The sapiential science of St. Thomas Aquinas is a creative reading of the tradition and does not exist apart from the ordering, interpreting and reconciling of authorities. But, precisely because theology is also with him a scientia beyond lectio, it has a degree of freedom from the condition in which the texts are received and a measure of independence from the often mistaken identifications given to his sources. Still, if we are to understand his discursive manner of thought, and especially his balancing, by a separation and unification, of the opposed powers and authorities within the single "populus christianus", we must at least identify correctly the greater lights of his cosmos. If free and unbiased historical study of Aquinas has been difficult in our time, no area has proved harder to open than this.

The very importance of Aquinas for the history of western thought generally, and for the doctrine of the Roman church particularly, has impeded our understanding even to the point of adding difficulties to the production of critically accurate texts. Thus, the Angelic Doctor is less well provided for in this regard than are St. Bonaventure or St. Albert the Great. Fear of what the Aquinas behind his textual tradition might turn out to say, together with impatience for the decades necessary to acquire the expertise, data, and laborious results for modern critical texts disrupted the work of the Leonine editors.

Aquinas was urgently needed for the present wars against the evils of modernity. Incomprehension of what was required for the task of purifying the spring whose waters would refresh the weary troops was the main problem for the editors. The obstacle was of the opposite kind when historical study both threatened to render impossible the use of Thomism as the centre of a neoscholastic, timeless, deductive, Aristotelian science and also gave evidence that it might undermine the conception of the church this Aristotelian science was to serve. In this circumstance, the intervention of the Holy Office was required, a body which has never shown incomprehension of the implications of intellectual projects.

In our historicist age, neither the Index nor Humani generis were able to sweep back the tide of historical investigation. As a result, if it can be said without self-contradiction, the philosophia perennis is dead, at least as Aristotelian science. We are on the way to a better understanding both of the developments within Aquinas’ thinking and also of the modifications he made by the way he understood his sources to the philosophical and theological amalgam he inherited, to which we give the far too general, and unsatisfactory, name of neoplatonism. Especially important has been the replacement of the picture of Aquinas as the authentic scientific Aristotelian struggling, on his right, against the Augustinian Platonism of his inheritance and of his theologically conservative contemporaries (especially the Franciscans,) and, on his left, against the radical
Aristotelian philosophers of the Faculty of Arts. We shall say nothing about the misinterpretations of his inheritance and of his contemporaries which this picture gives. We point rather to its radical transformation by our growing appreciation of his own neoplatonism, and especially of his positive relation to its Proclan stream.

The basic point having been recognized, despite the investments in representing him as an Aristotelian, we are now estimating how this neoplatonism was transmitted to Aquinas, with many admixtures, through Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite, Boethius, the Liber de causis, other Arabic sources, and finally even from the Elements of Theology itself. Crucial, and terribly difficult to understand are how both Aristotle and his Proclan sources were modified when Aquinas, and those who transmitted Aristotle to him, identified important features of this form of neoplatonism with Aristotelian thinking and how the Proclan tradition was also modified in its transmission to Aquinas. Both its Christianization - especially at the hands of Dionysius and his most important medieval translator, Eriugena, - and its reformulation by its Arabic transmitters are being laboriously studied.

A beginning has been made in rethinking our notions of Thomas' ontology and its sources, and in reconsidering its correlative, the way he structures his teaching. It is equally necessary to advance the beginnings made by Y. Congar, H. de Lubac, and others in respect to his political and ecclesiological doctrine. The conditions of the revival of Thomism by the ruling powers of the Roman church in the second half of the nineteenth century, conditions determinative of the character of Thomistic studies for a century after, were not promising for the disinterested study of this aspect of Thomas' thought. If the discovery of his neoplatonism would make it impossible to use him as the perfecter of an Aristotelian scholastic science, the discovery would also bring unwelcome confusion when used to understand his teaching on the all important institutional questions.

The practical circumstances were pressing indeed. The state had developed from being the institutional embodiment of an autonomous secularity which might seem to be both necessary to and compatible with Christendom. Now, moved by new impulses, at first anti-Christian and anti-clerical, and later even atheist, it had laid siege to the papacy itself. The Roman solution was to concede a secularity compatible with Christendom but to move in the opposite direction ecclesiologically. There would be no new Gallicanism. The autonomy conceded to national states would not be granted to their national churches. Rather, the centralizing tendencies in modern society would be exploited for the benefit of an hierarchically centralized, papal church. Happily, it appeared that the anti-Augustinian Aristotelian Aquinas could serve to provide the reasons for both of these contrary campaigns. It assists neither if rather his thinking about both the political and the ecclesial hierarchies is given a unity by the triadic, complex and hypostatizing mediatorial logic of Proclus rendered Christian by pseudo-Dionysius, his disciples and interpreters.
Dionysius is certainly the origin of the language of all our discourse about hierarchy, but in fact, he speaks of only one hierarch, the bishop, who by liturgical acts creates a sacramental world distinct from the profane. The general tendency of his thought is not only to gather all order moving graciously toward us from above in a single sacral hierarch, but also to make the presence of the celestial order with us sensible and historically concrete. The consequence is that Christian society will be conceived as a hierocracy with a single apex. It is possible then that the hierocrat whom the Dionysian tradition makes intelligible will be quite different from Denys' own episcopal hierarch. Denys' divine hierarch is both the link with the originating hierarchy above and also he is the source, and governing power of the sacred order below him. When imposed upon the institutional history of western Christianity this language and logic proves capable of considerable adaptation, but it also exercises a force on that historical development itself.

