Gerard O’Daly, in his recent study of Augustine’s *Philosophy of Mind*, affirms the contrast drawn by Pierre Hadot in a communication delivered to the Third International Patristics Conference between Augustine and Marius Victorinus. Victorinus, when he undertakes to explain the consubstantiality of the three divine persons of the Trinity through its image in the ternary structure of the human soul ... is primary concerned with the soul ... as an ontological reality: it is an image of divine substance, and hence of the structure of being. ... But in Augustine the schemes ... remain psychological: they are not, so to speak, translated into ontological or metaphysical terms.¹

If this be true, it may go some way toward explaining why, immediately after it became available even those (indeed, one might say, especially those) philosophical theologians who wished to remain faithful to Augustine’s teaching found it necessary to have recourse to the other major pagan and Christian Neoplatonic tradition which forms Latin theology. The Plotinian - Augustinian tradition, though primary in Western theology, was supplemented by the Procline - Dionysian stream as soon as figures appeared who know both.²

The relations between these Neoplatonisms, whether of conflict, mutual development, confusion or confluence, are too many and too complexly variegated to list here. At the very least, though, the more explicitly systematized Procline theology provided a framework within which Augustine’s psychological schemes

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could be placed. Thus, their epistemological status was explained (or altered), and they were given place in the order of creation and redemption, that is in the fundamental *exitus* and *reditus*. These Augustinian activities of the self were situated within the divinity and within creation, and within both of them as ontological realities and also as processes. They were located within the structure and dialectic of being and non being.

In another communication to this Conference I said something about the character of their meeting in the *Consolation of Philosophy* of Boethius and in the *Periphyseon* of Eriugena. The case of Boethius indicates the necessity at work and how the medievals will deal with it. In his writings, Augustinian theological notions are retained and developed and, in the *Consolation*, the inward upward movement of the soul on the road to salvation is the way of Plotinus and Augustine, but the systematic spirit is Procline. The system is totalitarian in its determination to make logical form explicit in literary structure, and in its development of that structure to include every persuasive art in order to be appropriate to every level and aspect of the soul as it is moved and moves toward the unity which is the good and our happiness. Further, the logical structure on which all is strictly ordered is a dialectic of the one and the many, a graduated movement of all toward the simple, motionless, perfectly good unity. Indicative of the medieval future is the ease with which notions plucked from the vast heap of Augustine’s diverse unsystematic writings are placed within a foreign system. But, the meeting which occurred in Eriugena though less graceful, gigantically and awkwardly gathering enormously difficult and incongruous notions in a form which will be suspect from the beginning, and eventually condemned, is more constitutive of what will make Western philosophical theology, theological cosmology and institutions. It also helps us to understand better the meeting of these same incongruities in Bonaventure.

Ordered into one vast circular system of procession and return are what we might call a Procline ontology and an Augustinian psychology. But such a denomination confuses more than it reveals. For the Procline element, although providing the underlying structure of reality, gives non-being priority over being and the Augustinian side provides the medium of creation. In a thoroughly Augustinian way, the psychological powers gathered in the human, including the trinitarian *mens*, stand in immediate proximity to the First Principle, but here they comprise the actual medium of creation. In contrast to Augustine’s *De Trinitate* or the *Consolatio* of Boethius, the interest is not in finding a way from the human to

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4 See P. Lucentini, *Platonismo medievale. Contributi per la storia dell’Eriugenismo*, 2nd ed. (Florence, 1980) and Hankey, “The *De Trinitate*.”
the First, but rather in showing how ineffable non-being, before all definition, being and multiplicity, comes into definite, varied, perceptible and predicable being by passing or “running through” intellect, reason, imagination and sense, the powers of the human anima. So, “in homine ... universaliter creatae sunt”. The consequence is not only an incomprehensible joining of Greek Christian Neoplatonism, in a profoundly apophatic form, with what in Augustine has always seemed most incompatible with that. But also, we have a system in which the logical, the ontological, the psychological and the epistemological are unified.

