diatribe, those who know him through Periphyseon and later works will be shocked to discover Eriugena not only calling Gottschalk’s Augustinian deductions ‘most stupid and most crude insanities’ (De praed. I.4 360A), but also opining that he ‘truly deserved to burn in oil and pitch’ (De praed. III.7 369D). Further, in contrast to his later eschatology, here he judges: ‘no one must doubt’ that the fire of eternal punishment is ‘corporeal’ (De praed. XIX.1 436D). Nonetheless, there is continuity between his views here

Porphyry, on the one hand, and that extending from Iamblichus to Damascius, on the other, submit to Christian trinitarian theology in the Fathers; representative is Crouse 1996.

4 Contreni, 1977.
5 Dutton 1986; his date, and that of Jeuneau 1979, 100. n 48, May 877, for the dedication is not universally accepted, see Herren 1993, 4.
and those in his later works; the assertion of the indubitable corporeality of hellish suffering in Chapter XIX follows a representation of eternal punishment as a subjective state. In *Periphyseon*, the return to God of evil doers consists in eternally preserving their malicious fantasies, their quest for the things that are not: ‘For the entire abolition of all evil generally in all human nature [which is its return] is something different from the phantasies of evil always preserved in the particular consciences of the vicious in this life, and, in this way, always punished’ (*Peri. V* 948CD).

Corporeal depictions of the final state come from Augustine (*De civ. Dei* XX-XXI), whom Eriugena finds to be more literal than the Greek Fathers in his interpretation of Scripture. Thus, in contrast to them, Augustine also regards Paradise as a physical place except when ‘he has followed the highest Greek theologians, especially Gregory’ (*Peri. IV* 817A), for whom Paradise signifies human nature before the Fall, and the identity of Christ and the human. As we shall see below, in *Periphyseon*, Gregory’s interpretation is essential; in this treatise, Eriugena seems determined to refute his adversary on his own Augustinian ground. Despite philological evidence that his reading of the Greeks (Origen, Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa) had already begun, Augustine is ‘that most acute investigator and assertor of truth’ (*De praed. XV.3* 513C; cf. *Peri. IV* 817A), and the Platonism of this treatise does not reach beyond that of Augustine and Boethius, where the first principle is simple pure being. In the numerous texts of Augustine he quotes, as well as in his arguments to prove the unity and simplicity of ‘the one divine substance’ (*De praed. E.3* 438C; cf. *De praed. P* 357B), God and his good will remain on one side of the opposition between God as ‘the highest being’ (*De praed. III.3* 366B; cf. *De praed. XV.5* 414C), on the one hand, and the non-being of evil, on the other. That non-being God can neither know nor will.

Eriugena’s purpose is to maintain the divine predestination and grace together with human freedom (*De praed. IV.1* 370A). This is also the purpose of Boethius in Books IV and V of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, and Eriugena’s fundamental argument follows his. The solution of Boethius is located at the end of a line of Platonic treatises and commentaries which start from a principle stated by Porphyry in *Sententiae* 10: ‘everything is accommodated to the substance of each knower’. In order to save *both* human freedom and divine providence, Iamblichus, Ammonius, Proclus, and Boethius—in the wake of his predecessors—distinguish between the mode of the knower and the mode of the thing known. Eriugena, by emphasising the difference between the eternal mode of the divine being and the temporal mode of the human, concludes, as Boethius had done, that the problem in our reasoning arises when ‘foreknowledge and predestination are transferred to God by likening him to temporal things’ (*De praed. XI.7* 393B). When we make this transferral, looking at God’s knowing and willing through our temporal way of knowing, we place his operations within the temporal process where they must determine our acts in such a way as to make them unfree. By basing his argument on the difference between the eternal and the temporal, and by making no recourse to the divine non-being, Eriugena remained one with Boethius and Augustine in this treatise. Nonetheless, he did not express himself acceptably to his audience.

Despite writing at episcopal request, and despite his concession to Augustinian literalism earlier in the treatise, Eriugena’s lapidary conclusion conceded nothing to the imaginative form of religious language. Double predestination is rejected on the strictly

---

6 Mainoldi 2002.
7 Hankey 2002, 128.
philosophical ground that it is inconsistent with the goodness and unity of God. His simplicity is such that predestination and God are one: ‘the one eternal predestination of God is God and pertains only to those things which are, and, in no way, to those things which are not’ (De praed. E.3 438C). Moreover, Eriugena insisted that the means by which he had arrived at his flinty formula were essential to theology, asserting the key idea of the Carolingian renaissance that the art of interpreting Scripture comes from the liberal arts.  

He was convinced that the theological errors on predestination had grown out of ‘an ignorance of the liberal arts’ and ‘of the Greek writings in which the interpretation of predestination generates no fog of ambiguity’ (De praed. XVIII.1 430C-D). Rightly interpreting Augustine, whose texts gave literal support to double predestination, would require the orthodox to cultivate both of these more assiduously than their adversaries had done.

