At which end shall we begin? Shall we start with ourselves and move toward the source and true beginning, or shall we commence *ad fontes* and follow the stream? This is a great problem in historical, philosophical and theological studies. For St. Thomas Aquinas, saving doctrine requires that both movements be simultaneous, that the *principium* move toward us as we are moved toward him. Equally, we discover that our old teachers speak to us or are silent as we really have questions or only our own answers. To discover which of these is our beginning, we need to look forward for a moment to Dr. Gillian Evans’ paper on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century developments: "The Sacrifice of Christ: the Divisiveness of the Sixteenth Century Questions in the Modern Debate."

She writes quite properly from within the English situation as determined by their *Alternative Services Book* (1980) and the results of ecumenical discussions between our Communion and the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed churches. From that perspective not much has changed since the Nineteenth Century. The controversy is not over the sacrifice of Christ but over its appropriation: not over the atonement but over the eucharist. So Anselm’s great clarification of the Patristic reflection on Scripture remains assumed: Christ’s saving work continues to be spoken of as sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction. The subjective remains rooted in the objective. Christ is our redeemer so that he can be our example.

Dr. Evans’ critical remarks about contemporary agreements on eucharistic sacrifice are unfortunately dead on target. She shows us that such agreement as was reached among Anglicans in the last two centuries depended upon theological vagueness and historical misrepresentation. Anglicans thought they could get back beyond the Sixteenth Century questions by agreeing that the Reformers’ problems were caused by so called "mediaeval abuses", thus we could overcome the Reformation divisions by returning to the Fathers. Dr. Evans points out that the Nineteenth Century controversialists did not know as much as they imagined about the Middle Ages and Francis Clark has demonstrated that the Tractarian endeavour to be reconciled with Tridentine Roman Catholicism depended on a caricature of Mediaeval eucharistic doctrine.¹ Just as importantly, mystery was substituted for theological analysis. The return to the Fathers was a movement to

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the inchoate, an endeavour to escape modern problems by pretending that they were resolved where rather they were only implicit.

Our North American situation is both like the one Dr. Evans describes and unlike it. Unlike it, our new liturgies are based on a criticism of what is still assumed formally and officially in England. The doctrine of the atonement is itself in question among us. The Nineteenth and Twentieth century criticisms of the Western development of that doctrine, especially in Anselm, are assumed by the American Prayer Book of 1979 and the Canadian Book of Alternative Services. That is to say these liturgical collections involve a refusal of the concept of a propitiating or satisfying sacrifice, or at least the refusal to make it fundamental. What the Church of England still assumes (at least in its liturgical formularies) is refused here. But like the English situation, the solution is sought in a return to the Fathers who are embraced just because their concepts are presented so vaguely as to cover our problems. In this context we must refer to one of the two books written by Swedish theologians in this century which have been as destructive as any of theological thought and true doctrine. The reference is to Gustaf Aulén's Christus Victor.²

The introduction to the eucharistic prayers in the BAS criticizes Cranmer and the Prayer Book first, because of the "closely related" issue of eucharistic offering. According to the authors of the introduction, the "fluid relation" of three biblical images for Christ's life, death, and resurrection on our behalf has been diminished in Cranmer's work. The biblical images have been defined "with the use of 'satisfaction' and 'substitutionary' language." This is legal language drawn from the idea that our salvation has been secured because Christ "stood in the place of guilty sinners and suffered the sentence and punishment of death for our sins".³

The crucial phrase is the one in the Prayer Book and the Thirty Nine Articles that on the cross Christ made "a full, perfect and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction".⁴ This apparently binds the formerly fluid biblical images to "the later mediaeval and Reformation themes of atonement".⁵ The introduction goes on to indicate that this narrowing and defining of Christ's saving work is related to a disjunction in the Prayer Book between the church's offering of the eucharistic gifts of bread and wine and the church's offering of herself as a community. Elsewhere the BAS claims that "during a long period of Christian history, a sharp line ran between the leadership role of the priest and the relative passivity of the laity." The authentic Christian sense of community was "eclipsed".⁶

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⁵ BAS, 179.
⁶ BAS, 11.
These criticisms of the Prayer Book tradition will be recognized by those of you who read Twentieth Century Anglican theology to derive from the liturgical ideas of Dom Gregory Dix and Fr. A.G. Hebert. The judgments about what happened to the doctrine of the atonement in the Middle Ages and Reformation derive from Gustaf Aulen, who was translated by Fr. Hebert.

These three were very negative about mediaeval developments in doctrine and liturgy and saw the Reformation as merely perpetuating the mediaeval distortions. According to Dix, the "Reformers were the victims - as they were the products - of the mediaeval deformations they opposed". Among the major faults of both mediaeval and Reformation Christianity was individualism. The mediaeval sacrifice was not done by the community but said by the priest and passively listened to by the people. "Instead of do this, the eucharist becomes see this, think this, or even feel this." "The old corporate worship of the eucharist is declining into a mere focus for the subjective devotion of each separate worshipper in the isolation of his own mind."

This subjective, inward individualism is, according to Dix and the BAS, what the Reformers chose in order to correct the false mediaeval doctrine that the priest's action at the altar repeats or adds to the sacrifice of Christ on the cross.

Fr. Hebert is also concerned to get past the divisions over eucharistic sacrifice which we inherit from the late Middle Ages and the Reformation. And he to wants to restore a sense of the eucharist as communal act - though he does not share Gregory Dix's hatred of the Prayer Book and thinks that drastic revision would divide rather than unite. For Fr. Hebert the false individualism is also a mediaeval development:

"It is a significant fact that the change of attitude towards dogma coincides in time with the change in the habits of worship which came over Western Christendom in the early Middle Ages, and in particular with the loss of the communion of the people from the great Sunday Service ...The change with regard to dogma is closely parallel with liturgical change."

