



**JEAN MONNET EUROPEAN UNION CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE
STUDENT ESSAY AWARD (2025-26)**

**Brexit and the Limits of Sovereignty:
The United Kingdom's Complex Path Through
Integration with the European Union**

Emma Fay

Introduction

Brexit was the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union in 2020. The United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU) to gain independent control over every sector of the country. Although the UK regained full control, it faced labour shortages, reduced trade and lower economic output. Additionally, it had to initiate new trade agreements with all countries, including the EU, which would entail compromises on its ability to have independent control. Brexit demonstrates that while the UK sought to reclaim sovereignty and national control, the outcome reveals the limits of this goal, with both economic and political challenges overtaking its once thriving economy, revealing how true independence in a globalized world is largely unattainable.

This paper will begin with the history of the UK's EU membership, explained through democratic peace theory, and then transition to the Constructivist gap, offering a theoretical analysis of how the UK perceived European integration to be different from how it actually was, based on the restrictions of human capacity shaped by one's external environment. It will then discuss the Brexit process, how politicians handled it, and the economic impact of leaving the EU. Finally, Brexit will be explained from both constructivist and realist perspectives, beginning with the constructivist argument that the British media largely influenced the erosion of British identity. Finally, it will discuss the broader picture of what Brexit means for the UK from a realist perspective, and how the need to maintain territorial integrity has now led to something bigger: democratic backsliding.

Why did the UK join the EU?

The UK originally joined the EU in 1973 (then called the European Economic Community). As background, during WWII, the UK experienced robust economic growth, much greater than that of many other countries (Coricelli, 2015). The weakness of many European

countries and the desire to foster greater cooperation to minimize chances of another war led to plans for European integration; however, the UK was hesitant, given its relatively strong economic growth (Coricelli, 2015). France initially proposed a customs union immediately after WWII, which did not pass, but eventually led to the Schuman Declaration in 1950, proposing the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the first supranational institution in Europe (the European Union, n.d.). This Declaration eventually led to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which set the stage for the European Economic Community, establishing a customs union to facilitate trade, investment, and the movement of workers (Dziak, 2023). At the same time, the UK began to experience a relative economic decline, but did not join either arrangement. Instead, the UK helped create the European Free Trade Association in 1960, along with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland, by signing a Convention in Stockholm on 4 January 1960 as an alternative to the EEC (Coricelli, 2015).

This history of integration, or refusal of it, offers insight into the UK's ambivalence toward strong integration with Europe. It appeared to desire some trade and economic integration, but not to the extent implied by the EEC. It was opposed to many of the supranational elements in the treaties. It wished to “pursue a ‘one-world economic system’ policy in which sterling was a central currency” (UK in a Changing Europe, n.d.).

Nevertheless, after two failed attempts to join the EEC in the 1960s, the UK eventually joined in 1973, for various reasons. First, with the departure of French President de Gaulle, there was less domestic opposition to the UK joining European integration, especially after Prime Minister Harold Wilson was defeated by Edward Heath, who supported joining the EEC (Coricelli, 2015). Second, despite the Commonwealth of Nations being Britain's main trading network, the UK would gain more economically by integrating with Europe through the EEC, especially since growth in Commonwealth countries was weaker than in European markets (UK

Parliament, n.d.). In addition, the European project was perceived as a way to halt the UK's relative economic decline. On this basis, joining the EU worked to halt Britain's relative economic decline vis-à-vis the EU6 and maintain its international standing (Coricelli & Campos, 2015). Among these many factors, the need for the UK to maintain its international standing and boost economic growth were key, interconnected reasons for joining the EU. This can be explained through democratic peace theory created by Immanuel Kant, who claims that democratic states make the world more peaceful (Lukasavage, 2024). It states that a representative republican government can limit wars by ensuring responsibility through both international law and the democratic production of high levels of economic and social interdependence (Kant, 1795, p. 60,69). This interdependence makes war costly, preserving peace extending beyond borders, creating perpetual peace between nations fixed by cosmopolitan law binding them economically (Kant, 1795, p. 60,69). For the UK, maintaining its international standing is critical to preserving peace within its borders and regrowing its economy to remain competitive in the European market. At the same time, the divisions within the UK, evident when it joined the EU, also sowed the seeds of Brexit.