The history of Dionysius' impact on western institutional development is long, complex and remains unwritten. Certainly, in the seventeenth century, Denys' conceptions still moved the Cardinal de Bérulle, his associates, and disciples in the "French School". But, by this time, the Apostle of France seems only to be able to exert a direct power on self-aware devotées in relation to questions of ecclesiastical order and spiritual life. It was, however, otherwise at the beginning, which followed immediately on the translation of his works by Hilduin and Eriugena in the ninth century. We might sum up the history from that point to the end of the thirteenth century crudely, as follows. The first medieval use of the Dionysian manner of thinking imagined society as a triad of labourer, warrior and priest and identified the sacral monarch with the episcopally anointed king. In the twelfth century, what belonged to the king is transferred by Christian theologians, like Hugh of St. Victor and Honorius Augustodunensis, to the Roman Pontiff, and the single apex of the two hierarchies is known as the Vicar of Christ. From the time of Pope Boniface VIII, who bridges the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, these two Christian absolutisms oppose each other to the death. From this time there is a fundamental change in both form and content. A new medium for the new polemic appears: the ecclesiological tract. These "were heavily dominated and shaped by a one-sided consideration of the institutional aspect" of the church. The shift has begun from a Dionysian système du monde in which Christian society is understood in terms of the descent and self-return of the celestial hierarchy through the ecclesiastical and civil hierarchies to the more limited Dionysian mystical spiritualité of the seventeenth century. Simple enough such a scheme is. But locating Aquinas within it proves difficult indeed. Because "his fundamental ecclesiological outlook" is richly theological rather than "predominantly juridical, political and sociological," and because he wrote no treatise on the church, Thomas is not to be numbered among the fourteenth century polemicists. However, his followers are to be found on both sides of the fourteenth century confrontation. Most tempting for the scholar seeking to define his position, a mediating position does develop.
This middle way has at least part of its basis in the language and idea of the political which Aquinas correctly finds in Aristotle, and it is the conception which Leo XIII will reach back to use in the nineteenth century emergency. The church has only, in this view, a *potestas indirecta* in the secular realm. The two hierarchies have no single earthly apex who can exercise power directly in both. John of Paris, an early Thomist writing against Boniface VIII before the publication of *Unam sanctam*, has long been recognized to have held such a view, though importantly, recent commentators judge him not to be a faithful Thomist. The political and the ecclesial hierarchies are each founded in the celestial realm; neither can constitute the other here below. But John of Paris seems to be opposing another Thomist, an early defender of Aquinas against the distortions of his adversaries, Giles of Rome, whose tract, *De Ecclesiastica Potestate*, is more absolute in its papalism than even *Unam sanctam*. Where shall we locate their common master? Aquinas certainly knows, understands, and uses the Dionysian conception of hierarchy in respect to all order in heaven and earth, and he does describe the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff, as priest-king, and apex of both powers.

Thomas' thinking on institutional order is pulled then in contrary directions by the Aristotelian and Dionysian logics which do seem to be really opposed - though we shall find that Aquinas will actually bring them together at one point at least. Moreover, the textual evidence in respect to how the secular and sacred hierarchies are united in the Supreme Pontiff may seem ambiguous enough that either one text may be interpreted through another (as apparently Cardinal Bellarmine did in order to place Aquinas with the advocates of the *potestas indirecta*) or some may be declared spurious (the more usual practice in our time, and the one actually employed by I. T. Eschmann, pursuing the same end as Cardinal Bellarmine). There are opposed logics, opposed texts in Thomas, pressing political and intellectual emergencies all but overwhelming his nineteenth and twentieth century interpreters. The prospect for understanding is grim, but then, to make matters worse, an intellectual red herring is dragged through the situation: the "augustinisme politique". It ascribes to the Augustinian tradition that hierocratic tendency toward the unification of both hierarchies which in fact belongs to the Proclan and Dionysian current within Thomas' own thinking. Thus, this tendency inherent to him becomes external, foreign to the Aristotelian scholastic. This "augustinisme" is a scapegoat on which may be heaped those features of Aquinas' thought which are incompatible with the otherwise hardly possible task of justifying both a secular autonomy *vis a vis* the hierocrat and the immediate exercise of his *plenitude potestatis* everywhere in the church.

The reasons compelling the creation of yet another pseudo-Augustinianism, and this not an invention of those unenlightened either by Renaissance learning or Enlightenment criticism, but by twentieth century scholars of medieval history, are not yet fully clear. But we must assume that an intellectual fantasy imagined by scholars of the stature of P. Mandonnet, E. Gilson, and H.-X. Arquillière, and which lingers still both despite utter annihilation at the hands of H. de Lubac, and in spite of a constructed and documented
alternative offered by Y. Congar, has some necessity. Surely such a fiction of historical scholarship succeeds, as Jaroslav Pelikan observes of pseudonymity, "only if it manages to set down on paper what everyone - or at least the 'right people' - will recognize as truth." The absorption of the proper independence of the state into "le droit ecclésiastique" by the medieval hierocrats is supposed to lie in:

\[ \text{et une tendance, fort bien analysée, entre autres par le P. Mandonnet et par M. Gilson à absorber l'ordre naturel dans l'ordre surnaturel. Cette propension est à l'origine de que j'ai appelé l'augustinisme politique.} \]

Thus, the question is at root one of the relation of nature and grace.

Here, indeed, we encounter that aspect of the doctrine of Augustine which had caused havoc in the western church since the Reformation. Perceived inadequacies in this area had led, along with other reasons, to the condemnation of ontologism: an Augustinianism which was also both the last great ecclesiastical Platonism and, as well, a positive approach to modern idealism. The Roman Church chose instead to oppose idealism with the uncompromising realism of an Aristotelian Aquinas. But, the first great victory of the historians of theology over the neoscholastic Thomists was the demonstration that Aquinas had never conceived of the pure state of nature which scholasticism had erected in the war against Protestantising Augustianism inside and outside the Roman church. This creates a problem. If nature were less completely separated from grace in Aquinas than the originators of the Thomistic revival thought, what was the future for the supposed Thomistic teaching on church and state since it had been conceived according to the same logic? The problems within Thomas' teaching, if he is to serve the purposes for which thinking in accord with him was revived and given official status in the church, are ascribed to an opposing Augustinianism instead. Certainly there was no conspiracy, but intellectual fantasies have, like some dreams, the energy of needful desire.

The Cardinal de Lubac attacks the "augustinisme politique" directly on two fronts - he had many years earlier been one of the handful who set out in the successful campaign waged by the historians of doctrine against the neoscholastic, supposedly Thomist, teaching on nature and grace. One might speak of this final sortie as a "clean up operation" by the victorious "new theologians". On the one hand, he shows that the hierocratic political doctrine has no basis in the teaching of Augustine, who distinguished well between the celestial city and the institutional church, and who has a strong sense for the reality, the necessity, and even the goodness of an independent secular power, as given in fact by divine providence. On the other hand, the Cardinal indicates not only that those accused of being Augustinian in politics use the authority and arguments of Aristotle, though his influence is supposed to counter this error, and also that they employ, as well, the authority and arguments of the pseudo-Dionysius. At this point,
Father de Lubac's observations about these medieval theorists join the outline of a history of the church understood as hierarchy sketched by Father Yves Congar.

We begin by agreeing with Father de Lubac's conclusions, proceed to draw them out a little further, and go on by bringing the results to bear on our understanding of Thomas Aquinas. If it is possible and necessary to distinguish, as de Lubac and Congar do, the Augustinian and Dionysian conceptions of Christian institutions, they were soon assimilated to one another. It was natural for medievals to believe that these great authorities must be concordant. Often, perhaps generally until the sixteenth century, the Augustinian positions were absorbed into a fundamentally Dionysian logic. R. A. Markus has discerned a fundamental shift from Augustine's understanding of the sacred and secular in the first Latin author whom we know to have read Dionysius.