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9 Dix, 599; Stevenson, 30.
10 BAS, 10.
12 Hebert, 98.
This statement comes from his book *Liturgy and Society*. There he is criticizing Anselm, and the scholasticism which follows him, for its rationalism. The mediaeval schoolmen move away from the fluid images of the Christianity of the first millenium. Gustaf Aulén has shown him that the "Fathers regularly present the Atonement under a series of images and symbols" ¹³: "In an earlier age Christian dogma is the expression of the mystery of Divine grace by which all human life is redeemed and sanctified; in the later it becomes a mystery in the intellectual sense, a sacred doctrine taught by the clergy and accepted by the laity with *fides implicita*, whereby they accept on trust propositions which they do not understand." ¹⁴

Here the form of the mediaeval teaching about the atonement, the movement from fluid images to intellectual definition which occurs in Anselm, is related both to individualism and also to the division of the community between clergy and a passive laity. In his introduction to his translation of Aulén's *Christus Victor*, Fr. Hebert goes further and suggests that these problems are also related to the content of the Anselmian doctrine of satisfaction.

Since "the eucharistic rite is the liturgical representation of the Atonement," we would expect, Fr. Hebert asserts, that the mediaeval "change in sacramental practice corresponds closely to the change in the accepted idea of the Atonement." Sacrifice is reduced to immolation, the death of Christ will be the focus: and "Here, again, the narrowing of the idea of sacrifice might be shown to be closely connected with the changed idea of the Atonement." ¹⁵

Fr. Hebert maintains that connected to these changes in the character and content of doctrine and in the relations of individual and community is the loss of the sacramental principle itself. It is replaced by a religion "predominantly individualistic and psychological" which "prepared the way for the coming of modern subjectivism." ¹⁶

So the Anglican liturgical revolution which the BAS represents is based in a criticism of the form and content of the doctrine of the atonement as developed in the Middle Ages, particularly by St. Anselm. This is the development by which Christ’s work on the cross is called "satisfaction for the sins of the whole world." Moreover, the criticism of Anselm and the representation of a return to the fluid

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¹³ Hebert, 97.
¹⁴ Hebert, 98.
¹⁶ *Ibid*, see George H. Williams, "The Sacramental Presuppositions of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*," *Church History*, xxvi (1957), note 129 where this idea is attributed to J.R. Geiselmann, *Die Eucharistielehre der Vorscholastik* (Paderborn, 1926), 409-413.
images and symbols of the Fathers as a solution to Anselm’s false turn is associated with Aulén’s Christus Victor.

It will not be surprising to find Anglo-Catholics like Dix and Hebert happy to find a way back to doctrines of eucharistic sacrifice which do not distinguish as sharply as the Reformers did between the Church’s offering and Christ’s propitiatory sacrifice. Aulén’s criticism of Anselm allowed this and had the added advantage of undermining the subsequent Reformed doctrine of penal substitution, i.e. that Christ saved us by bearing on the cross the penalty of our sin. Further, it seemed to explain how we had fallen into an individualized secularity both as consequence and reaction. What is more surprising is to find many of the same criticisms leveled against Anselm by an evangelical like J.R. Stott in his recent book The Cross of Christ.

There is much irony here; for Dr. Stott affirms in Archbishop Cranmer just what the BAS dislikes: he says that though "neither satisfaction nor substitution is a biblical word": “There is, in fact, a biblical revelation of satisfaction through substitution which is uniquely honouring of God, and which should therefore lie at the very heart of the church’s worship and witness. That is why Cranmer included a clear statement of it at the beginning of his Prayer of Consecration (1549). In consequence, for 400 years Anglicans have described Jesus Christ as having made on the cross, by his ‘one oblation of himself once offered’, a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world.”

So, Dr. Stott has much good to say about Anselm’s "fresh approach" which he notes has been called "epoch making" and "the truest and greatest book on the atonement". He gives a good summary of the Cur Deus Homo and also of Christus Victor. Let me remind you of Aulén’s position: “His thesis ... is that the traditional reconstruction of two main atonement theories is mistaken, namely the ‘objective’ or ‘legal’ view (Christ’s death reconciling the Father), associated with Anselm, and the ‘subjective’ or ‘moral’ view (Christ’s death inspiring and transforming us) associated with Abelard. For there is a third view which Aulén calls both ‘dramatic’ and ‘classic’. It is ‘dramatic’ because it sees the atonement as a cosmic drama in which God in Christ does battle with the powers of evil and gains the victory over them. It is ‘classic’ because, he claims, it was ‘the ruling idea of the Atonement for the first thousand years of Christian history’.

19 Stott, 118.
20 Stott, 228.
Dr. Stott judges that Aulén’s criticism of Anselm is ‘not altogether fair’. In particular he rejects Aulén’s view that, for Anselm, Christ’s death is "an offering made to God by Christ as man" as it were from below" or "a human work of satisfaction accomplished by Christ". For, writes Dr. Stott:

Anselm emphasized clearly that, although man ought to make satisfaction for sin, he cannot, for they are his sins for which satisfaction has to be made. Indeed, only God himself can, and therefore does through Christ ... Anselm’s teaching is that through the work of the unique God-man Christ Jesus, it is not only man who made satisfaction; it is God himself who was both the satisfier and the satisfied.