Euroscepticism and the Rise of Brexit Through a Constructivist Lens

Although the UK had strengthened both its economy and its international ties by joining the EU, there remained a disconnect with those who focused instead on the loss of sovereignty, identity, and independence. This situation demonstrates the relevance of the constructivist gap between perception and material reality. Constructivism is a theoretical lens which emphasizes the importance of identity, norms, and values. "Even so, constructivism does offer alternative understandings of some of the most central themes in international relations, such as the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interest, and the prospects for change (Hopf, 1998, p. 172)" (Flockhart, 2016, p. 82). This gap can be further

explained through a priori knowledge in Kant's book, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Kant states that humans have an innate mental framework that allows them to understand events a priori, but restricts them to knowing them only as they appear, not as they actually are in themselves (*Prolegomena* §10, 2001, p. 25). When citizens of the UK were making decisions on Brexit, their views were shaped by the dominant group of shared ideology, Eurosceptics, who understood integration by how it was being marketed – poor for Britain's overall identity and sovereignty, instead of what it actually was. This situation, in part, was due to the decades-long buildup of Euroscepticism. In 1988, Margaret Thatcher's speech framed the EEC as a threat to national sovereignty, and this skepticism was continued by many other politicians, such as Boris Johnson, another prominent figure in the Leave campaign, and Dominic Cummings, known for making extreme media exaggerations in support of Brexit (Thatcher, 1988). In contrast, politicians such as Prime Minister David Cameron, who supported EU integration and its benefits, received less airtime, creating a disconnect between shared norms and reality. Consequently, this culminated in out-group phenomena, where an ingroup develops emotional ties to its own group, viewing the out-group with opposing opinions as resistant (McFeeters, 2021). Relating to Brexit, there was a vast divide between leavers and stayers, favouring one group and creating affective polarization (Tilley & Hobolt, 2023). This divide led to the perception of Brexit as harmful to national sovereignty rather than economically and politically beneficial. As Kant argued, knowledge is limited to perception due to humans' innate mental frameworks; therefore, people were unable to discern what the benefits of Brexit actually were.

Building on Kant's structural perspective, David Hume introduces an empirical dimension by emphasizing the inherent fallibility of human memory. “Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that wherever we

depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty” (Hume, 1739-1740, T 1.1.3.3, SBN 9). Memory remembers events as a person individually experienced them, and if something is remembered incorrectly, it is simply because human memory is imperfect. This quote helps explain reactionary attitudes in the UK that aim to restore political, economic, and social institutions to their historical state (W.W. Norton, n.d.). Human nature is nostalgic and fallible, which can create memories that do not align with reality, meaning that a desire to revert to a time when the UK was free of external European control could be glamorized, even though that memory is false. These dynamics illustrate how constructivist forces of shared beliefs and subjective experience can override material realities in driving major political decisions such as Brexit that are grounded more in perception than in objective fact.

The Brexit Process

A referendum was held on the 23rd of June 2016, in which a majority voted to leave the EU (Walker, 2021). Leading up to this, Prime Minister David Cameron felt pressure from both the British public and the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which won the 2014 European Parliament elections, threatening the Conservative Party's reign, and receiving pressure from Eurosceptics within his own party (O'Reilly et al., 2016). In an attempt to win back public support and unite Eurosceptics within his party, he promised in his 2013 Bloomberg speech that if the Conservative Party won the 2015 election, he would discuss EU-UK relations and hold a referendum on exiting the EU (Cameron, 2013).