This conclusion brought Eriugena’s readers back to his first chapter and its assertion that, ‘true philosophy is true religion and, conversely, true religion is true philosophy’ (De praed. I.1 358A). This formula reproduced, but also intensified, Augustine, whom he had just quoted (De vera rel. V.8; cf. C. Jul. IV.14.72) so that philosophy and theology form a dialectical unity.  

The mutual transformation of philosophical ideas and religious images which Eriugena would accomplish in Periphyseon was only suggested here, but he was on his way to a ‘coherence of recta ratio and biblical auctoritas that forestalls real conflict between the two and therefore denies any meaningful distinction between philosophy and theology’ (McGinn 1996, 65).

The treatise resulted in a torrent of extravagant personal abuse and supposed refutations directed against Eriugena. Its propositions were formally condemned by a local church synod (Valence, 855), its judgments were renewed at Langres in 859. The Pope confirmed both the doctrine of double predestination and redemption for all believers. His patron, Archbishop Hincmar, was humiliated. Happily, the only evident effects on Eriugena were that he did not stray again into doctrinal controversy and that he took up the liberal arts and Greek more determinedly, thus increasing his capacity to break through the figurative language of Scripture to philosophy.

The Liberal Arts, Philosophy, and the Glosses on Martianus Capella

Eriugena taught both the three linguistic (grammar, logic and rhetoric) and the four mathematical (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music) arts at the Court, and his annotated textbook is his most extensive work in a non-theological genre. In it he distinguishes between ‘Divine Scripture and secular letters’ (Annot. In Marc. 163.15), but finds their teaching the same. We have it in two printed forms: his Annotations and his Gloss (both partial) on the Marriage of Philology and Mercury, by the fifth-century pagan Platonist Martianus Capella. There are, however, doubts about the character of these printed texts, and many other glosses of De Nuptiis, either by Eriugena himself or by those associated with him, may exist in manuscript.  

What we have are valuable, nonetheless, because they show something of the character of his Irish education, give striking examples of how he relates mythological and philosophical forms, and allow us to assess his learning since Martianus’ work was an encyclopaedia of the areas of knowledge available in the ninth century, frequently citing its

---

9 Jeanneau 1996a, 359.
10 Beierwaltes, 1990, 53.
sources by name.\textsuperscript{12} It, and the Gloss, mention diverse philosophical sects; and Eriugena exhibits what he knows of Platonism from Macrobius, Timaeus, and Calcidius.\textsuperscript{13} Despite some wishful readings, the Annotations do not give, however, a new heliocentric theory of the heavens, and Eriugena had no ‘idea of seeking truth by observation and so going beyond the literary tradition’.\textsuperscript{14} Instead, he demythologised the allegory of Martianus in order to distil both wisdom and science.

The liberal arts, as Eriugena received them, did not include the philosophical sciences deriving from Aristotle. In consequence, for philosophy to develop, the arts must do the work of at least some of those sciences. Already, before Eriugena, in the Carolingian schools, Aristotle’s Categories played a greater role in philosophy than that which Porphyry had assigned it. For Alcuin of York, who joined Charlemagne’s Court in 782, and for Eriugena, Categories was known through a fourth-century summary, Ten Categories, which they both falsely ascribed to Augustine. An important text in the curriculum, for Alcuin, it was not merely an introduction to logic for beginners dealing with parts of speech. Instead, it treated words, concepts, and things, and had become ontology. By mapping the kinds of being, it filled the place which would later be occupied by Aristotle’s Metaphysics when the medieval Latins had recovered it. Thus, for example, in the Annotations, Eriugena repeatedly sketches an emanation of the individual out of ‘OUCLA, by us called essence, beyond which none is able to ascend’. It is ‘a certain essence which comprehends all nature and in which everything which is subsists by participation, and it is therefore called the most general genus. It descends by way of divisions through genera and through species until the most particular species’, the individual, is reached. (Annot. In Marc. 157.17; cf. 191.26).

For Eriugena the arts are both eternal and innate to the mind: ‘philosophers have truly sought out and found that the arts are eternal and that they always immutably adhere to the soul’ (Peri. I 486c). By their cultivation, the soul pushes itself back from sensible embodiment to thinking the underlying intelligible laws. Thus it recollects itself and ‘always labours to make itself immortal’ (Annot. In Marc. 17.12), by what is immortal within it. Eriugena comments that Martianus ‘openly teaches that the study of wisdom makes the soul immortal…all the arts which the rational soul employs are naturally present in all men whether [or not] they make good use of them…and, for this reason, every human soul is made immortal by the study of wisdom which is innate in itself’ (Annot. In Marc. 17.12; cf. 171.10). The paradoxical doctrine that the soul ‘is made immortal’, by making what is ‘naturally present’ or ‘innate’ in it, results from two developments in the Platonism to which Eriugena is heir, one much earlier than the other. First, the Platonic forms have become living ideas in divine, angelic, and human minds; second, Aristotelian abstraction and Platonic reminiscence have been reconciled by the mid fifth century head of the Academy, Syrianus.\textsuperscript{15} As a result of his reworking of these developments, for Eriugena both the forms and the mind are known only by the activity of creating and practicing the arts; in humans, this is both a sensible and a rational activity. Eriugena will deepen his understanding of the implications of this connection between knowing and making, the divine and the human, and the sensible and rational in Periphyseon, and we must reconsider it later.