This is the crucial point and it is excellent to see it made. But Dr. Stott makes many criticisms of Anselm which are very like those of Aulén. He sees Anselm’s work as rationalistic. We have heard this before in Hebert: “his overriding concern was to be agreeable to reason” he says and judges that “his scholastic reasoning took him beyond the boundaries of the biblical revelation”. Then he goes on to accuse Anselm of what amounts to a sociological form of legalism (the BAS complaint):

Moreover, his whole presentation reflects the feudal culture of his age, in which society was rigidly stratified, each person stood on the dignity which had been accorded him, the 'proper' or 'becoming' conduct of inferiors to superiors (and especially to the king) was laid down, breaches of this code were punished, and all debts must be honourably discharged.

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21 Stott, 229.
22 Stott, 22.
23 Stott, 50.
24 Stott, 104.
25 Stott, 229.
26 Stott, 118 and 119.
27 Stott, 120.
This accusation of feudal legalism is very serious. It amounts to a cultural contextualizing which prevents theology being free. Elsewhere Dr. Stott links this feudalism to a over-emphasis on the humanity of Christ (the criticism he also later, when considering Aulén, refuses to accept):

The weakness of Anselm’s formulation, due probably to his cultural background in mediaeval feudalism, is that he over-emphasizes the humanity of Christ, since man the sinner must pay the debt he has incurred and repair the damage he has done.28

In other places he asserts that victory, "the note of triumph", was largely absent from the cool logic of Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo 29 and that ”it would be seriously unbalanced to proclaim... the cross without the resurrection (as I am afraid Anselm did)".30

I am, as I said, puzzled by these criticisms. Not only are they somewhat self-contradicting, but they are the same as those rendered by sacramentally and liturgically minded Anglo-Catholics who are happy, as Dr. Stott is not, to be rid of Anselm’s theology of satisfaction. Finally they have been refuted by distinguished historians of doctrine like Jaroslav Pelikan, the young, brilliant, and exceedingly prolific Evangelical historian, Alister McGrath, and even by Paul Avis, an oncoming radical theological historian.31 Indeed Dr. McGrath calls the criticism of Anselm as "'legalist', typical of the Latin 'impulse to carry religion into the legal sphere', "misguided and discredited".32

What is the source of these criticisms which twentieth-century Anglicans seem to take in with the air they breath? What is the perspective from which Anselm’s epoch making work appears so negative?

Beside Gustaf Aulén, Hastings Rashdall’s, The Idea of the Atonement in Christian Theology, a book severely and, in my view, correctly, refuted by Alister McGrath, is

28 Stott, 158.
29 Stott, 229.
30 Stott, 237.
a source for many in the English speaking world.\textsuperscript{33} Dr. McGrath shows it to be historically inaccurate in its representation of mediaeval theology, reproducing an Enlightenment subjective moralism which amounts to nothing more than a doctrine of salvation by merit, and anachronistically optimistic in the post World War II situation. Behind Rashdall and Aulén is the great liberal historian of dogma, Adolph von Harnack, who was a follower of the Nineteenth Century historian and theologian Albrecht Ritschl.\textsuperscript{34} Ironically, for our liturgists' yearning for community, mystery and symbol, Karl Barth presents Ritschl as the theologian of Christianity as bourgeois progressive culture, that is, as disciplined personal individual moral struggle.\textsuperscript{35} Yet it is astonishing to see the criticism of Anselm Ritsch
developed, having been transmitted and amplified by Harnack, and reproduced with the identical theological perspective by Aulén become current among contemporary Anglo-Catholics, Evangelicals, and liturgists.\textsuperscript{36} We shall not get to Anselm if we spend too much time on Ritschl, yet we shall not discover why the doctrine of satisfaction is so difficult for us if we do not understand the perspective from which our difficulties have developed, which perspective, as well as the particular criticisms, have a clear lineage from Ritschl and Harnack, through Aulén to our Anglican liturgists. Albrecht Ritschl is identified by the historians of Nineteenth Century Christian thought as belonging to the "antirationalist offensive" against the so-called rationalist idealism of his Hegelian teacher Baur and thus returning back to a Kantian position.\textsuperscript{37} The Ritschlians thought that in the Kantian philosophy which knows the limits of reason, and stays with human finitude, they had the philosophy of Protestantism and especially that by which Luther could be reclaimed.\textsuperscript{38} Ritschl and Harnack are profoundly anti-catholic and antimediaeval, Harnack's \textit{History of Dogma} is devoted to exposing the corruption of Jesus' teaching by Hellenism, because Hellenism and scholasticism endeavour to unify revelation and metaphysics. Ritschl maintains:

Metaphysical knowledge errs at the outset by lumping together nature and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{36} On this see the excellent book by John McIntyre, \textit{St. Anselm and his Critics, A Re-interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo}, (Oliver and Boyd: Edinburgh and London, 1954), 186.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} McGrath, \textit{Iustitia Dei}, ii, 159 and Tillich, \textit{Perspectives}, 215ff.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Tillich, 216.
\end{itemize}
spirit. More precisely, it is "indifferent toward the distinctions of kind and value that exist between spirit and nature".

For, writes Alan Galloway,

The essence of all religion, in Ritschl’s view, is the tension between spirit and nature ... There are two ways, he said, in which we relate to reality. In the one we establish facts in the context of science and knowledge. In the other we make evaluation in the context of free decision. Religion and theology pertain to the latter system ... As a free, deliberating agent, ... man is spirit. It is the destiny of spirit to establish its freedom from and dominion over nature. Blessedness is the wholeness and integrity which a man enjoys in freedom from and dominion over nature.

There are three major consequences for our investigations of Anselm stemming from this late Nineteenth Century religion which refuses to know God in the unity of spirit and nature. Religion is instead "argued for on the basis of the ethical experience of the personality." Here, as Paul Tillich puts it: "Religion is the help toward moral self-realization", or, as Karl Barth expresses it: "reconciliation, to put it baldly, means the realized ideal of human life. It is the intended result of justification ... All Ritschl's thinking springs from this result".