Cameron won in 2015 and kept his word to hold a referendum, creating the European Union Referendum Act 2015, which made it mandatory to hold a referendum before the end of 2017 (O'Reilly et al., 2016; European Union Referendum Act, 2015, p. 1). Cameron walked into this referendum confident that there would not be a leave vote, as he had previously

successfully navigated the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, and used this to prove to eurosceptics that a majority viewed the impacts of European integration as positive (Rosen, 2014). However, this was not the case, and when the referendum was held, a majority voted to leave the EU (Walker, 2021).

On the 29th of March 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May (who had replaced Cameron) and the EU Council President Donald Tusk officially put Article 50 into effect, which began the two-year countdown of Brexit during which the UK had to put together a deal with the EU on its exit (Walker, 2021). However, this date was later extended to June 30th, 2019 and subsequently to the 31st of October 2019 (Walker, 2021). Negotiating the deal and getting approval within a fractured Parliament had proven difficult. In the meantime, following Theresa May's resignation in July 2019, Boris Johnson became Prime Minister and vowed to secure a Brexit deal. Nevertheless, on October 19, 2019, the UK House of Commons passed an amendment that delayed a new Brexit deal crafted by Johnson, in part because Parliament was not given enough time to scrutinize it. The EU ambassadors and Tusk agreed to the extension of January 31st, 2020 (Walker, 2021).

In the December 12th, 2019 general election, Boris Johnson won due to his commitment to completing Brexit by January 31st, 2020 (Walker, 2021). On January 23rd of 2020, the European Union Withdrawal Agreement Act of 2020 received royal ascent, meaning that the withdrawal agreement between the UK and EU could move forward, and on January 31st, 2020, the UK left the EU and began a transition period (Walker, 2021). This ended at 11 pm on December 31st, 2020, and marked the UK's official independence from the EU (Walker, 2021).

Given that the UK joined the EU and truly began its involvement with deeper European integration for the economic benefits it bore, its decision to leave unsurprisingly damaged

economic growth. One recent study indicates that by 2025, Brexit will have reduced UK GDP by 6% to 8%, with investment, employment, and productivity all being affected, creating elevated uncertainty (Arnorsson & Zoega, 2018). Its economic impacts are so large that “the Bank of England estimates that output could be eight to 10 percent lower than the pre-Brexit trend in a “no-deal” Brexit, depending on how disruptive it turns out to be. However, in an “economic partnership” scenario, losses would be a fraction of this amount.” (Fay, 2019).

Euroscepticism and Fears of Greater EU Integration

Many people in the UK felt that the level of integration that occurred during the UK's involvement with the EU was eroding British identity and infiltrating British economic systems. British identity was deeply rooted, especially since the UK was one of the first countries to have a secure and flourishing economic and political system, which made integration seem like an erasure of Britain's past (Crozier, 2020).

The role of the media is relevant, as the roles news sources, opinion pieces, and fabricated lies played in shaping public views were among the main ways the logic of consequence was warped. The logic of consequence provides a cost-benefit analysis to maximize utility, and many Brexit supporters held views, shaped by both dominant power structures and history, that less European integration was the sole way to regain control over the economy and immigration policies (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). The core defining traits of the UK and its people, such as what creates a shared identity, their values, and cultural environment, are deeply rooted in their history and, through this, individual identities as well. Because of how strongly the UK feels about preserving its national sovereignty, the media was used to spread various lies and beliefs to broaden support for leaving the EU. For example, Dominic Cummings, the Vote Leave Campaign Director, posted false public statements on Facebook stating that the UK was spending 350 million pounds a week on the EU, which could have been allocated to the National

Health Service (Bakir & McStay, 2022, p. 3). He continued this by stating that Turkey, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Albania were planning on joining the EU and therefore immigration was about to further take over the UK and its strained National Health Service, and the way to prevent this was leaving the EU (Bakir & McStay, 2022, p. 3).