We know that, despite his condemnation, important elements of Eriugena’s work and ideas passed by various means to the thirteenth century builders of those new works of systematic Neoplatonism, the summae. Evidently, amongst other media was the Latin Corpus dionysiacum for which Eriugena was so responsible, having imbibed the thought of Dionysius thoroughly himself. Bonaventure certainly drank deeply from that well, though, like most, he received a Dionysius already thoroughly westernized by Hugh of St. Victor and others building on Eriugena’s beginnings. But we do not need to find direct traces of Eriugena’s hand. Bonaventure openly acknowledges his evident and real dependence on Dionysius and Augustine. The systematized unification of logics: conceptual, ontic, psychic and epistemic, which we behold in Eriugena’s Periphyseon, is, in fact, assumed and explicated in Bonaventure’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum, even if Eriugena were only a precedent and not a source.

Outlining the manifold forms in which Augustine and Dionysius appear in the Itinerarium, and how they oppose, transform, develop and complement one another would be far too great a work to attempt here. But our purposes require noting a few crucial points. There is the strictest conformity of literary form to logical structure and the fundamental image carrying the material and drawing it to its Dionysian end is from the pseudo-Dionysius. The six chapters between the Prologue and the Seventh and final chapter describing the “spiritual and mystical ecstasy in which rest is given to our intellect when through ecstasy our affection passes over entirely into God” repose upon the six wings of the Seraph which St. Francis beheld as crucified.

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6 Periphyseon iv, 8 (PL 122, 774a), see God in Himself, Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford, 1987), 53-55.


9 Ibid, prologue, 295.
described by Dionysius, and which he was so anxious should not really have been sent to Isaiah, as Isaiah 6.6 seems to say,\textsuperscript{10} figures as the ecstatic love proximate to the fiery divine darkness. However, the substance of what occurs as the soul moves up the three pairs of wings is understood in a thoroughly Augustinian way:

Corresponding to this threefold movement, our mind (\textit{mens nostra}) has three principal perceptual orientations. The first is toward exterior material objects and is the basis for its being designated as animal or sensual (\textit{animalitas seu sensualitas}); the second orientation is within itself and into itself (\textit{intra se et in se}) and is the basis for its being designated as spirit (\textit{spiritus}); the third is above itself and is the basis for its being designated as mind (\textit{mens}). ... Any one of these ways can be doubled, according to whether we consider God ... through a mirror or in a mirror (\textit{ut per speculum et ut in speculum}), or we can consider each way independently or as joined to another (\textit{seu quia una istarum considerationum habet commisceri alteri sibi coniunctae et habet considerari in sua puritate}).\textsuperscript{11}

The work is full of triads. A key to the understanding of the whole cosmos as so formed, a key which unlocks much else in the work, is provided at the beginning of the third chapter where the mind enters into itself:

Now in the third stage, we enter into our very selves; we should strive to see God through a mirror (\textit{per speculum videre Deum}) in the sanctuary ... Here the light of truth ... glows upon the face of our mind (\textit{in facie nostrae mentis}), in which the image of the most blessed Trinity shines in splendor. Enter into your self, then, and see that your soul loves itself most fervently; that it could not love itself unless it knew itself, nor know itself unless it remembered itself ...\textsuperscript{12}

Thus the famous trinitarian self of Augustine makes its appearance. It is the mental structure through which everything in the cosmos, the whole of which appears on the mind’s \textit{itinerarium}, is understood, and understood rightly because, according to this structure common to God and man, the cosmos has been formed. Toward the end of this third chapter, Bonaventure tells us that, by this knowledge of ourselves to which we can always revert (because it is the true and immediately accessible structure of the human self), we can also:

\begin{quote}
See how close the soul is to God (\textit{quomodo anima Deo est propinqua}), and how, in their operations, the memory leads to eternity, the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{10} See W.J. Hankey, “Aquinas, Pseudo-Denys, Proclus and Isaiah VI.6,” \textit{Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge}, 64 (1997), 59-93.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Itinerarium}, i, sections 3 & 4, 297.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, iii, 1, 303.
understanding to truth, and the power of choice to the highest good (memoria in aeternitatem, intelligentia in veritatem, electiva potentia ducit in bonitatem summam). These powers lead to the most blessed Trinity itself.\(^\text{13}\)

Bonaventure, proceeding from the known human self, then describes, one might say demonstrates, the divine Trinity, and concludes:

> When, therefore, the soul considers itself, it rises through itself as through a mirror to behold the blessed Trinity of the Father, the Word and Love.\(^\text{14}\)