This theology is opposed to the systematization of Christianity. This opposition Ritschl connected with his Lutheranism. As Harnack puts it:

Ritschl's uniqueness, following Luther, consisted solely in this: that he looked upon religion, and above all the Christian religion, as a powerful reality in and for

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41 Tillich, 217.
42 Barth, 393.
itself, distinguishing it from every philosophy; further that he strongly emphasized its historical-positive nature and thereby repudiated speculations over the so-called "natural religion and theology". 43

Therefore the attack on Anselm begins with the view that his speculative rationality, his endeavour to find the necessary reasons of what is believed, is wrong. This criticism of his method is found in Ritschl, Harnack, and Aulén, the last writes:

"God is at the same time the Reconciler and the Reconciled. His is the Love and His the Wrath. The Love prevails over the Wrath, and yet Love's condemnation of sin is absolute. The Love is infinite and unfathomable, acting contra rationem et legem ... Every scheme to force this conception into a purely rational scheme is bound to fail; it could only succeed by robbing it of its religious depth. For theology lives and has its being in these combinations of seeming incompatible opposites." 44

This opposition to rational systematization in religion is picked up by Fr. Hebert who develops (as we have seen) a theory associating it with the loss of lay participation in the eucharist and the division between clergy and laity in the church. It carries over into the BAS where the problem is identified as the definition, interpretation, and ordering of the "fluid images" of the Bible. Staying with images is essential. In Anselm's language, we must, if reason cannot be attained, stay with the beautiful picture, though what believers find beautiful is thought to be ugly and even blasphemous by those outside, who, unless the reasons of faith can be given, cannot be converted. 45

The second consequence for Anselm, approached through Ritschl's antirationalist position, is that Anselm's assumption of the God-man must be denied. Anselm explores the logic of the human situation in terms of two contradictions. There is, on our side, the contradiction between human happiness and unhappiness. On God's side, there is the contradiction between the divine purpose to share his goodness by making rational creatures happy and the frustration of that purpose through sin. 46 The solution of these contradictions is the God-man, the God who

43 Harnack as quoted in David W. Lotz, Ritschl and Luther, A Fresh Perspective on Albrecht Ritschl's Theology in the Light of His Luther Study (Abingdon: Nashville and New York, 1974), 55.
44 Aulén, Christus Victor, 172.
45 "Omnia haec pulchra et quasi quaedam picturae suscipienda sunt." S. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, Opera Omnia, ed. F.S. Schmitt, 2nd vol. (Nelson: Edinburgh, 1946), I, iv, 51, line 16; for the problems with this see the following chapters.
46 Cur Deus Homo, I, xxiv-xxv and II, i.
does what man cannot in the human nature from which the debt is owed. Anselm’s solution is the Incarnation, God and man united, but in exactly the definition of the Council of Chalcedon: two natures, human and divine, united in one divine Person.

Pope Leo, in his famous, Tome gave the West an expression of Chalcedon which clearly lies behind Anselm’s work:

And this nativity [of the Only Begotten] which took place in time took nothing from, and added nothing to that divine and eternal birth, but expended itself wholly in the restoration of man who had been deceived; in order that he might both vanquish death and overthrow by his strength the Devil who possessed the power of death. For we should not now be able to overcome the author of sin and death unless He took our nature on Him and made it his own, whom neither sin could pollute nor death retain.  

The Christian doctrine of the incarnation as defined by Chalcedon understands God doing his saving work in man. It is both God’s work and man’s, because the personality in which the human nature of Christ subsists is the Divine Logos. The criticisms of Anselm’s doctrine as over-emphasizing the human or, indeed, turning salvation into a human work, are merely assertions that the Chalcedonian definition is contradictory, impossible, false. This is the position from which Ritschl proceeds:

Ritschl thus argues that our knowledge of the person of Christ, in so far as this represents a genuine possibility, derives from our knowledge of the work of Christ - in other words that soteriology is prior to Christology in the theological ordo cognoscendi.  

This refusal to allow the ontology of the incarnation to be an assumption in the doctrine of salvation is put with characteristic vehemence by Harnack in his critique of Anselm:

Anselm wished to trace back everything to satisfaction, and he adhered strictly to

48 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, ii, 162.
the correct theory of Ambrose and Augustine, that it was the man Jesus who died, and that it is He therefore who is our mediator. At the same time, however, the impossibility of reconciling this view with the doctrine of the two natures now at last found definite expression in him; for where the subject of the redeeming personality is regarded, not as the God-Logos, but as, with Anselm, the man, there is a canceling, not, indeed of the Godhead of Christ, but certainly of the two nature doctrine. The term, "the Godhead of Christ", occurs in Anselm, within the lines of the strict theory, only as determinative of the value of the human person in his action.  

This is simply false, Anselm would never say that the subject of the redeeming personality is not the God-Logos but man, indeed his terrible problems about Christ's will come precisely from such a refusal.\(^{50}\) What is important, however, is that the criticism of Anselm is rooted in the Ritschlian assumption that it is contradictory to think of the human nature of Christ as possessed by the divine person and the divine person as acting through the human nature. The problem is not in Anselm, but in this refusal to accept the Church's definition of the ontology of the incarnation. This continues in Aulén, whose systematic theology is a sad spectacle. Eugene Fairweather is right that for him the human nature has only an "ornamental function" in the work of redemption.\(^{51}\) There is a collapse into the Divine love such that all distinctions disappear. As McIntyre says, Aulén would have difficulty avoiding the charge of docetism.\(^{52}\)

Jaroslav Pelikan is excellent on this. He sees in Anselm a profoundly Christocentric theology and the working out of the logic of the Chalcedonian definition in relation to the atonement. Anselm's work belongs indeed to the humanizing of Christianity, which is a phenomenon in both the Byzantine and Western tradition at the turn of the millenia. We must remember that Anselm's doctrine of satisfaction is intended to lead to a total following of Christ, a Christian discipline

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\(^{49}\) Harnack, *History*, 74.