This understanding of the study of wisdom, or philosophy, when taken with the interplay between it and religion asserted in On Divine Predestination, renders comprehensible

\textsuperscript{12} Herren 1986, 266.
\textsuperscript{13} Marenbon 2007, 73.
\textsuperscript{14} Liebeschütz 1973, 57, agreeing with Erhardt-Siebold 1940, 15-16, opposing Lutz 1939, xviii-xx.
his notorious comment: ‘No one enters heaven unless through philosophy, the seed of splendours’ (Annot. In Marc. 57.15). The gloss concerns ‘a certain woman who speaks of Philosophy’. She has the virtues and the arts at her disposition and brings to mind the Consolation of Boethius, which inspired the solution in On Divine Predestination. In the Consolation, Lady Philosophy opens the door of heaven in virtue of her ambiguity, her capacity to be earthly and heavenly, and even to pierce through the heavens. After long submission to her, she raises the soul to simple intuition in which the divine and human visions meet. In On Divine Predestination, immediately after his equation of true religion and true philosophy, Eriugena asserts that philosophy has ‘the four principal parts necessary for the solution of every question’ (De praed. I.1 358A). He goes on to give their Greek names, and then the Latin: ‘Division, definition, demonstration, and resolution’. These parts are treated throughout the Annotations; however, the order in which they are listed here, and their descriptions, make clear that, from the beginning of his writing, Eriugena thinks of philosophy as dialectic treating everything. By its four principal parts, dialectic brings forth the whole of nature from its source and resolves it back into that simplicity, now seen as end. In this explication and resolution, the structures of nature and of the operation of mind conform: ‘that art, which divides genera into species and resolves species into genera, which is called DIALEKTIKEÌ, is not made by human machinations, but was created in the nature of things by the author of all arts that truly are arts. It was discovered by the wise, who use it in their subtle investigations into things’ (Peri. IV 749A). Periphyseon gives us the universe manifested by that philosophical process.

Gone, since Boethius and Dionysius, is the confrontation between Christian and pagan philosophy where pagan philosophy is judged according to Christian lights. For Eriugena, philosophy is neither pagan, as opposed to Christian, nor mundane, as opposed to theology. Dialectic, mystical interpretation, and the itinerarium towards union with God, all belong to its work which is to give us the mind of Christ, for ‘the perfect human is Christ’ (Peri. IV 543B). In Periphyseon, Christ, as the eternal Word and the divine wisdom, is understood through the unity of knower and known in the NOUS of Plotinus (V 1 [10] 4, 26-9). Augustine (De Trin. IV.1.3) is a source for this doctrine (De praed. IX 393A, Peri. II 559A), but Eriugena also locates it in Dionysius (EH I.3) whom he quotes to assert that ‘the cognition of the things that are is the things that are’ (Peri. II 559B). When assimilating the teaching of these Latin and Greek Fathers, Eriugena makes them authorities for two doctrines: not only is being the knowing of being, but also God’s making and God’s knowing are the same. He will apply both notions to the human in an original way.

From the Translations to Periphyseon

At the request of Charles the Bald, Eriugena undertook a new Latin translation of the manuscript of the Dionysian corpus, a gift from the Byzantine Emperor presented to King Louis the Pious in 827. Dedicated to Charles, the translation appeared c860, improving upon an earlier attempt by Hilduin, Abbot of royal St Denys, which then faded into the shadows. This became the first of a series of translations which seem to have been inspired by what excited Eriugena about the Dionysian corpus: 1) the Ambiguities and 2) the Questions to Thalassius of Maximus the Confessor, who is essential to interpreting Dionysius. The matters treated in 3) Gregory of Nyssa’s On the Creation of Humankind must have been of great interest to Eriugena once he understood Dionysius through Maximus. Gregory’s work

---

would have seemed to complete and extend 4) the *Hexaemeron* of Basil. If indeed, as it seems, he did translate Basil, the text is now lost. There is textual evidence of the same kind as for the *Hexaemeron* that he also produced a lost translation of 5) the *Anchoratus* of Epiphanius.  