Sixteen years ago at this Conference, looking at this same kind of argument in the Monologion of Anselm of Canterbury, and comparing it to Augustine’s De Trinitate, Anselm’s Monologion, and Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, I described how Anselm, in deducing the divine Trinity from the structure of mind, had also accomplished just such a reversal of Augustine. I concluded then that Anselm’s argument in the Monologion could:

be looked at either in an Augustinian or [in] a Dionysian-Eriugenan context. In an Augustinian view, Anselm has dogmatically taken one side of Augustine’s necessarily two sided dialectic - i.e. the side where the understanding of self is a kind of demonstration of the principle by which, on the other side, the self is itself understood, and endeavored to represent the former alone.\(^\text{15}\)

The Monologion’s procedure is from the self, remembering, conceiving and loving itself, to a demonstration of the Trinitarian character of the First Principle. In the third chapter of the Itinerarium, Bonaventure is engaged in the same kind of project. In Bonaventure this use of Augustine for an unAugustinian deduction of the Trinity is set within a Dionysian context.

Bonaventure’s knowledge and use of Anselm is undoubted, though we are not compelled to find him dependent on the former Abbot of Bec in Chapter 3, but when we come to Chapter 6 of the Itinerarium, he is manifestly uniting Anselm’s

\(^{13}\) Ibid, iii, 4, 305.  
\(^{14}\) Ibid, iii, 5, 305.  
\(^{15}\) Hankey, “The Place of the Psychological Image,” 109; R.D. Crouse, in “A Twelfth Century Augustinian: Honorius Augustodunensis”, Atti III, Congresso Internazionale su S. Agostino nel xvi Centenario delle Conversione, Roma, 15-20 settembre 1986, Studia Ephemerides ‘Augustinianum’ 26, (Rome, 1987), 177, restates my point thus: “Anselm has taken one side of the Augustinian dialogue between the word of God foris and the word of God intus; he has thus, in his methodological independence of the revealed word, in a sense re-platonised Augustine, in the context of an established piety where the impasse of platonic spirituality, so acutely felt by Augustine, is no longer understood.
Proslogion and Dionysius. Anselm’s famous argument in the initial chapters of that book led, at Chapter 23, to a different deduction of the Trinity, than he employed in the Monologion, one which neither uses nor arrives at Augustine’s psychological triad. The Proslogion’s beginning and trinitarian deduction Bonaventure in Book 6 marries to Dionysius’ doctrine of the self diffusive good. But, before attending this medieval marriage, a contemporary detour is indicated.

As part of his endeavor to locate the origins of the onto-theological character which Heidegger ascribed to Western Christian theology, Jean-Luc Marion has recently asked “Is the ontological argument ontological?” He answered ‘no’, because there is in Anselm (as opposed to modern advocates of the argument) an apophatic relation to God like that in Gregory of Nyssa and the Pseudo-Dionysius, for example. This is not an assertion about what influenced Anselm, his own declarations about his dependence on Augustine are too clear for that, but it is rather an endeavor to clarify the nature of the logic. The argument depends on God being beyond conception, the inconceivably great must exist in re, outside mere intellection. It moves from maius to melius, God’s greatness exceeds our conception by its goodness. Anselm’s demonstration later in the Proslogion that this God is a Trinity of persons proceeds from the notion of the summum bonum ... omnino sufficiens, nullo indigens.

Something analogous can be said here in respect to Bonaventure. For, if in Bonaventure Dionysius becomes an Augustinian, since an Anselmian transformation of Augustine is placed within a Dionysian ascent to God, Augustine has been reshaped by the Procline logic within which his approach to the divine Trinity has been located. This mutual metamorphosis is evident in the sixth chapter of the Itinerarium.

Chapters Five and Six treat the relation of mind above itself in terms of another delightful and appropriate image taken from The Celestial Hierarchy. In the first triad of that hierarchy, the triad of the immediate presence, the angels

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16 Jean-Luc Marion, “Is the Ontological Argument Ontological? The Argument According to Anselm and Its Metaphysical Interpretation According to Kant,” The Journal of the History of Philosophy 30/2 (1992), 201-218 at 211, note 22 and 216, note 30 (re Boethius); on his enterprise more generally and with some recent conclusions about medieval theologians, see his article and that of Olivier Boulnois in the Revue thomiste 95/1 (1995); the issue is entitled Saint Thomas et l’onto-théologie.