\(^{50}\) *Cur Deus Homo*, I, xvii-xviii.


\(^{52}\) McIntyre, *St. Anselm*, 199; for the full range of difficulties with the theology from which Aulén judges Anselm see Gustaf Aulén, *The Faith of the Christian Church*, trans. from the 4th Swedish edition (Muhlenberg: Philadelphia, 1948) which has so abolished ontology (and thus persons and natures) as to have neither an orthodox doctrine of the Trinity nor of the Incarnation.
in our human condition, because Christ is the Divine Son working in the human. Pelikan puts it thus, quoting Anselm:

Before the incarnation, there were many aspects of authentic human existence that had never been seen in a concrete person but "could be demonstrated only by reason, apart from experience". But now the very one "who was to redeem men and to lead them back from the way of death and perdition to the way of life and eternal blessedness" would at the same time be the one who lived as a man among men and who, "in this association with them, as he was teaching them by word how they ought to live, would provide himself as an example for them". 53

The fact that for Chalcedon and Anselm the divine work is done in man not only enables the imitation of Christ, and thus all "modern" piety, but this humanism also gives honour to God. As Pelikan puts it:

It was one of the historic achievements of Anselm's doctrine of the atonement to have translated the fundamental significance of the biblical and liturgical image of sacrifice - that the redemption of mankind by Christ was an act addressed to God, not to man or to the devil - into a form that was compatible with the immutability of God. 54

The redemption is wrought in the humanity of Christ and the change is in humans, not in God, the beginning and the end. This is the basis of a humanism which maintains, indeed depends on, and is supported by the omnipotence and immutability of God. Therefore, Sir Richard Southern has suggested that the Christian humanism of Mediaeval theology has never been surpassed. 55

certainly, as Pelikan shows, the Reformation assumed the Chalcedonian Christology and Anselm's development of the doctrine of the atonement.

Ritschl is wrong. There is in Luther's Reformation a further stage in the development of "the old dogmatic Christianity," [Harnack] as the Anselmic doctrine of atonement through the satisfaction wrought by the suffering and death of Christ had represented an earlier stage of the development. Working within an Augustinian understanding of sin and grace, Anselm had taken as his starting point the Western reading of the settlement achieved at the Council of Chalcedon: Christ was the "God-man", who was not under necessity of dying (since he is almighty) nor under the obligation of dying (since he was sinless), but who of his own free will had assumed human nature into the person of the Son of God, so that by his dying he might voluntarily achieve the satisfaction owed by humanity and make it available to his fellowmen (since he did not need it for himself).56

All this was assumed by the Reformers, but, for both the Middle Ages and the Reformation, problems arose about the communication of the satisfaction of Christ through the means of grace in the church. Here we move to the divisive problems of which Bishop Cameron and Dr. Evans will speak.

It is clear that everything depends, both for the Middle Ages and the Reformation, on the way the relation of the divine and the human is understood. To grasp what is moving in Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, one must first follow the arguments of his Monologion and Proslogion. The Monologion aims to move from man to God, from that which is through another (per alium) to what is through itself (per se.) What he discovers is that there can be no movement of the human to the divine except insofar as otherness, and thus the human, is in the divine. The per alium which is creation generally, and man particularly, must be in God not only in its human integrity but also in its difference, its sin and falling away. Technically, this takes the form of the questions as to whether we can move to a knowledge of God as Trinity, the question of the Monologion, and whether, given the knowledge of God and the human, we are led by necessity reasons to the knowledge of the God-man

and his work of satisfaction, the question of the Cur Deus Homo. What intervenes between these treatises is the Proslogion, which followed from Anselm's own criticism of his Monologion.

While we must not delay overlong in the consideration of this work, which has caused as much philosophical controversy in the contemporary world as the Cur Deus Homo has caused theological controversy, it is essential to indicate the nature of its argument. Anselm's determination in the Proslogion is to think how the human is conformed to the divine nature in its self-sufficient goodness. The Monologion was criticized by its author just because the likeness and difference of the human and divine was not sufficiently considered. The Proslogion makes clear that the human is in total self-contradiction and endless self-destruction except as it finds its whole good in God. The other side of this is that the human demands that God be the complete fulfilment of its desire. Again and again in the work, Anselm finds the idea of God inadequate to man who is feeling and sensuous, as well as intellectual. It is not until the Trinitarian God appears in the argument, the God who contains difference in his unity, and when this God is given as our hope, when God is all in all and the present division of spirit and nature ends, that mankind can be satisfied. It has been remarked many times that the title of Anselm's book is not Why did God become man? but Why the God-man? The Proslogion provides the reason, the human is nothing without the divine, but the divine establishes man as a complete being, body and soul. Chalcedon on the incarnation is the correlative of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. There is no possibility of a human work of salvation apart from God for Anselm, because there is no humanity apart from God's creating, sustaining gracious activity.

The third Ritschlian criticism of Anselm has to do with the juridicial, forensic, or legal character of the doctrine of satisfaction in the Cur Deus Homo. This is a

57 On the problem with the Monologion and the aim in the Proslogion, see Anselm, Proslogion, Opera Omnia, ed. F.S. Schmitt, Opera Omnia, Vol.1 (Nelson: Edinburgh, 1946), proemium, 93, where he wishes to replace the "multorum concatenatione contextum argumentorum" of the Monologion with "unum argumentum, quod nullo alio ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret" which would then be like God himself the "summum bonum nullo alio indigens".