Eriugena’s translations are determinedly literal; ‘I am the translator of this work not the expositor’ (*Trans. Dion.* Prol. 1032C), he wrote in the Prologue to his Latin Dionysius, and he squarely faced the risk of being blamed for his faithful literalism. That consisted, according to the dominant medieval practice, not only in reproducing the Greek word for word in Latin, but also in replicating the Greek word order and grammatical structures. Anastasius, the papal librarian at the time, while marveling that a ‘barbarian’ could have made the translation at all, regretted that the literalism left Dionysius unintelligible. What, however, made Eriugena’s translation enduringly useful, and even irreplaceable as an interpretation, was that, in contrast to Hilduin, he genuinely understood the thought of Dionysius and the others. Despite problems at some very important points, the fundamental teaching got through, both to him and to his readers. Besides Eriugena’s philosophical genius, this was due, in part, to his use, outside the translations, of paraphrase, constant endeavours to restate what the texts said. In the end, Eriugena was a successful translator because he was a deeply philosophical expositor.  

Because of the reciprocity between his philosophical development and his understanding of the Greek texts he translated, particularly those of the opaque Dionysius, a crucial mistranslation is corrected by his later teaching in a) the continuously amended *Periphyseon* (begun c864), b) the still later *Exposition of the Celestial Hierarchies* (between 865-870), c) in the *Homily*, which succeeds and complements *Periphyseon*, and d) in the incomplete *Commentary* on John’s Gospel, belonging to the end of his life. The works which were begun after *Periphyseon* have its characteristic doctrines—with one important exception in the *Exposition* which I shall treat below—, and exhibit no substantial change in Eriugena’s thought, but rather nuances, and different ways to present the same substance.  

I shall allow these common ideas to come out in my consideration of Eriugena’s teaching in *Periphyseon*. Before turning to that, we must look, however, at his crucial misreading of Dionysius.

Eriugena’s philosophical movement, beyond his Augustinian foundation, to a Platonism in which the divine infinite nothingness by excellence exceeds both being and non-being, required him to rethink the Dionysian text. It conveyed Plotinus’s notion of a non-cognitive direct apprehension by which the soul seeking union with the first principle is struck. Eriugena was dissatisfied with his early translations, and we find manuscripts with variants in his hand between the lines of the *Celestial* and of the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. Michael Harrington has identified what distinguishes ‘Eriugena’s initial reading of Dionysius, as translator, from his further reading as composer of the *Periphyseon*…*The Periphyseon* radically emphasizes the non-cognitive character of the divine being and the unknowing which unites us to it, while the Dionysius translation tends to reduce this union to a form of knowing’ (Harrington 2004, 22). Crucial had been his ‘consistent rendering of the Greek *epekeina* [beyond] as *summitas* [summit]’ in his translations. For Dionysius, in contrast, God is the darkness beyond the intelligible peaks of the mountain. ‘By identifying God with the summit of the mountain, rather than the darkness above it, Eriugena includes God among those objects of intellectual activity’ (Harrington 2005, 137). In *Periphyseon* and subsequent works, however, by way of a Proclean superessential nothingness, God will assume the character of

---

Plato’s Good beyond thought and being. God became for Eriugena what he had been for Dionysius, the brilliant darkness.

Periphyseon: First Principle, Anthropology, Structure

Eriugena gave his masterwork a Greek title, PERI PHYSÆÓN, Concerning Nature (Expos. II 168A); it is a physiologia, a science of nature (Peri. IV 441C), a term he would have found in Gregory of Nyssa (De hom. opif. 1). As we have just seen, Eriugena’s understanding of the First Principle changed when he composed it and matched its subject. Nature includes ‘what is and what is not’ (Peri. I 441A) and the divine superessential nothingness, beyond all things which are and which are not, is its principle. Periphyseon explicates the structure, and the beginning and end, of the universe through a dialogue between a master, ‘Nutritor’, and his disciple ‘Alumnus’. The pupil is active; he draws out the master’s thought by asking questions and raising real problems and objections. He is well educated, and often represents someone with an entirely Latin, although excellent, education. Perhaps he is Eriugena himself before he awoke to deeper philosophical understanding through his reading, translation, and reflections on the Greeks. Certainly Eriugena remained in dialogue with himself in Periphyseon, just as he had deepened his understanding of the first principle during his advance toward writing it. Since 2003, we have a complete edition of the text giving significantly differing versions owed to Eriugena himself. It shows he left, not a finished canonical work, but a perpetually changing text. He not only kept revising the completed work, but also, because he found digressions and reconsiderations irresistible, he altered as he wrote.

The division of nature, a title generally given to Periphyseon, though not by its author, was intended as the division of the work itself; each division would have corresponded to a Book. This scheme prevailed for the first three Books (Peri. II 529A, III 619D-620A). The fourth Book was begun according to the same plan, although at its start Nutritor confesses that, because of the difficulty of its subject, the smooth sailing of the first three Books is now past (Peri. IV 743C). Nature is completely divided logically, and returns to itself according to the same logic: ‘first, into that which creates and is not created, second into that which is created and creates, third into that which is created and does not create, fourth, that which neither creates nor is created’ (Peri. I 441D). These divisions produce four subjects: 1) God as creator, 2) the primary causes, 3) what is subject to generation in place and time, i.e. the labours of the hexamaeron, including the human—the work of the sixth day—and its Fall. It, as the terminus of the procession, becomes the point of departure for the return into 4) God as end, the final object of investigation. The basic structure, like that of his ontology, is one he, and Latin medievals generally, discerned in Dionysius: MÔNE (remaining), PROODOS (going-out), EPISTROPHÊ (return), but, as Eriugena is explicit in his discussions of the human role in the exit and return, Maximus the Confessor is profoundly important for his reformulation of this structure.