While Professor Markus does not attribute this shift to Gregory the Great's understanding of Denys, it is surely at least fateful that another modern historian has assigned the same (or like) cause for an analogous shift in Boethius' sense of the world - Boethius being another early source for the west of Proclan neoplatonism. Professor Markus writes:

Augustine's theology of power was born of a need to interpret within a Christian perspective the facts of secular power, especially as embodied in the Roman Empire. In a significant sense 'secular' authority and institutions had vanished from Gregory's world ... Gregory's image of the Church of his own age is that of a community of believers which has absorbed earthly power into its' being, and he can envisage no reversal of this condition until the time of the final persecution in the last days preceding the end. ... The line which once divided the earthly powers from the Church now runs within the Church, between the true and the false Christians ...

Perhaps the origins of Leo XIII's problems lie in a "gregorienisme politique".

Certainly, then, there are in the western tradition, of which Aquinas is an heir, tendencies to absorb earthly power into the church, to institutionalize the celestial city, and to mediate the saving divine order through a unified sacral hierarchy, but it will not serve understanding to locate their sources in Augustine or Augustinianism. From Hippo's great bishop, the west learns that Providence governs the earthly, so that evil cannot prevail, because the spiritual is higher and stronger. As the soul is to the body, so the celestial spirits are to the earthly. Further, as there are ontological inequalities between the governing celestial and the earthly realms, between the rightly ordered ruling soul and the body, so fundamental inequalities are given in the relations between humans. These elements necessary to what Dionysius will call hierarchy, Augustine teaches. But just the most general principles of neoplatonic hierarchy derive from Hippo. Moreover, we will not find there either an elaborated revelation of the order of pure spirits, or the development of mediating ranks within a strongly unified system of descending causal powers, or the tendencies to externalize, embody and institutionalize the invisible holy
city of saints and angels, or even, quite specifically, a "divine" bishop. Not only will Hippo
not supply these doctrines of the Areopagus, but Augustine often leads thought in
contrary directions.

We have noted already dualities given in Augustine which do not come together in a
Proclan or Dionysian third: the celestial city of saints and angels and the earthly
institutional church, that same church and the state each independently given by God's
good providence. There is also Augustine's leading of the soul from science to wisdom,
from what is lower and external to what is higher and therefore intellectual and inner.32
Further, Augustine definitely places the bishop within the church as a servant member, a
sinner, a lamb of the flock, a son of the divine Father, a hearer of the Word. Though the
bishop is also a priest, pastor, father and preacher, he is not the perfect or divine hierarch,
the causally mediating link between the heavenly and the earthly orders, the point where
the lowest rank of heaven touches the highest pinnacle of earth.33 Finally, there is in
Augustine a gracious Christocentric humanism which is able to invert the natural
subordination of humans to angels, indeed to overthrow the hierarchy of creatures
generally, and which certainly functions at some points in western intellectual and
institutional history to reverse Dionysius.34

To identify the lights in Aquinas' cosmos by which he will determine the nature of the
ecclesiastical and secular hierarchies and how they come together, it is not enough to
point to what emanates from Aristotle, Gregory, Augustine, Proclus and Dionysius.
Beyond Scripture, Pope Gelasius, the canon law, the so-called 'Patristic Presbyterianism',
and the revolution consequent on the rise of the mendicants require at least a moment's
attention.

We shall not enter the long history of the interpretation of Pope Gelasius on the two
swords except to note that he opens the possibility for others to make the two one in two
ways. First, in the Epistula ad Anastasium itself, there is room for a unification by
subordination because tanto gravius pondus est sacerdotum: there is the far greater
weight of the priesthood. Second, in his On the bond of anathema, while only Christ
himself is truly both priest and king after his coming, what is one in him may be
participated by his members.35 It scarcely needs saying that "participation" allows
Gelasius to be assimilated into the Dionysian hierarchical thinking. We shall find
Aquinas unifying the two powers by both of these possible routes.

The other elements in this list, when taken together, move Aquinas toward a vision of the
church as essentially, but not totally, papal. That is to say, without the pope there is
certainly no jurisdiction in the church, and its infallibility is a gift of Christ to it though
Peter and his successors, but the pope does not create the other orders in the ecclesia.36
S. Chodorow draws together St. Bernard of Clairvaux and canon law as follows:
Gratian said the same thing [as Bernard] in the opening dictum of the Tractatus ordinandum: Christ instituted the greater and the lesser priests in the Church. This idea - that the pope was only the highest of the powers in the hierarchy and that the authority of the lesser ranks could not be denied without contradicting divine law - was the foundation of Gratian's theory of judicial power in the Church.37

As a mendicant, it is in Thomas' interest to justify a universal and immediate papal jurisdiction enabling the wandering friars to minister everywhere. Yet, though he compares the church to a single diocese and treats it as one political community, he does not reduce it to one diocese:

He defended the ecclesiastical rights of the Mendicants not by direct appeal to the pope's immediate jurisdiction in every part of the universal church, but by appealing to a bishop's power in his own diocese, that is to the episcopal jurisdiction. G. Sabra is not able to determine why Aquinas chose this line of argument, but, significantly for our consideration of mediation as a divine law, he notes: "it is not surprising that he did so, given his characteristic insistence on secondary causality and mediation in all aspects of life."38

A peculiar current of medieval thought, deriving from comments by St. Jerome, elevated sacerdotal power and dignity because, by priestly prayers, Christi corpus sanguisque conficitur. Some theologians drew the conclusion that the episcopate was not a distinct order, but only a power of jurisdiction. The relation of the priest to the verum corpus, as distinguished from the jurisdictional hierarchy's care for the corpus mysticum, is yet another force preventing the collapse of ecclesiastical order into the papal head. Priesthood, and its making of the true body, are God's gifts to the church and his continuing direct work in it. Early texts of Aquinas show the influence of 'Patristic Presbyterianism' on him. But his mature works definitely assert that the episcopate is a distinct order. Importantly, scholars discern in this development the growing impact of the ecclesiology of the pseudo-Dionysius on Thomas' thinking.39

For those attempting to unite these different and sometimes opposed sources, traditions and elements of political and ecclesial theory, the Proclan and Dionysian logic will be attractive. Above all, unlike the binary thinking of Augustine and Gelasius, the triadic logic is dynamic, it is the logic of the activity by which all things are derived from and return to their single source. It does not leave the two given opposed realities in their unresolvable communion and conflict. It both demands the existence of the difference, the other, which, as we have just seen, is in fact given in the received tradition, and also transforms it into the per media, the middle or means through which the highest, the one self-diffusive source, draws what is lowest, the furtherest manifestation of the one, back to itself. Metaphysically, it is attractive to those who would finally get free of an uncreated matter - there is no ultimate duality.40 Applied to institutions its virtue proves to be terribly dangerous. Per media it takes account of the existence of the other side. The
protagonists of the pope have given a necessary place to the secular power, the protagonists of the king make a place for the church. The trouble is that the medium is means or instrument; ultimately the dynamic process is a reduction. If the reduction took place only in a hidden beyond, in the ascended Christ, priest and king, war here below might be avoided, but this is not so.