58 The despair at several points stems from the fact that until the crucial turn in the argument, the more Anselm knows of God, the more clear his distance from God becomes to him. "Tendebam in deum, et offendi in me ipsum" Proslogion, i, 99, line 10. After his exploration of the character of the divine attributes, Anselm asks "Cur non te sentit, domine deus, anima mea, si invenit te?" (xiv, III, lines 14-15). He concludes God to be "quiddam maius quam cogitari possit" (xv, 112, lines 13-14). Therefore God is "Intra me et circa me es, et non te sentio (xvi, 113, line 4). He comes again then to despair: "Et iterum ecce turbatio, ecce iterum obviet maeror et luctus quaerenti quadium et laetitiam" (xviii, 113, lines 18 and 19).

59 The Trinity appears in chapter xxiii; as in the Monologion, moving to a right conception of God passes through the knowledge of the relation of God to space and time: chapters xviii-xxi.

60 McIntyre, 198.
criticism which is carried in one form or another from Ritschl, through Harnack and Aulén to Hebert and is found in both the BAS introduction to the eucharist and in Dr. Stott. The BAS asserts that behind the notion of satisfaction for sin or legal substitution lies the image of Christ in a court room paying our debt.\textsuperscript{61} Dr. Stott maintains that Anselm is thinking in terms of the structure of feudal society and the demand that the appropriate honour due to the dignity of each rank be paid.\textsuperscript{62} Albrecht Ritschl maintains that Western

\begin{quote}
theology takes up its standpoint on the 
fact of the universally inherited sin of the 
human race, and undertakes to deduce from 
this the necessity of a redemption, the method 
of which is brought out by comparing sin with 
the Divine attribute of retributory 
righteousness in the purely rational style 
which Anselm applied to this topic.\textsuperscript{63}
\end{quote}

Ritschl’s objections are many. He opposes the very idea of original sin, thinking it to be the imposition of an ontological structure on ethical and religious experience. Then, denying, rather surprisingly, that we have in the conception of divine justice an idea from Holy Scripture, Ritschl holds that to come to the notion of justification Hellenic juridicial ideas of God were imported into the religion of Jesus. Just so, Harnack supposes that we have here Roman legal notions,\textsuperscript{64} and Hasting Rashdall imagines that we are dealing with “the barbaric ideas of an ancient Lombard king or the technicalities of a Lombard lawyer”.\textsuperscript{65} Finally, Ritschl is objecting both to rational system, the thinking through of Christ’s work in a systematic scheme, and also to this legal system in particular which he judges incapable of resolving the contradictions of divine justice and divine grace. For him law and religion are by nature opposed. Anselm’s solution, and those formulations which follow him, are consequently artificial, impossible in principle, religiously impossible.\textsuperscript{66}

We are really confronting here, in a number of different forms, Ritschl’s antirationalism. As Alister McGrath puts it:

\begin{quote}
Ritschl argues that this [Anselm’s] approach is based upon purely rational ideas of God, sin and
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[61] BAS, 178.
\item[62] Stott, 120 and 158.
\item[63] Ritschl, 5.
\item[64] Harnack, 56ff.
\item[65] Rashdall, 355; see Stott at note 27 above.
\item[66] Ritschl, 262-64.
\end{footnotes}
redemption, and is quite unsuited either to the positive exposition of the doctrine [of justification] or to its defence against its rationalist critics. In particular, Ritschl objects to the Augustinian doctrine of original sin as implying a false hypostasisation of mankind over against the individuals who are its members, and as failing to account for the fact that all men are sinful to different degrees.\textsuperscript{67}

The refutation of these criticisms has been careful and is complete; so much so, that you may recollect that Alister McGrath called them "misguided and discredited"\textsuperscript{68} It has been known, at least from the time of publication of Harnack’s History of Dogma\textsuperscript{69} that the word satisfaction has, since Tertullian, belonged to the language of the Church and its penitential system.\textsuperscript{70} Our increasing knowledge of the mediaeval penitential system has only substantiated the view that the context of Anselm’s thinking is sacramental. It is not imported from secular social structures. George Williams has written most instructively about this in an article "The Sacramental Presuppositions of Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo." He concludes:

[O]ur analysis of the liturgical and sacramental allusions in Cur Deus Homo in connection with the allied material makes it clear that Anselm’s theory of the atonement is especially meaningful in the penitential-eucharistic context of a progressive incorporation into the universal humanity represented on the altar in a process which extends Christ’s far-away and long-ago action into each day’s struggle with wilfulness and each day’s acceptance of the heavenly manna, a sacramental process whereby "the body of lowliness" is gradually transformed into "the body of glory" prepared to find its place among the angelic host. Precisely because Anselm does not regard penance as adequate \textit{satisfactio} or sufficient \textit{poena} (as it had been for Tertullian), the \textit{satisfactio} of the God-man is not for Anselm, as he transposes the technical language of penance

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{67} McGrath, \textit{lustitia Dei}, ii, 168; see also Welch, iiff.
\item\textsuperscript{68} McGrath, \textit{lustitia Dei}, i, 55.
\item\textsuperscript{69} Harnack, 56ff.
\item\textsuperscript{70} Fairweather, 56; Pelikan, iii, 143, McIntyre, 177 and 196.
\end{footnotes}
to the objective atonement of Calvary, a "vicarious penance" but rather a vicarious oblation of utter obedience whereby the second universal Man obeys God in the drinking of the chalice and dying on the cross, and thus restores the original justice due to God. 71

