

Strategic Behaviour Syllabus

Department of Economics

ECON 3600 Fall 2026

Dalhousie University operates in the unceded territories of the Mi'kmaw, Wolastoqey, and Peskotomuhkati Peoples. These sovereign nations hold inherent rights as the original peoples of these lands, and we each carry collective obligations under the Peace and Friendship Treaties. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, recognizes and affirms Aboriginal and Treaty rights in Canada.

We recognize that African Nova Scotians are a distinct people whose histories, legacies, and contributions have enriched the part of Mi'kma'ki known as Nova Scotia for over 400 years.

Course Instructor

Name	Email	Office Hours
Professor Yulia Kotlyarova	yulia.kotlyarova@dal.ca	Friday 11 am - 12:30 pm or by appointment 6220 University Ave, C32

Course Description

Many economic questions (such as price competition, tax policy, research and development decision, bargaining) can be interpreted as games, in which each player's action affects payoffs of other players. The students learn how to recognize various strategic interactions in economics, and how to evaluate the outcomes of such interactions.

Course Prerequisites

ECON 2200.03 (or ECON 2210.03 or ECON 2220.03), MATH 1000.03 or equivalent with minimum grades of C.

Course Structure

Course Delivery: In-person lectures. The lectures will not be recorded.

Lectures: Monday and Wednesday 10:05-11:25 am LSC-COMMON AREA C332

Course Materials

Required text: "Strategy" by J. Watson (W.W. Norton 2013, 3rd edition)

[https://bookstore.dal.ca/CourseSearch/?course\[\]=SUB,202710,ECON,ECON3600,01](https://bookstore.dal.ca/CourseSearch/?course[]=SUB,202710,ECON,ECON3600,01)

The 2nd edition of the textbook is also acceptable.

Additional reading materials will be posted on Brightspace or distributed in class. Please check regularly the course page on Brightspace for course announcements and assignments.

Other useful textbooks (on reserve in Killam library):

“An Introduction to Game Theory” by M. Osborne (Oxford University Press, 2004): more advanced mathematical treatment of game theory

“A Course in Microeconomic Theory” by D. Kreps (Princeton University Press, 1990): graduate textbook

“Games of Strategy” by A. Dixit, S. Skeath, and D. Reiley (W.W. Norton, 3rd edition, 2009): detailed non-technical explanations

“Thinking Strategically” by A. Dixit and B. Nalebuff (W.W. Norton, 1991): informal introduction to game theory

"Behavioral Game Theory: experiments in strategic interaction" by C. Camerer (Princeton University Press, 2003): discussion of numerous experiments in game theory

Learning Objectives

This course introduces different types of competitive and cooperative behaviour of economic agents. Lectures focus on noncooperative static and dynamic games. The ideas are illustrated using examples from microeconomics and labour economics. The students will learn how to apply such concepts as dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, randomization, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated game strategies, and signaling. Problem-based learning is an important part of the course.

Assessment

Component	Weight, % of final grade	Date
<i>4 assignments</i>	20%	to be determined
<i>Closed-book midterm</i>	30% (80 min, in person)	in class, 2 November 2026 (tentative)
<i>Closed-book final exam</i>	50% (3 hrs, in person)	scheduled exam period

The midterm questions will include extensive and normal forms, dominance and Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and mixed strategies.

The final exam is cumulative.

Conversion of numerical grades to final letter grades follows the

[Dalhousie Grade Scale](#)

A+ (90-100)	B+ (77-79)	C+ (65-69)	D (50-54)
A (85-89)	B (73-76)	C (60-64)	F (0-49)
A- (80-84)	B- (70-72)	C- (55-59)	

Course Policies on Missed or Late Academic Requirements

If a student misses the midterm for a valid reason, the student must notify the instructor by email prior to the date and time of the exam. In this case, the final exam will count for 80% of the final grade.

If a student cannot submit an assignment on time, the student must contact the instructor prior to the assignment deadline to discuss alternative arrangements. Please note that late submissions will not be accepted once the solutions are posted on Brightspace by the instructor.

If a student misses the final exam for a valid reason, the student must notify the instructor immediately and provide the appropriate documentation. The student will have an opportunity to write a make-up final exam.

Course Policies related to Academic Integrity & Artificial Intelligence

The students are not allowed to collaborate on the assignments and exams. The use of generative AI is not permitted. The full text of Dalhousie's *Statement on Intellectual Honesty and Faculty Discipline Procedures* is available here:

http://www.dal.ca/dept/university_secretariat/academic-integrity/academic-policies.html

Course Content (tentative)

Week 1	Extensive and normal forms: Ch. 1 - 5
Weeks 2 - 3	Dominance and Nash equilibrium: Ch. 6 – 10
Week 4	Subgame perfect equilibrium in dynamic games: Ch. 14 - 16
Weeks 5 - 6	Mixed strategies: Ch. 4, 11
Week 7	Bargaining: Ch. 18 - 19
Week 8	Repeated games: Ch. 22
Weeks 9 - 11	Games with incomplete information (Bayesian Nash equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, auctions): Ch. 24 - 29
Week 12	Bounded rationality (based on papers by D. Kahneman and A. Tversky)

Course Accessibility

The [Student Accessibility Centre](#) is Dalhousie's centre of expertise for matters related to student accessibility and accommodation. To begin the process of requesting a formal academic accommodation, please contact access@dal.ca.

[Syllabus Appendix: Student Supports & University Statements, Policies, and Guidelines](#)