This sketch conceals as much as it reveals, however, most obviously because the anthropology expands itself into what Nutritor confesses is an unplanned fifth book (Peri. IV 860AB). This overflow is the result of a second notion, essential to his system, to which he

---

24 Jeaneau 1996, xi.
also came while writing *Periphyseon*. Drawing upon Gregory of Nyssa, Eriugena came to understand human nature in such a way, that, more than being ‘that in which all things could be found (*inerat*)’, it became ‘that in which all things are created (*condita est*)’ (Zier 1992, 80; cf. *Peri.* IV 807A).²⁶ The human is the workshop of creation (*Peri.* II 531AB, III 733B, V 893BC); it is the medium in which God creates himself and the universe of beings out of his own nothingness precisely because, uniquely among beings, the human possesses all the forms of knowing and ignorance, including sensation. Because everything is through human perception, there are no absolute objects. As in earlier Platonic systems, the forms have become not only thoughts, but forms of apprehension in various kinds of subject; as Plotinus puts it, ‘all things come from contemplations and are contemplations’ (*Enn.ode III 8 [30] 7, 1-2).*²⁷* In Eriugena, there are ‘thinkers who turn out to be objects of thought…[and] objects of thought which turn out to be thinkers’ (Gersh 2006, 156). *Periphyseon* is an interplay of diverse subjectivities looking at the universe from different, even opposed, points of view. The divisions of nature are constituted by human perspectives on God. Because God does not know what he is apart from human reason and sense, these perspectives are theophanies even for God in the human, divine manifestations of which God and the human are co-creators.*²⁸*

The very beginning of *Periphyseon* lets us know that human perspective is fundamental and constitutive. The Nutritor, before explaining why he is treating nature, reveals that the most fundamental division of all things is between what can be perceived by the spirit—his terms are general enough to include sensible perception and conceptual knowing—and what exceeds its grasp. The first are the things which are; the second are what are not (*Peri.* I 441A). Further, immediately after the four divisions are listed and their logical interplay is shown, there is a list of five modes. It describes the primal differences between being which ‘falls within the perception of bodily sense or of the intelligence’, and what, because its excellence flees ‘not only sense but even all intellect and reason’, is not (*Peri.* I 443A). For Eriugena, the non-being of the infinite is positive. Because it has not been thought or sensed, it has not become a defined being with a form, finite and a creature: ‘on account of its ineffable excellence and incomprehensible infinity the Divine Nature is said not to be’ (*Peri.* III 634B).

Because the human is essential to the divine self-knowing and self-creation, human subjectivity with its diverse, even contradictory, perspectives constitutes the objects *Periphyseon* treats. Michael Harrington has outlined how the functioning of this creative subjectivity establishes the divisions of nature. 1) Apart from a perceiving subject, no difference exists between the first and the fourth divisions of nature; they are our contemplations of God as beginning and as end (*Peri.* II 527AB, III 688C–689A). 2) The second and third divisions are also constructions of the human mind, because the ‘mediating’ aspect of nature ‘has two modes of appearance to those contemplating it: first when the divine nature is seen as created and creating…second, when it is seen in the lowest effects of the primordial causes, in which it is created only’ (*Peri.* III 689AB). 3) Within the third division: first, ‘cause and effect are two sides to the same creature—the creature as beyond knowledge, and the creature as manifest to knowledge’. Second, ‘God and creature

---

are two sides of one nature’ (Harrington 1998, 128-9). Nutritor explains: ‘we ought not to understand God and the creature as two things distant from one another, but as one and the same. For both the subsisting creature is in God, and God, in a marvellous and ineffable way, is creating himself in the creature’ (Peri. III 678c). 4) The Fall ‘is history and history is the Fall’ (McGinn 2002, 20). The Fall is no more a temporal event than Paradise, as human perfection, is a place or in a time. The Fall, and thus history, are matters of perspective. Within time humanity shifts back and forth between two opposed definitions of its nature: the human subject sees itself broken up into multiple external temporal objects when engaged in sensation, and is thus fallen, or it may consider its Paradisal unity, and is thus unfallen. For Eriugena, the creation of the world, and, thus, the manifestation of what God is, depend upon the differentiating activity of the human mind, as reasoning and sensing, and, consequently, on the Fall. 5) Eriugena judges that the human ‘in paradise before his sin fell short [of likeness to God] in nothing except in respect of subject’ (Peri. II 585A; cf. IV 778A). Christ exists through himself; the human requires Christ. This difference amounts once again to two perspectives on the same, from above and from below.