Even more important than this placing of the language of satisfaction within a sacramental day by day growing into Christ: acceptance, incorporation, imitation, has been the deepening of our understanding of what Anselm means by justice, iustitia. Here too there is a scholarly lineage. Michael Root depends on Eugene Fairweather.72 Eugene Fairweather and John Paul Westin depend on Robert Crouse.73 Alister McGrath and Jaroslav Pelikan are in agreement, apparently having reached the same conclusions independently.74

The root of the notion of iustitia is rectitude. Listen to Robert Crouse:

St. Anselm defines justitia as a certain rightness, or a certain rectitude of will for its own sake; it is one with truth and rectitude of will. Justice is what God wills, and human justice, or rectitude of will, consists in the subjection of the rational creature in obedience to God's Will. Man was created in a state of justice (justitia originalis), and sin is the absence or privation of that justice ... The basis of sin is the free defection of the rational will ... God, who is supreme justice, justly maintains His honour in the ordering of all things, and it is intolerable that man by disobedience should distort God's order of things, and thus rob the Creator of due honour without making satisfaction. But sinful man is powerless to restore the order of justice, for "a sinner cannot justify a sinner", so God Himself, in His mercy, intervenes to satisfy His own order of justitia, in the work of the

74 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, i, 54-6; Pelikan, iii, 139.
God-Man, who alone ... can offer satisfaction. By their incorporation into Christ's sinless (i.e. just) humanity, the faithful receive the benefits of Christ's atoning sacrifice. Thus creation, sin and redemption are set by St. Anselm within the framework of God's justitia, His right ordering of all things, which prescribes man's place in the hierarchy of created being, judges his defection, and effects his reconciliation. ... [I]t should be obvious that an interpretation of St. Anselm's concept of justitia in terms of legal justice, or even moral righteousness, is quite inadequate. The essential content of the term for him ... is rectitude of order, which has its source in God Himself, and embraces the whole order of creation, regulating the relations of man to God, of man to man, and mutual relations within the interior being of man.75

Eugene Fairweather speaks of justice in terms of "the visions of ontological, intellectual and moral order."76 Alister McGrath notes that both truth and justice are aspects of rectitude for Anselm.

The basic meaning of rectitudo is the divine ordering of the universe, which has its origin in the divine will, and which is itself a reflection of the divine will. Anselm's metaphysical theory of truth considers that the truth of a cognition derives from its rectitudo - i.e., it is as it should be. Everything has its own particular rectitudo; everything is true in so far as it is what it should be according to its idea in God. Truth is the conformity of what is to the rule which fixes what it should be. As this rule is itself part of the divine nature, Anselm concludes that there is only one supreme truth, God. Thus truth is basically metaphysical rectitude, conformity to the intended pattern. 77

75 Crouse, 114-15.
76 Fairweather, "Iustitia Dei", 330.
Similarly, justice also requires reference to the fundamental notion of rectitude. Justice has, as its basic sense, the moral rectitude of the universe, the moral order established by God at creation, itself an expression of the divine will and nature. 78

He goes on to show that the motive of the redemption is the divine justice:

For Anselm, the moral rectitude of the created order was violated by man's fall. It is therefore necessary that the moral rectitude of the created order be restored, as its present state is unjust. Because whatever is unjust contradicts God's nature, it is impossible for God to permit this state of affairs to continue. Therefore God's justice necessitates the redemption of mankind. God, as summa iustitia, is bound by his own nature to restore the moral rectitude of the created order, and therefore to redeem mankind. 79

It is crucial to grasp the nature of this necessity.

Jaroslav Pelikan writes of this:

[T]he word "necessary" must not be taken to mean that "God had need of saving man in this fashion, but that human nature had need of rendering satisfaction to God in this fashion." God did not need to suffer on the cross, but man needed to be reconciled through such suffering. God was free of any "necessity." What the justice of God demanded, the mercy of God supplied: Because "the sinner has nothing ... with which to make satisfaction," it was necessary that "the goodness of God come to its rescue, and the Son of God assume it into his own person" in order to provide the satisfaction that man needed to render and could not. 80

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78 Ibid, 207.
So we come back to the goodness of God. This is the primary assumption in the *Cur Deus Homo*, an assumption experienced by man in happiness and the desire for its completion, but rooted in the will of God to share the goodness which he is by making rational creatures happy. As Michael Root puts it,

> Will humanity achieve the end for which God created it? Anselm shifts the focus of the question from humanity to God. Can a divine intention either fall or change? The answer to that question is 'no'. It is 'no' by necessity. To think that God 'either could not complete the good work He began or else would regret having begun such a good work' is 'absurd' (*absurda*; I, 19; 84. 12-13[*84*]). Thus, if God has created humanity to be just and upright members of the Heavenly City who will thus honour and praise God, then it necessarily follows that this result will come about. 'It is necessary [*Necesse est ergo*] that God will accomplish with human nature what He began' (II, 4; 99. 5-7, 9[*100*]). The assumption that God's original intention in creating humanity *must* be fulfilled introduces necessity into Anselm's argument. This assumption is the engine that drives *Cur Deus Homo* forward and to which its conclusions can again and again be traced back.81

For Anselm the divine mercy is contained within the divine justice:

> In sparing the wicked, thou art just according to thy nature, but not according to ours ... so thou art just, not because thou requitest us as we deserve, but because thou dost that which becomes thee as the supremely good Being.82

Justice belongs to God as the *summum bonum*. Christ's satisfying sacrifice enables the salvation of sinners to serve the divine justice, the order by which the divine goodness is shared. Thus, the divine justice belongs to the divine love. Alister