This proposed deeper integration with the EU conflicted strongly with the UK's desire for territorial integrity. Against the backdrop of greater integration with the EU, the UK's eventual desire to leave stemmed primarily from a lack of territorial integrity. The economic interdependence of the EU contributed to democratic peace, based on the idea that since countries are interconnected, going to war with one another would be harmful. Nevertheless, this interdependence conflicted with the UK's desire for territorial integrity. For example, the EU consistently pursues opportunities to create safe havens for migrants, enforcing open-border policies such as the Schengen Area. The "Schengen guarantees free movement to more than 450 million EU citizens, along with non-EU nationals living in the EU or visiting the EU as tourists, exchange students or for business purposes, anyone legally present in the EU" (European Commission, 2025). The UK's rejection of open-border policies was notably evident in its refusal to join the Schengen Area. For many, the idea of joining the Schengen Area brought about possible risks to national security (Rusi, 2007). The UK had "opted into the less controversial parts of the Schengen system, namely most of the criminal law and policing rules" (Peers, 2015). However, this is as far as UK involvement has gone regarding the Schengen Area, as it prefers to maintain control of its territorial borders instead, and it is even pushing ahead with its own so-called 'e-borders' project. This new border system will link all of the UK's land, air and sea borders electronically. It will be able to receive personal travel data from private operators" (Brady, 2009), which began on 12 October 2025 (Government of the UK, n.d.).

Brexit alludes to possible democratic backsliding in the UK, which is defined as a decline in the integrity of democratic values or institutions within a political system (Ginsburg & Huq, n.d.). A common driver of democratic backsliding is when politicians exploit widespread frustration with certain conditions, whether directly related to the democratic regime or not, and use them as a leverage point to justify dismantling democratic institutions (Carothers & Press, 2022). These grievances stem from past economic conditions into corruption, crime, and general governance fecklessness (Carothers & Press, 2022). In the case of Brexit, this group was called the Eurosceptics and comprised both politicians and the general public. They played a dominant role in creating the notion that EU membership was detrimental to Britain, as this level of interdependence meant a loss of sovereignty. Brexit would not have been possible without the widespread criticism of the EU's functioning by Eurosceptics, in whole or in part (Usherwood, 2020).

This relates strongly to the Realist lens, which holds that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature. To improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which it lives. “The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure” (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 4). States act to preserve sovereignty and control; the UK left the EU to maintain autonomy in decision-making (e.g., trade and immigration). Furthering this, Rosenau's 5 factors to consider in foreign policy analysis, regarding the bureaucratic roles of policymakers, state that governments will have their own priorities and interests, often in line with those of the public, that impact the foreign policy decisions being made (Westcott, 2020). The UK government, after some back-and-forth in its views, ultimately prioritized independence and control over all decision-making within the country, thus leading to Brexit, allowing the UK to make decisions that maximize its overall power both domestically and internationally. However, as noted above, given humans'

inability to produce a priori thoughts, the reality of this situation did not align with the cost-benefit analysis. As previously noted, there were negative effects on the economy, partially stemming from another key issue: immigration and the desire to regain border control. In reality, this led to a labour shortage in lower-skilled jobs due to a decline in the number of migrant workers (Portes & Springford, 2023).

Conclusion

Brexit's economic and political consequences highlight how, in a globalized, interconnected world, national sovereignty and control come at a high cost. Although the UK regained full control over its economy, it has faced labour shortages, reduced trade and lower economic output. Additionally, it had to initiate new trade agreements with all countries, including the EU, which would entail compromises on its ability to have independent control. Brexit demonstrates that while the UK sought to reclaim sovereignty and national control, the outcome reveals the limits of this goal, with both economic and political challenges overtaking its once thriving economy, revealing how true independence in a globalized world is largely unattainable.

Therefore, and perhaps ironically, they had to implement different foreign policy strategies to rebuild their economy and maintain their place on the world stage as a strong, developed country. Several different theories can help explain Brexit: integration and democratic peace theory; constructivism and the importance of identity; realism through territorial integrity; democratic backsliding and the logic of consequences; and, finally, the media's role in providing biased commentary. Undoubtedly, all were at play as the UK struggled to maintain its independence and territorial integrity while recognizing that stronger links with countries outside the UK, such as the EU, were important to its economic growth and global reputation. In the end, however, what has resulted from Brexit is a lower trajectory of economic growth and the need to

strengthen relations with countries, including through trade deals, to counteract some of that weakness. This process also necessitates compromises that, to some extent, impinge on domestic sovereignty. Still, that is a choice that the UK can make for itself.