**Dialectic and the Categories**

*Periphyseon* has as parts 1) a consideration of whether, and then how, Aristotle’s categories may be predicated of God, together with 2) a hexamaeron, which concludes with 3) a massive eschatology corresponding to the seventh day of rest. Owing to Porphyry, Augustine, and Boethius, thinking about the Aristotelian categories was inescapable for Latin theologians in this period. 29 In part, because *Ten Categories*, as well as being a textbook for lessons in logic, had become a treatise on ontology in the Carolingian schools, Eriugena was able to identify logic and ontology through ideas taken from the Platonism he imbibed in his Patristic authorities. Despite employing standard Aristotelian terminology, he used these Platonic ideas to develop a metaphysics founded in opposition to such Aristotelian commonplaces as: 1) substance is knowable, 2) the distinction between primary and secondary substances, 3) the ontological priority of individuals, and 4) the denial of the real existence of universals. 30

In his *Annotations*, Eriugena had sketched the emanation of the individual out of ‘OUCLA’, or essence, and, at the beginning of *On the Divine Predestination*, he had described philosophy in terms of four dialectical operations by which every question could be solved, and the emergence of things, together with their return to their source, represented: ‘many are separated out of one by division’, ‘one is collected from the many by definition’, ‘by demonstration the hidden is revealed through the manifest’, and ‘by a process of dissolution the composite is resolved into simple things’ (*De praed. I.1 358A*). *Periphyseon* manifests this total movement, in which the stages of the way up and the way down are the same, by reducing the four operations to two, division and resolution:

For all division, which is called by the Greeks *MERISMOS*, seems as if it were a descending from some definite unit down to an infinite number of things, that is to say from the most general to the most specific. All recollection, however, which is, as it were, a return again, beginning from the most specific and ascending to the most general, is called *ANALUTIKÊ*. Thus, it is the return and resolution of individuals

---

into forms, of forms into genera, of genera into \textit{OUCLA}, of substances into the wisdom and prudence, from which every division begins and ends (\textit{Peri}. II 526\textsc{bc}).

Nutritor specifies that this ‘art’ of dialectic ‘returns to that \textit{OUCLA} from which it came out and in which it always desires to rest and around which it revolves with a motion either solely or mostly intelligible’ (\textit{Peri}. V 869\textsc{a}). This circling is not a comprehension; neither the generic \textit{OUCLA}, nor particular substances, are knowable.

This going out and return is also effected by his unification of affirmative (kataphatic) and negative (apophatic) theologies as Dionysius had done, and here, for him, the categories become crucial. In the Dionysian corpus, negative theology dominates the conclusion, the \textit{Mystical Theology}, which raises the soul towards henosis. In contrast, although negation of composition is crucial to the return in Eriugena—treated in the last fifth of \textit{Periphyseon}—he also begins with negation. The greater part of the first Book is devoted to denying that any of the categories can be properly predicated of God. Alumnus concludes: ‘And now at last I understand inconvertibly that God falls into no category’ (\textit{Peri}. I 518\textsc{b}). This elevates God beyond all finitude, so that he is a superessential infinity whose ‘what’ he cannot think by himself. In this respect, the human intellect and the divine are in the same situation. The human intellect is immediately one with the divine starting point; Nutritor quotes Augustine (\textit{De vera rel.} I.5) to the effect that ‘between our mind and the truth by which we understand the Father no creature is interposed’ (\textit{Peri}. II 531\textsc{b}). In consequence, it shares the divine nothingness, and like God, directly knows only that it is, not what it is: ‘For just as God is comprehensible when from the creature it is gathered that he exists, and is incomprehensible because by no human or angelic intellect, not even by his own, can what he is be understood—since he is not any kind of what, but is superessential—so it is only given to the human mind to know that it is; what it is in no way is permitted it’ (\textit{Peri}. IV 771\textsc{bc}).

In Book II, Nutritor judges that the interior image of the trinity in the soul subsists in ‘intellect called \textit{NOUC}, reason (\textit{ratio}) called \textit{LOGOS}, sense called \textit{DIANOIA}’ (\textit{Peri}. II 569\textsc{b}). He goes on to note that, because it is one thing for our nature both to move and to

---

be, both ‘NOUC and OUCLA, i.e. intellect and essence, designate the most excellent part of our nature’ (Peri. II 570A). Next he closely follows the Ambiguities of Maximus into a consideration of the ‘three universal motions of the soul’ which correspond to the image of the trinity in it (Peri. II 572C). By the first, ‘which is simple and surpasses the nature of soul’, it ‘moves around the unknown God’. By reason, within the nature of soul and proper to it, soul ‘defines God as the cause of all things’ (Peri. II 573A). Defining Eriugena treats through the category of place, ‘which does not exist except in the mind’ (Peri. I 475B), it is what makes the knowable by an act of rational circumscription (Peri. I 484BC). This cognition is ‘born’ in reason by the activity in it of the first motion.