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80 Pelikan, iii, 141.
81 Root, 219.
82 *Proslogion*, x.
McGrath puts Anselm's contribution to the development of the doctrine of justification in this way: Anselm's teaching about satisfaction is subsidiary:

the main element being his development
of *iustitia Dei* as action directed towards the highest good, and thus embracing the redemption of mankind.\(^8^3\)

This completes our consideration of the criticism of Anselm stemming from Ritschl upon which liturgical revision in Canada is now based. In every case not only has each of the criticisms been met in the scholarly literature and is based in a prejudiced or superficial reading of Anselm, but their origin in the anti-intellectualism of later Nineteenth Century Christianity is now evident to us. The problem with Anselm for this anti-intellectualism is not that he departs from Patristic Christianity, but rather that he assumes the Patristic Christology and anthropology, metaphysical and ontological mentality of the Fathers, and their rational spirit. In fact, it is Aulén as well as his mentors, Ritschl and Harnack, who have departed from the Christianity of the first centuries.

Nothing is more false than the representation of the Anselmian doctrine of satisfaction as a human rather than a divine work. Dr. Stott correctly perceives that

in spite of what Aulén writes, Anselm's teaching is that, through the work of the unique God-man Christ Jesus, it is not only man who made satisfaction, it is God himself who was both satisfier and the satisfied.\(^8^4\)

The doctrine of satisfaction in Anselm is profoundly Trinitarian. There is a giving and receiving within the divinity. The human is offered within the divine and receives immortal life as a gift in that communication and exchange. According to Anselm,

God, the Son of God offered himself for his own honour, as well as for that of the Father and Holy Spirit; that is, he gave his humanity to his divinity.\(^8^5\)

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\(^{8^3}\) McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, i, 60.
\(^{8^4}\) Stott, 229.
\(^{8^5}\) *Cur Deus Homo* 2, xviii.
This humanity was sinless, the sacrifice of that humanity unto death, was not owed to God, therefore, the Son deserves a reward. But the Son has no need of anything, who shall then receive it?

It would be both just and necessary that the gift should be given by the Father to whomsoever the Son wished ... Upon whom would he more properly bestow the reward occurring from his death than upon those for whose salvation ... he became man; and for whose sake ... he left an example of suffering death to preserve holiness? For surely in vain will men imitate him, if they be not partakers of his reward. Or whom could he more justly make heirs of the inheritance, which he does not need, and of the superfluity of his possessions than his parents and brethren? What more proper than that, when he beholds so many of them weighed down by so heavy a debt, and wasting through poverty, in the depth of their miseries, he should remit the debt incurred by their sins, and give them what their transgressions had forfeited.86

This manner of speaking in terms of the gracious transfer to others of what is owed to Christ as God preserves as the agent the divine generosity and superfluity of goodness. This is the opposite of mean spirited legalism. Bosco is moved at this representation of overflowing grace. He is overcome by a wonderfilled assurance. And Anselm moves to a doctrine of justification by faith founded on the sure word of Scripture. Bosco says:

The universe can hear nothing more reasonable, more sweet, more desirable. And I receive such confidence from this that I cannot describe the joy with which my heart exults. For it seems to me that God can reject none who come to him in his name.

Anselm answers:

Certainly not, if he came aright. And

86 Cur Deus Homo 2, xix.
the Scriptures, which rest on solid truth
as on a firm foundation and which by the
help of God we have examined. The Scriptures,
I say, show us how to approach in order to share
such favour, and how we ought to live under it. 87

But how does he approach and how live under it? The human dies and is reborn to
eternal life as the sacrifice offered and its reward given between the divine persons.
The context of God’s favour is sacrifice as the divine and human activity. Anselm
imagines this address of the Father and the Son.

What compassion can excel these words
of the Father, addressed to the sinner
doomed to eternal torments and having no
way of escape: "Take my only begotten Son
and make him an offering for yourself" or
these words of the Son: "Take me, and ransom
your souls." For these are the voices they utter,
when inviting and leading us to faith in the
Gospel. 88

George Williams supplies us with an explanation of what this means for an
individual within the sacramental life of the mediaeval church. He becomes an
imitator of Christ and participant in the benefit of his death:

The specific action of full appropriation
and identification takes place ... when the
believer ... having come from infant baptismal
ablation of the generic culpa of not having
justice in his essential human nature, and then
coming more directly from penance with due
affection, having joyfully accepted the poena,
the penitent believer responds in the mass ...
to God in the liturgical action of the priest when
God, in effect says: "Accept (accipe) my only
begotten Son and give him for thyself," as the
believer’s part in the debita iustitiae of man in
general and his own personal debita in particular,
and hears the Son himself say: "Take (tolle) me
and redeem thyself." It is no chance that key
words of this passage reflect the phrasing of the

87 Ibid.
88 Cur Deus Homo 2, xx.
canon of the mass ... The sense of the divine presence on the altar had become especially tangible in the time of Anselm. The Host was commonly addressed in prayer, held in the devout hands of the priest.  

Justification by faith requires the appropriation of the sacrifice of Christ, that we may be by it in the giving and receiving which constitutes the Holy Trinity. "Draw me nearer, nearer, nearer, blessed Lord to thy cross and pierced side." To be present body and soul by thought, sense and feeling at and with the sacrifice of Christ: this is everything for Anselm. He showed no inclination to divide himself from his teacher, spiritual master, and patron, Lanfranc, who asserted in the strongest terms the reality of the presence and the actuality of the oblation of Christ in the sacrament of the altar. The Reformation brings us to division over this manner of the appropriation of Christ's satisfying work and thus moves us on to Bishop Cameron and Dr. Evans.

W.J. Hankey

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89 Williams, 265.