References

- Arnorsson, A., & Zoega, G. (2018, December). On the causes of Brexit. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 301-323.
- https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268016302701?casa_token=FRw8mlh0aLoAAAAA:VxrBLfHsStYtCEJKGu5Txj65eUfwoXBnV4LekMN4LQGUOcqMdxFBiqc7tA1pCnPns4omg4Dn
- Bakir, V., & McStay, A. (2022). AGAINST OPACITY, OUTRAGE & DECEPTION: Towards an ethical code of conduct for transparent, explainable, civil & informative digital political campaigns. *UK Parliamentary Committee*, 3.
- <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/105137/pdf/>
- Brady, H. (2009, February 10). BRITAIN'S SCHENGEN DILEMMA. *Centre For European Reform*. <https://www.cer.eu/insights/britains-schengen-dilemma>
- Cameron, D. (2013, January 23). EU speech at Bloomberg. *GOV.UK*.
- <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg>
- Carothers, T., & Press, B. (2022, October 20). Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*.
- <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/10/understanding-and-responding-to-global-democratic-backsliding>
- Coricelli, F. (2015, February 3). Why did Britain join the EU? *World Economic Forum*.
- <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2015/02/why-did-britain-join-the-eu/#:~:text=Why%20did%20Britain%20join?,%2D%C3%A0%2Dvis%20the%20EU6>.
- Coricelli, F., & Campos, N. (2015, February 3). Why did Britain join the EU? A new insight from economic history. *CEPR*.
- <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/why-did-britain-join-eu-new-insight-economic-history>

- Crozier, A. J. (2020). British exceptionalism: pride and prejudice and Brexit. *International Economics and Economic Policy*, 17(3), 635-658.
https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/iecepo/v17y2020i3d10.1007_s10368-020-00469-z.html#:~:text=Simultaneously%2C%20the%20rise%20of%20Germany,forced%20the%20referendum%20of%202016.
- Dziak, M. (2023). Treaty of Rome. *EBSCO*.
<https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/treaty-rome>
- European Commission. (2025, May 27). Schengen area.
https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen/schengen-area_en
- Fay, R. (2019, January 22). The Long-simmering Economic Issues Behind Brexit. *Centre for International Governance Innovation*.
<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/long-simmering-economic-issues-behind-brexite/>
- Flockhart, T. (2016). *Foreign policy : theories, actors, cases*.
<https://dal.brightspace.com/d21/le/content/414111/viewContent/5320020/View>
- Ginsburg, T., & Huq, A. (n.d.). Democratic backsliding. *Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs*.
<https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/explore-engage/key-terms/democratic-backsliding>
- Goodwin, M., & Heath, O. (2016, August 31). Brexit vote explained: poverty, low skills and lack of opportunities. *Joseph Rowntree Foundation*.
<https://www.jrf.org.uk/public-attitudes/brexit-vote-explained-poverty-low-skills-and-lack-of-opportunities>
- Hume, D. (1739-1740). *A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*. Hume Texts Online.
<https://davidhume.org/texts/t/full>

Kant, I. (1795). *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*. Project Gutenberg.

<https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50922/50922-h/50922-h.htm>

Kant, I. (2001). *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Hackett Publishing Company.

Lukasavage, A. (2024). Democratic peace theory. *EBSCO*.

<https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/political-science/democratic-peace-theory>

May, T. (2019, April 2). PM statement on Brexit: 2 April 2019. *GOV.UK*.

[https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-brexit-2-april-](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-brexit-2-april-2019#:~:text=It%20is%20putting%20Members%20of,determine%20which%20course%20to%20pursue.)

[2019#:~:text=It%20is%20putting%20Members%20of,determine%20which%20course%20to%20pursue.](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-brexit-2-april-2019#:~:text=It%20is%20putting%20Members%20of,determine%20which%20course%20to%20pursue.)