The Dionysian logic is both so attractive, and also so dangerous for peace, because it assimilates so much of what is inherited in the western tradition. Besides giving a logical necessity to the factually given other, whether it be the earthly, the secular or the sacerdotal (to look at the matter from the perspective of the ecclesial hierarch), besides abundantly supplying the vision of the heavenly order on which the earthly is modeled and showing the connections of these two orders, and besides providing the reasons for inequalities ontological and social, it has a place for what we have called the "gregorienisme politique". There is in the Dionysian thinking a movement outward and downward to scientia, the sensible, the external, historical and particular. There are two movements. There is both exitus and rebitus. While in Denys' ecclesiastical hierarchy, there is only one hierarch, the bishop, and only one place of action, the church in its liturgical life, the divine order operates through his actions in space and time and the fundamental logic does not in principle exclude the drawing of the secular power into his activity as another of his media. It belongs to the Dionysian logic that the authorities and powers leading humanity back to the heavenly city must have an earthly external coincidence. Their conflict in this sphere and in these terms cannot then be avoided.

So it is that the only authority other than holy Scripture cited by Boniface VIII in Unam sanctam is the the pseudo-Dionysius: “Nam secundum B. Dionysius lex divinitatis est infima per media in suprema reduci.” All things are not led back equally and immediately to their source, but mediately, according to their proper order. The greater dignity and nobility of the spiritual in respect to the earthly power requires that, for the good to be done, the spiritual must direct the earthly as its subordinated means. The practical conclusion intended is the obedience of kings to popes. In this way, Dionysius enfolds Augustine, Gregory, Gelasius and the canon law.

The same text ascribed to, and in truth ultimately derived from the Areopagite, had been employed for the same end by Boniface's supporter, Giles of Rome. His hastily written and unpolished De Ecclesiastiae Potestate, which is thought to have appeared just before the promulgation of Unam sanctam, contains a substantial exposition of the doctrine of Denys on the relation of the celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchies and cites the Liber de causis in support of Dionysian doctrine. Another papalist tract, the De Regimine Christiano, also cites Denys, though not the passage in Unam sanctam. Yet one quotation attracts our interest since the argument is in part identical with that in the first proposition of Proclus' Elements of Theology: the title of chapter 3 is "Quod regnum ecclesie est unum et quomodo et per quid". The argument procedes thus:
Ostendendum est autem primo, quod regnum ecclesie est unum. Quod ex hoc patet: nam omnis multitudo participat aliqualiter uno. Alioqui multitudo ipsa confunderetur et distraheretur, ut philosophi probant. Unde beatus Dyonisius, ultimo capitulo "de divinis nominibus", ait quod non est multitudo non participans uno. 44

However, the use of Dionysius lex divinitatis by papalists is not finished. François de Meyronnes, responding either to Dante or Aquinas, employs it to the same ends as Boniface in his Quaestio de Subjectione and explains its place in Unam sanctam in his commentary on that work. Naturally enough, given the medieval acceptance of Dionysius’ identification of himself with St. Paul’s Athenian convert, de Meyronnes understands him to be explaining the Apostle of the gentiles:

Notandum etiam quod ista ratio sumpta a Dyonisio et est ad propositum principale, et est declaratio eius quod Apostolus dixerat. Dicebatur enim për Apostolum: potestates a Deo sunt et ordinate sunt; cum ergo dubitari posset quomodo ordinate sunt potestates et res aliae que sunt in universo, ideo Dominus Papa declarat per Dyonisium potestates et alia que videmus in universo ordinata esse, quia infima per media, inferiора per superiorа ad ordinem reducuntur.45

But the same text and the same fundamental logic can be used by the other side. As we have noted, Dante avoids Dionysius in his De Monarchia but his Aristotle is the neoplatonist of the Liber de causis. Indeed, at I, xv he ascribes to Aristotle a view which the Philosopher thinks inappropriate to the political and which he criticises Plato for applying in that context. Dante’s quotation is:

Propter quod in omni genere rerum illud est optimum quod est maxime unum ut Phylosopo placet in hiis De simpliciter ente.46

By such a reasoning, Dante concludes that the secular monarchy flows from the divine unity sine ullo medio.

John of Paris, however, asserts the proper autonomy of the secular authority, not only using Dionysius but indeed the very regula or lex which is authoritative for Boniface, Giles and de Meyronnes. This is a remarkable feat because, as A.P. Monahan remarks,

As long as unqualified acceptance was given to the principle that all things must be subordinated to one, there was no logical escape from the doctrine that the temporal must be subordinated to the spiritual, whose ultimate unitary embodiment was the papacy.47

Moreover, he agrees with Dionysius "in ecclesiastica hierarchia" that the laity, with their kings, are in the lowest rank, though perfectible, as compared to the various ranks of the perfected and perfecting clergy:
Quidort succeeds by returning to the original character of the Dionysian hierarch: he is an exclusively ecclesiastical figure and by his liturgical acts creates a purely spiritual community. At chapter III, "De ordine ministrorum ad unum summum et quod non est tam necesse omnes principes ad unum reduci sicut ministros Ecclesie ad unum supremum", there is an important citation of Dionysius. The sacramental realm is constituted by the bishop and reserved to him, but, precisely on this account, it is separated from the secular.

Thus, the mediating powers in the world are separated into purely spiritual and purely secular hierarchies. But according to the doctrine of Denys the supreme cannot lead the lowest except per media. Therefore the highest in each hierarchy, kings and popes, are without the means to subordinate either sphere to the other. The hierarchies are one only in the celestial realm:

Constat autem secundum doctrinam eiusdem Dionysii quod infimi non reducuntur ad supremos nisi per medios nec suprmi perficient hierarchiae infimos immediate sed mediantibus mediis. Igitur summus pontifex non habet potestatem generalem et immediatem super laicis nisi quantum habet medii de hierarchia immediata et magis contracta, ut episcopi vel abbates.

Dionysius is turned against the hierocratic doctrine of the papalists to free the spiritual and secular hierarchies from mutual interference. Which kind of Dionysian is Thomas Aquinas? Are John of Paris and Dante his true disciples? or are rather Aegidius Romanus and Pope Boniface VIII his faithful followers?

M. F. Griesbach has shown clearly that Jean of Paris when using St. Thomas omits those portions of crucial texts from the Commentary on the Sentences and the De Regno which ascribe to the Roman Pontiff a regale sacerdotium.

In describing the origin and nature of the sacerdotium John begins with an almost verbatim transcription of a famous passage in the De Regno of St. Thomas "..[S]ince eternal life is attainable only through divine grace...[leading men to it] must belong to that King who is not only man but also God - Jesus Christ, Himself." At this point where Aquinas goes on to conclude: "Unde ab eo regale sacerdotium derivatur" Quidort abruptly drops the text of the De Regno.