The third motion, sense, involves communication back and forth between reason and sensible things (as in Plotinus, V 3 [49] 3, 45, to which this whole discussion is close). It is not essential to the soul, and, when the body dies, it will no longer act. For the motion which is sense, first there is a reception of ‘phantasms of the things themselves through the five exterior senses,’ then, reason, by its activities of gathering, dividing, and ordering, ‘moulds the reasons within itself and makes them conform to itself’ (Peri. II 573AC).

Elsewhere, this work is compared to the way the eternal liberal arts, always already there, are also produced in the human. What the Alumnus touches by his corporeal sense are ‘in a certain way created in me’. Because, as he testifies, when I ‘imprint the phantasms of them in my memory, and when I treat these things within myself, I divide, I compare, and, as it were, I collect them into a certain unity, I perceive a certain knowledge of the things which are external to me being made within me’ (Peri. IV 765C, version V). He compares this becoming to ‘concepts of intelligibles…as for example the concept of the liberal arts’ which only the mind contemplates, and which he understands ‘to be born and become’ in himself (Peri. IV 765D).

God makes all things, including himself, by knowing; ‘to know and to make are one in God. For, by knowing, he makes, and, by making, he knows’ (Peri. II 559B). Ultimately, production is thinking, and thinking is creation, for both God and the human. Thus, in their second kataphatic appearance, the categories are the means by which God and the human come to know what they are, and by which they create themselves and all else. The divine nature:

creates itself in the primordial causes. It begins to appear in its theophanies, willing to emerge from the most hidden recesses of its nature, in which it is unknown even to itself, that is, it knows itself in nothing because it is infinite and supernatural and superessential and beyond everything that can and cannot be understood; but descending into the principles of things and, as it were, creating its very self, it begins to know itself in something (Peri. III 689AB).

In using the categories, the principles of things, as the means of this creating, Eriugena reworks their treatment by Iamblichus, whose surprising step in this is conveyed to him primarily via Dionysius (cf. DN IX) and Maximus. Iamblichus moved the categories into the intelligible realm, maintaining that they applied there analogically (cf. Simplicius, On the Cat. II.9-14). Eriugena assumes this move, takes them to apply there, and then uses the fact that they structure human reasoning, to construct the universe. Michelle Wilband has shown how, for Eriugena, in the kataphatic use of the categories, because of their role in dialectic—separating and gathering, defining and ordering—they are not only intelligible realities, but also are ‘the ultimate constituents of the universe and the only means by which it can be known’ (Wilband 2008, 84).
The most revealing example is Eriugena’s treatment of place. Place exists only in the mind, ‘for if every definition is in art, and all art is in the mind, every place, since place is definition, will necessarily be nowhere else except in the mind’ (Peri. I 475B). To define is to place and to know. For Eriugena, being is not as such knowable. Rather, the defined, the limited, is the knowable. Beings are known as defined, circumscribed by the accidental categories. Without place, God cannot define himself in human reason, but, by this defining, everything comes to be. Defining is placing, circumscription, within God, as the ‘place of places’ (Peri. III 643C). ‘Only God is infinite; everything else is limited by “where” and “when”, that is, place and time.’ Time and place are creatures, but ‘are prior, not temporally, but in respect to creation, to all things that are in the universe’. ‘What contains is prior to that which is contained, in the way that the cause precedes the effect’ (Peri. I 482C).

The simple First causes the universe of things directly through the three motions of the human soul: intellectual, rational, and sensible, rather than through ordered ranks of separate substances. In consequence, hierarchy is flattened out.  

OUCIA is ‘not more fully in the most general genus than in the most particular species, nor is it less in the particular species than in the most general genus’ (Peri. I 492A). Equally, God is ‘wholly beyond all things’ and ‘wholly in all things’, wholly in the sensible and in the intelligible, wholly in the universe as a totality and wholly in its parts. The same is true for ‘human nature in its own world’ (Peri. IV 759AB).

The Nothingness of Substance and the Categories

From two fundamental notions: God creates himself, and God is nothing, Eriugena draws the conclusion that the nothing from which God creates is himself. Unsurprisingly, Alumnus is troubled both by the premises and by the conclusion. The result is a long treatise on nothing (Peri. III 634-688), half of Book III and the midpoint of Periphyseon. Because there is no other from which the universe can be made, Nutritor concludes that ‘God is the nothing of the things which are and which are not’, (Peri. III 687B) not as privative, like matter, but, as infinitely full. Infinite nothingness is not left behind when God creates. Because the human soul is immediately one with its divine starting point, it shares its infinite nothingness, and its sublime ignorance of what it is. The substance of things is also incomprehensible. Gregory of Nyssa provides confirmation that ‘no substance or essence, either of a visible or an invisible creature is able to be comprehended by intellect or reason’ (Peri. I 443B). Nutritor declares that none of the wise inquire as to the ‘what’ of any essence ‘because it cannot be defined except in terms of the circumstances which, so to speak, circumscribe it within limits.’ A list of the accidental categories follows: ‘I speak of place and time, quantity and quality, connection, …’ He goes on to assert that, by these, ‘substance, which is unknown and indefinable in itself, by reason of being a subject [for accidents] is shown, but only as subsisting, not in respect to what it is’ (Peri. II 586D-587A).