McFeeters, B. B. (n.d.). Ingroups and Outgroups. *EBSCO*.

<https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/social-sciences-and-humanities/ingroups-and-outgroups>

Morgenthau, H. (2006). *SIX PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REALISM*. McGraw-Hill.

<https://dal.brightspace.com/d21/le/content/414111/viewContent/5303783/View>

O'Reilly, J., Froud, J., Johal, S., Williams, K., Warhurst, C., Morgan, G., Grey, C., Wood, G.,

Wright, M., Boyer, R., Frerichs, S., Sankari, S., Rona-Tas, A., & Le Gales, P. (2017,

January 6). Brexit: understanding the socio-economic origins and consequences. *Socio-Economic Review*, 14(4), 807–854.

<https://academic.oup.com/ser/article-abstract/14/4/807/2896901?redirectedFrom=fulltext>

Peers, S. (2015, December 3). The UK and the Schengen system. *UK in a Changing Europe*.

<https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-uk-and-the-schengen-system/>

Portes, J., & Springford, J. (2023). The Impact of the Post-Brexit Migration System on the UK

Labour Market. *IZA Discussion Paper*.

<https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/15883/the-impact-of-the-post-brexit-migration-system-on-the-uk-labourmarket#:~:text=Our%20analysis%20suggests%20that%2C%20although,labour%20supply%20for%20some%20sectors.>

Rosen, A. (2014, September 18). Here's How David Cameron Blundered Into Letting Scotland Vote On Its Own Independence. *Business Insider*.

<https://www.businessinsider.com/how-cameron-blundered-scotlands-independence-vote-2014-9>

RUSI. (2007, November 19). Evaluating Schengen.

<https://www.rusi.org/publication/evaluating-schengen#:~:text=National%20security&text=However%2C%20there%20are%20possible%20disadvantages.could%20prove%20to%20be%20inflexible.>

Schuman Declaration May 1950. (n.d.). European Union. Retrieved April 2, 2026,

from https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59/schuman-declaration-may-1950_en

Thatcher, M. (1988, September 20). Speech to the College of Europe ("The Bruges Speech"). *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*.

<https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332>

Tilley, J., & Hobolt, S. B. (2023, August 10). Brexit as an Identity: Political Identities and Policy

Norms. *PS: Political Science & Politics*. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/brexit-as-an-identity-political-identities-and-policy-norms/603206F87FAEFFCC9F98A3F4B25DB01B>

UK Government. (2024, September 5). EU Entry/Exit System. <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/eu-entryexit-system#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%27s%20%28EU%29%20Entry,operation%20expected%20from%20April%202026.>

UK Parliament. (n.d.). The EEC and the Single European Act.

<https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/legislativescrutiny/parliament-and-europe/overview/britain-and-eeec-to-single-european-act/>

Usherwood, S. (2020). Euroscepticism after Brexit. *Sage Publications*, 11(2).

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2041905820933373>

Walker, N. (2021, January 6). Brexit timeline: events leading to the UK's exit from the European Union. *UK Parliament*.

<https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7960/>

Westcott, N. (2020, March 23). The big squeeze: British foreign policy after Brexit. *European Council of Foreign Relations*.

https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_big_squeeze_british_foreign_policy_after_brexit/#:~:text=Firstly%2C%20that%20the%20world%20is,at%20home%20or%20persuasive%20abroad.

Why did the United Kingdom not join the European Union when it started? (2020, September 21). UK in a changing Europe. Retrieved April 2, 2026, from

<https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-facts/why-did-the-united-kingdom-not-join-the-european-union-when-it-started/>

W.W. Norton. (n.d.). Political Attitudes and Political Ideology.

<https://nerd.wwnorton.com/ebooks/epub/casesconcepts3/EPUB/content/3.5-chapter03.xhtml#:~:text=Reactionaries%20are%20similar%20to%20conservatives,nature%20of%20the%20status%20quo.>