As we have already seen, Quidort concedes to the Pope only a supremacy among the ministers of the church and the office of the principal vicar of Christ in spiritual matters.
His transformation of *In II Sententiarum*, distinction 44, *expositio textus, ad 4* has the same effect. Professor Griesbach concludes that Jean Leclercq, Cardinal Bellarmine and others are incorrect in joining Aquinas and Quidort as common teachers of the *potestas indirecta*.

Certainly Professor Griesbach is right in his assertion that *De Potestate Regia et Papali* is not another description of the hierarchical organization of a Christian world into one sacral society. There is no *regale sacerdotium*, no *Summas Sacerdos* to whom "all the kings in Christendom are subject as to our Lord Jesus Christ."52 He is also quite right to point out that Aquinas does unite kingship and priesthood in the *summus sacerdos*, the Roman Pontiff, and that this is required by his subordination of the secular to the spiritual power as its means:

since the end of civil society, only an intermediate end, is itself ordained to the ultimate end, which is the concern of the spiritual authority, political power is subsumed under the supreme spiritual ruler.53

In this view Aquinas is the true teacher of the *potestas indirecta* because he derives the pope's regal power from his spiritual supremacy. He is not directly a secular ruler; the pope will not ordinarily exercise secular power directly - the Papal States are an exception.

We are inevitably drawn toward the conclusion that Thomas is a Dionysian in the tradition of Aegidius Romanus and Pope Boniface rather than of Quidort. This inclination grows toward conviction when we discover, first, that the Leonine editors have concluded against I.T. Eschmann that the *De Regno* is a genuine work of Aquinas and, second, that in ecclesiological matters, at least, the influence of Dionysius on Thomas increases - countering the 'Patristic Presbyterianism'.54 We can neither eliminate the *De Regno*, nor interpret it through the early *Commentary on the Sentences*. It is the developed doctrine of the mature Aquinas that in order for humans to obtain the supernatural end of eternal life, the royal priesthood of the God-man Jesus Christ must have an earthly embodiment in a *regale sacerdotium*, ordering the earthly to the heavenly, the secular to the spiritual and thus all the kings of the Christian people are subject to the Roman Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ, as to the Lord Jesus Christ himself.

Aquinas knows the *lex divinitatis* of Dionysius and it is a rule for him from the beginning to the end of his writing. To give only representative examples, it is a principle of his thought in such major works as the *Commentary on the Sentences*, the *Disputed Questions*, and the *Summa Theologiae*.55 It, and derivative or like rules, require there to be intermediaries ordering the various series through which God operates: the angelic hierarchy, physical causes, virtues, human communities.56 It is *immobiliter firmata* or *inviolabiliter stabilita*.57 As with François de Meyronnes, Aquinas regards it as explicating St. Paul in *Romans 13* on the divinely established order. It is after all the law of divinity.58 Like his successors, Aquinas supports it with congruent principles drawn from the *Liber
de causis. So, for example, the same metaphysical rule, drawn in that source from Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, which Dante uses in the *De Monarchia*, appears as an authority in the important discussion of institutional questions found in the forty-fourth distinction of the *In II Sententiarum*. However, finding evidence of the pervasive and decisive authority of Dionysius’ inviolably established divine law in Aquinas is easier than tracing its source in Dionysius himself.

The editors of St. Thomas’ works derive it from many places in Denys, though the wisest of them are content with the references Aquinas himself gives. However, having pursued all of them with the help of Chevallier’s *Dionysiaca*, I am required to say that the formula is not found in the forms used by Aquinas anywhere in the Latin texts of Denys available to the thirteenth century. Similar formulae for the Dionysian law are, however, to be found in Aquinas’ contemporary St. Bonaventure and in St. Albert the Great, who both taught him to read Denys and also outlived him. Is Albert the formulator of the law? The intellectual substance of the *lex divinitatis*, though not the formulae for it as given by Albert, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Jean de Paris, Aegidius Romanus, Boniface VIII and François de Meyronnes, is to be found in Hugh of St. Victor’s *Commentariorum in Hierarchiam Coelestem S. Dionysii Areopagite*. Hugh is also a principal authority for many of the papalist tracts, certainly for Aegidius and François.

The theologians just listed share an understanding of the law requiring mediation in the divine operations which goes back at least to Hugh of St. Victor. Only one of these, John of Paris, when applying this general principle to questions on the relation of the civil and ecclesiastical hierarchies, reaches further back to the actual character of the ecclesiastical hierarch as described by Dionysius. Only John resists the impulse to combine the general neoplatonic tendency to refer everything to a higher unity with the specific Dionysian requirement that the unity save humans through externalization in historical sensible reality which together arrive at a result different from that of the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* itself. The ecclesiastical hierarch of Dionysius and John is a sacred figure, separated from profane things, constituting a sacramental world through liturgical acts. Denys’ bishop has no secular authority. His power derives from his contemplative knowledge of and union with the celestial order. Nothing is said in Denys about the hierarch’s relation to the civic order or to worldly power. Aquinas, in contrast, belongs securely to the general tradition stemming from Hugh of St. Victor in this matter. He engages in no philological or historical critical search for the original Dionysian hierarch in distinction from the pontifical priest-king of Hugh and his hierocratic papalist successor. It is as part of this general tradition that St. Thomas' teaching on the union of church and state is best understood.

One major question remains for us in defining Thomas' place within the Victorine branch of the Dionysian tradition on that union. That salvation requires a subordination of temporal to spiritual power is already clear, as is Aquinas’ view that these powers are united in the Roman Pontiff. It remains to consider whether the Vicar of Christ can direct
temporal rulers universally or only within the Papal States. In an important article on the
classical character of Christendom and the papal *plenitudo potestatis*, Gerhart Ladner attempted to
show that Aquinas restricted the papal jurisdiction. The "*plenitudo potestatis*...is the full
sovereignty of the ruler in his realm". But the papal realm is, with the exception of the
Papal States, spiritual and sacerdotal. The *apex potestatis*, the unity of both powers, is the
form of his *plenitudo potestatis* only in the *Patrimonium Petri*. I. T. Eschmann takes this
course when interpreting In II Sententiarum 44. Sustaining this interpretation depends
for him on showing the *De Regno* to be spurious. His judgement is no longer
tenable.

In my view D. Bigongiari has given us an account based on all the decisive texts which
makes impossible the position of Professor Ladner, and of those who, since Cardinal
Bellamine, would make Aquinas teach a *potestas indirecta* for the pope. His exposition
runs along the following lines.

The old days in which kings could stand against Christ are past: *in isto tempore reges sunt
vassalli Ecclesiae*. The pope possesses this general lordship of the church. Indirect
power in respect to the temporal is for lesser prelates. The Christian church is one
body and has one head, Christ, who operates through his vicar, the Roman Pontiff: "in
uno speciali populo unius ecclesiae requiritur unus episcopus, qui sit totius populi
caput".