Gregory is also the source for another astonishing doctrine: ‘matter is nothing else than a certain composition of accidents which proceeds from invisible causes to visible matter’ (Peri. I 479B; quoting De bom. opif. XXIV). Nutritor recalls this doctrine midway through the treatise on nothing in order to show how what is comes from nothing: ‘for quantities and qualities, although in themselves they are incorporeal, yet when they come

---


together into unity they produce formless matter, which, by the addition of incorporeal shapes and colours, moves into diverse bodies’ (Peri. III 663A, version III). He goes on to consider the consequence of the fact that ‘all bodies come from the elements, but the elements from nothing’ (Peri. III 663C). This brings to mind Aristotle’s consideration of composition out of the elements (Part. Animal. II.1 646a15), perhaps the source of Nyssa’s idea. It recurs in the account of the return, linked to the notion that ‘substances do not depart from their causes but always subsist in them’; ‘from the [accidental] qualities of these substances… this world is fabricated and compacted’ (Peri. V 886CD). This rendition recalls the Proclean doctrines that the effect remains in, as well as proceeds from, and returns to, its cause, and that the First is properly the cause of subsistent being (El. Theo. Props 30, 35, 56, 138-40). In virtue of remaining in the One, substance would share its incomprehensibility. These recollections of Aristotelian and Proclean notions brought to Eriugena by Greek Church Fathers, and made elements in a strikingly original system, suggest again both the extraordinary way by which he came to his philosophical ideas, and his enormous creativity in handling them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations (from Armstrong’s edition)

De praed. = On Divine Predestination
Annot. In Marc. = Commentary on the Marriage of Philology and Mercury by Martianus Capella (ed. Lutz)
De imag. = Translation (into Latin) of Gregory of Nyssa, On the Creation of Humankind (De hominis opificio)
Expos. = Exposition of the Celestial Hierarchies of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite
Hom. = Sermon on the Prologue of the Gospel of St. John (Homilia in Johannem)
Comm. in Iohann. = Commentary on the Gospel of St. John

Supplementary abbreviations
Peri. = On the Division of Nature (Periphyseon)
Trans. Dion. = Translation of the Pseudo-Dionysian Corpus
*****

Works

Fragmentary works are preceded by an asterisk, lost works by double asterisk, and any dubia or spuria by an obelisk (◊).

*Commentary on the Gospel of St. John
Annotations on the Marriage of Philology and Mercury by Martianus Capella
*Glosses on the Marriage of Philology and Mercury by Martianus Capella
Commentary on meter IX of Book III of the Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius.
Commentary on Priscian’s Institutione grammaticae.
Exposition of the Celestial Hierarchies of Dionysius
Glosses on the Bible
Glosses on the Parisian Dionysian Corpus (not inserted by Eriugena)

On Divine Predestination

On the Division of Nature (Periphyseon)

◊ On the Eucharist

Poems [e.g. Starry Halls (Aulae sidereae)]

* Sermon on the Prologue of the Gospel of St. John (Homilia in Johannem)

Translation (into Latin) of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Works

Translation (into Latin) of Gregory of Nyssa, On the Creation of Humankind (De hominis opificio)

Translation (into Latin) of Maximus Confessor, Ambiguities (Ambigua)

Translation (into Latin) of Maximus Confessor, Questions to Thalassius (Questiones ad Thalassium)

** Translation (into Latin) of Basil, Hexaemeron

** Translation (into Latin) of Epiphanius, Anchoratus

Translation (into Latin) of Priscianus Lydus Solutions for Chosroem (Solutiones ad Chrosroem)

** Treatise on the Vision of God

****

Editions and Translations


Secondary Literature


______. (ed.) (1990a) Begriff und Metapher. Sprachform des Denkens bei Eriugena (Heidelberg)


Cappuyns, M. (1933) Jean Scot Eriègne: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée (Louvain)


Erhardt-Siebold, E. von and Erhardt, E. (1940) Cosmology in the Annotations in Marcianum: More Light on Eriugena’s Astronomy (Baltimore)


Gersh, S. (1978) From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden)


______. (ed. and trans.) (1993) Iohannis Scotti Erivgenae Carmina (Dublin)


______. (1987) Études Érigéniennes (Paris)


______. (ed.) (1996) Periphyseon Liber Primus (Turnhout)

______. (ed.) (1997) Periphyseon Liber Secundus (Turnhout)


______. (ed.) (2000) Periphyseon Liber Quartus (Turnhout)


O’Meara, J.J. and Bieler, L. (1973) The Mind of Eriugena (Dublin)


______. (1994a) ‘Hierarchy and Participation in Dionysius the Areopagite and Greek Neoplatonism’, *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 68:1, 15-29


****

*Major secondary works as a guide to further reading*