18 Marion, Questions, 244-52.

19 Proslogion, (Schmitt, vol. i), xxii, 117. The actual deduction is in xxiii (117), where this good is also "simplex". 
next below the loving Seraphim are the contemplative Cherubim. These, in the 
*Itinerarium*, as in the Ark of the Covenant constructed by Moses, gaze toward one
another across the “Mercy Seat”.20 For Bonaventure what they see from their
opposed perspectives on God differs, but differs as the most intimately connected
of contraries.21 The Cherub, whose vision is the subject of Chapter Five, beholds
the divine being, and being a Neoplatonic Cherub, has on this account, like
Thomas Aquinas, a vision of the absolutely simple unity of God. Naturally, this
Cherub, like Aquinas in this also, supposes that he is considering God’s preeminent
name.22 As Bonaventure puts it: “Damascene, therefore, following Moses, says
that *He who is* is God’s primary name.”23

The facing Cherub, is equally convinced that he is regarding what is first,
and he has excellent authority for his conceit, as Bonaventure informs us:
“Dionysius, following Christ, says that the Good is God’s primary name.”24 In
Chapter Six, penultimate to the ecstatic rest, the vision of that second Cherub is
disclosed. From the Dionysian conception of the totally self-diffusive, and
therefore absolutely perfect good, he sees, in accord an argument resembling that
of Anselm in the *Proslogion*, the three persons of the divine Trinity. The self-
sufficient and perfect good communicates itself so that persons are formed who
give “to one another their entire substance and nature.”25 “Ibi est summa
*communicatio* et vera diffusio” in this emanation.26 “You are able to see that
through the utmost communicability of the Good, there must be the Trinity of the
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.”27

When, in the sixth chapter, what belongs to the primary name Dionysius
ascribes to God is explored, in which his characterization of it as self-diffusive is
essential, Anselm intervenes. Describing the highest good, Bonaventure calls it:

> without qualification that than which no greater can be thought.
> And it is such, [Bonaventure continues, following Anselm in the *
> *Proslogion*], that it cannot rightly be thought not to be, and since to

20 Exodus 25. 19.
21 On Chapter 6, on the opposed visions and perspectives of the Cherubim, and on whether the
vision of the good and the Trinity takes precedence over the vision of being and unity, see Jean-Luc
ultimate nomination recedes from Being to goodness”), Emmanuel Falque, “Vision, excès et chair.
Essai de lecture phénoménologique de l’oeuvre de saint Bonaventure,” *Rev. sc. ph. th.* 79 (1995), 3-
48; John Milbank, “Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysics,” 336-337 (opposing Marion’s
supercession of being) and Fergus Kerr, “Aquinas after Marion,” (at 362), in *New Blackfriars* 76, No.
805 (July/August, 1995), “Special Issue on Jean-Luc Marion’s *God without Being.*”
23 *Itinerarium*. v, 2, 308.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid, vi, 2, 310.
26 Ibid, vi, 3, 311.
27 Ibid vi, 2, 311.
be is in all ways better than not to be, it is such that it cannot rightly be thought of unless it be thought of as three and one. For good is said to be self-diffusive, and the highest good (summum bonum) is supremely self-diffusive.\(^{28}\)

In the deduction of the divine Trinity in the Proslogion, and when Bonaventure employs Anselm to explicate the Cherubic vision in the Itinerarium, there is no reversion to the psychological triad of Augustine. The argument of these Augustinian theologians is from the simple self-sufficiency of the highest good so communicating itself within the divine unity as to bring forth distinct divine persons. The relations of these persons are the relations of love (other constitutive activities are not mentioned).\(^{29}\)

Anselm’s Proslogion emerged from his dissatisfaction with the inadequacy in the Monologion between the simple notion of the God he was demonstrating and the complexity of his argument, an argument he thought could be judged by those who would read Augustine’s De Trinitate. In that distress he was graciously granted a way to God in which the form of thought was appropriate to the simplicity of its content. This beginning should stand as a question mark to those who might over emphasize the negative theology in the Proslogion. Anselm’s new beginning Bonaventure, with speculative insight, assimilates to Dionysius’ primary name for God, so as to bring forth Anselm’s deduction of the Trinity and, from thence, to lead the itinerant mind to the Dionysian darkness which is light and emptiness which is entirely full. It is significant that in both authors Augustine’s psychological triad is surpassed, though the vision of the first Cherub is not passed beyond since the Trinity of persons only appears when the summum bonum is also simple being. Dionysius has become an Augustinian, and Augustine lives within a systematic cosmos which is not his creation.

Wayne Hankey

\(^{28}\) Ibid vi, 2, 310.