But Thomas’ argument here is political. The church, like any other political body, is best
served by having a single head. Aquinas, who conceives the papal hierocracy in a
traditional Victorine form, is also the Aristotelian who respects the integrity of the
political.

... St. Thomas stresses...the stability of the political order. For its sake the church refrains
from going the whole length in imposing this God-given authority ... over the natural
state....the pope ordinarily exercises no immediate jurisdiction. He does not wield the
two swords. One of them, that of earthly justice, he hands over to the secular ruler who is
to unsheath it, however, at his beck (*ad nutum*).

It is crucial to grasp that this restraint is not compelled by the nature of the papal
authority or power but is prudential. This is made clear by what will be our last text in
which the Dionysian hierarch and Aristotle’s politician meet.

The *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem* defends the mendicants against their
enemies. These seek to maintain the older structures of ecclesiastical institutions
(including the universities) and entrenched rights against the new orders. The
mendicants will be served by a strengthened papacy: the power by which they were
established and which can assist their universal mission against parochial interests. The
subtlety and richness of Thomas’ argument is indicated by the fact that he exalts the papal
authority by means of the episcopal. Moreover, he does this by assimilating both to the hierarch of Denys' *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. This is consistent with, and indeed necessary to, the conception of the apex of that hierarchy which is common to Hugh of St. Victor and his heirs in the Dionysian tradition.

The *Contra Impugnates* was written during the period when the place of the mendicants in the universities was threatened, especially in Paris, the location of most of Thomas' university teaching. The papal power was the best hope against those who would exclude the Dominicans from this vitally important centre of their ministry. Thomas concludes that the pope exercises a direct power in the universities as the heir of the ruler of the Greek polis:

*Ad eum enim qui regit rem publicam pertinent ordinaire de nutritionibus ad inventionibus iuvenum in quibus exercesi debeant, ut dicitur in X Ethicorum; unde et politica ut in I Ethicorum dicitur "ordinat quas disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus et quales unumquemque oportet addiscere et usquequo". Et sic patet quod ordinate de studio pertinet ad eum qui praest rei publicae, et praecipue ad auctoritatem apostolicae sedis qua universalis Ecclesia gubernatur, cui per generale studium providetur.*

Aquinas reasons that because Aristotle regarded regulation of the education of the young as a prerogative of the ruler of the commonwealth, he assigned the judgement as to what sciences should be studied in the state, and which and how much of these each citizen should learn, to the art of politics. The pope as ruler of the whole Christian republic, i.e. the whole Christian church, has inherited this perogative and the right to make these judgements. By this argument the papal power is extended *ad cathedram*, the teacher's chair. This is a direct power. Aquinas does not indicate that any of the prerogatives of the ruler of the commonwealth or judgements belonging to the political art are in principle outside the power of the *summus sacerdos*. The shedding of blood necessary to the wielding of the secular sword is not compatible with the priestly sacrifice. So secular rulers wield this sword for and at the beck of the priest.

The secular sword remains in his power. In general, it seems to be only when the priest-king is fully educated, theoretically and practically, in the art of politics that he will know how and where to delegate his *plenitudo potestatis*, or, indeed, what lies outside it. History would seem to be the school in which the Dionysian hierocrat will learn the Aristotelian political art and the exercise of political prudence. Aquinas serves that education by teaching the hierocrat more Aristotle, but he himself is no more an Aristotelian than a Dionysian and he and his hierocratic intellectual companions are at least as much Aristotelians and Dionysians as they are all Augustinians.

June 30, 1992

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**Notes**
1. M. D. JORDAN, Ordering Wisdom. The Hierarchy of Philosophical Discourses in Aquinas, Publications in Medieval Studies iv, (Notre Dame, 1986), passim; A. MACINTYRE, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1988); IDEM, Three Ideal Versions of Moral Inquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition, The Gifford Lectures, 1988 (London, 1990), the treatment of Aquinas in both. My solution to the problem of handling the vast bibliography on almost every matter touched in this article is to refer only to the most recent work unless it does not provide access to the earlier literature or unless reference must be made to a specific point in something older.


5. AAS, 42 (1952), 56ff; AAS 34 (1942), 37.

6. But, see note 25 below.


Bérulle, (Paris, 1959). Despite this enthusiastic following of Denys, the Christocentric reversal treated polemically by Milet, and carefully by others listed here is, in my judgement, finally a return to Augustine which occurred in Bérulle's controversy with the Protestants. But this needs a demonstration of its own.


14. For the transition see BERNARD of CLAIRVAUX, who seems to reflect Denys only through Gregory the Great: De Consideratione ad Eugenium Papam, Santi Bernardi Opera, ed J. Leclercq, H.M. Rochais, iii (Rome, 1963), III, 17-18 (p. 444) and LV, 17 (pp. 480-81), the latter reference has an important quotation from Boethius, useful comments are in S. CHODOROW, Christian Political Theory and Church Politics in the Mid-Twelfth Century. The Ecclesiology of Gratian's Decretum, (Berkeley, 1972), 180-83 and J. PELIKAN, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300), The Christian Tradition 3 (Chicago, 1978), 198-9, HUGH of SAINT VICTOR, Commentariorum in Hierarchiam Celestem S. Dionysii Areopagite secundum interpretationem Joannis Scoti, (PL 175, 924-1154) and De Sacramentis fidei, II, II. 2-4 (PL 176, 416 ff.) on whom see ZINN, note 13 above, and ROQUES, 1962, note 8 above; HONORIUS AUGUSTODUNENSIS, Gemma Animae (PL 172) especially I, chapters vii, xv, lxxii, lxxiii, clxii - cxxxvi where the bishop, and above all the pope, has taken into and upon himself the imperial power and ornaments, and Summa Gloria, Libelli de Lite 3, MGH (Hanover, 1897), 63-80 where is taught: c. 14. "Quod soli sacerdotes olim populum regebant", c. 15 "Quod Christus non regem, sed sacerdotem constituit", c. 18 "Quod accelia sibi reges constituit", c. 22 "Quod rex consensu episcoporum sit constituyendum", c. 23 "Quod quilibet presbyter dignior sit rege" and c. 27 "Quod regibus non semper sit obediendum". Honorius is a disciple of the Dionysian Eriugena; see on him DUBY, 300-10 and C. MORRIS, The Papal Monarchy. The Western Church from 1050 - 1250 (Oxford, 1989), 206. In general there are W. ULLMAN, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, (London, 1961), 46 - 51 and E.H. KANTOROWICZ, The Kings Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval Political Theory, (Princeton, 1957), 194-206.


17. Ibid.
18. M.F. GRIEBACH, note 15 above, proivdes convincing evidence that John of Paris is not faithful to Thomas doctrinally because he drops significant portions of Thomistic texts he reproduces; for the schema of judgement he is using see W. ULLMAN, "The Medieval Papacy, St. Thomas and Beyond", Aquinas Society Paper 35 reproduced in the Ullman collection, Law and Jurisdiction in the Middle Ages, Variorum Reprints, (London, 1988) which gives a good summary of the Aristotelian side of Aquinas on the state, 20ff., on John of Paris (Quidort), 24-6.


20. .....papa, qui utrisque potestatis apicem tenet, scilicet spiritualis et saecularis, hoc illo disponente qui est, sacerdos et rex.... In II Sententiarum, d. 44, exp. textus, ad 4, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929). Later uses of the title Vicarius Christi are, for example, Summa contra Gentiles (Leonine xv, 1930), iv, 76; De Regno ad regem Cypri (Leonine xlii, 1979), p. 466, lines 110ff.....non terrenis regibus sed sacerdotibus est commissum, et principie summo sacerdoti successori Petri, Christi vicario Romano Pontifici, cui omnes reges populii Christiani oportet esse subjectos sicut ipsi Domini Ihesu Christo, and Contra errores Graecorum (Leonine, xl, 1967), c. 32, p. A 101; c. 34, p. 102, lines 3-5: quod Petrus sit Christi vicarius, et Romanus pontifex Petri successor in eadem potestate ei a Christo collata.


23. For MANDONNET and GILSON, see note 25 below, for de LUBAC and CONGAR (1970) see note 9 above. There were critics before de Lubac especially, as he indicates, at the 1954 Augustine congress. Besides these there is F. CAYRé, "L'Augustinisme", L'Année théologique, 2 (1941), 64-88, especially 66 and 75 ff. In a note on p. 79 Cayré makes the following remarkable comment: "C'est Bossuet, sans aucun doute, qui, parmi les modernes, a le plus exactement reproduit la pensée et la manière de saint Augustin". Among those who have not yet heard that the fantasy has been blown away are M. BASTIT, Naissance de la loi moderne. La pensée de la loi de saint Thomas à Suarez, (Paris, 1990), 142 ff., his master M. VILLEY, Questions de saint Thomas sur le droit et la politique ou le bon usage des dialogues, (Paris, 1987), interestingly, for them, Augustine's doctrine has this character because it is neo-platoniast, whereas Aquinas is a Aristotelian realist "rattaché le bien à l'être" (BASTIT, 44), R.W. DYSON, xiii, see note 15 above, and P.E. SIGMUND, St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, (New York, 1988), xxii. This last has, however, useful material on the Dionysian and Proclan influence on Aquinas.

24. PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, note 8 above, introduction, 23.

25. H.-X. ARQUILLIÈRE, 1972, note 22 above, 38; there he gives as references Mandonnet's Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme latin au XIIIe siècle, (Louvain, 1911), 53 and Gilson's Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin, (Paris, 1929), 53-54. These are the classic works for a picture of Aquinas struggling between a radical Aristotelian left and a Platonist Augustinian right.


27 See MCCOOL, note 4 above, chapter 9; de LUBAC, note 9 above, HANKEY, note 7 above, 83, note 8.

28. Most recently, on the "rapprochement on certain points between the theses of Augustinian Platonism and those of Proclan Platonism", there is R.D. CROUSE "Augustinian Platonism in Early Medieval Theology" in Augustine, from Rhetor to Theologian, J. McWilliams, ed. (Waterlo, 1992), 109-20; on their fundamental differences and the assimilation of Augustinian conceptions to a Dionysian logic: W.J. HANKEY, "The Place...


32. HANKEY, note 28 above.


34. See PEPIN, ROQUES and ZINN, notes 8, 11 and 13 above; HANKEY, God in Himself, 32-4, 51-4; and M. REEVES and B. HIRSCH-REICH, The Figurae of Joachim of Fiore, Oxford Warburg Studies (Oxford, 1972), 58-60, 201-4 for both a Christocentric humanist reversal of Dionysius in Joachim of Fiore and references to relevant patristic and mediaeval texts.

35. "Gelasii Epistula ad Anastasium", 20, line 353 and "Tomus de anathematis vinculo papae Gelasii" in E. SCHWARTZ, Publizische Sammlungen zum Acacianischen Schisma, Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch - historische Abteilung, 10 (Munich, 1934). The text of the Tomus at 14, lines 10-15 reads: sed cum ad verum ventum est eundem regem atque pontificem, ultra sibi nec imperator pontificis nomen imposuit nec pontifex regale fastigium vindicavit quamvis enim membra ipsius, id est veri regis atque pontificis secundum participationem naturae magnifice utrumque in sacra generositate sumpisse dicantur, ut simul regale genus et sacerdotale subsistant.


38. SABRA, note 16 above, 131-32, for an opposing view there is C. ZUCKERMAN, "Aquinas' Conception of the Papal Primacy in Ecclesiastical Government", Arch. hist. doct. lit. m.a., 48 (1973), 97-134.


40. DUBY, note 13 above, is concerned throughout both with the movement from the binary to the triadic logic and then the disintegration of the latter as a tool of social analysis, HANKEY, note 7 above, and GERSH, note 8 above and From lamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition, (Leiden, 1978) treat the metaphysical questions.

41. CROUSE and HANKEY, note 28 above. Eriugena is crucial for the drawing out of Augustine through Dionysius in this development, DUBY; note 13 above, chapter 10 has profoundly interesting remarks. The text goes on: Non ergo secundum ordinem universi omnia eque ac immediate, sed infima per media, inferioura per superioura ad ordinem reducturur. Spiritualem autem et dignitate et nobilitate terrenam quamlibet praeceederle potestatem, aportet tanto clarious nos fateri, quanto spiritualia temporalia antecellunt....in I.O. LOGRASSO, note 15 above, 212.
43. On the date and character of the tract see DYSON, note 15 above, xiii; for the use of Dionysius and the Liber de causis, see the SCHOLZ edition, note 15 above, I, iv, pp. 12-13; I, ix, p. 33; II, xiii, pp. 114 and 121 ff., III, ii, p. 151.

44. The ARQUILLIÈRE edition, note 15 above, 106.

45. The de LAPPARENT edition, note 15 above, 145 - 46, the use of the regula of Dionysius in de Subjectione is at 83; there are useful remarks about his relation to Denys at 48, to Dante and Aquinas at 18 - 25.

46. For ANCONNA COSTA, note 17 above; Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic principle that "the greater the unity of the state the better" is at Politics II, ii.

47. A. P. MONAHAN, note 15 above, xxvi.


49. Ibid., p. 179, line 35 - p. 180, line 2.


51. M.F. GRIESBACH, notes 15 and 18 above, 38. See note 20 for Thomas' texts.

52. Ibid., 43.

53. Ibid., 46.

54. For Eschmann's important article see note 9 above; the Leonine De Regno is volume xlii (1979), 417-471, Eschmann is considered at 423.

55. See the extraordinarily useful "Index of Authors" in A.C. PEGIS, The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2 vol. (New York, 1945), ii, 1168, for a partial list; especially notable, most outside this list, are: In I Sent., 16, 1, 4 ag 5; In II Sent., 11, 3 ag 4 and ra; 10, 1, 2 sc 1 and co; In III Sent., 11, 1, 2; ag 8;3,2b,co; In IV Sent., 24,1,1a,co and 45,3,2,co; Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (Leonine xxii, 1973), 27 (De gratia), art 3, ag 18, p. 796, lines 132 - 37; art 4, ag 8, p. 802, lines 64 - 68: secundum Dionysium in V cap. Ecclesiasticae hierarchiae, lex divinitatis est per prima media, et per media ultima adducere...the reference given here is "Pars 1 sect. 4 (PG3 504 c; Dionysia 1330)"; Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo (Leonine xxiii, 1982), 3, 3 ag 15, p. 72, lines 117-19 where we are referred to the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy V "ut dictitur" by Aquinas; 16, 9 co, p. 324, lines 144-46: secundum Dionisium in libro De celesti ierarchia, infima a supremis mouentur per media where we are referred to De cael. hier. cap. 4, sect. 3 (PG 3, 181 A; Dionysiaca 812)"; 16, 10 ag 5, p. 306, lines 30-34; ST (Piana, Ottawa, 1953), 1, 106, 3 sc; I, 113, 2 ag 2; I-II, 63, 3 ag 1; I-II, 94, 4 ra 3.


57. STI, 106, 3 sc, In II Sent., 10, 1, 2 sc.

58. STI-I, 111, 1 co: sicut Apostolus dicit, Ad Rom. XIII: "Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt." In hoc autem ordo rerum consistit, quod quaedam per alia in Deum reducuntur, ut Dionysius dicit, in De Cael. Hier.


60. For example see Mandonnet's note on "in pluribus locis", In II Sent., 11, 3 ag 4: sed secundum Dionysium in pluribus locis...lex divinitatis est ut numquam ultima reducatur in finem nisi per media. The editors of recent Leonine texts are more conservative, see note 55 above.


62. BONAVENTURE, In II Sent. (Quaracchi ii, 1885), 11, 1, 1 sc 3, p. 277 b: lex universitatis hoc exigat, ut media reducantur per prima, et postrema per media ad suum principium; et hoc confirmatur per illud quod dicit Dionysius in libro de Anglica Hierarchia: "Lex divinitatis est in nullo negligere ordinem, sed per prima media, et per media postrema reducere", also co, p. 277b; 29, 1, 1 sc 3; 697, In IV Sent. (Quaracchi iv, 1889), 19, 3, 1 co, p. 508 b. In IV Sent., 24, 2, 2, 4 co, p. 635 b and Quaestiones Disputationae de perfectione evangelica (Quaracchi v, 1891), p. 198 treat the relation of the pope to the hierarchies according to a Dionysian logic in the Victorine tradition. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Commentarii in Opera B. Dionysii Areopagitaee (Paris xiv, 1892), De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia 5, 11, p. 705; 5, 19, p. 718; De Coelesti Hierarchia 5, p. 115: secundum statum patriae, cum assumantut homines secundum gradus Angelorum...quidem sunt superiores, quidem medi.
quidem inferiores, et superiores quidem recipiunt illuminationes a Deo immediate, medii vero et inferiores (cum lex divinitatis sit per prima, media et per media ultima reducere) recipiunt mediantibus superioribus; 10, 2, dubia ad 2, p. 296; Super Dionysium de Divinis Nominibus (Cologne edition xxxiv, 1, 1972) 4, 2, p. 129, lines 19-21 and 44ff. The comments of Albert and Thomas on chapter twelve: "king of kings" and "lord of lords" etc., are usefully compared; Aquinas is more concise and yet more ready to draw the political order into his explanations. At Summa Theologiae (Paris xxxiii, 1895) pars II, 22, 141, 3, p. 483 Albert shows what he thinks about the relation of the pope to the secular mediating powers; in relation to divine ordinances: *Papa est ordinarius omnium hominum, quia vice Dei est in terris.* This defines the papal plenitude potestatis. 63. PL175 (924-1154): 931 D: *His hierarchiis, id est principatibus sacris totus mundus: in quibus summa potestas est, quae imperat tantum, et infima, cui tantum imperatur; et media quae imperat inferiori, et cui a superiori imperatur and II, 5 generally;* 1035C: *quippe quae omnem participationem spiritualis gratiae nonnisi ipsa mediante concipiunt;* 1088C: *nulla hierarchia est quae non habet et primos, et medios, et ultimos ordines.* See also 1091A and Liber IX, titulus capitituli 10, 1099-1104 generally. 64. Contrast the picture of Aquinas (as opposed to Albert) in A. de LIBERA, note 7 above. 65. G. H. LADNER, "The concepts of Ecclesia and Christianitas and their relation to the idea of papal *Plenitude potestatis* from Gregory VII to Boniface VIII", in Sacerdozio et e Regno da Gregorio VII a Bonifacio VIII, Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae 18, (Rome, 1954), 49-77, esp. 66 and 73-4; ESCHMANN, note 9 above, 179 and 191. 66. Note 54 above. 67. D. BIGONIARI, note 9 above. He specifically rejects the restriction of direct papal powers to the Papal States at xxxv. 68. *Questions Quodlibitales*, 12, 1, 19, ra 2. 69. Bigoniari relies here on In II Sent. 44 and ST II-II, 60, 6. Aquinas’ position would seem to be the same as that of Albert, see note 62 above. For the giving of the powers of Christ as priest-king to Peter and his successors one might supply, AQUINAS, *Super Evangelium S. Matthaei Lectura*, 16, 2 (Marrietti, 5th ed., Rome, 1951) sections 1392, 1993. 70. *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, 76. Bigoniari refers us also to *Contra errores Graecorum*. I was unable to find his quotation in the Leonine edition (vol. 40, 1967) but the work is certainly an extreme statement of the papal position: rejecting the Vicar of Christ is compared to the rejection of the *Filioque* (c. 32, p. A101), the pope has in totam Ecclesiam Christi potestatis plenitudinem (ibid.). His power is Christ’s through Peter (see quote in note 20 above). Nothing is explicitly said here, however, of temporal power. 71. BIGONIARI, xxxvii. The *ad nutum* reference is In IV Sent. 37, *expositio textus* with ST II-II, 64, 4, ra 3. 72. See *Contra Impugnantes* (Leonine xli, 1970), c. 4, lines 542-62, 593-602, 1028-29 and 1319 and note 38 above. 73. *Ibid.*, 3, 7, p. A68, lines 485ff. 74. See note 71 above.